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November 1975

This is the first issue of "Select Papers from the Center for Far Eastern Studies," to be published annually at the University of Chicago.

Each year papers will focus on a specific theme in Japanese or Chinese studies. The papers are written and compiled by advanced graduate students, under the guidance of the Center for Far Eastern Studies and the editorial supervision of individual faculty. This year's papers were selected from research seminars under the direction of Professor Philip A. Kuhn. Professor Harry D. Harootunian also served as editorial assistant.
SELECT PAPERS FROM
THE CENTER FOR FAR EASTERN STUDIES

No. 1, 1975-76

The University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
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The papers in this issue originated in the Seminar on Chinese Local Institutions at the University of Chicago. They represent exploratory probes into some difficult problems. Each contributes something fresh to our understanding of where leadership originated, and how it operated, in China's rural society.

I use the term "leadership" advisedly. "Control," a term often used in this connection, is certainly an aspect of leadership: the maintenance of local order as perceived by the governing elites in local society. The term "leadership," however, recognizes the multiple orientations of community elites: toward the state apparatus which legitimizes local authority; toward the interest of their own social groups, whether defined in terms of a stratified lineage or a horizontally-linked social class; and toward the interests of the local community, as such interests were perceived by the elite itself but also shared by all or part of the broader community.

How successful have local leadership elites been in so balancing these orientations as to provide a reasonably stable and secure environment for rural communities? From late imperial times until comparatively recently, the answer given by many Chinese political thinkers has been: not very. The specific problem seems to have been the relative weakness of institutionalized leadership on the sub-county level, and the resulting domination of key administrative functions by groups exogenous to rural society. These papers address the question in the context of social and political transitions, from the decay of local administration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to its revolutionary restructuring in the twentieth.

Ku Yen-wu's views on local government, as studied by Mr. Kornbluth, suggest how far the crisis had advanced by late Ming times. The problems of administration to which Ku was addressing himself stemmed from the failure of the imperial state to enlist local elites in an institutionalized system of sub-county management. An index of the growing difficulty is the decline of the system
of "tax captains" during the course of the sixteenth century, a system in which the state had attempted to enlist substantial landowners in the collection of revenue. The ambivalence of the state toward such local leaders had the inevitable result that they were heaped with obligations but denied power. Economic forces and ideological constraints both tended to move local elites away from such duties, until there was not adequate sub-county infrastructure in the key area of revenue management. Nor on the level of the li (the 110 household groups charged with responsibility for local services) was there an indigenous leadership able to bear the increasing burdens imposed by an unequal and increasingly monetized tax system. The li themselves gradually became territorial units of tax assessment rather than human networks of local management.

In the absence of indigenous networks of administration, the management of public functions became increasingly commercialized. The resulting system of informal leadership by degree-holding elite should probably be seen as part of a larger system of commercialized management, ranging from low-status clerks and runners working as tax-farmers under the aegis of county government, to degree-holders performing community "services" for cash fees. Ku Yen-wu's solution, Mr. Kornbluth shows, was not an elaborate formal structure of sub-county control, but rather a fundamental change in the relationship between local administration and society.

A new kind of linkage between community and bureaucracy began to emerge during the period of disintegration of Ch'ing dynastic power. Nineteenth-century militarization brought about a ramified network of patronage between bureaucratic elites and local militia bosses. In the crisis of late Ch'ing rebellions, social distinctions became blurred as lower degree-holders and local strongmen assumed de facto control of local affairs. The efforts of the state to control and coopt such types gave rise to a system of newly formalized roles for lower elites in rural society.

The national crisis of the dynasty's final years was the setting for the growing-over of such local leadership into new patterns of constitutionalism. The "local self-government" programs of the last years of the Ch'ing (1908-1911) formalized and legitimized local elite roles
in community management and economic development. Ms. Ma's paper deals with the conflicts this process generated in a district near Shanghai.

Local elite activism, as Ms. Ma's paper suggests, existed simultaneously in several frames of reference. It represented leadership in economic development, while at the same time it was seen as simply another example of traditional elite commercialism and exploitation. Class resentments growing out of the old system made the role of the new leadership a difficult one. Class antagonisms were also, for a time, congruent with lines of cultural cleavage: lines dividing the culture of the modernizing treaty-ports from the still pre-modern countryside outside the gates. This paper illuminates the nature and limitations of indigenous local leadership in the first stages of political modernization in rural China.

Certain of these themes of conflict re-emerge in the 1930s, but now in the context of a new kind of local elite organization. Mr. Ts'ai's research examines the attempts by the Kuomintang, through its local party branches, to alter traditional patterns of bureaucratic authority. The difficulties encountered by KMT party branches -- charged with supervisory functions over local bureaucrats during the "tutelage" stage of national development -- stemmed partly from a lack of consensus on the political role of the party. On a deeper level, however, they stemmed from intractable elements of political culture and administrative behavior, a residual preference for purely bureaucratic expressions of the state-society relationship. As competitors for power, the new local elites represented by the party branches were hampered by profound ambivalences within the upper strata of the party itself.

In Mr. Blecher's study of local leadership during the land reform and the early stages of collectivization, we see the problem in a new context, which is immediately apparent in a discrepancy of scale: published local sources of the empire and early republic have abundant information on the scale of counties and big commercial towns, but little on the scale of village and multi-village organization. The situation is entirely reversed in printed accounts dated after 1949. A plausible explanation is that the classes whose political, economic, and social connections enabled them to operate on higher scales (and whose outlooks were reflected in traditional local histories)
have been overthrown. A new indigenous leadership is arising in the villages, while on higher scales of organization (township, ward, and county) agencies of the Communist Party have become the managerial elite. The populist bent of the new elite, however, does not permit local history to be written from a large-scale managerial perspective, and the result is micro-history: accounts of political and economic reorganization from the bottom up. Mr. Blecher's case study of a region near Sian explores the search for a new infrastructure of leadership below ward level, one which would both control and mobilize village society.

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INTRODUCTION

In the Jih chih lu (The Record of Knowledge Acquired Daily), Ku Yen-wu makes a distinction between the "collapse of the state" (wang kuo) and the "collapse of civilization" (wang t'ien-hsia). The collapse of the state is a dynastic change, a "change of names"; it is not a fundamental change in society. The collapse of civilization, on the other hand, is a condition of complete chaos. It is a time when "benevolence and righteousness are blocked and men devour one another like animals." Ku's life spanned the collapse of one state and the establishment of another but his writings indicate that he regarded the fall of the Ming as more than a mere dynastic change. The forces which brought down the dynasty seemed to Ku to threaten the social order itself. Civilization, it seemed, was on the verge of collapse.

The late Ming was without a doubt a period of grave social and political crises. The factional disputes that followed the death of Chang Chu-cheng in 1582 severely hurt the court's prestige. The rebellions which broke out after 1628 badly weakened imperial control over much of the country. The defiance of the Manchus undermined Ming prestige among non-Han peoples. Underlying these problems were economic and social changes stemming from the breakdown of the manorial system in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Most significant was the gradual impoverishment of the countryside which Ku frequently remarks. The spread of money, the growth of absentee landlordism, and the breakdown of the tax-collection and registration system (li-chia) all worked to the disadvantage of the peasants. The rebellions which broke out first among unemployed soldiers on the northern frontier quickly spread to the countryside and fed on the anger of the poor. A severe drought and famine exacerbated the situation in the north. The government was unable either to alleviate the people's hardships or to suppress the rebellions. Critics like Ku and Huang Tsung-hsi placed the blame for this on a decline in the quality of the official life. Officials were weak, corrupt, and stupid. Good officials were at the mercy of bad superiors. The
result was that the task of preserving the people's livelihood was abandoned and the government became concerned simply with maintaining order which it could not hope to do for long in the circumstances. The Manchu conquest was a result not of Manchu superiority but of Chinese weakness.

Ku responded to the crisis by making a detailed analysis of social conditions and by proposing reforms, some of them quite radical, in strategy, military organization, agriculture, coinage, and local administration. Huang Tsung-hsi, who was a contemporary of Ku and with whom he corresponded, likewise wrote a critique of society society and government; but whereas Huang concentrated on the problems of central administration, Ku was much more concerned with problems of local control. He spent most of his life after 1645 travelling around north China observing conditions and studying. Among the fruits of his observations and reflections was an essay in nine parts on the reform of local government, the Chun-hsien lun (On the Prefectural System). My aim in this paper is to elucidate the underlying political concerns of Ku through his analysis of local government.

The primary sources I have used are the Chun-hsien lun (hereafter CHL) in Ku Yen-wu wen (The Prose Writings of Ku Yen-wu) selected and annotated by T'ang Ching-kao, Shanghai, 1933; selected essays from the Jih-chih lu (hereafter JCL), Wan-yu wen-k'u edition, Shanghai, 1934; and excerpts from the writings of Ku included in the Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien (A Collection of Essays on Statecraft, hereafter CSWP) edited by Wei Yuan and Ho Ch'ang-ling, Shih-chieh shu-chu edition, Taipei, 1964.

PART I - THE PROBLEM

In his analysis of the problems of local government Ku concentrates almost exclusively on the formal power structure, the bureaucracy, in particular on the role of the county magistrate (chih-hsien). The significance of Ku's failure to discuss the informal gentry power structure will be discussed below, but it is important here to keep in mind the distinction. Ku's emphasis on formal administration implies, I believe, a critical attitude toward gentry power that may have influenced the attitude of the later statecraft (ching-shih) school toward gentry participation in local affairs.
The problems of the county magistrate which Ku discusses can be looked upon as problems in his relationships with three groups: his superiors, his subordinates, and the people who lived in his county. This last must not be confused with the relationship between the magistrate and the gentry. The term "people" (min) used here is undifferentiated. It refers to all of the people and the relationship indicated is that of the official to the non-officials. In its most general formulation it involves the responsibility of the magistrate to secure the people's well-being and the responsibility of the people to obey the law and pay their taxes. It is from the conflict between the magistrate and these three groups that the characteristic themes of Ku's writing on local government emerge. There are five such themes: 1) the growing powerlessness of the county magistrate, 2) the growth and power of the clerkly class, 3) the growing complexity of regulations, 4) the role of imperial centralization in weakening local administration, 5) the decline of the sub-county infra-structure. The second, third, and fourth themes are, as I will show, aspects of the first. The fifth theme I include with reservations because it is not clearly connected with the other four. It is included, however, because it is a persistent theme in Ku's writings and because it is related to the problem of Ku's attitude toward the relationship between the formal and the informal power structures. Implied in Ku's proposals for the reform of local administration is a certain conception of the magistrate's non-bureaucratic role. The breakdown of the old structure of control at the village level required a significant modification of that role.

The subject of this paper is Ku's analysis of the problems of local administration and his proposed solutions but my aim is to get beyond Ku's specific concerns to his underlying political beliefs. Ku's ideas do come out in his discussion of specific problems. His treatment of the related problems of the independence of the clerks, over-regulation, and imperial centralization reveal certain assumptions about government which influenced his analysis of these problems and his proposed reforms. I argue that these assumptions distorted Ku's perception and caused him to overlook important factors making for change in local administration. But the purpose of this paper is not chiefly to criticize Ku's ideas but to
elucidate them. They were, I suspect, characteristic of an important branch of Chinese political thought in the seventeenth century.

The Problem of Powerlessness. In one of his numerous essays on the problems of local administration Ku refers to local officials (shou ling) as "the most powerless in the empire". Elsewhere he says that they approach the task of administration with "fear and trembling". They regard being replaced as a boon. Quoting a Yuan dynasty author, Ku says that of the four powers of the government, finance, personnel, security, and administration, none is in the hands of local officials. In contrast, the responsibilities of the magistrate include nearly all public activities. Ku lists nine duties of the magistrate: to open land to cultivation, to manage land already cultivated and land left in its wild state (t'ien yeh chih), to encourage the cultivation of trees, to maintain irrigation systems, to keep walls and fortifications in repair, to make certain the granaries are well stocked, to encourage schools, to guard against bandits, and to keep the district weapons in good repair. But his list is incomplete; it does not include the duties of the magistrate looked upon as most significant by the central government: the collection of taxes and the suppression of rebellions, including the suppression of all potentially rebellious elements. Clearly, there is a gap between the formal powers of the magistrate and his duties.

In addition, magistrates are discouraged from attempting to overcome their weakness. Again quoting the Yuan author, Ku says that, nowadays, magistrates go to their posts unprepared, they spend too little time in them to learn the duties, they are burdened with trivial matters such as welcoming and departure ceremonies for visiting dignitaries and congratulation ceremonies for prefectural and provincial officials; and they are encouraged to flatter their superiors rather than concentrate on real problems. Under these conditions the capacity of the magistrate to "assist the people's well-being" is negligible. Poverty and banditry occur. If they become widespread then rebellions occur. Since civil war invites foreign aggression, the nation is in danger of being invaded. If the invaders are strong, the dynasty falls and a period of disunity can ensue which may
last generations. The powerlessness of the magistrate, therefore, threatens the existence of the dynasty through its effects on the lives of the people.

Another way in which the powerlessness of the magistrate is manifest is in the growing power and independence of the clerks. Ungraded and unsalaried, the clerks are theoretically subordinate to the magistrate and the assistant magistrate. In fact, they form an independent sub-bureaucracy which subverts the magistrate's authority and resists attempts to reform it. Ku likens them to an aristocracy. Quoting the Sung statesman Yeh Shih (1150-1223), Ku says that nowadays the officials of the empire do not have fiefs, only the clerks have fiefs. Fathers transmit their posts to their sons, and younger brothers receive posts from elder brothers. They manipulate the law to their own advantage and they recognize no superior authority. Their power and independence stand in marked contrast to the weakness of the magistrate.

The basis of the clerks' power is twofold according to Ku. First, they are much more familiar with local conditions than is the magistrate. Second, they have a more detailed knowledge of the law (fa), including the bureaucratic procedure, than does the magistrate. The clerks are natives of the areas in which they serve. Also, they serve in the same office throughout their official careers. The magistrate, on the other hand, is always an outsider and seldom serves longer than three years in the same county. He depends on the clerks for information in making decisions. He also depends on them to carry out his decisions. Under these circumstances the opportunities for the clerks to influence government on their own behalf, or on behalf of their clients, are numerous.

The other basis of clerkly power is specialized knowledge of the laws. Ku frequently refers to the clerks' manipulating the laws to their own advantage. Ku is aware of the distinction between laws and administrative regulations, but he does not distinguish between them in talking of the clerks' power. In terms of the influence of the clerks on local administration, both are rules to be manipulated. There is a vivid example of this in an essay by the Sung scholar Yang Wan-li (fl.1160-1200) which Ku quotes:

Nowadays, when an official (shih-ta-fu) goes to
the Bureau of Civil Appointments and asks if what he desires is in accord with the laws, he is told "Yes, definitely." Later he is told by a clerk with some kind of written authority, "No, definitely not." Still later another clerk tells him "Yes, definitely" again. And so it goes. Now although there are fixed rules governing whether something is permissible or not, yet there are no fixed interpretations. Why is this? Because of the clerks.\textsuperscript{13}

The clerks are the custodians of the laws as well as their executors. They are acquainted with them in a way that the magistrate cannot be. The magistrate is in the frustrating position of having to accept the advice of the clerks although he often has reason to suspect that they are not impartial. He is, as Ku says, compelled to submit to the decision of the clerks in the name of respecting the laws.\textsuperscript{14}

It is clear that Ku regards the areas of law and administration as primarily the domain of the clerks; but the power of the clerks is manipulative rather than creative. They do not make the laws they enforce. Legislative power is entirely in the hands of the emperor and his counselors. In their eagerness to gather all power in the emperor's hands, they create a network of laws to regulate every facet of official life. The restraining effect of the laws is the third aspect of the powerlessness of the magistrate.

In an essay entitled "Laws and Regulations" (fa chih), Ku quotes Yeh Shih to the effect that nowadays the laws have become so "fine" that even when a man has a stroke of genius about what to do in a particular situation, he discovers that the laws have anticipated the very contingency that inspired him. The result is that "the man's spirit does not find expression. He remains sunk in confusion, blindly obeying the laws."\textsuperscript{15} Ku does not deny that laws are necessary, but he is extremely conscious of their inhibiting effect. He compares them to a rope or a net.\textsuperscript{16} They are devices for binding officials so that they cannot act contrary to their superiors' will.\textsuperscript{17} The district magistrate as the lowest ranking official in the bureaucratic hierarchy is the final object of regulation. He is the most restricted, and hence the least powerful official in the empire. Over-regulation is the real source of the magistrate's powerlessness.\textsuperscript{18}
The Problem of Clerks: The Opposition of Clerks to Officials. The theme of clerical independence that runs through Ku's writing on local administration is not his alone. As the cited passages indicate, Ku often uses quotations to express his ideas. Most of the writers he quotes were scholars of previous dynasties. Most were not writers on local administration. Ku finds them relevant because the problem of controlling the clerks was a systemic problem in Chinese bureaucracy. Not only magistrates but also responsible officials throughout the bureaucratic hierarchy confront this problem. Ku's treatment of it reveals a conception of the relationship between officials and clerks that foreshadows his general conception of government. In Ku's formulation, officials (kuan) are distinguished from clerks (li) on the basis of their ethical natures, a distinction which we will find repeated in Ku's analysis of the problem of imperial centralization. The opposition of officials to clerks is the first of the general theoretical propositions that emerge from Ku's writings on local government.

Although Ku's discussion is theoretical and not confined to a single bureaucratic level, one should keep in mind that the actual referents are, for our purposes, the county magistrate and his clerks. We will return to the actual conditions of local administration in Ku's time at the end of this section.19

In an essay on the methods for selecting officials which Ku quotes, The Sung scholar Yang Wan-li (fl.1160-1200) says the reason the quality of officials has declined is that the responsibility for selecting them has fallen to the clerks rather than remaining in the hands of officials. It is, he says, a case of "trusting in clerks and not trusting in officials."20 In another essay Ku talks of imperial power having been taken from the emperor's ministers (jen ch'en) and entrusted to the clerks (hsu-li).21 Again, in an essay entitled "Clerks and Runners" (li-hsu), Ku quotes a contemporary, Hsieh Chao-chih (chin-shih of 1593), to the effect that all problems of government are due to officials shunning affairs of state and entrusting them to clerks.22 The sharp distinction between proper official power on the one hand, and improper clerkly power on the other, is a recurrent theme in Ku's writings. It bespeaks a conception
of their difference that goes beyond the institutional opposition of subordinates to superiors observed in contemporary bureaucracies. Ku's distinction implies, I believe, an ethical differentiation: officials are moral agents whereas clerks are without moral scruples.

The hypothesis of ethical distinction between clerks and officials is lent credence by Ku's complete pessimism concerning the role of clerks in the government. It is not an exaggeration to say that Ku regards any concession of authority to clerks as dangerous. He accepts their indispensability but he insists that only officials (kuan) can act in the public interest. In his essay on clerks and runners Ku says that clerks are incapable of appreciating the noble purposes for which the laws were established. They regard the laws as just "old ordinances" (chiu tu) and value them only for what they can get from them. He says that clerks in the offices of superior officials are not above using the laws to "tie up" subordinate officials if they think it is to their advantage. Elsewhere he talks of the clerks taking advantage of an official's unfamiliarity with the rules to "deceive him and carry out their schemes." The slightest lapse of discipline on the part of the officials, it seems, will be exploited by the clerks.

One peculiarity of Ku's writing deserves notice. Ku nowhere talks of the devices the clerks use to exploit local society. Crimes such as tax-engrossment, extortion, and influence-peddling are widespread. They are a major source of the clerks' income. Moreover, corruption must have occurred in provincial and central government offices as well as in the district. Why does Ku confine his criticism to the efforts of clerks to deceive and manipulate their superiors? The reason may be that Ku wishes to expose the cause of clerical corruption; and crimes such as extortion and tax-engrossment are, properly speaking, its effects. Corruption supplies the clerks with resources to increase their power, it is true, but the opportunities for corruption are always present in the environment of the bureaucracy. What makes it possible for the clerks to exploit the opportunities is insufficient control by the officials. Ku's examples of misconduct are all examples of clerks undermining the government of officials. Establishing official control over them, and over local society as a whole, is an important aim of Ku's reforms.
In contrast to the clerks, the officials are treated generously by Ku. "Trusting in officials" (hsin kuan) is looked upon as the way to good government. The difference between trusting in officials and trusting in clerks lies in the concern for public well-being which can be expected of the former. Officials are expected to internalize the public interest in a way that the clerks and ordinary people cannot. Clearly the quality of being an official inheres in the man rather than in the office. It is a moral quality. This is the basis of Ku's criticism of the examinations as a mode of official selection. The examinations, he says, have achieved the goal of impartiality but they are not producing good officials. In fact, Ku complains, the worst men regularly succeed while the best men regularly fail. But this is not because the system is being undermined by corruption; it is a consequence of the system itself. What is needed is not a refinement of methods but a reorganization that will make the system consistent with the principles on which it was established. Ku's criticism is worthy of attention because it demonstrates the essentially ethical character of the official. His complaint is not with the legality of the selection but with the character of the selected. They are "corrupt, weak, old, vacillating, and stupid." Those who fail are "good, capable, and honest." The determination of these qualities is necessarily subjective. It can be assumed that Ku would have regarded any man as qualified to be an official who displayed the qualities of goodness and honesty, regardless of his formal standing.

The twofold problem of selecting good men to be officials and controlling clerks was, as we have seen, a systemic problem in Chinese bureaucracy but it was not without degrees of severity. Ku regards the late Ming as a degenerate age, but he looks back to periods of history when the problem was not acute. The question therefore arises, why should the clerks have become so powerful in the late Ming that they threatened to destroy completely the balance between public and private interests in county government? It is not possible to answer this question completely without leaping ahead in our discussion, but a partial answer is possible.

The growth in power of the district clerks and underlings was a result of the decline in power of the magistrates due to external factors. By external factors,
I mean changes in the power structure above the county level. The distinction is emphasized because there were important changes taking place below the county level, or within society, which Ku, strangely, does not include in his analysis. I am speaking of the breakdown of large landed estates and the consequent transfer of many public functions previously performed by the landed gentry to the bureaucracy. Both changes were well-advanced by the mid-seventeenth century and they are reflected in Ku's writings, but in terms of their possible effect on the relationship between the magistrate and the clerks Ku is silent. Could changes in the power structure at the village level have affected power relations within the county office? Certainly, by increasing the resources available to the clerks and by increasing the opportunities for corruption, such changes could have assisted the clerks to improve their position with no loss in the formal power of the magistrate. At least one contemporary scholar says that this was the case. Confirmation awaits fuller study, but Ku's explanation is prima facie incomplete. This lack of consideration for the possible effect of local, internal factors on the relative power of the clerks and the magistrate is puzzling in view of Ku's intimate knowledge of local society; but it seems consistent with his disdain for informal (non-bureaucratic) power generally. We will discuss this again when we examine the significance of Ku's proposal for the reorganization of local administration.

The Problem of Regulation: The Opposition of Law to Principles. Another underlying concept which emerges from Ku's writings and which parallels the distinction between clerks and officials is the distinction between "laws" and the "Law". The term laws (fa or hsiao-fa) means methods, ways of doing things; it has no moral content. Law (fa or ta-t'i), on the other hand, refers to the ethical principles which ideally guide men. It is analogous to natural law in the West. The distinction between laws and the Law parallels the distinction between clerks and officials. We have already seen that Ku makes a close identification of clerical power with rules and regulations. He assumes, I believe, a similar correspondence between being an official and acting in accordance with the Law. As in
the case of clerks, laws imply an absence of moral sentiment. There are no good laws. In his essay on the evaluation and selection of officials, Ku says that the origin of the present crisis in official recruitment lies in the concentration on laws and the neglect of the Law on the part of the authorities. In such a situation the clerks are superior to the officials. In another essay, entitled "talented men" (jen-ts'ai), Ku refers to laws as "an instrument for destroying talent." In the same essay Ku contrasts laws with moral exhortation (chiao-hua) as instruments of social control saying that before the Wan-li period (1573-1620) laws and regulations (fa chih) were employed together with moral exhortation but that after Wan-li moral exhortation was abandoned with the result that "crises multiplied and talent diminished." In still another essay Ku says that establishing laws to assist the Board of Civil Appointments in selecting officials is equivalent to telling the officials of the Board, "I absolutely do not trust you and you can have absolutely no confidence in your own judgement." Sentiments such as these are very common in Ku's writings; he is consistently critical of laws and suspicious of those who enforce them. But Ku's criticism of laws is of law as method. He has great respect for law as the embodiment of principle.

Ku's sense of the Law as the embodiment of ethical principles, in contrast to his understanding of its vulgar aspect, is difficult to document. His reference to the "great purpose" (ta-i) of the Law has been mentioned. The most convincing evidence for a sympathetic interpretation of law is in a passage from the Jih chih lu in which Ku distinguishes between the Law and precedents or rules (li). The Law, Ku says, was established "for the sake of civilization" but rules were established "because of men and they harm the public spirit (kung) of the empire." He continues:

Formerly the danger lay in using rules to injure the Law. Now it lies in establishing laws because of rules; in simply following rules and discarding the Law. Rules here very clearly refer to what we have hitherto called laws. They are "small methods" (hsiao-fa); purely formal law without moral content. The Law, on the other hand, is here used to mean a constitutive
element not only of the state but of civilization. In contrast to rules, the Law supports the public interest. It is explicitly not for the interests of individual men but for the community.

Concerning the relationship between laws and the Law, Ku reveals an interesting aspect of his political thinking in setting them in strict opposition to one another. The passage just cited is a good example. Previously, rules were a threat to the Law, now they have supplanted the Law entirely. By previously Ku may mean before the period of political and military conflicts that brought down the Ming, or, simply in ordinary times. If so, then the relationship between laws and the Law is one of conflict even in ordinary times. This view is consistent with Ku's understanding of the relationship between clerks and officials. In both cases there is a permanent antagonistic relationship, a tension between opposites, the destructive force of which is held in check by the dominance of the officials and the Law over the clerks and the rules. Maintaining the power of the former is the prime bureaucratic imperative. If this interpretation is correct then it lends credence to the view that Ku's demand for local autonomy was actually intended to strengthen government control; and that his proposals, if enacted, would have involved a greater degree of government participation in local life.

The question of why laws replaced the Law in the late Ming can be answered completely only in the context of imperial centralization; but, as in the case of the official-clerk dichotomy, Ku attributes the change to factors beyond the capacity of local magistrates to alter. What effect, if any, changes in the informal power structure had on the relationship between formal and substantive law I do not know, but Ku evidently does not regard them as significant. His overriding concern is, rather, for the damaging effect of over-regulation. In his view it was the vast proliferation of petty laws and official positions in the Wan-li period that had upset the balance of legal control. He complains of official posts being piled on official posts and of laws being piled on laws while the situations they are meant to correct get progressively worse. The result of all this legislation is, paradoxically, the inability of those charged with enforcing the law to take the initiative in solving problems. In-
stead of responding creatively to the problems confronting them, officials "tremble and dare not do it."42 They expend all their efforts "merely following the laws and staying out of trouble."43 The result is that the officials "become daily weaker while the clerks and runners become daily more powerful."44 This was the condition into which local administration had fallen by Ku's time. We will now explore the cause of this decline, the fourth major theme in Ku's work: the effects of imperial centralization.

The Problem of Centralization: The Opposition of Government by Men to Government by Laws. In the Chun-hsien lun (On the Prefectural System), Ku contrasts feudalism with the prefectural system saying that power is concentrated at the bottom, while in the latter the flaw is that power is concentrated at the top.45 With the exception of certain periods the prefectural system had been the characteristic system of local government since the beginning of the imperial era. The tendency to over-centralization was, therefore, the major problem in imperial administration and an important concern of political reformers from Sung times to the present. Ku regards it as the chief cause for the decline of local administration. In the Chun-hsien lun he says:

The ancient sages acting in accord with the spirit of public well-being (kung-hsin) rewarded men with land and allowed them to establish separate kingdoms. Nowadays, although the monarch controls all the territory within the four seas as his own prefectures and counties, still he is not satisfied. He suspects everyone. He uses every means to control them. He thinks that in this way the local officials will not be able to harm the people. He does not realize that officials in fear and trembling just try to stay out of trouble and regard being replaced as a boon. He does not realize that there is none willing to work for the people's benefit for even a day.46

Moreover, Ku regards the associated problems of over-regulation and the independence of the clerks as results of imperial centralization. In "Local officials" (shou-ling) Ku says that because the myriad affairs of the government were more than the emperor could handle.
alone, "power was shifted to laws, and laws and prohibitions became numerous." The good and the wicked alike were restrained, and the exercise of power was "taken from the ministers and entrusted to the clerks." \( ^{47} \)

This is, in brief, Ku's explanation for the wretched condition of local administration in his day, but it is not entirely convincing. Why should the emperor have sought to relieve the pressure of work by creating laws instead of, say, by creating new departments of government? Why should the proliferation of laws have so inhibited officials and so encouraged clerks? After all, there were laws governing clerks just as there were laws governing officials. In short, what justification had Ku for asserting this casual sequence? This question was touched upon in the preceding section but it has not been fully answered.

In a long and very interesting essay on the problems of official selection, Ku quotes the Sung scholar Yang Wan-li (fl.1160-1200) to the effect that the principle of good government is to "trust in officials", and that establishing laws is not trusting in officials. For the emperor to govern through law shows a lack of confidence in officials and, by extension, a lack of confidence in his own capacity to govern. \( ^{48} \) The distinction made here between trusting in officials (hsin kuan) and trusting in laws (hsin fa) is the most important of the three distinctions discussed in this paper. It explains, by reduction to their sources in Ku's thought, the clerk-official and the Law-laws dichotomies.

There are two ways of governing, according to Ku; one by men, and the other by laws. \( ^{49} \) These two methods are not mutually exclusive; there are laws in a state governed by men and there are officials in a state governed by laws. The difference is in the moral quality of the two. Government by men, by which Ku means government by men who have studied the Classics and live by their teachings, that is, true officials, is government in accordance with the principles of Heaven. Government by laws, on the other hand, is merely government in accordance with the will of the ruler; its only moral content is that imparted to it by the conscience of the king. A good king employs the virtuous. A bad king, or a weak one, depends on laws. \( ^{50} \)

The question of why the centralization of power encourages government by laws is answered by reference to
the concept of the official. Officials are moral men. They cannot be induced to behave immorally, that is, in a way inconsistent with the principles of Heaven as they understand them. This makes each official an individual moral universe, since each has come to knowledge of the good through personal study of the Classics. Clearly, such men are not reliable servants of a monarch who suspects that his actions may not be noble. They can be expected to condemn what they think is wrong. A good ruler shows his goodness and his confidence that he is acting in a principled way by delegating his power to officials. A bad ruler, or one who lacks confidence in the justness of his decisions, cannot afford to share power with the officials. He must use laws to do without scruple what he fears the officials would not do. He must also use laws to control the officials because he knows that unless they are controlled they will oppose him. In this way, laws become "an instrument for destroying talent", a rope for "tying up" the righteous. Good men depart. Those who are not in office decline to seek preferment. Those who remain in office live in fear of offending their superiors. Only the unrighteous flourish.

We must be careful to distinguish here between the Law which is the embodiment of ethical principles and laws which are merely methods without moral content. What becomes of the Law in a state governed by laws? Huang Tsung-hsi, Ku's contemporary and fellow social critic, provides an answer. But in order to understand it we must first consider a question Huang does not ask but which is logically prior to the one just posed. The question is why is there Law in a government by men? To put it another way, if every official follows his conscience and if officials' consciences are in conformity with ethical principles, what need is there for Law? Both Ku and Huang assert that Law is indispensable to government. Huang even goes so far as to say that only if there are good laws will there be good men in the government. But neither Ku nor Huang explains why this is so. A possible answer is that government by moral men is not government for moral men exclusively. While scholars may be able to receive Heaven's guidance directly, ordinary men cannot. Ordinary men require Law. Some require a measure of coercion. Hence, Law is made to demonstrate, and to compel, morality. But the Law
requires mechanisms for dissemination and enforcement. These have rules of their own, what Ku calls small methods or precedents, and a class of men, the clerks, to administer them. The rules are like the Law because they enjoin conformity with it but they are not the same as the Law because they lack the moral significance of it. They are, as it were, the Law's traces. In a well-ordered state, adherence to the rules leads to conformity with the Law; but one can obey the rules and still be in defiance of the Law, as was the case in the late Ming. In answer to the question what becomes of the Law in a government of laws, then, Huang's reply is that true Law, like true officials, is abandoned and that that which is called Law is not Law at all but "pseudo-Law" (fei-fa chih fa).\(^54\) It has no moral force and no power to compel a man of conscience.\(^55\)

In the case of Ku and Huang Tsung-hsi the historical referent for the concept of government by laws was the Ming dynasty. Ku seldom refers to specific events. He prefers the topical form in writing essays, but he selects only topics which have contemporary significance. Thus, the whole corpus of Ku's political writings can be looked upon as a critique of late Ming government. In the area of local government he is, as we have seen, extremely disturbed by the separation of the magistrate from the people. The full significance of the calamity of government by laws does not become apparent until the people are alienated from their governors. Then, there is no resolution short of a dynastic change, which Ku fears because of the danger of disorder which this involves.\(^56\)

To paraphrase Ku, the first emperor of the Ming understood the importance of keeping the people's loyalty, of "being close to the people" (ch'in-min). He established a comprehensive system of village administration, including a system to feed back popular opinion to the throne, but it failed to function as intended. Partly through his own suspicion and partly through the weakness and suspicion of succeeding emperors, the system was allowed to deteriorate and the process of concentrating power in the hands of the ruler began. Centralization meant more laws and fewer good men in government. The empire began to experience the consequences in the Wan-li period (1572-1620). It was in the Wan-li period, remember, that moral exhortation finally gave way to law. Ku
does not refer to Chang Chu-cheng and the factional disputes that followed his death but they are certainly in his mind. Chang's name was a synonym for despotic control. The triumph of the court party, and later of the eunuchs, over the Tung-lin party was looked upon by later scholars as the triumph of evil over righteousness.57 The frequent use of extraordinary posts such as Grand Coordinator (hsun-fu) and Supreme Commander (tsung-tu) was a sign that the court was no longer in effective control of the provinces.58 Finally, chaos spread to the northern frontier of the empire where a corrupt general allowed the Manchus to enter and begin the conquest, which Ku discreetly calls "the events of Liao-tung."59 The Manchu conquest resolved the conflict between government by men and government by laws in the Ming by simply destroying the old order; by, as Ku says, "sweeping away all the petty rules."60

Ku lived long enough (he died in 1682) to see the re-establishment of strong central government. There was no period of disunity or semi-conquest comparable to the periods that followed the collapse of earlier dynasties. The Manchu government continued the trend toward absolutism which Ku regarded as the downfall of the Ming. Peace and prosperity returned despite this. The opposition of government by men to government by laws must have become less clear-cut in the Ch'ing than it had been for Ku. It would be interesting to see how Ch'ing scholars handled the opposition.

The Decline of Sub-District Administration.
In a very informative essay on the offices of the hsiang and the t'ing (administrative subdivisions of a county), Ku says that Ming T'ai-tsu established a system of sub-district administration to "assist the people and the magistrate."61 This system included agencies for collecting and transporting taxes, agencies for settling disputes among the people, and agencies for hearing complaints against the government. The most important of these was the Three Elders (san-lao) system. According to this system, which was borrowed from antiquity, every prefecture (fu) and county (hsien) were to select elderly men of virtue, whom the people trusted, to hear disputes in the villages and to convey the people's opinions to the magistrates and the prefects.62 In order to avoid
the elders' becoming mere servants of the officials, they were to have the right to memorialize the throne directly on matters pertaining to the conduct of officials in their area. It is not clear that the Three Elders system actually functioned as intended, but Ku certainly regards it as a wise policy. He specifically points out that the elders of antiquity were known as officials (kuan) rather than as clerks (li), a distinction which is crucial for Ku, as we have seen. Unfortunately the Three Elders system and the other agencies of village government did not survive long uncorrupted. In 1425, just thirty years after the establishment of the Three Elders system, the censor Ho Wen-yuan memorialized that the elders selected in those days were not men of virtue but "slaves and servants" (li p'u) who took the post of elder in order to avoid the corvee. The officials did not bother to investigate their character, they hastily appointed them to office. Far from serving as a link between the people and the officials, they oppressed the people and deceived the officials. Censor Ho recommended that the court take action to reform the system. No action was taken, however, and the Three Elders system apparently fell into desuetude.

The other agencies of sub-county administration were also in decline early on. Ku quotes a memorial of 1431 which says that grain-tax collectors (liang-chang) are abusing their authority and refers to numerous fruitless prohibitions of corrupt practices. Likewise the sub-county magistrate (hsun-chien) is said to have been in decline since the early Hung-chih period (1488-1506), its functions taken over by irregular officials who could not perform them as well. The tax-collection and registration system (li-chia) which took over the function of tax-collection after the abolition of the post of grain-tax collector was apparently in confusion by Ku's time. In an essay entitled Li-chia Ku quotes another author's plan for the re-organization of the countryside into pao and chia, the units of a system of mutual surveillance distinct from the li-chia. The so-called Single Whip reform was intended to eliminate the abuses brought about at least in part by the decline of the li-chia system.

The significance of Ku's treatment of the decline of sub-county administration for his proposed reforms is problematic. He makes no mention of the tax-collection and registration system, or the Three Elders system in
the Chun-hsien lun and, in fact, his reforms would have rendered them useless by centralizing the very functions they were intended to perform.

Ku is also silent on the reasons for the decline in sub-county administration. If we assume that the same forces which destroyed county government also injured sub-county government, how can we account for the fact that the former was in decline in the early fifteenth century well before the period which Ku regards as the transition from government by men to government by laws? It is difficult to believe that Ku would not have regarded imperial centralization and its attendant evils as having affected sub-county government in some way. For example, was the decline in the quality of village officers associated with the growth in power of the clerks, or were they independent phenomena? How did the decline in the Three Elders system affect the magistrate's relations with the people? Does the theory of government outlined above account for the decline in village administration? Further study of Ku's work is necessary to answer these questions. The point here is that, despite considerable attention to the sub-county infrastructure of the Ming and earlier dynasties, Ku is silent on the significance of informal (non-bureaucratic) or gentry power for local administration. The role of the gentry is simply ignored. So is the possible significance of class conflict and changes in the local tenure system. The emphasis is entirely on the formal, bureaucratic aspects of local land government. Even the various agencies of sub-county administration are treated independently of their social environment. It is as if there were no question of the relationship between governmental and non-governmental power; they are treated as a single entity. Why Ku did not recognize as significant a relationship which writers both before and after him have stressed is puzzling, particularly in view of the fact that Ku himself was a gentry member and intimately acquainted with local conditions.

In the powerlessness of local officials Ku observed the corrupting influence of the doctrine of government by laws which denied the value of moral exhortation, reduced officials to ciphers, drove out the virtuous, and encouraged the wicked. At the heart of the problem was the demand of the emperor to be an absolute master. Absolute control could only be achieved by denying the
autonomy of officials and this led to the proliferation of laws, since laws, unlike men, could do only what the emperor willed. But the emperor's will was not actually carried out. Just as the initial incorrect desire to control everything proceeded from weakness on the emperor's part so the proliferation of laws weakened rather than strengthened imperial control. By denying the autonomy of officials the emperor was in effect giving a free hand to the clerks to exploit the law on their own behalf. The clerks were the agents of the imperial will but, unlike laws, they were capable of acting on their own. Without the moral education of the officials and free from official scrutiny the clerks were in a position to subvert the decisions of the throne. The proliferation of laws only increased the scope and variety of their abuses. This led to the paradox of an emperor who claimed absolute power being unable to prevent the abuse and exploitation of his people. The result was the erosion of popular support and, ultimately, dynastic collapse. Inherent in this analysis of the causes for the fall of the Ming is the dichotomy between government by laws and government by men. The former implies a complete lack of moral judgment and a slavish adherence to bureaucratic forms. The latter implies conformity with natural law and a willingness to reform administration. In a government of men the principles of Heaven form the body of the Law and government is administered by officials qualified by their study of the Classics to interpret Heaven's Law. Laws, regulations, and clerks remain but are controlled. The security of the throne is guaranteed by the security of the people. It was this condition which Ku sought to restore in proposing to reform local administration.

PART II - THE SOLUTION

In the Chun-hsien lun Ku says that the way to restore confidence in local government is to "infuse the prefectural system with the fuedal (feng-chien) spirit." Ku does not mean by this that fuedalism should be restored. He does not believe that fuedal restoration is possible or desirable. The prefectural system and the centralization bureaucratic monarchy of which it is a part should not be discarded but reformed. This is con-
sistent with the principle of "being appropriate" (ts'ung-i), which Ku regards as the axiom of politics. He is not a radical, despite the sweeping nature of his reform. He is motivated rather by the desire to restore balance to relations between the central government and the counties. The extreme autonomy which Ku demands for county government is a necessary corrective to the extreme centralization which characterized late Ming government. The goal of his reforms is to strengthen the empire by reconstituting its elements.

Ku's reforms

The Status of the magistrate. The most significant feature of Ku's plan for the reform of local administration is his proposal to increase the status and power of the county magistrates. To begin with, Ku proposes abolishing the title "magistrate" (chih-hsien) and replacing it with "county commander" (hsien-ling), a title which was in use before the Sung and which Ku feels denoted an official of more independence. He also proposes raising the rank of the magistrate from grade seven to grade five. Ku would provide triennial increases in rank as a reward for good service. If at the end of twelve years a magistrate was still in good standing, he would be rewarded with life tenure and the right to select his successor. It is often remarked that Ku favored hereditary magistracy, but this is not entirely correct. What he says is that magistrates who have achieved life-tenure should be allowed to "select their sons and younger brothers to succeed them. If they do not select their sons or younger brothers but select another, then heed them." Heredity itself is not a justification for the magistracy. According to Ku magistrates should also have the right to select their subordinates. With the exception of the vice-magistrate, who would be appointed by the Board of Civil Appointments, the magistrate would have complete control over office personnel, including the clerks.

The responsibility for collecting district revenues would be entirely in the hands of the magistrate. He would also have the right to reserve whatever portion of the revenue he thought necessary for county expenses. Only if there was a surplus would the central government receive tax payments, and then only with the magistrate's
As for the command of local forces, Ku does not say specifically that the magistrate would be commander-in-chief of the county forces, but he favors a strategy of local defense that would make sense only if the local civil officials could function as military officers when the need arose. In contrast to the powers of the magistrate, the restrictions on him seem minor. He would still be appointed by the central government (although with certain limitations on its power as we will see), and his conduct would be subject to review every three years until he had proven himself worthy of receiving tenure. Also, Ku warns, corruption and official misconduct will be severely punished. But, by and large, the magistrate's freedom outweighed the limitations.

The proposed increase in the power and status of the magistrate is a direct response to the powerlessness of the magistrate described in the first part of this paper. The four powers which Ku complains are in the hands of central government officials would be entirely in the hands of the magistrate in the reformed administration. He would have the power to prevent abuses on the part of the clerks; and he would be free from control by superior officials; he would be able to fulfill his responsibilities to the people, which previously he had failed to do through lack of authority. He would be, in effect, the ruler of the county. What would prevent him from abusing his authority?

Ku's answer to this question is surprising. He does not say, as one would expect of a thinker as concerned as he was with balancing opposing forces in government, that the central government or even the people should have power to remove the magistrate or punish him. Instead, he assumes that the problem will not arise. His reason for assuming this depends on his view of human nature. According to Ku, men do not abuse those with whom they are intimately related. The outstanding example is the family, which is the most cohesive social unit, despite the fact that no outside agencies compel the members to stay together or to respect one another. What Ku is seeking to do, and what he believes he has achieved in his plan for the reform of local government, is to make a county a family in which the members are
bound to one another by ties of affection, and in which each regards his neighbor's interest as his own. "Then, the people of the county will be like the magistrate's children, the territory of the county will be like his own land, and the granaries of the county will be like his own storehouses." In this way Ku hopes to avoid despotism and preserve the unity of the people with the officials at the county level. We will return to this subject when we discuss the significance of Ku's reforms for the magistrate's relations with the people and the place of Ku's thought in Ch'ing intellectual history.

The Localization of Finance. In an essay on Ming local government, Lien-sheng Yang quotes Ku to the effect that, since the Sung, local governments have been increasingly impoverished because of the demands made upon their resources by the central state. According to Ku, the state takes every penny from the prefectures and districts. The local officials and the government are "both pressed to exhaustion." This was not an exaggeration, as Yang's research attests. County governments in the late Ming were increasingly impoverished, partly by the increased demands of the central government, and partly by increased corruption and inefficiency at the local level. Ku's solution was straightforward and to the point: "The revenue of a district should remain in the district." The core of Ku's reforms of local finance is the abolition of the tax quota system. Under this system, counties were assigned quotas by the central government. The quotas were assigned without regard to the actual yield and reflected the government's estimation of its expenditures. This method of taxation placed the districts in the position of having to provide a fixed revenue from an uncertain income rather than forcing the government to calculate its expenses in terms of its income. Incentive was provided by making the successful collection of the quota an element in official evaluations. Failure to collect one's quota was punished according to a scale of non-compliance. Ku's reform would have eliminated this system and compelled the central government to budget expenses only after its income was known. Moreover, Ku's system would have allowed the localities to hold back whatever portion of their revenue they wanted. Under the old system, counties were allowed to reserve revenues, but the amounts were decided by the central
government. Under Ku's system the counties would decide how much was to be sent to the central government, a reversal of the old relationship.\(^{80}\)

The Localization of Appointment. One of the reasons the clerks were powerful was that they were much more familiar with local conditions than was the magistrate. They were natives of the county and permanent employees of the district office. The magistrate, by contrast, was a stranger who usually served less than four years in one post. This situation encouraged a dangerous dependence on the clerks. Ku would have eliminated this dependence by eliminating the rule of avoidance.\(^{81}\)

The rule of avoidance (hui-pi) which Ku opposed specified that a magistrate could not serve in his native province. The stated purpose of this rule was to assist officials in avoiding conflicts of interest, but it was also intended to prevent local officials from forming alliances with local gentry. The rule of avoidance, coupled with the policy of frequent transfer, made it impossible for magistrates to become assimilated in their counties; they were always outsiders.

Abolition of the rule of avoidance was important because it struck at the heart of the traditional conception of the magistrate's role. Instead of being an agent of a foreign power, so to speak, the magistrate would be the representative of his county to the central government as well as its effective leader. Under Ku's system, magistrates would be obliged to serve within one thousand li (roughly three hundred and thirty-three miles) of their native places. Vice-magistrates (ch'eng) would be required to serve in their own or adjoining prefectures. All other employees of the district would be natives of the district.\(^{82}\) In this way, Ku hopes to eliminate the problem of alienness which plagued magistrates, and to arouse the sense of sympathy which was to unite the people with their officials. Giving magistrates life tenure and allowing them to select their successors guaranteed that they would remain in their counties and would strengthen the bond of affection between them and the people.\(^{83}\)

In previous sections I drew attention to Ku's strange silence about the significance of the gentry in local administration. That their influence was consider-
able is attested by many writers on traditional China. Ku's reluctance to discuss them is peculiar, all the more so in view of his familiarity with local conditions. In the Chun-hsien lun, however, we get an inkling that Ku is concerned with informal, gentry power. The clue is the geographic scale of appointment mentioned in the previous paragraph. Magistrates are to serve within three hundred miles of their homes. This means that the area where one could expect to have an official career was roughly six hundred miles in diameter, an area two or three provinces in size. Vice-magistrates are confined to their own or neighboring prefectures. The difference in scale suggests that Ku regards magistrates and assistant-magistrates as having different geographic spheres of activity. These may correspond to the spheres of activity, or of social connections, of the various levels of the gentry. If this is true it would suggest that in selecting magistrates an important criterion is membership in the upper gentry. Vice-magistrates, whose responsibilities were fewer and less important than the magistrate's, needed fewer and less important connections. The assistant-magistrates, constables, tax collector, clerks, and other district employees needed only county-wide connections to do their jobs.

If it is Ku's intention that the magistrate utilize his gentry connections to assist him in governing his county, then why is he silent about gentry influence within the county? Ku's conception of the county as a great family suggests an answer. In the old system, it was partly the magistrate's alienness that made him ineffective. He was the representative of the formal power structure exclusively. Under the new system the magistrate would retain his formal status but he would also acquire new status as the leader of his community. He would unite the interests of the people as the head of a household unites the interests of the family members. In this situation formal and informal power would be combined, and hence conflict between them would be impossible. I am sure that this idea is included in Ku's conception of the relationship between public and private interests which we will consider shortly. The questions remains, however, why in his analysis of existing conditions Ku overlooks gentry participation in public affairs. This is a question I simply cannot
Among the topics Ku treats extensively in his writings is examination reform. He was very critical of the existing system. In his plan for the reform of local administration Ku includes a proposal that would have eliminated the examination system as the method for choosing magistrates, and replaced it with a modified system of examination and recommendation. According to Ku's plan, candidates would be recommended by their counties. Each county would be allowed to recommend one candidate every two years. Those recommended would go to the capital to be examined by the Board of Civil Appointments. Those who placed in the upper third would be given the rank of vice-president of a board (lang) and would be allowed to become magistrates. Those in the second third would become vice-magistrates with the option of advancing to the rank of magistrate after nine years. The lower third would return to their districts to become assistant-magistrates (pu) and guard commanders (wei). The merit of this system, from Ku's point of view, is that it combines selection on the basis of merit with an evaluation of character. It also gives every county an opportunity to produce local officials. Previously certain counties, usually in prosperous or cultured regions, produced many officials while others produced none. The only objection Ku can see to his system is that it provides too few opportunities to the educated to become officials. But he does not regard this as a serious objection. Those who cannot be officials can be teachers, he says, and, anyway, scholars should be discouraged from running after profit.

The Localization of military power. In the Jih-chih lu Ku says that in T'ang times, when soldiers were needed, they were provided by the localities and were under the command of their local officials (shou-ling). Nowadays, he says, soldiers come in from without, and the local officials have no control over them. They consume the produce of the county and terrorize the people. In place of quartering strange troops in the county, Ku proposes making each county responsible for its own defense. The people of the county will be alternately farmers and soldiers. Civil officials will double as military officers, with the magistrate in command. In
this way Ku hopes to overcome the problem of the separation of authority (ling pu-i) in the sphere of local defense. 87

Ku anticipates two objections to his proposal to localize military power. The first is that the various counties will not be able to defend themselves against foreign invaders, a particularly serious problem for those in border regions. The second is that localizing military power will increase the incidence of rebellion. Ku answers the first objection by an appeal to history. In the essay "On commanderies" (fan-chen) Ku says that neither the T'ang nor the Sung fell because they had localized forces. In fact, he says, the T'ang was able to overcome both internal rebellion and external attacks precisely because its forces were localized. It was the loss of Ho-pei, apparently as a result of stupidity on the part of central government officials, that doomed the dynasty. 88 The Sung, like the Ming, had a highly centralized military system. It was only after repeated failures in the field that the Sung realized the folly of this and tried to decentralize. They fell because their reform came too late. 89 As to the danger of rebellion, Ku simply points out that if military forces are nationwide, no one county has the power to defeat its neighbors and no prefectural or provincial official can command his counties to rise. 90 Also present in Ku's mind, though not made explicit, is the assumption that there will be no coalitions of counties against the central government because the raison d'être of resistance to central government oppression will not exist.

The Reorganization of Local Administration. Aside from proposing to localize finances, appointment, and military power, and to raise the status of the magistrate, Ku also proposes reorganizing county administration. In place of the tax-collection and registration system (li-chia) Ku proposes establishing a regular district office (se-fu), combining the functions of tax-collection and adjudication of petty disputes. 91 The office of se-fu was originally part of the Han system of local administration but it continued to exist until the Northern Sung. 92 Another ancient office that Ku proposes reviving is that of constable (yu-chiao) with the responsibility of apprehending criminals. Like the post of
adjudicator and tax-collector, that of constable would be a regular county office, rather than a village office as it had been under the Sung.93 Other posts include those of assistant magistrate (pu), guard commander (wei), instructor (po-shih), postmaster (i-ch'eng), and granary-keeper (ssu-ts'ang).

The significance of Ku's proposed reorganization has already been pointed out. I mentioned earlier that although he favors the decentralization of governmental powers to the county level, he would centralize government within the county. All administrative functions would be performed by the county government. This is puzzling in view of Ku's admiration for the ancient institutions of rural control and his regret at their decline in the present dynasty. He makes no mention of the Three Elders system, for example, or of any governmental agency below the county level. All the functions previously performed by these agencies are to be transferred to the office of the magistrate. It is as if Ku wishes to balance county autonomy from central government control with direct control over local society by the county government. This may be his intention. There is evidence of a strong desire among reformers of the statecraft school, to extend formal control to the lowest level of society. Ku was one of the founders of that school. His reluctance to acknowledge the significance of gentry influence in local government may be a result of his commitment to formal local control. Even if this is the case, however, it does not explain why Ku ignores the gentry. If he looked upon them as adversaries, then one would expect to find deprecatory remarks about their influence in his writings. If he regarded them as allies then one would expect at least some mention of their value as allies. Instead there is nothing.94

The Three Relationships in the Context of Ku's Reforms

In the introduction I said that Ku is concerned with the role of the magistrate in his relations with three groups: the clerks, the central government, and the people. Over-centralization disturbs the relations by reducing the magistrate's power vis-a-vis the clerks and his superiors. This in time affects his ability to
perform his duties, thereby alienating the people. The triumph of government by laws is the isolation of the magistrate from the people. Under Ku's reformed administration this relationship would be restored and the others rectified. As Ku envisions its, the magistrate would be freed from control by the central government by being given the power to regulate county finances, personnel, and security. He would be freed from dependence on the clerks by the increase in his power and by being made to serve in his native place. He would be able to perform his duties and he would be inspired to perform them well by his affection for the people. The only limitation on the magistrate's power, in fact, would be his own conscience. Reformed county government would be government by men.

The Relationship of the Magistrate to the People. In the Chun-hsien lun Ku says that the most constant affection is that for one's parents and one's children. To be affectionate to one's family (ch'in ch'in) is natural and is consistent with the principles of Heaven. To feel affection for one's neighbors is good but it is not automatic. Ku's aim in reforming local administration is to establish conditions in which affection between neighbors, in particular between the magistrate and the people, is encouraged. His reformed administration is not without the power to coerce, but he assumes that harmony between groups is the rule rather than the exception. The sustaining power of this harmony, however, is not, as may be expected, an elevated conception of human nature but a very ordinary one. According to Ku, the key to social harmony is self-interest.

The term which I here translate self-interest (tzu-ssu or tzu-wei, literally "thinking of oneself" or "acting on one's own behalf") is a pejorative term in modern Chinese. It connotes selfishness and lack of consideration for others. As Ku uses the term, however, it means a proper regard for one's own interests. One is "selfish" if one thinks of one's family before another's. One is acting in one's self-interest when one produces more or sells more. Self-interest is not necessarily bad. Nor is it necessarily in conflict with the self-interest of others as in Hobbes' bellum omnium contra
omnes. On the other hand, self-interest is not a virtue like honesty (lien) or shame (ch'ih). It does not have an ethical basis. It is simply human nature considered in its plainest aspect. But it is precisely the plainness of self-interest that makes it appealing to Ku. If one can establish a society based on ordinary emotions one will not need extraordinary men to run it. This is not to say that virtue has no place - Ku does not reject the Classics - but the cultivation of virtue, involving, as it does, years of patient study and reflection, is not something ordinary men can engage in. What is needed is a society in which ordinary men can live as ordinary men, yet in which the various evils ordinary men are prone to are suppressed. Ku's reform is an attempt to enlist human nature in support of social harmony. The key to success is the the identification of "affection for one's family" (ch'in ch'in) with "affection for the people" (ch'in min) in the mind of the magistrate.

We have already seen how Ku intends to achieve this. By giving the magistrate responsibility for the affairs of his county, and by compelling him to serve in an area where his own family will be affected by his decisions, one offers him the strongest encouragement to govern well. Also, the reward for governing well is permanent tenure with the opportunity to transmit one's office to one's descendants. These appeals to the self-interest of the magistrate, coupled with the preparation for office that Ku undoutedly intends the magistrate to have, would guarantee that no threat to stability would come from him. Rather, he would look upon the county as his own property and the people as his children.

But will the people accept the magistrate as their father? Yes, says Ku, because it will be in their interest to do so and one can always count on men to do what is in their interest. In Ku's view the error of the old system was that it ran counter to human nature by attempting, through various devices, to suppress it. Instead of restricting human nature, Ku would release it, guide it and use it to create an enduring social order.

The Relationship of the Magistrate to the Clerks. In Part Eight of the Chun-hsien lun Ku says that if his reforms are adopted, laws and regulations will be abolished, personnel administration (li chih) will be greatly simplified, and clerks will no longer be able to manipulate
officials. All the problems that bedevil local administration, he says, would be gone in a day. This is hyperbole. Elsewhere, Ku acknowledges that the danger of clerical independence and over-regulation cannot be eliminated. But he does believe that they can be controlled; first, by appointing magistrates who are natives of the region, and second, by giving magistrates the power they need to combat the clerks' schemes. The first reform would eliminate the advantage of familiarity with local conditions which the clerks had under the old system, and the second would make it easier for the magistrates to expose and suppress corruption. The antagonistic nature of the clerk-magistrate relationship would remain unchanged but the clerks would be discouraged from attempting to abuse their authority.

It is interesting that what Ku regards as the crime of the clerks is what he thinks most men do most of the time, that is, follow their own interests. The difference is that most men, in serving their interests, affect only themselves, or, at least, do not injure others. The clerks, however, are in a position of public trust. If they try to help themselves by exploiting their position, they inevitably affect relations between the magistrate and the people. In this sense government by moral men is a necessary adjunct to government in accordance with human nature. There must be virtuous men in government. The elitist tone of this is significant. Ku did not believe that governing in accordance with the nature of ordinary men entitled ordinary men to govern. Men must still be trained to virtue and those who become officials must still act in accordance with principles.

The problem of law requires elucidation. Ku says that after his reform, laws and regulations will be abolished. He does not mean that all laws and regulations will be abolished, but only those which are unnecessary. If the rules are abolished what will take their place? In the essay "Local officials" (shou-ling) Ku quotes a Yuan scholar to the effect that the great feudatories of T'ang selected their subordinate officials from among their personal retainers (mu-fu liao-shu). Each official had his own responsibilities and each concerned himself only with those:

The subordinate officials assisted in governing, controlled agriculture, and looked after water conservancy. The secretaries handled the

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documents. The military officers guarded against bandits. The local official (shou-ling) was unburdened and concerned himself exclusively with the right and wrong of his administration. The impression given here is that the proper role of the magistrate is coordinative rather than active. He does not engage in tasks himself; he directs others to perform them. Laws are devices for facilitating coordination. When the law becomes too detailed or too restrictive, as it did in the Ming, it ceases to facilitate coordination and becomes a hindrance. The way to restore the proper function of law is to simplify it. Ku's reforms would have law at the service of the magistrate and, through the conscience of the magistrate, at the service of principles. Again, the relationship remains unchanged but the balance is in favor of moral consciousness.

The Relationship of the Magistrate to the Central Government. In Part Five of the Chun-hsien lun Ku says something which at first glance appears to be self-contradictory. The self-interest of the people, he says, is the public spirit of the emperor (t'ien-hsia chih ssu, t'ien-tzu chih kung yeh). Elsewhere he repeats this idea in somewhat different words; the sages, he says, used the self-interest of the empire to create the public-interest of the "One Man". What Ku means by this is that the interests of a community are the interests of its members conceived together. Public-spirit or public-interest (kung-hsin) is the accumulation of private interests. The emperor as the leader of the community embodies the unity of interests of the people.

To say that the emperor unites the interests of the people is not to say that what is good for the emperor is good for the empire. The term "public-interest" does not mean the interest of the emperor as a man or of the imperial household as a family. Rather, it means the interests of the people as a whole. What serves their interests serves the interests of the emperor as well. The magistrate, by assisting the people's well-being also assists the emperor. In this way he fulfills his responsibility to the state. In Ku's opinion the magistrate stands in the same relationship to the county as the emperor does to the nation. He is responsible for seeing to it that the interests of the community are served. He unites in his person the myriad interests of the
people. In his case, as in the emperor's, ruthless self-aggrandizement destroys his function and harms the public interest in a way that the selfishness of ordinary men cannot. The magistrate, like the emperor, has therefore to be better than ordinary men. He must have a sense of his role as unifier, as protector of the public good. The relationship between the magistrate and the central government should not be antagonistic, as it was in the Ming, but complementary. The magistrates should preserve the community of interests in the county as the emperor does in the nation.

PART III

THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF Ku'S REFORMS

In an often-quoted letter to a friend, Ku criticizes the scholars of the recent past saying that they concentrated too much on philosophical questions and ignored the practical affairs of the world. As a result practical problems went unsolved and the political life of the empire became degraded until, finally, the dynasty collapsed. Ku proposed to restore scholarly concern for practical matters. He set an example in his own work. Later scholars, particularly in the nineteenth century, picked up Ku's ideas. He is today remembered chiefly as the founder of two schools of thought stemming from his interest in practical affairs, the statecraft (ching-shih) school and the textual criticism (k'ao-cheng) school. Ku's proposals for the reform of local administration may be looked upon as an attempt to put his principles into practice. He approached the question of the fall of the Ming from the point of view of the influence of local government on national affairs. He proposed methods by which the dynasty could be reconstituted on a sound basis. His proposals reflect his disdain of speculative thought. The proposal to replace direct centralized control by the emperor with centralized control by the magistrate does not change the relationship between the people and the government. The possibility of despotism remains, but not at such a remove. The only guarantee of equity is the conscience of the governor, and here the reluctance to speculate about modes of moral cultivation is a weakness. Ku obviously expected his magistrates to be moral men,
but there is nothing in his proposals to insure that moral men are selected. Likewise, Ku's concern to establish his new society on the basis of man's ordinary nature is a reaction against the empty theorizing on man's nature that characterized Ming thought. In spite of this, however, Ku clearly remains wedded to the tenets of Confucian political philosophy: the supremacy of ethics, the need for a governing elite, the distinctive effect of law, and the acceptance of the family as the model for social organization. What is new is the mode of organization, and even here I think history provides parallels. But novelty was not a virtue in China. Ku's aim is not to create something new but to restore the past. If some sage will arise to put his plan into practice, then "we will approach the kind of government that existed in the Three Dynasties. How much easier will it be to re-create the splendor of the Han the T'ang!"

NOTES

In the references to the Jih-chih lu the numbers following the chuan number and title indicate the volume number and page for the edition which I used. The references to the Chun-hsien lun include the part number and the page number in the Ku Yen-wu wen.

A Table of the Abbreviations Used in the Notes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>JCL</td>
<td>Jih-chih lu</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHL</td>
<td>Chun-hsien lun</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHCH</td>
<td>&quot;Ch'uan hsuan chih hai&quot; (The problems of evaluation and selection), JCL, chuan 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTCC</td>
<td>&quot;Hsiang t'ing chih chih&quot; (On the offices of the hsiang and the t'ing), JCL, chuan 8.</td>
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1. JCL 8 "Cheng-shih", 5:41.
2. Ku's proposals in the areas of strategy, military organization, agriculture, and coinage are contained in four essays written before the fall of Nanking. They are discussed in Williard Peterson's

3. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:15.
4. CHL 1:2.
5. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:17.
6. CHL 3:5.
7. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:16.
8. JCL 8 "Hsuan pu", 3:84.
9. CHL 8:12.
10. CHL 8:11-12.
11. John Watt, in The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China, Columbia, 1972, refers to the clerks as "representatives of local interests" in the bureaucracy (p. 142). This overlooks the variety of interest that existed at the local level. For example, Ku points out that the wealthy were frequently the victims of the clerks' chicanery. (CSWP 8:2a-b). The common people, he says, call them "wolves and tigers". (Ch. 8:12). The clerks, together with some unscrupulous lower-degree holders (sheng-yuan), were an interest group, but they by no means represented local society.

12. Watt shows that for the four districts and three clans he studied, officials frequently spent well over three years at the rank of magistrate but usually in different places and not always in substantive positions. (Watt, p. 64-67).

13. JCL 8 "Ch'uan hsuan chih hai" (hereafter CHCH), 3:93.
14. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:93.
15. JCL 8 "Fa chih", 3:81.
16. JCL 8 "Li hsu", 3:78.
17. JCL 9 "Jen-ts'ai", 4:1; 8 CHCH, 3:95; 8"Li hsu", 3:78.
18. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:92-93.

19. Although the English terms officials and clerks imply no moral distinction I have chosen to use them rather than the Chinese terms li and kuan. This practice is followed throughout the paper. Whenever the sense of a Chinese word is not conveyed, or is distorted, by its literal equivalent I have included the Chinese and occasionally an explanatory phrase.

20. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:93.
22. JCL 8 "Li hsu", 3:78.
23. Michel Crozier The Bureaucratic Phenomenon
The Chinese examination system was not, as Weber and others believed, a "rational" system of official selection compelled to compromise with the ethical demands of a patrimonial society. It was a system of ethical selection. The tension in the system did come from the conflict of rational-legal with ethical-educational requirements but, as the demands of educational reformers from Ku to Chang Chih-tung attest, the resolution was ideally in the direction of the latter. The complaints were the same in all cases: too great reliance on objectivity undermines the purpose for which the examinations were established. We must get away from formalism and reinfuse the system with the spirit of substantive justice. Weber was right to identify the Chinese system as ethical rather than rational but he was wrong to assume a progression from one to the other. It is a testament to the completeness of Weber's model that it exercises an influence over contemporary analyses of the Chinese state. See C.K. Yang "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior" in Arthur Wright, ed., Confucianism in Action, pp. 134-165.

29. Ku at one point suggests rewarding good magistrates with the title "True Official" to distinguish them from those who have the name but not the substance. (CHL 2:3).

30. Mark Elvin, in The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Stanford, 1973, asserts that the Ming saw the breakdown of the manorial system and its replacement with the system of absentee landlordism and small tenant farming that characterized Chinese society down to 1949. In his formulation, the departure of the landlords to the city and the transfer of their capital to more profitable urban enterprises forced the responsibility for tax-collection, mediation of disputes, and other public services on to the poorer stratum who were unable to carry them out. The clerks and members of the lower gentry moved into the vacuum created by the landlords' departure and established a system of gentry management based on collusion between the formal and the informal
power structures. (Elvin, chapter 1. "The Disappearance of Serfdom").

John Watt describes the transfer of responsibility for tax-collection from the tax-collection and registration system (li-chia) to the county government. The increased administrative burden necessitated a vast increase in the number of clerks with a consequent increase in corruption and lack of official surveillance. Watt's is the better book. Elvin bases his judgment on material gathered from the south and southeast, by all accounts the most advanced and cultured region of the county. Ku made most of his observations in the north. What differences there were between these areas and whether these differences were great enough to warrant ascribing the decline in local administration to different causes I do not know. There is general agreement, however, that local government was in decline throughout China in the seventeenth century (Watt pp. 140-145, 151-159).

31. The list of the magistrate's duties is an example. Earlier these would have been regarded as the responsibility of the local gentry. In fact, they never became the exclusive concern of the magistrate but it is an indication of how the locus of authority had shifted that Ku considers them the magistrate's duties. Another example is the breakdown of the sub-district administrative structure. This will be discussed in a separate section.

33. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:94.
34. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:94.
35. JCL 9 "Jen-ts'ai", 4:1.
37. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:92.
38. The term t'ien-hsia literally means "all under heaven". It is usually translated empire but it has the meaning of the civilized world; the two were identified in the minds of most Chinese. I have translated t'ien-hsia variously depending on the context.
39. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:95.
40. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:95.
41. JCL 8 "Hsiang t'ing chih chih" (hereafter HTCC), 3:70; 8 "Fa chih", 3:80.
42. JCL 9 "Jen-ts'ai", 4:1.
43. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:15.
44. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:15.
45. CHL 1:2.
46. CHL 1:2.
47. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:15.
48. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:93.
49. JCL 8 CHCH, 3:92-93.
50. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:15.
51. JCL 8 "Li hsu", 3:78; 8 CHCH, 3:95; 9 "Jen-ts'ai", 4:1.
56. The question of Ku's attitude toward the fall of the Ming and toward dynastic change generally opens up the very interesting question of Ku's historical consciousness. I had originally intended to deal with this question, but I was not able to find enough information in the material I read to draw any conclusions. Ku at times argues for a cyclical view of history and at times for a linear view. These are not necessarily contradictory. As Robert Crawford points out in his article on Chang Chu-cheng, a conception of history proceeding through cycles of growth and decay but with each cycle a unique configuration of institutions and ideas was available to Ku. (Robert Crawford "Chang Chu-cheng's Confucian Legalism" in Wm. T. de Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought pp. 367-415, Columbia, 1970).

It is probable that he held this view. Whether these cycles corresponded to dynasties or not is unclear. Ku's specifically historical writings are few, at least in the sections of the Jih-chih lu I read. They indicate, however, that Ku was a careful student of history. A close reading of his historical writings would probably reveal a coherent philosophy of history.


59. JCL 13 "Lien-ch'ih" in Ku Yen-wu wen, selections, p. 158.

60. JCL 8 "Hsuan-pu", 3:83. Ku's attitude toward barbarian conquest is more complex than his reputation as an anti-Manchu would suggest. In the Jih-chih lu he contrasts the decadence of the Chinese with the simplicity and directness of the barbarians. (CSWP 8:8b-9a) Barbarian conquest, it seems, can have a rejuvenating effect.

61. JCL 8 HTCC, 3:72.
62. JCL 8 HTCC, 3:72.
63. JCL 8 HTCC, 3:69.
64. JCL 8 HTCC, 3:69.
65. JCL 8 HTCC, 3:72-73.
66. JCL 8 "Li-chia", 3:73-74.
67. CHL 1:1.
68. JCL 9 "Fan-chen", 4:29.
69. CHL 2:3 and JCL 9 "Chih-hsien", 4:12.
70. CHL 2:3.
71. CHL 2:3-4.
72. CHL 2:4.
73. CHL 2:4.
74. CHL 7:11-12.
75. CHL 3:7.
76. CHL 5:7.
87. JCL 9 "Shou-ling", 4:17. According to James Parsons it was not uncommon for district officials to deny entry to the district town to armies of the central government. Government troops, for their part, frequently committed crimes against the local people. This was particularly true in times of crisis when armies were on the march and food was in short supply. See Parsons Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty.

88. JCL 9 "Fan-chen", 4:27.
89. JCL 9 "Fan-chen", 4:26.
90. CHL 3:6-7.
91. CHL 2:4.
92. JCL 8 HTCC, 3:69.
93. CHL 2:4.

94. In an excerpt from one of his essays included in the Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien Ku says that success in administration depends on managing the rich. The rich, he says, must be protected from exploitation by unscrupulous clerks and litigation specialists. (CSWP 8:2a). I have not been able to find the essay from which this passage is taken, and the excerpt is inconclusive on the matter of Ku's attitude toward the gentry as a class.

95. CHL 5:7.
96. CHL 5:7.
97. CHL 5:7.
98. CHL 8:12.
99. CHL 8:12.
100. JCL 8 "Shou-ling", 4:16.
101. CHL 5:9.
102. CHL 5:7.
103. CHL 5:9.
In the spring of 1911 a dispute broke out in Ch'uan-sha county (just east of Shanghai) between the Ch'ang-jen township (hsiang) self-government organization and a crowd of people from Ch'ang-jen township and Nan-hui county over use of a certain Yu-kung Temple as a site for the local self-government office. The Ch'ang-jen township self-government had previously borrowed some houses in the town on a temporary basis. Since this was found to be costly, it was suggested that they use Yu-kung Temple which, besides its convenient location, was also a kind of "public" structure. The proposal was approved by the county magistrate and carried out by the local self-government organization. According to the report given by the local self-government officers, "the office was located in an empty, unused building in the western section of the whole complex of the temple." Madam Ting, the woman in charge of the temple, and her supporters had opposed the idea vehemently. The self-government officers tried to reason that "the office did not really interfere with the house that she occupied." But Madam Ting and her cohorts continued to object. As a consequence, although the self-government office sign-board was hung out and a meeting was once called in midwinter, 1910, no officer was stationed in the new office regularly. It appears that the report given by the self-government officers was somewhat ambiguous concerning exactly which portion of the temple was to be used. Another report submitted by an advisor in the Kiangsu governor's office did little more than add to the confusion when it was stated that "the Western hall" was being used. A closer look at the situation, however, discloses that the entire temple had been leveled by fire in 1887, and that only a relatively simple structure composed of three little houses in the Western portion of the original site had been reconstructed. From this one could conclude that at least at the time the Ch'ang-jen township self-government conference took place, it must have required the use of a major portion of the temple.

Apparently, Ting was a vegetarian sect-leader. Her
critics claimed that she had received a good deal of money from the "superstitious" multitude. Most of her sect came from neighboring Nan-hui county. On February 7, 1911, each township in Ch'uan-sha held an election to choose district representatives. In Ch'ang-jen township, the election was scheduled to take place in Yu-kung Temple. On that morning, over a hundred people claiming to be "worshippers" unexpectedly thronged into the temple, leaving little room for the voters. In the afternoon, a man called Chang A-hsi, described as a "ruffian" from Nan-hui county, appeared along with some companions. Reeking with alcohol, it was said, they barged abruptly into the temple, shoving the furniture about. After breaking the office sign-board, they went on to cause more trouble. Persuaded with great difficulty by Ts'ao A-ssu, the constable, to leave, Chang announced that he would come back again tomorrow and would then surely strike. At that time the sect-members also dispersed.

The meeting for announcing the result of the vote was secretly rescheduled from the following afternoon to the morning to avoid interference from the sect. On the next day, after the meeting was over, the self-government officers went to town and complained to the magistrate, who immediately went to Ch'ang-jen to investigate. Chao A-ssu, the constable, was punished with 50 strokes (presumably for allowing all the trouble to occur) and Madam Ting was arrested. In the meantime a joint warrant was issued in both Ch'uan-sha and Nan-hui to arrest Chang A-hsi, who had returned to Nan-hui. However, before Madam Ting could be brought to trial, she was released privately through a bribe of 30 yuan to the jailor. Egged on by the clerks of the county yamen, she determined to gather her sect and fix a date for an uprising.

On February 28, Chuang A-hsi was arrested in Nan-hui and was being escorted under guard to Ch'uan-sha. As soon as he and his escort had ventured far enough into Ch'uan-sha, at Tang-mo Bridge, Chang's gang made a sudden appearance. They beat gongs to gather more people to rescue Chang. The three government escorts fled. As a result of this victory, the power and influence of the gang waxed considerably. Throughout the night, the sound of gongs continued without a break.

In the morning of February 28, Wu Ta-pen, township
head (hsiang-chang) of Chang-jen, hurried to report to the magistrate in the county seat. He had hardly finished when news arrived of the destruction of Wu's house and of the school which he operated. Another self-government officer also reported the destruction of his house by the mob. However, the magistrate maintained that Wu and his friends ought to be able to handle the situation by themselves.

On March 1, the mob was restrained for a while by a rumor that the magistrate was conducting a troop of soldiers to investigate. But the magistrate was caught ill-prepared with only a small following. Seeing that the mob was growing bold and that his sedan-chair had been destroyed, the magistrate grew frightened and hurriedly retreated to the city. Immediately following this incident, a yamen clerk called Li Sung-ping declared to the mob that only the self-government officers deserved punishment, but that the villagers should be left in peace. The most important target, he maintained, was the Chih-Yuan T'ang in town. This was the local charity center run by the gentry. To destroy it, said Li, would forever forstall the imposition of the "new policy." He then issued directions to attack the houses of various self-government officers.

That same afternoon, Ch'ang-jen township self-government officers submitted a report on the increasing destruction by the mob and implored the magistrate to send a telegram to secure more troops. In the subsequent three hours arrived three more reports, which recounted the destruction of some schools in Kao-chang township on the previous day and the ruin of more houses and a school in Ch'ang-jen. But the magistrate was still reluctant to send a telegram to seek help from higher authorities. During that night, the yamen clerk Li Sung-ping and some of his following went to the market town of Kung-Chen to further stir up the gangs in Chiu-t'uan and Kao-Ch'ang townships.

On March 2, the local self-government offices in P'ai-t'uan, Chiu-t'uan and Kao-ch'ang townships were all destroyed. Through the day, the gangs pillaged the county from one end to the other. At the same time the yamen clerks maintained that the magistrate would not intervene because he expected the self-government officials to educate and pacify the people themselves. Some clerks, how-
ever, were content that the gangs destroy the country gentry's houses to their hearts' content as long as they kept away from the city. What the magistrate's actual instructions were, however, we do not know.

On March 3, more houses and shops went up in flames. The gangs added to the terror by extorting money and food from house to house. Some people were even forced to join the gangs. By the afternoon of that day, troops from Shanghai had arrived, but the magistrate was still reluctant to lead the soldiers against the mob. But after receiving more urgent entreaties from self-government officials, he finally agreed to lead the troops. Just as the troops were leaving the east gate of the town, some yamen underlings showed up to threaten him once again, whereupon he retreated into the yamen.

It was not until March 4, when a Chiu-t'uan self-government officer ran into the magistrate's hall and struck the alarm drum, that the magistrate led the troops to put an end to the entire affair.

In the last decade of Ch'ing rule, popular uprisings had so pervaded the empire that they defied any effective response by the government. Such conditions give rise to a number of questions: What was the nature of these uprisings? What were the social and political forces at work in local society that conditioned them? What were the social and economic relationships between the various groups in local society, and what state of consciousness did they carry with them into the 1911 Revolution? What were the problems and difficulties troubling the local society that were left unsolved when the nation finally shook off the imperial regime? This paper will approach these questions by exploring materials on social conflict in Ch'uan-sha county.

In the incident related above, three local self-government offices, twelve schools, and the property and houses of twenty-nine families were obliterated within a span of four days. A self-government officer was severely injured. The incident broke out simultaneously in Ch'ang-jen township in the south and in Kao-ch'ang township in the north, which suggests careful planning and coordination. On the other hand, the uprising involved a total of "several thousand" people, suggesting that the grievance was widespread and deeply felt. One slogan commonly voiced during the uprising was "Down with the New
Policies" (Ta-tao hsin-fa), referring to the recently established local self-government and the policies and actions it sponsored. We shall see what these "new policies" really meant for the leaders and the followers who participated in the uprising. Local self-government was the last trick pulled by an exhausted court to avoid its impending fate. By focusing on the relationship between the local self-government organizations and the local society, we hope to discover some of the tensions that pervaded China's local society on the eve of revolution.

THE INSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

In 1908 the court issued a nine-year program of constitutional development which would include: 1) convocation of a national assembly in 1910, 2) regulations for the election of provincial assemblies and their convocation within a year, 3) establishment of local self-government offices in cities (ch'eng), market towns (chen), and rural townships (hsiang) by 1914 and prefectures (fu), departments (t'ing) and counties (hsien) by 1914, and 4) election and convocation of a parliament to replace the national assembly in 1917. During and after the Boxer Rebellion, the court had become alarmed by the growing power of provincial governments and by their autonomous tendencies. The series of tactical maneuvers to replace prominent governors under the guise of reform was crowned by the official adoption of constitutionalism in 1908. The provincial assembly would act outside, instead of inside, the existing structure of provincial government. The cooperation as well as tension between the two parties on the provincial level would permit direction from the national assembly above. This would presumably prevent the power of the provincial government from looming large enough to threaten central control; and at the same time, would provide a formal framework for new social and economic energies, making them responsive to the will of the government. On the county level, however, the government had no intention of creating a counterweight to the existing bureaucracy. Local self-government was intended to complement and assist the bureaucracy in jobs that lay beyond the traditional sphere of bureaucratic concern.

On the other hand, some non-official spokesmen for
constitutionalism held a different conception of what self-government could do for China. Local self-government, as it worked to consolidate the basis for a national constitutional government, also fulfilled the ideal preached by some traditional statecraft thinkers of infusing a "feudal" (feng-chien) spirit into the centralized government bureaucracy in order to remedy the ills of the latter. The "feudal" spirit—i.e., involving the notables of local society in the operation of the local government so as to foster a regard for the local society as inseparably bound to one's own private interests thereby encouraging service to the welfare of the society—assumed a new meaning in the context of twentieth century constitutionalism. In 1902, K'ang Yu-wei published an article called "On citizen self-government." This article was probably the first to articulate the importance of local self-government as a means of releasing energies for popular mobilization to serve as a necessary basis for national survival.

The overall situation in Ch'uan-sha may be characterized as a conflict between the potential of constitutionalism and the existing reality which it sought to transform. In 1908, the court, in order to preserve the status quo, created an explicit network of control paralleling the existing formal network of governmental control. On the local scene, the creation of local self-government meant the elevation of the gentry's informal control, among other local powers, to an unprecedented level of formal operation. This transformation caused the local elite to assume a different kind of relationship to the existing configuration of power. As the new organization struggled to materialize, such a transformation inevitably clashed with the existing interest groups and the general local sentiment. This generalization, of course, must be qualified in the sense that constitutionalism on the local level, even though it exhibited some progressive and modernizing tendencies, was by no means entirely characterized by such tendencies. The actual meaning of its modernizing policies can only be understood in relation to the entire spectrum of competing interests in traditional society, both within and without the framework of local self-government.
As an initial step toward identifying the social conflicts that lay behind the riots of 1911, it will be necessary to describe local self-government in Ch'uan-sha and to characterize the persons involved in it.

Structure of Ch'uan-sha Local Self-government. In 1908, the regulations for the election of Members of the Provincial Assembly were issued. Within each province, a primary election would be held in each county and a final election would be carried out on a prefectural basis. In Ch'uan-sha county was founded a special institute for the preparation of the election. The general office was set up in the town and investigators chosen from the city and each township to investigate the qualifications of voters. Four hundred among a population of 104,976 were found qualified. Proportionate to this figure, 5 representatives were elected to participate in the election of the Members of the Provincial Assembly in February of 1909. In March, Huang Yen-pei was elected a member of the Provincial Assembly. After the formation of the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly, regulations for local self-government in cities and townships were issued, and subsequently representatives were elected. By July 1909, the city and township self-government assemblies in Ch'uan-sha had already put into effect a host of improvements and reforms. However, in March 1911, the anti-self-government uprising broke out. This disrupted the development of the budding institution. After a rather thorough investigation concerning the cause of the uprising, the agents from the neighboring districts unanimously agreed that all the self-government officers in Ch'uan-sha were unexpectedly sincere in their intent and that they could find no evidence concerning any dishonest behavior of any staff members. It was also agreed that the self-government in Ch'uan-sha was the most efficient and successful among its counterparts in the province of Kiangsu. Most of the other self-government organizations in Kiangsu at the end of 1911 had not progressed beyond the stage of census-compiling. This was due either to the lack of initiative from a strong "progressive" leadership, or to the movement's disruption by mass riots at the initial
stage of census-taking. Thus the Ch'uan-sha self-govern-
ment system was unusual in the sense that it not only
managed to begin various projects for local "reforms,"
but also included the majority of the county's most prom-
inent and influential figures.

Social and Cultural Background of Self-government Officers.

There was a high degree of diversity in the social
and cultural backgrounds of self-government offices.¹²
The meaning of the term "elite" here seems to include a
wide spectrum of human types which, together, mark a
society in the throes of a fundamental transformation.
The two most important hallmarks of social distinction
remained chiefly education and wealth, but the character-
istics of education and wealth were undergoing some im-
portant changes. The functional relationship of these
self-government elites to the society roughly falls into
three categories. These three categories represent a
cross-section of the three stages of the development
of the local elite. The first group had explicit cultural
ties with the West, and did not emerge until 1905. The
second group gradually became a significant phenomenon of
Ch'ing local society only within the last century of im-
perial rule. The third group, which lay at the root of
the first two, persisted throughout the entire imperial
reign and constituted an image of traditional gentry power.

The first category was distinctly new to Chinese
society: for example, returned students from Japan,
graduates from a "modern" type teachers' college, or a
"modern" type of efficient administrator for churches and
industry in Shanghai. The appearance of these characters
in Ch'uan-sha could not have occurred prior to the final
decade or so of the Ch'ing Dynasty. They may have appeared
radically novel or even alien to Ch'uan-sha rural society.

The second category includes men who established new
channels of influence within the framework of Ch'ing
society. It had been steadily built up during the last
century before 1911. Teachers of traditional subjects
such as classical military principles or methods of agri-
culture and sericulture were strangely complemented by
graduates from the Nanking Naval school, which had been
founded and supervised by the government. The latter were
products of the official "self-strengthening" policy and
were channeled into the established hierarchy by being
granted official titles; while the former, by virtue of

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their technological concerns, might have been more sensitive to China's need for modernization. Another aspect of the changing character of the local elite originating from native sources is revealed in the increased merchant participation in local self-government assemblies. During this period, the most remarkable deviation from the familiar concept of local leadership was the increasing political impact of commercial activities in market towns and treaty ports. The most distinctive feature of local self-government was the influence and status of commercial wealth in its own right. The editor of the Ch'uan-sha Gazetteer commented that nine out of ten of the people from Ch'uan-sha who made a fortune made it in Shanghai. It is rather difficult to ascertain how many of the Ch'uan-sha self-government officers were actually successful merchants returned from Shanghai. However, 23 out of 33 cases of which we have information had some connections with Shanghai. We do not know that local merchants who headed the management of the public affairs in the county seat and the flourishing market towns occupied a rather substantial portion of the self-government posts, even though they might or might not have connections outside of Ch'uan-sha.

A third category was composed of entrenched sources of power among the local elites such as landed wealth, local managerial functions, members of the old established gentry families, and examination degree-holders. Regarded as a pool for the supply of local leadership, the lower degree-holders (sheng-yuan) unfailingly emerged as prominent supporters of the constitutional movement on the local scale. About 40% of the self-government posts in general and 54.5% of the important posts in particular were occupied by lower degree-holders in Ch'uan-sha. At the top of these lower degree-holders stood gentry members who commanded a wider degree of influence owing to the long-established families they came from. Checking the geneologies of Ch'uan-sha against the list of self-government officers shows an astonishingly high degree of participation from such members. Virtually all the existing important established families were represented. Their members not only constitute a substantial portion of the total self-government official posts, but in particular they occupy the most important posts, such as chairman and vice-chairman of the assemblies, township-chief and
assistant township-chief, and members of the county self-government assembly. This group also produced the most assiduous reformers, and their network of social relationships extended far beyond the borders of Ch'uan-sha.

Another source of gentry power was the local managerial functions with their institutional expression—the Chih-yuan T'ang, the local charity office. Many of the gentry managers of the Chih-yuan T'ang were included in the local self-government officers list. In fact, the charity office was turned into the headquarters for the city and county self-government officers. It was a case of the same people using the same funds for the same purposes, such as running orphanages, charity medicine, charity burial, famine relief and water-works or road construction. Not all the managers in the charity office became self-government officers, but at least the most important ones were included and continued to play an active role within the new institution. The role of landed wealth seems to have played a much smaller part in Ch'uan-sha self-government than one might expect. We can be certain of only two cases of major landed interest here. One might postulate that this small figure was due to the avoidance of representation of landed interests, assuming that there were many of them in existence. But other evidence points to the contrary. In a land investigation conducted much later, in 1928, it was concluded that those households depending upon rent collected from land comprised a surprisingly low percentage as compared to other areas along the Yangtze River Valley. This perhaps explains the relative importance of commercial wealth in the composition of the local self-government in Ch'uan-sha.

ACTIVITIES OF THE CH'UAN-SHA SELF-GOVERNMENT MEMBERS

New Schools. In 1905, an edict finally did away with the traditional civil-service examination system and led to a profusion of new schools. This occurred in Ch'uan-sha as well as other areas. But the process of educational change actually began much earlier. During the Kuang-hsu reign, Ch'uan-sha produced four scholars who passed the provincial examination (chu-jen), two in 1898 and two in 1902. One later became a metropolitan degree-holder and then a county magistrate; another remained in Ch'uan-sha to assume a traditional role of gentry leadership.
The other two, Ai Ch'eng-hsi and Huang Yen-p'ei, however, rejected the prospect of becoming government bureaucrats. Ai Ch'eng-hsi was the father and cousin of two active self-government officers. After he gained his chu-jen degree, he collaborated with a friend, Wu Ta-pen, to open an unconventional kind of school. In this school, the curriculum was the production of clothes and crops, uncomplicated and unhindered by any literary exercises. It was very popular among the villagers. It seems probable that the purpose of this enterprise was to introduce a practical and agrarian orientation to Chinese education.

The most memorable event in Ch'uan-sha education occurred when Huang Yen-p'ei returned from Shanghai to found the first public primary school in Ch'uan-sha city in 1903. In 1901, an Imperial Edict had ordered the establishment of primary schools in every county. In August 1902, regulations for high, middle and primary schools were issued, which each province was obliged to follow. At that time Huang Yen-p'ei was studying in Nan-yang Public School in Shanghai. In November, the students of that school staged a strike. The students, who subsequently left the school, proceeded to organize the Patriotic Study Group (Ai-Kuo Hsueh-she). Huang returned to Ch'uan-sha instead. He recalled:

I and my friends in Ch'uan-sha, such as Chang Chih-Ho, and a senior, Lu Chia-chi, were all influenced by the new idea of 'Save China through education.' We were all distressed by the view of China's desperate condition while our countrymen were still inert as though in a deep slumber. I remember reading a book called Plans to Appropriate China by Ozaki Yukio. So we swore an oath, determined that we would set up new schools in order to save China. At that time, there were no slogans such as 'Movement for Mass education', 'Down with Illiteracy Movement' etc. which have become very popular now; but the method was similar.... Since there were imperial edicts to change all the traditional academies (shu-yuan) into new schools, we seized the opportunity to present a petition to the magistrate to request changing Kuan-lan Shu-yuan into Ch'uan-sha Primary School.
The history of the early years of Ch'uan-sha Primary School created by Huang Yen-p'ei and Chang will illustrate the kinds of hostility the creation of new schools introduced into local society. They include antipathy among supporters of traditional learning, passive recalcitrance from the county magistrate, hostility from religious sects and secret societies, as well as resentment from tenants who rented the endowment land that belonged to the school.

By late 1902, traditional learning remained largely unchallenged. Kuan-Ian Shu-yuan in Ch'uan-sha city was regarded as the academic center of the entire county. There, the students were tested monthly on standard examination curriculum, and were awarded small stipends for good performance. The stipends were paid out of the rent collected from the property owned by the school. On occasion, even the magistrate would contribute an additional bonus to the students. This constituted an indispensable portion of many people's income. When Huang Yen-p'ei and Chang Chih-ho proposed to establish a public primary school, their plan was to take over the properties of the old school. This naturally elicited a barrage of objections from traditional scholars, not merely because it threatened their livelihood, but because it would also strip them of the prestige and security attached to the old learning. Old-fashioned private schools were still very popular in the area. The teachers of the private tutorial schools (ssu-shu) which were situated in every lane or two were also apprehensive about the impending fate of their profession.

The magistrate wanted to avoid trouble and therefore would readily ignore any proposal for change. Therefore, Huang Yen-p'ei and Chang Chih-ho, together with six other people who later became self-government officers, presented a separate petition to the Liang-chiang governor-general separately from the routine petition to the magistrate. The governor-general Chang Chih-tung was a famous proponent of modernization and reform, and therefore lent Huang Yen-p'ei the support he needed. With pressure from above, the magistrate succumbed. He was at first rather upset by the notion but later reasoned that it was hopeless to oppose it and so became quite friendly toward the project. However, the general feeling about the school was still rather uneasy, so that even though Huang Yen-p'ei was a
very poor man at the time, he and others on the staff of the new school agreed to teach gratis. Fortunately, the backing of an older man, Lu Chia-chi, lent them greater acceptability in local opinion, which would otherwise have dismissed them as a group of young, reckless, innovators. Even those parents who sent their children to the school did so primarily out of a feeling of expediency. They objected, for instance, to their children participating in the daily schedule of physical education, because they were afraid that they would be too weak for such exercise. But of course the youngsters were very excited by the new curriculum.

The activities of the new school were not restricted to the students officially enrolled. Public lectures were delivered by young intellectuals from Nan-hui County and Shanghai. The content of such lectures invariably revolved around how the foreign powers were about to carve up China, how important it was to build more new schools in order to strengthen the nation, and how opium smoking, gambling and footbinding were practices that would ultimately lead to China's destruction and therefore ought to be eliminated. In time, more and more villagers attended these lectures and were moved by the speeches. During the gatherings one could generally expect an audience of "several hundred." The lecture crowds were on very friendly terms with a group organized by the Christian churches. The members of both groups participated in each others' functions quite frequently, so that the lectures became rather important events in the county. The crowd included the population from both Ch'uan-sha and Nan-hui county since the two counties were contiguous and the network of social relationship between them was fairly dense. Unfortunately, the burgeoning movement was stymied suddenly when Huang Yen-p'ei and some speakers from Nan-hui who had just returned from Japan were accused of being revolutionaries. This occurred in the summer of 1903 as a result of an affair wherein they unwittingly exposed certain illegal activities of the local secret society in a temple in Nan-hui. The secret society struck back by leading the magistrate to believe that Huang Yen-p'ei and his friends were revolutionaries from Japan keenly pursued by the central government. Huang Yen-p'ei and Chang Chih-ho fled to Japan. Many of the text books in the Ch'uan-sha Primary School were subsequently burned by local officials.
Gatherings for popular lectures were never to occur again in Ch'uan-sha.

The financing of the new schools remained the primary point at issue. Ch'uan-sha Primary School was in a better position than most, because it received income from the old Kuan-lan Shu-yuan property. But the process of collecting rents certainly did not promote any good will among the local people. Traditionally, the government clerks were responsible for collecting rents for the school. But there had always been stubborn households who refused to pay for two or three years at a stretch. Since 1909, when the "Office for the Promotion of Education" (Ch'uan hsueh so) became associated with the local self-government, this condition had been rectified. Chang Chih-ho, who by that time had returned and succeeded Huang Yen-p'ei as the chairman of the board, induced the Sung-chiang Prefect to instruct the Ch'uan-sha magistrate to punish these stubborn families severely and also to instate a rule making the payment of rent necessary for obtaining permission to farm the land. This proved to be very effective. The reformers certainly believed that they were doing all this for the "public good." But for the tenant who now had to pay the full quota it was quite another matter. Since the reformers were much more conscientious and effective in collecting rents than the previous managers, it was not easy to persuade the tenant that the extra sum he paid was truly for the "public good," for he usually did not enjoy the benefit of any such "good," nor did he share in the honor attached to the achievement of it. Within the last five years of Kuang Hsu's reign, (1903-1907), 15 new schools were founded. In the subsequent three years, another seven were added. In some cases, these efforts unavoidably intruded upon the rights of other groups to use certain public properties such as public temples and lineage temples.

Even though the new schools were formally independent and were begun prior to the formation of the local self-government in Ch'uan-sha, most of the people who ran them were also very active in self-government. In fact, they represented the most progressive element among local self-government assembly members. Out of the 22 self-government members whose houses were destroyed during the 1911 uprising, at least 15 can be identified either
as founders of the new schools or as active promoters of them. New schools and self-government offices in each township seemed to comprise the primary targets of the mob. Besides the direct conflict with local interest groups, perhaps the new school became, to the local people, the symbol of the "New Policy," whatever that might have meant, upon which their anger could be vented.

Suppression of Opium-smoking and Gambling and the Compilation of the Census. In the wake of the "reformist" movement initiated by the Manchus in the last decade of the dynasty, an effort to prohibit opium-smoking and opium was revived, and in 1906 an edict was issued to that effect. The prohibition of opium-smoking and gambling was reported to be quite rigorous in Ch'uan-sha, carried on by various organizations in the city. Total fines of 656 yuan and 16 sticks of illegal opium were collected and presented to the magistrate between 1906 and 1911. Besides financing the investigation for uncovering the opium smokers the rest of the sum was kept within the magistrate's office for public purposes. The books and receipts produced by the agents suggested that they were unexpectedly honest with the proceeds. However, the same people who conducted the investigation and requested strict enforcement of the penalties, also collected fines from the people. Although they reportedly handed such fines directly to the magistrate without any meddling by the yamen clerks, the runners and clerks continued to demand the usual extra fees from the people, so that the villagers simply concluded that the anti-opium agents were responsible for all the additional trouble. Furthermore, the villagers believed that the agents actually appropriated the fines for themselves instead of channeling them into public projects. Consequently the agents seemed to hold no more legitimate claim to enforcing anti-opium-smoking and gambling laws than anyone else. Although the two organizations for fighting opium-smoking and gambling were formally distinct from local self-government, yet the members and investigators in both organizations were often concurrently members of the local self-government staffs, so that the population regarded them as belonging to one and the same entity, represented by the terms "self-government" and its "new policy." New schools and the prohibition of opium-smoking and gambling apparently
had the most immediate impact on local society. If we combine the list of the people involved in the operation of new schools with the list of those engaged in opium and gambling suppression, (which in several cases overlap) we discover that the resulting list covers all the local self-government officials who were victimized by the riots. In fact, a peasant named Huang Hsu-san, who was not a self-government officer, suffered great loss during the riots because he was an assistant in the organization for opium suppression.³⁸

Most of the local self-government movements in Kiangsu Province were paralysed in the initial stage of census compiling. The intent behind the project was probably related to tax collection and revitalizing the defunct police control system. Most of the population were disturbed that they had to report the property and land they owned and they tried their best to conceal it. As far as police control is concerned, besides the usual information required, the household members had to report any person with a criminal record, who did not have a "proper" occupation, or any who was an opium smoker. In Ch'uan-sha the census project was quite successful. For instance, by 1911, over 60% of the opium smokers' households had their register placards posted on their doors. But after the uprising hardly any of these placards could be seen except in one little section of a township. All the others had been destroyed.³⁹

Local Self-government Policies and Activities. The policies that had been recommended and put into effect during the year before the outbreak of the anti-self-government uprising were of three types: 1) general improvement of public welfare, 2) appropriation of sources of income, and 3) minor bureaucratic reforms. The various procedures adopted seem to have been calculated to unify and regulate the existing mechanism of local control. Most of the policies were proposed and carried out within the formats of the various township self-government organizations, and in that of the city. Policies that had county-wide application were brought up for discussion in a general assembly representing all the townships and the city. The proposals were directly handed to the magistrate, who either approved or disapproved them and issued public ordinances to legalize them. The magistrate, however, seldom contradicted the wishes of the local self-government.
Under the category of general improvement of public welfare, new items such as garbage disposal, street lamps and sanitation were added to such traditional public concerns as water control, road construction, charity medical care, and charity burial facilities. The Chih-yuan T'ang, which had been the sole agent of the traditional charity work since 1895, served as the general office for the city self-government. The self-government staff included many of the original managers of the Chih-yuan T'ang. What differentiated the new institution from the old was more energetic and thorough execution of policies. New schools, public reading places, and public lectures to educate the people in self-government were all designed to produce a new outlook among the masses. Teachers from traditional schools were invited to participate in an institution dedicated to studying new methods of education.

Under the heading of superstition and eradication of bad customs, occultist cliques were forbidden to solicit money, and the extortion of customs fees and blackmail by local ruffians in public places was to be reported by the self-government staff to the magistrate. The local self-government assembly also attempted to champion popular local causes such as requesting that the old, more favorable copper-silver exchange rate in tax collection be maintained despite the order to standardize the entire exchange rate in the province of Kiangsu. The magistrate, however, had already granted such a request to the public before the proposal was presented to him by the self-government assembly.

The local self-government inherited all the resources of the Chih-yuan T'ang allowing it to continue to finance the projects for which the funds were originally allocated. But in order to fund the new projects and ensure the effectiveness of the administration, new sources had to be tapped. Construction of fish ponds, taxing of imported milk cattle, and collection of fees from shops along those streets furnished with lamps and sanitary improvements helped to fill out the income of the self-government, but the amount was not very significant. Other measures, while aiding the finance of self-government projects, were more significant as establishing control over certain spheres that had previously been independent of the local gentry elite. Several instances of this type can be cited:

a. In Heng-sha township the local self-government
replaced various unofficial groups in the collection of fees from fishing boats along the shore in payment for spoiling the reeds which were used for fuel. It also obtained permission to take over the rights of the Bureau of Polderland Affairs (Sha-wu chu) to collect fees from the porters on the piers and fees for gathering marsh week along the shore, which amounted in aggregate to some 200,000 cash. 47

b. The magistrate had approved a proposal authorizing the local self-government to print some standard contracts for property transactions. The forms would be distributed free, although 20% of the brokers' fees would be collected for the self-government. The magistrate issued public ordinances to forbid private transactions and also ruled that transactions conducted without the local self-government's official seal would be considered void. 48

c. The biggest embankment in Ch'uan-sha had been built over 170 years earlier. A dike-head and some dike-attendants were officially employed to take charge of it. In the course of time, much land had been reclaimed between the embankment and the coastline, so that its original function had been lost. Many market towns had been built along the old embankment and much of the area had been privately laid flat for houses and farmland. Since the dike-head and the dike-attendants had been accused of a great deal of corruption and destruction of the embankment, the local self-government assembly requested their removal and proposed that the self-government offices should take over their responsibilities, i.e. to collect all the rents and property due from the houses and land that illegally occupied the original site of the embankment. The magistrate approved, but stated that half of the rent collected should be handed in to finance the magistrate's new office. 49

d. The replacement of entrenched interest groups by the formal apparatus of the self-government offices and the competition for these resources between the magistrate and the self-government offices as illustrated above was repeated under a number of other circumstances. The magistrate was asked to issue public ordinances delegating to the self-government the sole authority over shoreland that had just emerged from the water to forstall "Local strongmen and polder rascals" (shih-hao sha-lun)
from taking advantage of the situation. It is interesting that the magistrate, who was responsible for raising funds to finance the new police system, wanted to draw income from this shoreland. But according to a resolution of the Provincial Assembly, the profit from the land should be reserved for financing the local self-government projects alone. This left the magistrate in a grave dilemma and he put off a final decision until a later date.\(^{50}\)

The Ch'uan-sha self-government assembly proposed several minor bureaucratic reforms which, in themselves, signify little more than patching up the numerous holes in the existing system, but contained important potential for reconstructing China's internal political institutions in a constitutionalist direction. A few cases are listed below:

a. The magistrate was requested to restrict the activities of the chief jailor and to make him responsible for preventing his assistants from collecting illegal fees. (This is the only proposal that was not enacted.)

b. The tax-collecting clerks (Kuei-shu) were forbidden to demand illegal fees. This was to be effected by publishing the actual amount to be collected. In the meantime, the taxpayers were to go personally to pay in the tax-collecting station and have their receipt written out there while the chief clerk would be accompanied by some self-government officials for general inspection in Ch'uan-sha.\(^{52}\)

c. More constables (ti-pao) were to be created. The pao-chia system had been malfunctioning for a long time. For example, in Pa-t'uan Hsiang, there were only 4 constables for 12 chia. The local self-government assembly planned to enlist more help from the pao-chia system and so suggested that the number be raised to 12. The apo-chia clerks usually demanded a large sum of extra fees from the constables.\(^{53}\) This custom was to be ended and the fees reserved for compiling a census. The magistrate agreed that the customary exactions of the clerks should be ended. He continued to profess that his new office was short of funds so that he had been examining the various kinds of customary fees collected by the clerks in hopes of converting them to reserves for public purposes. The magistrate ruled that the pao-chia clerks were to be strictly prohibited from collecting fees from
the constables, but that each constable at the beginning of a term of service should pay a fee of 10 yuan, half for the self-government, half for the magistrate's new office.54

RELATIONSHIP OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT TO EXISTING POWER BLOCS IN CH'UAN-SHA

The elevation of the gentry's influence in local affairs from an informal to a formal status in the name of local self-government had caused a necessary restructuring of the relationships among the various power groups in the local society. The significance of this alteration, whether potential or actual, can be discerned from the self-government activities described above.

The County Magistrate and the Local Self-government.

Traditionally the magistrate seldom played a constructive role in local affairs. Restrained by a system deliberately calculated to cultivate "non-action" in the local society and by the centralization of power in Peking, the magistrate was held strictly accountable for mismanagement in the county, while, at the same time, faced the barrier of being a total alien to local society. Therefore, for self preservation, the magistrate would usually adhere to the policy of keeping "peace": discouraging upheavals which in many cases meant opposing change or remaining insensitive to it.

In Ch'uan-sha, we can see this principle at work. But in the context of the first decade of the twentieth century, the magistrate, in order to maintain peace, had to seek a delicate balance, not just among the various sectors of traditional influence, but between the new mode of political action and the old. Furthermore, this new mode was backed by authorities superior to the county magistrate. In 1903, the magistrate yielded to the request of Huang Yen-p'ei and his friends to turn the traditional academic center into a modern primary school, through pressure from the Liang-chiang governor-general. In 1908, a request from Chang Chih-ho through the prefect of Sung-Chiang fu, caused the magistrate to assist the reformers in obtaining full rent from the tenants on school lands. These changes, the magistrate realized, would antagonize certain groups in society, but to resist them could cause even greater problems for him. The
inception of local self-government was intended by the central government to complement the incomplete control of the magistrate, in much the same way as had traditional gentry services. This is observable in the continuation of the activities of the charity center, opium-smoking and gambling prohibition, and census compilation. But the creation of another official organ proved to be a two-edged sword. Not only was the magistrate's sanction utilized to the fullest extent by the local self-government to legitimize their efforts to gather more control, but the magistrate found himself in a position of competing with the self-government for resources to finance the new modernization projects that he was supposed to implement. The magistrate was responsible for his new office (of which we do not have sufficient information) and a modernized police system. In a society that functioned in an economically closed system with most of the people struggling to survive at a subsistence level, it would have been impossible to collect surplus wealth for the implementation of all the new projects. The local self-government assembly and the magistrate inevitably coveted the same exploitable items. The magistrate claimed a share of the income from the constable's inauguration fee, profit from the shoreland, and rent from the land reclaimed from the embankment. Tension between the government and the constitutionalists could already be detected when the provincial assembly exerted pressure on the provincial government to give directions to local magistrates to keep hands off the resources of the developing shorelands, leaving them exclusively at the disposal of the local self-government.55 The local self-government assembly seemed to have found an effective channel for dealing with the magistrate. These same pressures also drove the magistrate to tighten his authority over the runners and clerks. However, his attempt to examine the illegal incomes of the clerks must have strained the relationship between them.

Relationship Between the County Administrative Bureaucracy and the Local Self-government. The local self-government's reforms proved to have dealt the severest blow to the clerks and various other underlings in the county administrative bureaucracy. Extortion of illegal fees in the complicated process of tax-collection was curtailed. Even
though the clerks' experience was indispensable for the immediate maintenance of governmental procedure, their functions were now to be strictly supervised by local self-government officials. The responsibility as well as the income of the Bureau of Polderland Affairs was assimilated into the local self-government office. Corrupt and ineffectual dike-attendants were removed and the watchman was dismissed for being an opium-smoker. What the local self-government in Ch'uan-sha attempted to do was to centralize and regulate the inflated, corrupt but essential mechanism of control long entrenched in the county bureaucracy. To revitalize the pao-chia system by increasing the number of constables and assigning them specific functions in the local self-government was another important step toward rebuilding the local control system. The pao-chia system in the early Ch'ing was for the purpose of police control. To counterbalance the other powers already assembled by the gentry, the system was designed to include them under its control but to exclude them from its leadership. The constable (ti-pao) thus was a commoner vested with a lot of responsibility but with no authority or prestige. By assimilating the ti-pao into the structure of the local self-government, the previous distinction between the natural and administrative divisions of local control represented respectively by the gentry and the ti-pao were eliminated. This might have meant a more efficient local government with a definite advancement of local elite control from an informal to a formal level. Because of the entrenched power and position of the clerks and runners, the magistrate was helpless. His alienation may have been intensified by the fact that he was not a Han but a Manchu.

We can assume that the runners and clerks had already surreptitiously achieved a degree of control over the magistrate prior to their appearance before the public. But they preferred to keep their influence secret so that they could rely on the magistrate's authority and concentrate their energies against the local self-government. Thus, in the public speeches delivered by the clerks after the riots broke out, it was stressed that it was not the magistrate's intention to implement the new policy, but that he had been pressured by the gentry-staff to do so. Finally, the clerks proclaimed that the new policy had actually been repealed by an
order from the Court but that the magistrate had been prevented by the self-government staff from publicizing it. These efforts were obviously calculated to discredit whatever legitimacy the local self-government assembly had acquired for itself during the last year or so and expose it to open attack from the public.

Attitudes of Traditional Scholars toward the Local Self-government. Coordinating the quantity and quality of the educated elite with the needs of society has been a challenge to every society. This challenge is particularly evident amid the events of the past hundred years of Chinese history when fundamental changes were occurring in the educational and social systems. In this perspective, the significance of local self-government lay largely in its capacity to provide, for a host of a lower degree holders, a legitimate and meaningful social function that would not have been possible in the traditional political system. The degree of acceptance of the local self-government system provides some measure of the degree of willingness and ability of the local educated elite to adapt to changing political and cultural conditions. Out of approximately 75 lower degree holders in Ch'uan-sha, 33 were self-government officers. Approximately another 15 of them were close relatives of self-government officers. This left 27 of the lower degree holders outside of the local self-government. This indicates the degree of support of the policy from the lower degree holders. For those traditional scholars (including degree holders and educated commoners) who refused to participate in the local self-government, the local self-government may have seemed a threat to their social status and livelihood, and even a defilement of the essence of classical learning. Hostility toward the new schools was certainly a symptom of such attitudes on the part of a significant fraction of the educated group. The institution which proposed to reorient the traditional teachers was an effort to reduce the estrangement of the remaining traditional scholars. Of course, the extent to which the local self-government members were actually able to transform themselves in this increasingly chaotic situation is impossible to determine.

Relationship of the Heterodox Groups to Local Self-Government. The growing influence of religious groups
and secret societies in local society signified the failing grip of orthodoxy in the late Ch'ing. These mass organizations were traditionally hostile to the status quo. Not surprisingly the constitutionalists, with their elite backgrounds, were largely out of sympathy with these mass organizations. The leaders of religious sects and secret societies, who stemmed from the same roots as the masses and were united with the masses in their resentment of elitist exploitation and therefore were potentially revolutionary, nevertheless continued to behave in a manner well within the bounds of traditional relationships. This fact dominated their relations with the local self-government.

In Ch'uan-sha, we strongly suspect that a considerable interpenetration had occurred between the religious sects and secret societies. However, we do not know exactly what kind of relationships existed or how many of the peasants who participated in the riots were closely affiliated with them. We only know that most of the ringleaders in the riots, apart from the yamen clerks, were chiefly people in charge of the temple, or gang leaders such as Chang A-hsi. Focusing on the latter two groups separately it is possible to uncover a few clues to their antagonism toward the local self-government.

The local self-government officers attempted to eliminate the extortion and other illegal activities of local "ruffians" by volunteering to report such activities to the magistrate. Most of the gang members were dissatisfied and displaced elements who were addicted to opium and mingled in the society of the local gambling dens. The local self-government's effort to cleanse local society of its evil habits unavoidably affected the business of these groups.

As for the people in charge of temples, their antipathy toward the local self-government arose from the competition over the use of public buildings (temples) for schools and local self-government offices. Perhaps more important, these people also had basic economic interests at stake. Ku A-erh, the man in charge of the temple to Lord Kuan (Kuan-ti-miao) in Kao-chang township serves as an illustration. He styled himself the "director" of the temple (miao-tung), and in this capacity collected funds for the temple. The income he collected from the single
item of tung oil alone amounted to a considerable sum. Furthermore, he often acted as a mediator for contending parties in the local tea-houses and usually received some sort of remuneration for his services. He expressed his displeasure and remained uncooperative when the Kao-chang township self-government office was being set up in the temple. Since the establishment of the self-government office, one could observe his authority dwindling day by day. This no doubt accounted for his frequent complaints. Ku was also the owner of a nearby incense store, and could hardly have appreciated the self-governments staff's exhortations against "superstition." The economic welfare and prestige enjoyed by people like Ku A-erh derived from the people's religious beliefs and practices. Thus the reformers' effort to cultivate a different kind of mentality produced a conflict with the heterodox groups in the realm of basic cultural values. During the uprising, the house of the constable in that area, Chih Po-ta, was also destroyed, due to his having assisted the local self-government in office business. Ku A-erh had often scolded him for these transgressions.58

The conflict between the gentry and the other groups in local society, such as the four mentioned above, is an old theme repeated time and again in the local setting. But the formation of the local self-government forced these conflicts into a new stage of development. Elevated to an official level and supported by a nation-wide program of constitutionalism, the local self-government assembly appeared to threaten the existence of everyone of these groups. However, the threat was more apparent than real, because the committment to constitutionalism was not strong and wide enough to survive the tumultuous days of dynastic collapse and national reconstruction. Moreover, the movement failed to achieve a sense of legitimacy among the masses, as the following section will show.

RECEPTION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
BY THE GENERAL POPULACE

"Down with the new policies" was the slogan commonly voiced during the riots in Ch'uan-sha. What aspects of the "new policies" were the masses revolting against? The primary objection of the masses to the new policies was that they proposed levying new taxes on many miscel-
aneous items. A team of investigators dispatched by the local self-government office in Nan-hui particularly addressed itself to this problem and found that the accusations were based primarily on rumors. For example, the enforcement of the longstanding prohibition on goats ruining the new crops was interpreted as taxation on goats. Taxation on imported milk-cattle was interpreted as taxation on all draft cattle. The effort to forbid the brushing of newly processed cloth in the street where it obstructed traffic was interpreted as taxation of all the weaving machines in the area. An effort to forbid the practice of leaving unburied corpses exposed in the open air around the public places on the embankment was interpreted as a charge for coffins kept at home. Finally, investigation of the number of school-age children and census-taking were interpreted as taxation on every new-born baby. Even without the stories spread by the clerks and runners, the local self-government could not completely allay the villagers' suspicions. Everybody believed that the local self-government was going to levy many new taxes, and when asked for evidence of it, they emphasized that it was only because of the riot that the dreaded plan was checked. Looking at the policies and activities of the local self-government, already described, particularly in respect to appropriation of various local sources of income, one might easily believe that they were merely appetizers for a long course of further taxation. The power that the local self-government seemed to be able to wield labeled it in the public mind as another agent of effective exploitation. It was in this sense that the local populace was resentful of the "new policies."

But why did the peasants so easily misinterpret the new policies to their disadvantage, and why was their reaction so extreme? The causes are more widespread and deep rooted than appears at first sight. They involve the image presented and actions implied by the local self-government members to the local population in the context of the evolving cultural and social conditions in Ch'uan-sha, which reflects the condition of the nation as a whole.


From 1883 to 1905, Ch'uan-sha had suffered four severe storms and floods. In 1883 and 1889, over 33,000
people were on the relief rolls, a figure amounting to more than 30% of the total population at the time. In 1905, a typhoon killed about 5,000. In addition to these extraordinary hardships, opium addiction was a serious drain on local resources. An opium smoker could not avoid becoming a terrible burden for a family of average income. Not only did it sap the economic foundation of the family, but the psychological strain and mental depression could be even more costly. This condition of economic and moral bankruptcy was intensified as China was repeatedly humiliated by foreign guns in 1895 and 1900. Local "contributions" were levied to subsidize the expenses of the troops stationed at Po-lung Harbour in order to prevent them from pillaging local property. Additional property taxes, opium taxes and several other miscellaneous taxes were levied in 1902 and 1909 to pay the Boxer indemnity. Checking the record of taxes officially collected, we find that the tax quota levied on Ch'uan-sha had been steady for thirty years before 1900. But since 1900, the amount of taxation collected rose rapidly. By 1909, it was 85% over the level of 1900. In the midst of all this, expensive reforms were initiated by the Ch'ing court. Under the rubrics of new schools and local self-government, the grain tax was increased twice in 1906 and 1908, each receipt for the semi-annual grain tax was charged an additional fee of 5 cash, and taxes were levied on pigs and tea. Thus, it appeared that the so-called "reform" and "new policies" were both simply intended to swindle the people. This outlook on the part of the masses seriously hampered the local self-government. The slightest gesture on the part of the local self-government toward centralizing and perhaps rationalizing the scattered sources of income, even though for "public" purposes, might have been interpreted as replacing an old group of exploiters with a new one, or worse still, the superimposition of a new exploiting group upon the old.

Even though Ch'uan-sha did not have as many landlord families as other areas in South China, landlordism was nevertheless a problem; and the emergence of the local self-government seems to have fit right into existing patterns of landlord-tenant antagonism. The land inherited from Chih-yuan T'ang, the charity center, Kuan lan shu-yuan, the academic center, the Bureau of Polder-
land Affairs and various other newly emerged lands, now under the management of the local self-government, put it in the position of corporate landlord. Change, "new policies," never meant change for the better for the masses. It is naturally seen as a source of additional injustice to the poor.

Extension of Governmental Control through Local Self-government. Previously we have mentioned the activities of the local self-government members in census taking and in opium and gambling suppression. These procedures seem absolutely essential government functions. In the context of Ch'ing government, however, the more complex the network of contact between the government agency and the general population, the more the occasions for corruption and swindling. That is why the average person would pray to have as little to do with the government as possible. The requirement that the constable pay initial fees could one to surmise that being a constable might have been a rather lucrative position by virtue of its intimate contact with the common people. The Kao-chang township self-government assembly proposed increasing the number of constables from 4 to 12. For the people, this meant a more intensive police system and a heavier financial burden. The people's reaction to the controls on goat-rearing, taxing of milk cattle, and the restriction for brushing cloth in the street (which were interpreted as taxation for goats, draft cattle and weaving machines respectively) is an indication of the fear of governmental restriction on one's means of livelihood. In the relatively underdeveloped economy of China at that time, extension of governmental control meant sucking the last drops of water out of a shallow well. Before the well could be deepened, the peasants had to protect their won meagre subsistence. Therefore, while they were voicing their objections to new taxes, they were also voicing their resentment toward extended governmental control at a time when the society was ill prepared for it.

Social and Cultural Gap. The novelties which the local self-government members presented to the local populace in many cases might have been regarded as unnecessary or even hideous. There is no doubt that many of the most active local self-government officers were on good terms
with the missionaries. This is most clear in the affiliation of the missionary groups with the public lecture group in 1903. When Huang Yen-p'ei, Chang Chih-ho, and some of their friends were jailed as revolutionaries and were about to be executed, they barely escaped when a missionary, backed by the American consul, came to intervene. In this incident we also find that Huang Yen-p'ei and Chang Chih-ho did not appear in proper attire when they first called upon the magistrate. This caused some misunderstanding which prejudiced the magistrate in the later development of the case. One of Huang Yen-p'ei's chief enemies, Huang Te-yuan, also expressed his distaste for Huang Yen-p'ei's clothing. Huang Te-yuan claimed to be an uncle of Huang Yen-p'ei and secured the magistrate's sympathy by suggesting that Huang Yen-p'ei was an unfilial revolutionary.

In other counties in Kiangsu, Ch'ang-shu and Chao-wne, a peasant uprising broke out in August of 1911. In this uprising the peasants went into town to report on the desperate situation caused by rain and flood. The magistrates from the two counties and the local self-government members of those two counties were in a conference when the crowd came in for relief. They were promised relief. However, the peasants "were baffled by the language barrier between the magistrate and themselves and by the new terms and jargon of the self-government members." The peasants conceived that they were not being permitted to report the damage and became very angry. They responded by smashing the local self-government office and later continued on to the magistrate's yamen and the houses of the chief gentry in the city.

We do not know how much new jargon the local self-government members used in Ch'uan-sha, but the gap between the estimation of the situation by the masses and the reformist elite must have been considerable. Perhaps some of the local self-government members felt rather self-righteous while denouncing the "evil habits" of the populace. Apart from their zeal to collect fines for opium smoking and urging "contributions" for public projects, the local self-government policies on the unburied corpses must have embarrassed many people. Most of the corpses exposed in the open air belonged to people who could not afford a decent burial for their relatives and were too embarrassed to use the charity burials. Some
of them kept the bodies in ceramic jars and left them in the open air saying that until they could find a good geomantic ground they would not bury them. Evidently this was a very common practice in Ch'uan-sha because the wasteland near the embankments was reported to be full of corpses. The local self-government sent agents to investigate the situation and proposed to clear up the mess very quickly, a proposition leading naturally to hurt feelings and outrage. In some of the comments of the magistrate to the proposals of the self-government assembly, propositions to raise funds by "peaceful persuasion" were recommended. We can surmise from this that some means other than "peaceful persuasion" had been employed. These circumstances and many others reflect the arrogant style of the self-government elite, which could hardly have appealed to a population with a strong sense of social ethics. The importance of the content of these changes notwithstanding, the manner in which they were proposed should not be disregarded as a source of popular antagonism.

CONCLUSION

The local self-government organization in the several years just before the 1911 Revolution can properly be labeled a reformist, development-oriented group. Apart from traditional charity services, street lights, sanitation measures, and new schools, all of which were responses to the need for reform and modernization, we detect in the Ch'uan-sha self-government agenda an effort to rationalize the mechanism of economic and political control and to centralize them in the hands of the local self-government. In an attempt to maximize their own authority, the local self-government unavoidably infringed upon the spheres of influence of existing interest groups and the existing sub-county control mechanisms. Even the magistrate was driven into competition with the self-government for a limited pool of funds. Ironically, the magistrate's or the governor's endorsement was always the means by which the self-government's seizure of control was legitimized.

Thus, the concrete problem facing the local self-government was its attempt to maximize and centralize its control in local society and the reaction of existing groups
in protection of their interests. This only heightened pressure on the already poverty-striken and demoralized masses. Under such desperate conditions, in order to achieve any transformation of local society, the local self-government stood in need of both popular support from below, and legitimation from above. The township, city, county, provincial and national assemblies in 1911 appeared as a framework on the basis of which a comprehensive and unified system of representation and control could eventually supplant and take over the withering Ch'ing order. But the time was by no means ripe for the institution of an independent national constitutional system. The incidents in the uprising in Ch'uan-sha illustrate this point very clearly. The temporary failure of the local self-government in the spring of 1911 stemmed from the temporary removal of legitimacy. The clerks spread the news that the local self-government assembly was supported neither by the magistrate nor by the recent decision of the central government. When the magistrate failed to take a strong hand in dealing with the rebels, the masses had no reason to refrain from wreaking vengeance upon this conspicuous, yet impotent symbol of elite power.

With the benefit of hindsight, we realize that voluntary mass support could have been the strongest source of legitimation for such a regime. But popular support required that the self-government be trusted and viewed as a genuine agent of the public interest. This would necessitate some means of reintegration both economically and socially for the dislocated elements in local society. How far the Ch'uan-sha self-government was prepared to go to meet such a requirement, resulting ultimately in a reordering of local social and economic relationships, we cannot be certain. As our study of the characters in the Ch'uan-sha self-government assembly displays a wide spectrum of economic and social backgrounds and interests, we can expect a variety of solutions occurring to each individual in his later pursuit of an answer to China's future. But considering it as a total institution in 1911, the local self-government was limited by its functions as a "reforming" rather than "revolutionary" body. The local self-government was aiming at dealing with the other blocs of existing power, and, therefore, "reform" only in the sense of altering the
the relationships between one power group or the other within the realm made up by the various groups with vested interest. But the fundamental relationship between the mass and the elite was not considered. The traditional attitude of the governing group toward the masses was never questioned, while the traditional ties binding the society had gradually deteriorated. This situation demanded ultimately a more extensive reconstruction.

NOTES

1. The material in this section on the riots has been pieced together from two reports presented to the Kiangsu governor. The first report was composed by the chief officers of the local self-government offices in Ch'ang-jen, Kao-ch'ang, Pa-t'uan, and Chiu-t'uan townships. The other report was by Yang T'ing-tung, an advisor in the governors office. Ch'uan-sha Hsien-chih 1936, 23:9-10, 23:12-17. (Hereafter referred to as Ch'uan-sha 1936).

Ch'ang-jen township is one of the five townships that make up Ch'uan-sha county in Kiangsu. The township at this time was the largest rural administrative unit under the county. The other four townships in Ch'uan-sha were Kao-ch'ang, Pa-t'uan, Chiu-t'uan and Heng-sha. Ch'uan-sha is in the Yangtze Delta, southeast of Shanghai.

2. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 12:9b.

3. Nan-hui is a county southwest of Ch'uan-sha. Ch'uan-sha county was carved out of a portion of Shanghai and a portion of Nan-hui. Therefore intimate social relationships had been retained among these counties. Evidently Chang A-hsi and his friends were on very familiar terms with Ting-fei and the people in Ch'ang-jen township.

4. The Yangtze Delta terrain is laced with rivers and lakes so that the naval troops became one of the most mobile and effective means of police control. However, in a report given by the Kiangsu governor Ch'eng Te-ch'uan, the fast-rowing fleet had greatly deteriorated and moved slowly. Sometimes, the fleet moved only on paper. Ch'eng Te-ch'uan "Fu-Wu-wen-tu" (Documents on the governing of Kiangsu) in Hsin-hai ko-ming chiang-su ti-ch'u shih-liao (Historical materials on the 1911 Revo-
olution in Kiangsu, Nanking, 1961), 16.

5. The Chih-yuan t'ang managed the care of orphans, elders, widows, charity burial, charity medicine, and famine relief. Upon its founding in 1898, it received a donation of slightly over 100 mou of farmland, 15 houses in Ch'uan-sha City and 30 mou of burial land. It did not attain as large a scale as charity centers in other localities because Ch'uan-sha was such a small county, an undeveloped area only 300 years before, and deficient in big rich gentry families compared to other areas.

6. For the enormous extent of peasant revolts in the last decade of Ch'ing Dynasty, see Kung Shu-to and Ch'en Kuei-ying "Ts'ung Ch'ing chun-ch'i-ch'u tou-cheng" (A survey based on Ch'ing Grand Council documents concerning the masses' struggle of resistance prior to the 1911 Revolution) in Hsin-hai ko-ming wu-shih chou-nien lun-wen-chi (Collected essays for the 50th Anniversary of the 1911 Revolution) Peking, 1962, 208-210.


11. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 18:2b. Huang Yen-p'ei (1878-1965), known as an early advocate of vocational education in China, founded the China Vocational Education Society and industrial schools such as China Vocational Institute. In the 1940's he became active in anti-Kuomintang groups which advocated constitutional government in China. He helped found (1945) and served as Chairman of the China Democratic National Construction Association. After 1949, he held office in the Central People's Government, serving as minister of light industry until 1954.
12. A complete set of lists containing the names of self-government assembly members of the Ch'ang-jen, Kao-ch'ang, Pa-tuan and Chiu-t'uan townships and of the city and county self-government assemblies has been compiled with entries containing information concerning whether or not these men were 1. official degree holders (sheng-yuan or purchased degree), 2. the targets of attacks during the uprising, 3. active in the anti-opium campaign, 4. active in new schools, 5. members of prominent local lineages, and 6. additional biographical information pertinent to an understanding of their economic or career backgrounds. These lists are on file with the original paper and are available upon request from the author. The information in the lists above is based on the following lists included in the Ch'uan-sha Hsien-chih 1936: geneologies (3:1-14), biographies (15:5-38), lists of examination degree holders (18:1-3), lists of Sheng-yuan during the reigns of T'ung-chih and Kuang-hsu (18:3-9), lists of purchased degree holders and purchased office holders (18:16-18), lists of activists in promoting the new schools (9:8), and lists of proprietors of the new schools (9:36-38).

13. One example is Huang Yen-p'ei. See note 11.
15. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 1:12b.
16. See note 12.
17. See note 12.
18. With respect to the role played by lower degree holders in Ch'uan-sha local self-government, we can surmise from the biographical data assembled in the appendix that a) the number of degree holders is 41, out of a total of 88 local self-government officials; i.e. 46.6%, b) out of the 44 more important positions in the city, township and county local self-government assemblies, 24 were occupied by degree holders; i.e. 54.5%, c) 30 officials of the local self-government assemblies were involved in the new schools project and 21 out of these 30 were again lower degree holders, i.e. 70%.

19. An analysis of the appendix allows us to characterize the extent of participation by members of prominent lineages as follows: a) each of the existing prominent gentry lineages in Ch'uan-sha was represented by some members in the local self-government assemblies, b) almost all of these (16 out of 20) occupied important
positions in the assemblies. Out of 44 important positions available, 16 were occupied by this category, i.e. 36.3%. c) The geographical distribution of these gentry members from the most prominent lineages shows that they tended to concentrate in the city and county as opposed to the township assemblies. Kao-ch'ang Township claimed a particularly low proportion of these members, probably due to its relatively commercialized economy resulting from its proximity to Shanghai.

20. In 1928, the China Vocational Institute initiated a land investigation project in many places in Kiangsu. In the Ch'uan-sha report, it found very few large, single holdings. It was an extremely rare occasion to find a family holding of 30 mou. Most family holdings fell between 8 mou and 4 or 5 mou; some had nothing at all. This shows that income from land, if not supplemented by other sources of income, could not function as a significant basis of power for active participation in the local self-government. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 5:14-20.

Further evidence to show that landlordism in individual terms played little part in the make-up of Ch'uan-sha local government is that Heng-sha Township, which had the most tenancy, was the only, out of the five townships, in which the uprising of 1911 did not take place. In 1896 a riot broke out in Heng-sha alone to protest against high rent. (Ch'uan-sha 1936, 23:3a). This is not to suggest that the Ch'uan-sha local self-government was not involved in landlordism in a "corporate" fashion, considering the rents collected for education and charity and the recently acquired shoreland. It is important to note that the assemblage of such wealth was related explicitly to the new institution—the local self-government.

22. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 16:18 (Chang Chien) 16:21b (Huang Chi-Ian).
23. See note 12.
27. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 14:6b.
29. Ch'uan-sha, 9:26b.
31. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 23:3b.
33. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 9:26b.
34. The Office for the Promotion of Education was formerly the Educational Committee which was founded in 1906 as a response to the court's new educational policy since 1905. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 9:4.
38. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 23:15b.
44. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 19:14.
51. The significance of this change in the procedure of tax collection could only be fully appreciated with the background knowledge of how the tax collection system functioned on the sub-district level in Ch'ing times. Very often the tax-payer had to pay several times the amount due owing to the manipulation by the runners and clerks etc. See Hsiao Kung-chuan's study on this subject. Hsiao Kung-chuan Rural China: Imperial control in the 19th century, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960, 84-144.
53. Hsiao Kung-chuan Rural China: Imperial control in the 19th century, pp. 43-84.
55. See p. 62.
56. The name of this magistrate is Ch'eng-an, a white banner man. His office in Ch'uan-sha was from April 1909 until July 1911. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 17:2.
57. Out of approximately 75 lower degree holders in Ch'uan-sha in 1911, 33 could be identified as officials in the local self-government assemblies; another 15 were close relatives of local self-government officials. This
leaves a minority of 27 lower degree holders who were not related to the local self-government.

60. See pp. - of this paper.
61. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 11:3.
63. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 8:61.
64. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 3:26b-28a.
65. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 8:40.
66. See note 20.
67. Ch'uan-sha 1936, 23:3b-8a.
68. "Ch'ang-shao shui-tsai mao-huang jih-chi (A diary of flood and famine in Ch'ang-shao counties) in Hsin-hai ko-ming ch'iang-su ti-ch'u shih-liao (Historical materials on the 1911 Revolution in Kiangsu areas), Nanking, 1961, pp. 135-141.

GLOSSARY

Ai Ch'eng-hsi 艾承禧
Chang A-hsi 張阿希
Chang Chih-ho 張志鶴
Ch'ang-jen hsiang 成安鎮
Ch'eng-an 程安
Ch'eng Te-ch'uan 程德全
Ch'eng 城
Chih-yuan t'ang 至元堂
Chiu-t'uan hsiang 九團鎮
Ch'uan-sha 湖沙
Ch'uan-sha hsueh so 車所
Chu Po-ta 朱伯達
fei-wo-ch'uan 船佻
feng-chien 封建
heng-sha hsiang 橫沙鄉
hsiang 縣
Huang Te-yuan 黃德淵
Huang Yen-pei 黃炎培
Kao-ch'ang hsiang 高昌鄉
Kao-heng 高行
Ku A-erh 顧阿二
Ku-ho Ch'ing 顧合慶
Kuan-lan shu-yuan  開園寺
Kuan-ti miao  開國廟
Kuei-shu  桂書
Kung Chen  謹鎮
Li Sung-p'ing  劉松坪
Liang-chiang (governor general)  兩江總督
Lu Chia-chi  郭家驥
Miao-tung  棄童
Nan-hui  南惠
Nanyang Kung-hsueh  南洋公學
Ozaki Yukio  尾崎行雄
Pa-t'uan hsiang  八團鄉
Po-lung kang  白龍港
Sha-wu chu  沙橋舟
Shih-hao sha-kun  勢豪沙棍
Ssu-shu  私塾
Sung-chiang fu  松江府
T'ang mo chiao  唐墓橋
Ti-pao  地保
T'ing-fei  丁薦
Ts'ao A-ssu  曹阿四
Tzu-cheng yuan  致政院
Wu ta-pen  吳太濱
Yang Ssu sheng  楊斯盛
Yu-kung Temple  俞公廟
Yang Ping-tung  楊廷棣
This paper deals with the early years of the political tutelage stage of Kuomintang administration in Kiangsu, the province where its leaders once hoped to build a model of administration for other areas. It examines the concept of political tutelage which lay behind the relationship between party and government, the rules governing this relationship, and the actual working out of this relationship in practice at hsien (county) level. It focuses on the role the party played in county politics. It attempts to answer such questions as: what were the functions of the party? How did the party carry out its professed supervisory responsibility? To what extent did the party succeed in its supervision? What kind of tension or conflict, if any, existed between the party and the government? What measures were taken to alleviate such tension or conflict, and to what extent did they succeed?

THE THEORY OF POLITICAL TUTELAGE

Sun Yat-sen's blueprint for revolution

The concept of political tutelage originated in Sun Yat-sen's schematic design for China's revolution in three stages. The transitional period in this design, which he first designated as Yeh fa chih chih in 1905, was termed hsin cheng (political tutelage) in his 1914 party constitution. During this period, the nation would be governed by Sun's party, and the Chinese people would be trained and prepared under the guidance of his party for eventual constitutional democracy.

In his writings on China's revolutionary development in 1923, Sun had enumerated the tasks to be performed during this transitional period. In his design, the major task was to institute local self-government at county level. An ambitious program was outlined which would transform China into an advanced nation. This was to be initiated after the military forces had swept away the Ch'ing dynasty's corrupt bureaucracy and its bad influence. Also during this period, the people would receive
instructions on how to exercise their rights (min-ch'üan). The governing rights of the revolutionary government would be clearly spelled out, as would the steps of achieving local self-government at the county level. However, just how this ambitious program was to come about in terms of a party-government relationship was not clear and was never fully worked out in Sun's lifetime. Thus, when Sun died in 1925, he left the Kuomintang with a legacy of his teachings on the Three People's Principles, his design of a three-stage revolution for China and particularly his concept of party dictatorship (I tang chien kuo and i_tang chih kuo). As we will see later, the ill-defined party dictatorship during the period of political tutelage was diversely interpreted and inevitably became a source of constant conflict within the party as well as between the party and the government. First, let us examine the development of Sun's own thoughts on the relationship between party and government.

**Direct rule by party elites**

One searches in vain in Sun's own writings for explicit statements about the role of the party in relation to the government in his design for the transitional period. The closest indication to party dictatorship was contained in the 1914 constitution of his Chinese Revolutionary Party (Chung-hua ko-mingtang), which was organized after an abortive revolt against Yuan Shih-k'ai. Article 5 of this constitution embodied, in essence, the principle of party dictatorship. It states:

> From the date of the uprising of the Revolutionary Army until the time the Constitution is promulgated, is called the Revolutionary Period. During this period, all responsibilities of the nation's governing rest on the shoulders of our party members...^5

In other words, the country would be ruled directly by Sun's party members during the transitional period. Sun went on to group his party members into the three categories of "party vanguards" (shou-i tang-yüan) who joined the party before the revolution, "supporting party members" (hsieh-chu tang-yüan) who joined the
revolution before the establishment of the revolutionary government, and "ordinary party members" (p'u-t'ung tang-yüan) who joined after the establishment of the revolutionary government. Only the party vanguards would be given priority in assignments of government positions. Supporting party members were entitled to elect and to be elected to government positions, while ordinary members had only the right to vote.

This concept of party dictatorship, however, was regarded as a strange novelty, and its significance was not generally understood by party members at the time, according to the authoritative party historian Tsou Lu.7

Sun reiterated his principle of rule by party members again in 1921 in response to criticism of his party rule in Kwangtung.8 He emphasized his rule of Kwangtung by his party members (tang-jen chih Yueh), because, he argued, his party members would bring happiness to the Cantonese people by carrying out his party programs. He counted on his party members to implement his ideas of the Three People's Principles.

Rule by party principles

Two years after Sun defended his policy of party rule in Kwangtung by party members, he appeared to have lost confidence in them. For now he was disappointed by the low quality of his party members and disillusioned by the fact that the majority of them seemed to have joined the party as a short-cut to officialdom. Again, he reiterated his long-held notion of party dictatorship. But he warned that people were seriously mistaken who thought that party dictatorship constituted government by party members. Instead, he argued, party dictatorship meant rule by party principles.9

It was obviously impossible to accommodate all party members in the limited number of government positions available in Kwangtung. For example, there were only some 90 magistracies in Kwangtung, while there were in excess of 300,000 party members. In short, party dictatorship did not necessarily mean government by party members, Sun asserted. Only the most able party members would be given priorities in
government positions to implement party principles. It was the party principles, not party members, that were emphasized. But to insure that people understood party principles and party programs, members of the party were responsible for propagating these messages among the masses. Sun was apparently more concerned with implementing his Three People's Principles than with making government positions available to his party members and would allow non-party members in government positions as long as his party principles were upheld.

Party above government

In his writings up to the eve of the 1924 reorganization of the Kuomintang along the Leninist lines, Sun did not seem to have envisioned a party institution separated and functionally distinct from the government. His concerns were primarily how to carry out his ideals by the government either through party members or through party principles. However, the reorganization in 1924 of the Kuomintang on Soviet model clearly placed the party above the government. We now find Sun praising Soviet party dictatorship, after which he intended to pattern his regime. Soviet party dictatorship, according to Sun, held more political power than the political parties in Great Britain, the United States and France. The success of the Russian Revolution was attributed to the strong organization of the party and its party dictatorship, Sun conceded. The reorganization of the Kuomintang, therefore, should place the party above the government as was the case in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Kuomintang was reorganized with a committee system which provided a framework for decision-making by the party and the execution of its policies by the government, which was also reorganized along the lines of a committee system. The separation of party from government was gradually taking place, with the government taking orders from the party. The Kuomintang forces were now prepared for their Northern Expedition to unify the country.

However, before Sun's death in the following year the working relationship between party and government had not been fully defined except in most general terms at the highest level. By the time the
Nationalist Government and the Kiangsu Provincial Government were organized in 1927, frictions between party and government had occurred at lower levels. Divergences in the views of Kuomintang leaders and members on the role of the party and the relationship between party and government contributed to the confusion. Yeh Ch' u-ts'ang, one of the most influential party leaders in Kiangsu, for example, contended that party dictatorship meant party rule by principles only. He warned against falling into the trap of the Communists, who, by joining the party and by insisting on party rule, were trying to take over Kuomintang's political power. Others, such as the young party member Hsiao Cheng, who later rose to prominence in party and government, insisted that party dictatorship constituted rule of party by its totality, that is, by party organization, party principles and party members. Before we examine further the development of the rules governing party-government relationship and the actual working out of this relationship, it may be useful to speculate on the possible alternative courses available to the Kuomintang.

THE PARTY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER 1927

Possible alternative models

Given its turbulent history and its short period of political administrative experience in Kwangtung following its reorganization, the Kuomintang in 1927 had hardly enough preparation for the situation it now confronted on a national scale. Nor were conditions in Kiangsu at this time similar to those in the southern home base of Kwangtung. With the Kuomintang military phase ostensibly concluded, political problems of enormous magnitude suddenly called for modern devices and process of control for which traditional Chinese political experience afforded no guide. With the demise of Sun, the significance of his theory of political tutelage, which was now to be the order of the day, was largely left to the various interpretations of his party lieutenants. What was to be the proper relationship between party and government during the period of political tutelage?

It would appear that there were only certain possible workable resolutions: (1) the effective
merging of party and government at various levels by means of personnel integration, (2) detailed rules for supervision of government by party, or vice-versa, (3) ideological leadership and indoctrination by party, and (4) functional separation, whereby each would have its own sphere of operation, supplementing rather than conflicting with the other.

Personnel integration. To effectively merge the party with the government by means of personnel integration would mean for the key officials at various levels to hold both party and government authority. This would ensure that party policies were faithfully carried out. It would also appear to coincide with Sun's initial interpretation of rule by party members (tang-jen chih-kuo).

During the period of political tutelage, personnel integration was effectively accomplished only at the national level. There, the members of the Committee of the National Government (kuo-min cheng-fu wei-yuan-hui), the highest government administrative organ, held concurrent membership in the KMT's Political Council (Cheng-chih hui-i) which was the party's highest policy-making organ. Once policies were made by the party organ, they were passed on to the government for execution. At provincial level, however, party officials were divorced from government administration. Though most were party members, government administrators did not hold concurrent positions in the party committees. At county level, the KMT regulations of 1933 governing the selection of magistrates did not even require the magistrates to be party members. Thus, there was no personnel integration at either provincial or county level between party and government.

The KMT's concept of integration did not seem to require the replacement of government administrators by its party cadres. Thus, the 252 party cadres of the first class graduating from the Center Party Academy (Chung-yang tang-wu hsüeh-hsiao) in 1928 were assigned party positions only. This new breed of party cadres was integrated into the party bureaucracy at all levels. However, as the goals of the Academy, later re-named Central Political Academy (Chung-yang cheng-chih hsüeh-hsiao), underwent considerable changes

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during the subsequent years, both government administrators and party cadres were produced, with special emphasis now placed on government administrative jobs at local levels.\textsuperscript{17} No personnel integration in the sense of key officials holding both party and government positions at local levels was attempted.\textsuperscript{18}

Given the fact that party branches in many counties were non-existent or were only being organized after the establishment of county governments, the possibility of implementing the principle of personnel integration at county level was extremely slim if not altogether impossible. The county party units also suffered at various times from suspension of all activities for a variety of reasons, ranging from party purge to re-organization. For example, in Wu County, where county government was established in April, 1927, party units were not fully organized until December. Subsequently, party activities were suspended from May through June, 1928, and again from January through March, 1930.\textsuperscript{19}

Detailed rules and procedures. Sufficiently detailed rules for supervision of government by party with some workable enforcement procedures could also have defined the relationship between party and government. If carefully and realistically drawn, they could have served both institutions well. However, the existing rules governing the relationship between them were neither specific nor detailed. The \textit{Organic Laws} (Chung-hua min-kuo kuo-min cheng-fu tsu-chih fa and Sheng cheng-fu tsu-chih fa) of 1925 of both the National Government and the Provincial Government, for instance, were couched in extremely general terms. They stated that the National Government, being under the instructions and supervision of the KMT, was entrusted with the management of the nation's politics; while the Provincial Government, also under the instructions and supervision of the party, but through the direct orders of the National Government, was responsible for provincial administration.\textsuperscript{20} Such rules clearly ignored the existence of the party branches at the provincial level.

At the county level, unfortunately, the \textit{Organic Laws of County Government} (Hsien tsu-chih fa) failed altogether to acknowledge the Party's role in the creation of the Government at national level. Nor did
they mention the relationship between the government and the party. Thus Sun Yat-sen's local self-government program, toward which Political Tutelage was ultimately aimed, was left without any legal definition of the relations between county government and county party branch. It would take much friction between local party units and county governments for the Kuomintang headquarters to realize the desirability of providing more detailed rules and procedures to regulate the relationship between the two institutions. In essence, these rules, when finally promulgated, actually discouraged direct and positive interaction as well as cooperation between party and government at the local level.

**Ideological leadership and indoctrination.** Another possible relationship between party and government was to have the party assume the role of an ideological leader that would indoctrinate the masses with party ideology and make sure that party policies were correctly implemented by government. This would be, in Sun Yat-sen's words, rule by party principles (tang-i chih-kuo), which he once asserted to be the real spirit of party dictatorship. In Sun's view, party members were the vanguards of revolution. They were the enlightened segment of the population who understood the real meaning of the Three People's Principles. Therefore, they were the only ones who could correctly interpret the party ideology.

During the initial period of Political Tutelage, the Kuomintang did make repeated efforts to indoctrinate the masses. All government workers, military personnel and people in the police and security forces, for instance, were required to study party ideology regularly. However, this indoctrination campaign appeared to have been directed from the central party headquarters and from the provincial party only. We find no evidence to indicate its accomplishment at county level. On the contrary, a party survey of the counties in Kiangsu indicated in 1929 that few party workers really understood party ideology, and that the majority of government workers not only did not understand party ideology but also distrusted the party. Thus, as evidenced in this survey, the Kuomintang failed to assume its role of
ideological leadership at county level.

Functional separation. A final meaningful relationship between these two institutions could take the form of functional separation, whereby each would have its own sphere of operation, supplementing rather than conflicting with the other. Obviously, this was the solution most clearly envisioned, and therefore most favored by the Kuomintang leaders who had been "given priorities in government positions," to use Sun's terminology. Hu Han-min, president of the Legislative Yuan and the party's chief theoretician, for instance, explained this functional separation. He contended that the party had delegated the task of governing to the government while retaining the responsibility of educating, leading and training the masses in carrying out local self-government. While "the duty of the party was to lead the people and to persuade them to adhere to the principles of self-government," the duty of the government was to "establish the method of self-government." In short, the government's task was to administer, to "raise standards through education, health, transportation, and so on;" while the party's task was "to spread propaganda, to engender faith and confidence, and to disseminate information." Functional separation of party from government was reflected in actual practice in the institutional structure of these two institutions. It may best be understood by an examination of them.

Institutional structure of party and government

Since the government was assigned the task of governing, its institutional structure was set up accordingly to administer such functions as public security, finance, development, education and land affairs. At county level, these functions were managed by the administrative bureaus bearing their names. Above these bureaus stood the county magistrate. Theoretically, the magistrate was responsible directly only to the provincial Department of Civil Affairs, but more often he was given credit for all the good and held responsible for all the evil within his administrative area. Under him, however, things were actually run by the various administrative bureaus who corresponded directly with the analogous bureaus at provincial level. Traditionally, he was the head
and the ultimate authority of the county under his administration. But during the period of Political Tutelage, a new, separate party institution existed to perform certain functions that were clearly outside the control of the magistrate.

As mentioned earlier, the major task of the party was to educate, lead and train the masses in carrying out local self-government. This philosophy was evidenced in the structural set-up of the county party units. Despite frequent reorganization, the party units usually consisted of functional departments such as organization, training, propaganda and mass movements. The chief officials of the departments made up the executive committee, which represented the county party unit. In addition, a supervisory committee served as party watchdog.²⁷

Thus, at county level, two separate institutions of party and government existed side by side to perform separate functions, ostensibly to supplement each other. In reality, the relationship was not supplementary, but rather one of interference and intervention.²⁸ The theoretical requirement for supervision of government by party was not reflected at county level as clearly as at the national level. As we will see, the party's attempts to control the government at county level, and the government's resistance to such control, generated a great deal of conflict.

Role of the party

It was generally understood that, as the creator of the tutelage government, the Kuomintang was to control and supervise the government, to train the people in the use of their political rights, and to guide the people toward self-government in preparation for constitutional democracy. Since the political party was a relatively new institution in China, and party dictatorship a new concept, how was this general view of the party's role to be translated into reality in terms of concrete procedure?

The divergent views of the proper role of local party units in relation to the local governments were confusing and often contradictory. Hsiao Cheng, the young party member whom we have mentioned before, for example, insisted that provincial and county governments take orders from party organs at their levels,
just as the central government did at the national level. Since the government was the creature of the party, government administrators were delegated by the party to manage political affairs. Therefore, he argued, the party at all levels should take a supervisory position in policy making and pass on the policies to the local governments for execution.  

In direct contradiction was the view of the party's chief theoretician, Hu Han-min. Hu complained about exactly this kind of attitude. In his view, those who conceived of the party as superior to the government and insisted on the government's unconditional submission to party leadership were seriously mistaken. What, then, was the proper role of the party?

Supervision. The KMT statutes of 1928 stipulated that the highest policy-making body was the Party National Congress, or when the Congress was not in session, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. Since the Congress was rarely convened and the CEC too large to be effective, the actual decision-making power was often exercised by the Standing Committee of the CEC. By 1929, however, the CEC had designated its Political Council to guide the progress of national revolution and to determine and execute political goals. The Council thus became "the guiding and supervisory organ for the task of national tutelage." It initiated guidelines for national policy and passed them to the National Government for execution. It was the only formal link between party and government at the national level. At this level, the party's supervision of the government was complete and absolute.

At provincial and county levels, however, the party's supervisory function appeared to be not so clearly defined and understood. In the local party branches, the institution closest to performing the supervisory function was the supervisory committee, which only served as party watchdog. Even its authority to supervise government appeared to be in question. In fact, the various attempts by the county party branches to supervise county governments generated great hostility between party and government, as I will show later.
Thus the Kuomintang's role as a direct supervisory organ to tutelage government was realized only at the highest level. At county level, the KMT's supervisory position bore little resemblance to the facts. However, it appeared that a number of functions were clearly reserved for the party.

Control of people's groups. The Kuomintang had regarded itself as vanguard of Chinese revolution. It now considered itself as teacher of the people. Its responsibility in training the people in self-government was clearly spelled out in the party programs for the tutelage period.33

Regarding supervision of people's groups (min-chung t'uan-t'i), the party was to enjoy a total monopoly, at least theoretically, without the interference of government. At various times, special departments, sections or committees were set up in the party at provincial and county levels to guide and supervise the activities of people's groups. In the Kiangsu Provincial Party Branch in 1932, for instance, the Section of Mass Movement (Min-chung yun-tung chih-tao k'o) was responsible for this supervision.34 In 1928, the Committee for Mass Training (Min-chung hsün-lien wei-yüan-hui) was created in the county party branches and party officials were assigned to direct the activities of people's groups.35 In most cases, newly formed groups were authorized by party branches. However, once organized, the groups were also to be registered with the government. In 1931, for example, fifty-six county agriculture associations, forty-six county commerce associations and fifty-five county educational associations were registered.36 They were supposedly under the control of county party branches.

The Kuomintang's interest in controlling the people's groups stemmed from its self-appointed role as guardian of the people. The people needed guardians because, without training, they were vulnerable to sinister political influence. At this time, the Kuomintang's fear of Communist domination was real rather than imagined.37 The supervision of people's groups served as an excellent device to prevent the Communists from organizing the people. Mobilization was clearly not the goal of party control. Thus, we find very little activity reported. One source contended that
mass movement was discouraged because of its previous domination by Communist elements.  

Indoctrination. Indoctrination of the masses was an important role of any party with an ideology. The Kuomintang's professed ideology of the Three People's Principles had not been sufficiently publicized in China's vast countryside. Nor had it been properly understood by all party members and government workers. Earlier, we have noted a nation-wide indoctrination campaign in 1928 aimed primarily at government workers, military personnel and people in the police and security forces. This plan called for all personnel of the government, the military and the police to organize themselves into groups for the purpose of studying the party ideology on a regular basis. However, we find that a year later, the party headquarters complained bitterly that many organs under the banner of the party, i.e. the government organs and the military, had not yet organized such study groups. We also noted that at the end of 1929, a provincial survey of county party affairs reported the general ignorance of the masses about party ideology. 

Now in 1930, the Kuomintang's third plenary session of the third National Congress outlined a new program of propaganda to be carried out at county level. The task of the county party branches, according to this plan, was to send party workers out to the countryside or to direct its subordinate party units to publicize party ideology so that the masses would understand the Three People's Principles. It was the responsibility of the party to publicize the benefits of the various programs of self-government. This was done to assist and supplement the government's own efforts in the initial stages of self-government.

Anti-Communist activities. Following the admission of Communists into the party and the 1924 reorganization, the Kuomintang began to face keen competition from the newcomers. Before the Northern Expedition was launched, the Communists had managed to dominate some departments of the KMT. At the central headquarters, for instance, the Departments of Organization, Labor, Farmers and Youths were controlled by the Communists. In addition, a few Communists occupied important positions of the party at the highest level. In Kiangsu Province, when the provincial party was
secretly organized in 1925, six out of nine executive committee members were ranking Communists. This resulted in the complete domination of the KMT by the Communists at provincial level. It also had an immediate impact on the existing party branches at county level, where the Communists also assumed important positions and gained considerable control.\(^{42}\)

Following the bloody purge of April, 1927, the Communists went underground. Their activities became increasingly difficult to check. Thus, in May of the same year, the KMT's central headquarters established a Section of Investigation (tiao-ch'a k'o) in its Department of Organization. Subsequently, it carried out a vigorous campaign against the Communist underground.\(^{43}\) At the same time, the Kiangsu Provincial Party headquarters also set up a Section of Intelligence (ch'ing-pao k'o) in its Purge Committee (ch'ing-tang wei-yuan-hui) to deal with the Communists.\(^{44}\)

For a period of time before the courts were formally instituted to prosecute the Communists, it was the responsibility of the party to conduct a vigorous drive against them. In July, 1928, for instance, local party units were requested to report Communists to the special court for prosecution.\(^{45}\) By 1929, the KMT had become increasingly alarmed by the activities of the Communist underground. In August, 1929, Tuan Mu-chen, one of the committee members of the Kiangsu Provincial Party, set out to arrest eight Communist suspects and later turned them over to the local T'ung-shan County government for detention and interrogation.\(^{46}\) Later in the same year, in a joint conference of the highest officials of the Kiangsu Provincial Government and the Provincial Party, in which Tuan also participated, the question of bandit-suppression was raised by the party. Subsequently, it was resolved that thereafter the party would be responsible for keeping tabs on the activities of the Communists and other factions. The Provincial Government should send information regarding the activities of such groups to the party if the government came into possession of such information.\(^{47}\)

In 1932, after the "bandit-suppression" (chiao-fei) campaign had been launched, local party branches were urged to do their best to investigate the activities and organizations of the Communists. They were
required to send out party workers to spread "bandit-suppression" propaganda and to organize village traveling propaganda teams to investigate the whereabouts of the Communists.\textsuperscript{48} In the same year, an office of intelligence was formally instituted at Kiangsu Provincial Party headquarters to investigate the activities of the Communists and other "reactionaries."\textsuperscript{49}

Thus, during the period of Political Tutelage, we find that the Kuomintang was functionally separated from the government. This was especially true at local level where there was no formal linkage between these two institutions. This relationship, or rather the lack of it, did not present any particular difficulty when both party and government were mutually satisfied with their prescribed roles. However, this was not always the case. Therefore, provisions were made to regulate the relationship when conflict did arise.

CONFLICT BETWEEN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT

Not long after the Kuomintang established the Nationalist Government in 1927, the Kuomintang Political Council, which was the highest policy-making organ during the period of Political Tutelage, passed a resolution by Ch'en Kuo-fu regulating the working relationship between party and government at county level.\textsuperscript{50} The resolution established the rights of the county party branch to supervise county government. But it lessened the party's position considerably by adding that the party's duty was to make suggestions to the government and that the party was prohibited from taking direct actions to implement its suggestions. Ch'en Kuo-fu was obviously aware of the fact that party units in many counties had yet to be formally organized. In these counties, the resolution added, the duty of the party was limited to party business. On the other hand, the county government had the obligation to support the county party branch, but was also prohibited from interfering with party work. The resolution further provided a cumbersome channel for airing complaints and discontent. When the county party branch was dissatisfied with the conduct of the county government, it would voice its objections to the provincial party branch which would relay them to the provincial government for correction. Likewise,
the county government should do the same in reverse order if it objected to the conduct of the county party branch. However, each was prohibited from taking direct actions against the other.

This resolution is extremely significant in its provision of the party's supervisory role. Unfortunately, it stopped short of defining the meaning of supervision. The divergent views of the significance of supervision on the part of many party officials later resulted in frequent conflict with the government.

**The Party's attempt to control the government**

Conflict between party and government took many different forms. Although direct party control of government at county level was clearly prohibited by the Kuomintang headquarters, as evidenced by the Ch'en Kuo-fu resolution, many county party officials insisted all along on having some general supervisory responsibility over county governments. It was not unusual to find lower party officials in open defiance against the orthodox interpretation of the party's role of supervision. Thus, as Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang warned against the notion of party rule by all party members at all levels, Hsiao Cheng would insist that governments take orders from party branches at corresponding levels. Yeh asserted that party control meant rule by party principles only. He condemned the notion of party rule by party members and by all party branches as being a Communist conspiracy designed to usurp the Kuomintang's political power through party control.51

Supervision. Despite the prohibition of direct control, the county party branches never ceased attempting to exercise their supervisory authority over the county governments. In the final analysis, the Kuomintang at county level served at least a watchdog function, as the two cases presented here seem to suggest.

The first case concerns the Chief of the Finance Bureau of Hsing-hua County, P'an Chi-kuang, who was censured by the local party branch in 1929. P'an and his bureau subordinates were reported to be opium smokers and patronizers of a local brothel. They were alleged to have received bribes and appear to have abandoned their duties and fled their offices. Having
gathered some evidence against P'an and his subordinates, the local county party branch sent a telegram to the Kiangsu Provincial Government pressing the charges and asked the government to fire and prosecute P'an and his subordinates. The government immediately ordered its Department of Finance to investigate the case.  

Another case concerns the rights of a county party branch to review the county government's administrative policies and reports. In March, 1929, the Supervisory Committee of Chü-jung County Party Branch sent a memorandum to the local county government asking, for the first time, to review government administrative policies and guidelines. Surprised by the request, the county government sought advice from its superior, the Provincial Department of Civil Affairs (min-cheng-t'ing), which in turn sent a memorandum to the provincial party committee for clarification. The provincial party committee replied that, according to the KMT organic laws for the organization of the supervisory committees of county party branches, the county supervisory committees had the right and duty to review county government administrative policies and to determine if they conformed to party policies. The provincial party committee cited the exact laws to prove the authority of the county party supervisory committee on this matter, without mentioning that this authority had never been exercised. The discovery later prompted the provincial party committee to send another memorandum to inform the provincial government of its decision to request that, thereafter, county government administrative policies, resolutions and administrative reports be submitted to county party supervisory committees for review. This was, as the request indicated, to reestablish the authority of the party. However reluctant the provincial government might have been, its committee members resolved to go along with the request in an obvious effort to avoid a confrontation with the party in the face of the latter's complaints. Subsequently, the provincial government ordered the county magistrates to obey the new decision. Finally, the county party branches succeeded in acquiring some form of supervisory rights over the county governments. It should be pointed out, however, that we do not find evidence that county magistrates were willing to submit
to party scrutiny. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the party's insistence on this matter was blatantly ignored. We will discuss this development in the section dealing with the government's resistance to party control.

Budget-making. Although the tutelage government was the creation of the party, party expenditures during the tutelage period came from government budgets. The party itself had no channel for collecting taxes. The proportion of the government budget allocated clearly indicated the insignificant role assigned to the party. At national level, for example, the party accounted for only one percent of the budget in 1928 and thereafter declined annually to eight-tenths, six-tenths and five-tenths of one percent. At provincial level, the pattern closely resembled the national pattern.  

At county level, party fund allocations were not always guaranteed, or if promised, were not always delivered. In 1927, for example, the party budgets came from the unused portion of a special fund earmarked earlier for county assemblies, which were not organized under the Nationalists. Sometimes, party activities at county level were suspended and the budget denied.

The problem of party finance loomed large in the relationship between the magistrates' offices and the local party branches. In the struggle between party and government, party finance was the central issue which both sides tried to use to their advantage. Thus, while the magistrate was trying to bring the party to its knees by holding up the allocated budget, the party constantly demanded more funds to carry out its activities. In some cases, the party was forced to borrow money from the county government and was thus placed at the mercy of the magistrate. In an effort to reverse the situation, the executive committee of Kao-yu County party branch, for instance, demanded in 1929 to participate in the county government's budget-making process. It presented its argument of supervision to the provincial party, which relayed the request to the provincial government. Understandably, the provincial government denied the request on the grounds that budget-making belonged in the area of political administration.
Personnel selection. Conflict between party and government also involved the issue of personnel selection. When it did, it often reflected individual style rather than institutional policy. In the first case presented below, the party official involved appeared to have acted more in his own interests than in the interests of the party.

The first case involves a powerful party committee member, T'ung Ch'uan-chün of Chia-ting County. As Chief of the Training Department of the county party branch, T'ung was responsible for reviewing the credentials of school teachers who were selected by the county government's Bureau of Education to teach courses on party ideology. Instead of reviewing their credentials, he rejected them all as being unqualified. Subsequently, he notified the Bureau of Education of his own choices and sent his personal associates to teach in the schools. It turned out that he and his associates were more interested in criticizing the local administration and the school teachers than in teaching party ideology. This greatly provoked the school community. In a joint plea to remove T'ung from his party authority, the magistrate, the chief of Police Bureau and the chief of local defense units listed an inventory of T'ung's misconduct. As a result, T'ung was fired from his party office.

Another case involves a county party branch which had been ordered to suspend all activities. Tan-yang County party branch was accused by the magistrate of having interfered with county government administration in general and with its personnel selection process in particular. When the county government was in the process of hiring its own personnel for accounting and property management, the party branch was alleged to have pressured the government to allow the party's participation in the process. Moreover, in the selection of candidates for the village administrative offices, the party was also allegedly guilty of monopolizing the selection process. These actions of the party branch also provoked great resentment among the local population. As a result, the party headquarters at Nanking authorized the Tan-yang county magistrate to notify the county party branch to cease further activities.
immediately.  

**Arrest.** The case presented here was the first of a series of actions taken by the party branch workers to disgrace the magistrate and to discredit the county government's authority in the struggle between party and government. This case concerns the party's sabotage of the government's effort to collect taxes. It happened in 1928 in Chen-chiang County, when the government dispatched its clerks to the villages to collect land taxes for fiscal year 1927. Earlier, the Nationalist Government had announced that uncollected land taxes prior to fiscal year 1926, i.e. before the Kuo-mintang's seizure of power, would be exempted. Taxes due the government for 1927, however, would be collected. With the deadline for payment approaching, the people still refusing to pay the taxes, county government dispatched its clerks to enforce its tax collecting efforts. The clerks returned empty-handed. On their way back to town, they were arrested and searched by county party branch workers and taken to party branch office. There, the government's order for tax payment was confiscated by the party workers. A receipt was issued by the party for the confiscated order, charging its illegality. This incident greatly damaged the government's effort to collect taxes and resulted in the subsequent non-payment of taxes long overdue.

The party's efforts to control the government were not limited to these incidents. Other tactics used by the party ranged from plain harrassment to intervention in government administration. The above cases, however, were typical of numerous KMT attempts to control the government at the local level. Conversely, the government was not innocent of interfering with party affairs.

**Government's resistance to party control.**

The separation of party from government control under the Nationalist regime must have been anathema to the magistrate who had a traditional view of his role of total supervision of county affairs. The presence of an independent party structure at the local level now represented a serious breach in the magistrate's authority. It is understandable that in the
early days of the Nationalist administration, the magistrate tried very hard to resist the party officials' influence.

Arrest. The county government's earliest effort to resist party control was most often expressed in the form of arrest of party workers. This reflected the local suspicion and distrust of the new institution. As early as August, 1927, four months after the establishment of the Nationalist Government, party representatives from Kiangsu province reported that party workers sent by the headquarters were being arrested by county government authorities. In T'ai-hsing County and Wu-hsi County, for example, the Police Bureaus of the government often conspired with the local bullies and bad gentry and had the party workers arrested. In a speech delivered to the Kiangsu Provincial Government on June 4th, 1928, Yeh Ch'uts'ang confessed that party commissars sent by the national headquarters to work in the provinces were unable to get to their assigned localities, or could not function if they ever got to the places, or were forced back by local hostility. Although he would not admit that Kiangsu was among those provinces where local party officials were being arrested, we have evidence to suspect that this was the case. For instance, one month after his speech was delivered, the Kiangsu Provincial Party, through the regular channel of provincial government, requested that county magistrates ensure the safety of party workers. It was doubtful that this order from the provincial government could have immediately lessened county governments' hostility toward the new institution. In any case, both party and government at higher levels had to issue directive after directive to warn against local authorities' stepping upon the local party workers.

Ignoring of the Party. After the initial failure to prevent the local party units from being organized or from functioning, some county governments must have realized that as a new and separate institution, the party was there to stay. This new institution was not subject to control by existing government structure. On the contrary, it sometimes claimed to be above government control. We have noted, for example, that in early 1929 some county party branches had begun making
demands on county government for review of government policies. By June of the same year, the provincial government had given in to such demands and had ordered the county governments to comply. If it was to conform to the demands of local party activists, the county government's relationship to the new institution would have to be drastically changed. What was to be done? At least one county government was reported to have chosen to ignore the county party units altogether.

In Dao-yu County, where the supervisory committee of the county party branch had demanded to review the county government's administrative policies, plans for administrative reforms, and records of administrative meetings and resolutions, the party's communications to the government had fallen on deaf ears. Two months after the requests, there was still no response from the county government. Moreover, in an effort to determine the current conditions of village administration and public security, the committee had also asked the government to order its subordinates to fill out some questionnaires. Such requests had also met no response in spite of repeated reminders by the party committee. Nor was there any response to its request that the county government's Bureau of Development (Chien-she chü) make public its budget and its monthly reports. In other words, the county government had ignored the existence of the local party branch altogether.

Financial cleavage. As noted earlier, in the struggle between party and government, party finance was the one central issue that both sides tried to use to their advantage. However, the evidence available seems to indicate that party finance was the one cleavage the government successfully utilized to resist the party's attempt to control the government. We have commented generally on the Nationalist Government's budget-making process. In the early days of the Kuomintang administration of Kiangsu Province, provincial party expenditures were originally to be funded by the Kuomintang Central Headquarters. Since the headquarters was itself in financial straits, provincial party funds were later borrowed from the Kiangsu Provincial Government. By March, 1928, for instance, the Kiangsu Provincial Party Branch had borrowed more than ¥60,000 from the Kiangsu Provincial Government for its own expenses, and more than
¥30,000 for funding the activities of the people's groups under the party's guidance. In the countryside, the county party units were not guaranteed their funds and were forced also to borrow from the county governments. Thus, they were placed at the mercy of the county magistrates.

In June, 1927, the Soochow Party was not provided with any funds to carry out its activities. From May through June of 1928 in Wu County, party activities were suspended and the party monthly budget was reduced from ¥1200 to only ¥60 for survival. The Chü-jung County party branch was not as lucky. Its request for ¥200 to support its committee members during the period of suspension of party activities was altogether rejected. In July, 1928, the Kiangsu Provincial Party complained that some county governments had not made loans available to county party branches while other county governments had not made enough loans. It pleaded with the Kiangsu Provincial Government to order the county governments to bear with the county party units "just once more" so that party activities could be continued. Subsequently, the provincial government decided to ask the county governments to do just that, and no more.

If other magistrates were willing to help out the party branches in their counties, the magistrate of Nan-t'ung County, Shih Su-chih, certainly held no sympathy for the party in his county. In March, 1929, when the party chief, together with some representatives of the people's groups went to Shih to borrow fund to revive party activities, he got insults instead. Shih was reportedly incensed at the party's request, refused to make loans, uttered "counter-revolutionary" remarks and rejected the legitimacy of the representatives of the people's groups.

Nan-t'ung County magistrate was not alone in refusing to help the local party branch. Su-ch'ien County Government was even more hostile to the party workers. After a riot by bandits some time in 1929, Su-ch'ien party branch workers no longer considered it safe to operate in the county. Subsequently, the branch was evacuated to Nanking and continued to direct party activities from the capital. Its monthly budgets were then held up by the county government's Finance Bureau. When the party asked for the funds, the Bureau refused to
Attempts to solve conflict. 

Earlier, we have noted the Ch'en Kuo-fu resolution passed by the Political Council in 1927 to govern the working relationship between county party and county government. The resolution established the county party's rights of supervision over the county government and the county government's obligation to support the party, but prohibited each from taking direct actions against the other. The negative attitude of the resolution also prevented a positive relationship from emerging. The above cases demonstrated that both party and government frequently violated the non-intervention clause. Given the nature of the conflict, the resolution obviously did not serve its purpose well.

In August, 1928, the central Kuomintang headquarters reiterated this resolution and ordered both the party and government at local levels to observe the provision. However, as conflict continued to arise, some efforts were made at the local level to mitigate the hostility. In September, 1928, for example, both the county magistrate and the party chief of Wu-chiang County signed a joint petition to the Kiangsu Provincial Government, reporting a meeting held between them and offered to draw up regulations for further such meetings. Whether because of insensitivity to the problems between party and government, or because of some other reasons on the part of the provincial authorities, this offer was not accepted. The provincial government committee members handling the suggestion resolved against such regulations. However, they conceded that such meetings between party and government might take place if deemed necessary by both. Thus, the first attempt to establish and regularize a positive relationship between party and government at local level failed.

However, three months after the initial negative response, the Kiangsu Provincial Government Committee members held a meeting with their counterparts in the Kiangsu Provincial Party, in which the merits of meetings between party and government were recognized. As a result, the provincial government ordered the county governments to hold such meetings with their county party branches on a regular basis, i.e. once every two weeks,
to discuss mutual concerns and to iron out whatever differences existed between them.  

Such meetings might have led to the development of a more meaningful relationship between the two institutions had they been held regularly as ordered. However, evidence suggests that this was not the case. For example, ten months after the above order had been made public, the Provincial Party was asking the Provincial Government to hold their second joint meeting.  

It was not until October, 1929, when the second joint meeting finally took place, that the rules to regulate such meetings between party and government at county level were worked out. Such meetings were to be attended only by the most responsible officials of the two institutions, i.e. the members of the Executive Committee and Supervisory Committee on the party's side, and the magistrate and the bureau chiefs on the side of the county government. The meetings were to be held bi-weekly, and to be called alternately by the party and the government. Obviously, the order to hold such meetings was not strictly carried out. In December of the same year, for instance, conflict between party and government was reported in Chiang-yin County, and in January, 1930, the order had to be re-issued by the provincial authorities.  

CONCLUSION

The Kuomintang's administration in the counties of Kiangsu during the early years of the tutelage period was marked by constant conflict between party and government. It was the result of general confusion over the meaning of party dictatorship. In the absence of detailed rules to regulate the working relationship between them, both institutions attempted to remain in the dominant position and each tried to control the other.

The notion of party dictatorship originated from Sun's theory of three-stage revolution in China. Reinforced by the experience of the Russian Revolution, it was developed over a long period of time and assumed different meanings at different stages. Whether rule by party elites, by party ideology, by party organization, or by a combination of them all, the ill-defined term was subject to various different interpretations.
Among the party members, party ideology was not well understood, and party dictatorship was often a subject of dispute. After Sun's death, no authoritative interpretation was able to convince all parties concerned. This was reflected most clearly in the struggle between party workers and government officials at local levels.

While the Kuomintang was ostensibly the creator of the tutelage government, it did not assign itself a dominant role to be played at all levels. In the nation's politics, only the highest party organization was given an unequivocally dominant role over the government, but at local levels the supervisory role of the party remained largely on paper. At best, the party's supervision of government only took the form of a kind of local censorate.

The party's role was functionally separated from that of the government. It was to control and guide the activities of the people's groups, to propagandize local self-government, to indoctrinate the masses with party ideology and to conduct anti-Communist activities. Its structural set-up reflected this basic philosophy. With the most able party members elevated to government positions, the party appeared to have remained to take care of those who had not "made it" into the government. This seemed hardly surprising in view of the fact that as early as 1914 Sun had already incorporated this basic belief in his party constitution which promised to "give priorities" for government posts to the most able party members. In other words, the most talented and dedicated party members were the first to be "elevated." Thus, for instance, when Hu Han-min in his opening speech celebrating the establishment of the Kiangsu Provincial Government in May of 1927, congratulated the newly selected Provincial Government Committee members, he was actually implying that they had been loyal hard-core party members and had therefore been elevated to government positions. 80 This pattern of elevation of the ablest party members to government positions seems further borne out, for instance, by the Kiangsu provincial regulations governing the selection of county Chief of Police Bureau. 81 They stated that party workers who were also college graduates with more than three years experience in party affairs were qualified for the position.
With the most able party members moved into government administration, the party's secondary role seemed inevitable. This, perhaps, explains the rationale behind the inconsequential party budget allocated. It seemed only natural that the party's supervisory authority was not taken seriously by the government.

The unwillingness to give local party branches the power to supervise the government directly may also be explained by the assumption that party positions at local levels would probably be occupied by those inferior in ability to the government officials at the same levels.

The lack of detailed rules to govern the relationship between the two institutions prolonged the conflict between them. In the ensuing struggle, both party and government were guilty of interference and intervention, perhaps more so on the part of the government. This was no surprise in view of the fact that the party was a newcomer and an intruder into the local scene. The struggle seemed unavoidable in the light of the ill-defined relationship. However, the conflict and hostility could have been mitigated considerably had the KMT worked out detailed rules and coupled them with some enforceable procedures.

Standing in the way of the party's acceptance by local administrators were also some cultural values which the KMT had not been successful in changing. Among these were traditional concepts about the desirability of official careers, i.e. administrative posts. True, the KMT had hoped to revolutionize this traditional concept. For example, Sun Yat-sen was widely known for his advice to his followers not to seek official careers. However, the attitude expressed in such regulations as those governing the selection of county police chiefs, noted earlier, attest eloquently to the survival of such traditional concepts. The KMT had also attempted to effectuate a favorable change in its image and in the attitude of the people toward the party by injecting new blood into the local party bureaucracy. However, the meager number of new graduates of the Central Party Academy was immediately absorbed by the vast network of party bureaucracy on the one hand, and outnumbered and overwhelmed by the veteran party workers on the other. Subsequent graduates were trained for
government administrative jobs. They graduated too late to have an immediate impact on local politics during the period under review. While the new breed of party cadres might have been useful, or even instrumental, in consolidating the regime's political power in general, their ability to evoke a favorable local attitude toward the party appeared questionable.

Further, the traditional views on the prerogatives of the magistrate over all other local interest groups may also have contributed to preventing the party from emerging as an effective, competitive political force at the local level. The KMT, as a transitional form of political organization, was groping toward new patterns of action; these factors, among others, stood in the way.

NOTES

*This is a period in which the Kuomintang, after the successful Northern Expedition to seize the nation's political power, was groping for a pattern of action at the local level to carry out its blueprint of revolution. During this five-year period, three "governors" ruled Kiangsu Province, which gradually became the stronghold of the KMT party-state. Immediately after this period, especially after the watershed year of 1932, Ch'en Kuo-fu was made governor of Kiangsu, the area which later became the bastion of his so-called "C-C Clique." A very different picture of Kiangsu emerged during Ch'en's administration, and the period deserves a separate investigation.

1. The hope was expressed by Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang in a speech delivered on June 4th, 1927, dealing with the conflict and relationship between party and government. See Kiangsu sheng-cheng-fu kung-pao (Kiangsu provincial gazette, hereafter cited as Kiangsu SCKP), 37 (June 11, 1928), 58.


3. "Chung-kuo ko-ming shih" (History of China's Revolution) in Sun Wen, Chung-shan ch'üan-shu (Complete works of Sun Yet-sen), Shanghai, 1929, IV, 1-13, esp. 3-4,
6. Tsou, Shih-kao, I, 162.
8. Sun, Chung-shan ch'Uan-shu, III, 37.
10. Sun, Chung-shan ch'Uan-shu, III, 81
12. Kiangsu SCKP, 37 (June 11, 1928), 57.
13. Hsiao Cheng, "Hsün-cheng shih-ch'i yu hsien-cheng shih-ch'i tang chung-t'uan-t'i che chih kuan-hsi" (Relations between party, government, and people's groups in the tutelage and constitutional periods) Hsin sheng-ming yüeh-k'an (New Life Monthly) 2:4 (1929), 1-10.
15. Kiangsu sheng tan-hsing fa-kuei (Cumulative compilation of laws and regulations of Kiangsu Province) 1935, I, 1-5.
18. The Academy's achievements in the later years in Kiangsu, especially when that province was under the administration of Ch'en Kuo-fu, were much more remarkable in comparison with those of the previous years. The role of the Academy in the modernization of government administration in Kiangsu, and later in the provinces of Szechwan and Kweichow, deserves deeper study. For a brief account of the accomplishments of the Academy in these provinces, see the articles by Lo Shih-shih, Ch'en K'ai-ssu, Hsu Shih-pu and Ch'en Lieh-fu, collected in the Cheng-ta ssu-shih nien, 177-201.
23. Sun, Chung-shan ch’uan-shu, III, 81
24. Kiangsu SCKP, 47 (Aug. 20, 1928), 44-46.
33. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien (Kuomintang yearbook), 1929, 192.
34. Chao Ju-heng, Kiangsu sheng chien (Kiangsu yearbook), Chinkiang, 1935, II, 11-12.
35. Chao, Kiangsu sheng chien, II, 14.
36. Chao, Kiangsu sheng chien, II, 30.
37. For example, the labor movement was almost completely dominated by the Communists. See Teng Chung-hsia, Chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung chien-shih (Brief history of Chinese labor movement), Tientsin, 1949.
38. Chao, Kiangsu sheng chien, II, 30.
39. Kiangsu SCKP, 243 (Sept. 21, 1929), 7.
40. Tsou, Shih-lüeh, 170.
41. Ch'en Kuo-fu, "Shih-wu nien chih shih-ch'i nien chien ts'ung-shih tang-wu kung-tso ti hui-i" (Recollections of my party activities from 1926 through 1928) in Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Ch'en Kuo-fu ti i-sheng (Biography of Ch'en Kuo-fu), Taipei, 1971, 98. For a

42. Chao, Kiangsu sheng chien, II, 3.

44. Chao, Kiangsu sheng chien, II, 11.
45. Kiangsu SCKP, 41 (July 9, 1928), 35.
47. Kiangsu SCKP, 265 (Oct. 18, 1929), 16.

Other factions under investigation included Wang Ching-wei's "Re-organization Clique" (Kai tsu p'ai), which was organized in the Winter of 1928 and disbanded in January, 1931.


49. Chao, Kiangsu sheng chien, II, 8-12.
50. Kiangsu SCKP, 2 (Sept. 22, 1927), 67-68.
51. Kiangsu SCKP, 37 (June 11, 1928), 57.
52. Kiangsu SCKP, 201 (Aug. 3, 1929), 5.
54. Kiangsu SCKP, 166 (June 22, 1929), 8-9.

56. Kiangsu SCKP, 2 (Oct. 22, 1927), 27.
57. Kiangsu SCKP, 23 (March 5, 1928), 40-41. We have already mentioned, for example, that party activities were suspended from May through June, 1928, and again from January through March, 1930, in Wu County.

58. Kiangsu SCKP, 155 (June 10, 1929), 8.
60. Kiangsu SCKP, 27, (April 2, 1928), 34.
62. Kiangsu SCKP, 4 (Oct. 7, 1927), 44.
63. Kiangsu SCKP, 37 (June 11, 1928), 46.
64. Kiangsu SCKP, 42 (July 18, 1928), 46.
65. Kiangsu SCKP, 169 (June 26, 1929), 11.
66. Kiangsu SCKP, 23 (March 5, 1928), 40.
69. Kiangsu SCKP, 29 (April 16, 1928), 36.
70. Kiangsu SCKP, 42 (July 16, 1928), 48.
71. Kiangsu SCKP, 102 (April 6, 1929), 12.
72. The "bandits" were referred to only as tao-fei, or sword bandits, but not further identified.
73. Kiangsu SCKP, 175 (July 3, 1929), 11.
74. Kiangsu SCKP, 52 (Sept. 24, 1928), 5.
75. Kiangsu SCKP, 66 (Dec. 31, 1928), 34.
77. Kiangsu SCKP, 265 (Oct. 18, 1929), 17.
78. Kiangsu SCKP, 305 (Dec. 15, 1929), 10-11.
79. Kiangsu SCKP, 334 (Jan. 11, 1930), 1, 14.

Please note that data for the analysis of the relationship between party and government were available only up to and through January, 1930. Subsequent development after that date was not determined.

80. Kiangsu SCKP, 1 (Sept. 15, 1927), "Pao-kao" (Reports), 27. Each section of the earliest issues of the gazette published in 1927 was individually paginated.

81. Kiangsu sheng tan-hsing fa-kuei hui-pien, I, 60.

82. While 314 young recruits were admitted to the first class of the Academy, only 252 were graduated in 1928. Their placements were not only limited in the counties but in the central headquarters, provincial and municipal party units as well. See Chang Chin-chien, "Pen-hsiao chiao-yü ti fa-chan" (Educational development of our school), in Cheng-ta ssu-shih nien, 30.

83. The 410 new recruits of the second class of the Academy were not graduated until July, 1932, after the Japanese invasion. Since the goals of the Academy had undergone changes, it was no longer devoted exclusively to training and supplying party cadres to the party bureaucracy. Instead, both government administrators and party cadres were produced, with the emphasis now placed on the former. See Chang Chin-chien "Pen-hsiao chiao-yü ti fa-chan" (Educational development of our school), in Cheng-ta ssu-shih nien, 31.

84. Chiang Kai-shek, president of the academy, in his speech delivered at the 13th anniversary of the academy, contrasting the achievements of the Political Academy with those of the Military Academy, complained
that the former fell far short of the goals and duties established by the party. See [Chiang Kai-shek] Chung-yang cheng-chih hsüeh-hsiao ch'uang-shih tsung-chih ho chiao-hsüeh ti fang-cheng (The goals and the purpose of the Central Political Academy), in Cheng-ta ssu-shih nien, 1-6.

85. This situation might have been perpetuated by the fact that the local party units were seldom uninterruptedly staffed by qualified cadres who stayed on long enough to effect noticeable change or reverse unpopular attitudes toward the party. For example, while three party cadres of the new breed from the Party Academy were sent to direct party work in Wu County in July, 1928, among 12 veteran party officials, only two remained a year later. By March, 1930, however, all three had left their party posts. See Wu-hsien, "Party affairs," 12-17.

GLOSSARY

Cheng-chih hui-i 政治會議
Chiao fei 劉匪
Chien-she chü 建設局
Ch'ing-pao k'o 情報科
Ch'ing-tang wei-yuan-hui 中華革命黨
Chung-hua ko-ming-tang 中華民國國民政府組織法
Chung-yang tang-wu hsüeh-hsiao 協助黨員
Hsieh-chu tang-yüan 縣組織法
Chung-hua min-kuo kuo-min cheng-fu tsu-chih fa 訓政
Chung-yang tang-wu hsüeh-hsiao 以黨治國
Hsien tsu-chih fa 改組派
Hsün cheng 改組
I tang chien kuo 以黨
Kai tsu p'ai 改組
Kuo-min cheng-fu wei-yüan-hui 國民政府委員會
Min-cheng-t'ing 民政廳
Min-chung-hsün-lien wei-yüan-hui 民衆訓練委員會
Min-chung-yüan-tung chih-tao k'o 民衆運動指導科
Min-chung t'uan-t'i 民衆團體
Min ch'üan 民權
P'u-t'ung tang-yüan 普通黨員
INTRODUCTION

What is politics like at the local level in China? Who makes which kinds of policy decisions? How? What do the various groups of peasants want? How do they perceive their interests? How do they express their interests through their political participation and access to leaders? How much influence do they have on the local cadres? How do the latter respond to their demands? In short, how do the Chinese people relate to their political system and it to them? Scholars of Chinese politics have been so pre-occupied with the study of elites that they have failed to raise serious questions about elite-mass relations. What is certain for now is that the old, simple manipulative model of relations between leaders and masses in China does not explain some very important phenomena in the recent history of Chinese politics. A more subtle and complex understanding of politics in China must be reached.

This paper is a first, cautious step in that direction. It was written at a time when I was just beginning to think about problems of local political process in China. I began by attacking the problem from both ends: on the one hand, I tried to learn as much as possible about local politics in other societies, in order to help me focus the problems which need to be studied in the Chinese case and suggest analytical methods which could be used to solve them; on the other, I tried to learn as much as possible about local institutions in China, both before and since 1949. In pursuing the latter goal, I was fortunate to participate in a seminar on Local Institutions in Modern China at the University of Chicago in the winter and spring of 1973, led by Professor Philip Kuhn. The breadth of interest and knowledge of my colleagues in that seminar was a constant source of ideas, criticism, and inspiration. This paper grew out of that seminar.

The logical starting point for my research was to look at reports of local developments which appeared in
the official media and books published in China, which constitute the most comprehensive and readily-available source for my research project. I decided to write a case-study of one village based on such materials, in order to learn something about village politics in this period, develop my skills at using this kind of material, and help discern the strengths and weaknesses of this type of material for my overall research project. These materials proved so voluminous that I decided to restrict this first foray to the period from liberation through co-operativization, for reasons partly arbitrary, partly related to historical logic, and partly because I expected these materials to be, like newspaper reports from China, more revealing in the 1950's than in the 1960's and 1970's. I began by making a bibliographic-geographic index of People's Daily (by using its Chinese index: Jen-min jih-pao suo-yin), the three volumes of Chung-kuo nung-yeh ho-tso-hua yun-tung shih-liao (Historical Materials on the Agricultural Co-operativization Movement in China), the three volumes of Chung-kuo nung-ts'un ti she-hui chu-yi kao-ch'ao (Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside), which was probably edited by Mao himself, and a few other small compendia and reports. I had hoped to find reports on villages which were also mentioned in the extensive local-place bibliographic files for the pre-1949 period, which were then being assembled by Professor Kuhn and his assistants in a separate but parallel project. My attempts to find matches between Professor Kuhn's pre-1949 bibliography and my post-1949 one failed. Judging that the next-best strategy was to find a village which was the subject of as many different reports by different people at different times as possible, I was led by my files to a number of possible cases on which three separate reports appeared. After a close reading of them all, I decided that the material on Wang-mang was the richest. I was unable to locate any information from other sources (such as hsien gazetteers) on the pre- or post-1949 situation in Wang-mang or any of the other villages on which I considered writing.

The first step was to piece the reports on Wang-mang together in an attempt to write as detailed as possible a history of the village. I then approached this account not with hypotheses, but with questions such as those outlined at the beginning of this intro-
duction: Who are the local leaders? At what level and by whom are certain kinds of decisions made? How are the views of the different social groups articulated, and how far up are their voices heard or their interests taken into account? Do they reach a level in the hierarchy at which their problems can be solved? If not, then what are the consequences? To these questions I added a methodological aspect: Having pushed this material as far as it would possibly go, how useful did it seem to be for research into the types of questions I hoped to answer? What advice could I give researchers interested in other facets of village life in China? Could this type of material be relied upon as the exclusive or major basis of the larger research project which I envision? If not, how is it to be supplemented by and integrated with other kinds of materials?

This, then, is as much a report on work in progress as it is a finished product. Nevertheless, Wang-mang does have much to teach us. Though it is a model and no claim is made for its typicality, it is reasonable to expect that, precisely because it is a model, at least some of the important features of Chinese development are in evidence in Wang-mang, and that the case can suggest some hypotheses and directions for future research. Hopefully too, this paper can provide something of a research guide to the steadily-growing number of scholars who are becoming interested in analyzing aspects of local-level social, political, and economic life of the Chinese people.

THE MUTUAL AID MOVEMENT IN WANG-MANG VILLAGE

Origin of the Mutual Aid Teams.
Wang-mang village is located in Shensi province, Ch'ang-an county (hsien), Tu-ch'u ward (ch'u), eighth township (hsiang). It is about ten miles southeast of the city of Sian. The average population of this part of China is more than 200 per square kilometer, which puts it among the most densely populated agricultural areas of the country. Most of the population are Han Chinese. The village is approximately 1,000 meters above sea level, and precipitation is about 40" annually. More than 50% of the land is cultivated, and the major products are millet, corn, and winter wheat.
The village was liberated in 1949, although the existence of a peasants' association prior to 1949 suggests some Communist activity in the village before the Nationalists were finally driven out. But even the outlines of Wang-mang's pre-liberation history are not discernable from available sources.

Wang-mang village had a population of 167 families in the early 1950's. Basing ourselves on estimates of family size in various parts of China provided by Hinton, Wlyrdal, and Yang, we arrive at estimated family size of 4.5, yield a population of approximately 750. When it was liberated, 60% of the land (900 mou) was owned by the peasants themselves, and 40% by the landlords. This is comparable to the 31% figure offered by Hinton for Long Bow. There were only two landlord families, one family of "small rentiers," and four rich peasant families. Seventy-one families (42.5% of the families of the village) were middle peasants, the largest single group was the 83 poor peasant families (50%), and there were six tenant farmer families (4%).

The pre-liberation problems were similar to those of most of the Chinese countryside at the time: overtaxation, landlordism, and pervasive poverty and economic stagnation typical of bare subsistence communities.

Following quickly upon the liberation of Wang-mang in mid-1949 were a reduction of rent and interest and an "anti-tyrant struggle" (fan e-pa tou-cheng). This follows the general sequence implemented by the Communist Party throughout China by the fall of 1949.

In the same fall, the first attempt to organize mutual aid teams (hu-chu-tsu, hereafter MATs) in Wang-mang failed. That an attempt could even be made to organize MATs before land reform is attributable to the relatively low tenancy rate. But the overzealousness of the village leader, P'u Chung-chih, may well have been the decisive factor causing Wang-mang to make the abortive attempt. While a work team (kung-tso-tsu) did come to Wang-mang to propagandize Mao's slogan "Get organized and develop production," the report gives the distinct impression that the movement for this early organization of MATs was spearheaded by a local peasant named P'u Chung-shih, who was later to become a top village leader. The villagers' response to P'u's plan was unenthusiastic. They "suspected trouble and feared..."
getting the worst of it."\textsuperscript{10} Thereupon, the 28 village cadres decided to get mutual aid underway by organizing their own MAT as an example for the rest of the village.

While this form of labor cooperation overcame some of the inefficiencies of the traditional privately operated system,\textsuperscript{11} and while this helped recruitment a bit by convincing twenty members of the peasants' association to join, the project failed in less than three months. The failure was attributed to imprecise planning. The problem was that distribution was to be figured according to "labor days," (kung), each was divided into ten work points (fen). The MAT determined in advance that for each kung, a member would receive \(1\frac{1}{2}\) pints (sheng) of rice. But when the time came to pay everyone, the team had credited 40 more sheng than it actually had.\textsuperscript{12}

This failure seems to have slowed down new mobilization for about a year. In the fall of 1950, land reform was finally carried out, and the "landlord class" which had only been "dealt a blow" during the anti-tyrant struggle was now "completely defeated,"\textsuperscript{13} i.e., their land was expropriated. They were not killed and did not flee the village. During the land reform, the "activists" (\textit{chi-chi fen-tzu}) of the later MAT movement made their first appearance.\textsuperscript{14} In January 1951, a work team of eight model laborers from the North Shensi district of the provincial production association (\textit{sheng-ch'an hui-i}) came to Wang-mang "to talk about the experience of 'getting organized and developing production.' This opened the way to the organization of MATs."\textsuperscript{15}

The relationship between the local cadres and the work team personnel in this process is unclear. Fourteen MATs were organized by P'u Chung-chih, who was director of the village peasants' association and a member of the Party Small Group (\textit{tang hsiao-tsu}, hereafter PSG), Yi Chi-tung, who held the position of village headman\textsuperscript{16} (\textit{ts'un-chang}) and was head of the PSG, and other "activists who had surged forth during the land reform."\textsuperscript{17} But the organization of MATs was also carried out "with the help and guidance of the county and ward work cadres."\textsuperscript{18}

In any event, fourteen MATs were set up in late 1950 or early 1951. They were small: from three to ten persons each. (If we postulate that the teams averaged six
members, then about 84 people, approximately 11% of the population of Wang-mang were organized at this stage.) The mutual aid movement expanded quickly in Wang-mang in 1951. By about June, another MAT and a supply and marketing cooperative had been organized. By the end of the summer, two more MATs had been added, and five more by late fall. By January, 1952, there were 25 MATs in Wang-mang; all but sixteen households, or approximately 90% of the village, had been organized into MATs, and of these, six were engaged in "revolutionary work," two were former landlords, and the rest were "widowers, widows, orphans, and childless people" who had no working power.19 In addition, during 1951, seventeen women's MATs were organized with the family as the unit, and each was "interwoven" with the work of a (men's) MAT.20 The exact functions of the women's MATs and their organizational links with the "men's" remain unclear.

Each team "democratically elected"21 a team chief (tsu-chang) and an account-keeper (chi-chang yuan). The MAT chiefs interlocked with other kinds of administrative leadership, often serving concurrently as "hsiang government committee members, production committee members, or people's representatives."22 The mutual aid team was mainly an organization for economic cooperation. Its main function seems to have been the cooperative allocation of human and animal labor power and agricultural tools.23 Ownership of tools was collectivized, but animals and land remained in private hands. It was the responsibility and prerogative of the team to both plan for and calculate the value of goods produced in sideline production. The value of each member's contribution of his own labor and that of his animals was also calculated by the individual team.24 In these respects, the MATs' functions, an embryonic form of the commune production team, which ultimately developed from the early MAT. The MAT was something of a political unit as well. Each team had a newspaper-reading group (tu-pao-tsu), and the village received eighteen copies of newspapers daily, including fifteen of the Shensi Daily (Shensi jih-pao).25 But the MAT could not develop into an effective political unit, probably because of both its small size and the relative shortage of Party members compared to the number of MATs.

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Higher-level leadership groups.

All the team members in Wang-mang (who collectively formed the Mutual Aid Federation, hu-chu lien-tsu, hereafter MAF) elected from among themselves a seven-member "production encouragement and investigation small group" (sheng-ch'an tu-ts-ts'ui chien-ch'a hsiao-tsu), known for short as the lien-tsu. The membership was: P'u Chung-chih, director of the peasants' association and member of the PSG, who was elected head of the lien-tsu; Yi Chi-tung, the village headman and head of the PSG; Pai Yu-k'un, about whom we know nothing; Chao Ching-k'un, a member of the production committee (probably of the peasants' association); Yi Tung-hsun, chief of the village study groups (hsueh-hsi-tsu); Yi Hu-hsien, a member of the organization committee (again, probably of the peasants' association); and a woman, Wang Kuei-lan. It was to "help draw up production plans, resolve difficulties, allocate human and animal power and tools, and develop the functions of the mutual aid federation." The importance of the lien-tsu in the leadership of the Wang-mang Mutual Aid Federation (MAF) is apparent from the fact that its main functions were coterminous with those of the MATs": the co-operative allocation of human and animal power and tools. Four of the seven members of the lien-tsu were Party members.

There were nine Party members in Wang-mang, and collectively they made up the Party Small Group (PSG). Yi Chi-tung was the head (hsiao-tsu-chang) of the PSG. The report notes that the "Party small group serves the function of strong and firm leadership within the lien-tsu, and the nineteen Youth League members are reliable and forceful helpers." This last clause is suggestive of the nature of the Party control in Wang-mang. Obviously, the Party itself could not directly penetrate every activity of each MAT--not every MAT could have a Party member. This helps explain why the individual MATs could not (or were not permitted to) develop into effective political "basic units." Their economic responsibilities did not require constant, personal vigilance by a Party member; a team's economic performance could be monitored by the Party from outside the team. But the Party may have enlisted the support of the Youth League in infiltrating each team for political work, since the
number of Youth League members plus the number of Party members comes to 27, and there were 25 MATs.

The nature of the lien-tsu as a leadership organ is now clear: it integrated the Party and non-Party leadership of the village, under the control of the Party. Production plans in Wang-mang were relayed from the PSG (perhaps from higher level Party organs) to the lien-tsu to a meeting of the MAT heads, and finally to a meeting of all team members, where they were "democrati- cally discussed and examined."32

Of course, these monthly meetings were also a form of political work.

Criticism and self-criticism were carried out, experiences summed up, the good was praised, and deficiencies were criticized. The members' patriotic productive enthusiasm and political consciousness were constantly raised, and unity was promoted.33

At each meeting, either a visiting propagandist or the study group chief would report on "current events." Political lectures were presented as well. Special campaigns, such as the "Resist America Aid Korea" movement, reached Wang-mang through the monthly meetings (as well as through the newspapers, of course). In this case, money for the Resist America Aid Korea General Association was raised through the MAF meeting.34

The proliferation of functional groups.

In addition to the MATs, the MAF, the PSG, and the lien-tsu, there was a variety of other organizations in tiny Wang-mang. Political work was carried out in various kinds of educational groups. It has been noted that every MAT had a newspaper-reading group.35 Four study small groups (hsueh-hsi hsiao-tsu) were also established, probably by the PSG, since the term "hsueh-hsi" (meaning "study" or "learning") implies political and ideological study. In addition, an after-work school was set up, which probably combined literacy work, training in agricultural skills, and political discussions.36 The lien-tsu established a technical-research small group "to research the improvement of production techniques."37 The technical research small group's functions overlapped in part with those of the lien-tsu, which was to send its cadres "to the nearby villages
Characteristics of organization in the MAT period.

The organizational picture which emerges from all this is a remarkably novel and complex one, at least from the point of view of a Wang-mang peasant. The MATs administered day-to-day co-operative economic and productive affairs, and in this regard the MAT member had to deal with his elected officials (who were also his neighbors)—the team chief and the account-keeper—rather frequently. He would work with fellow team members all day, and would meet with them every night, in one forum or another. Once a month he would attend a meeting of all the MAT members in Wang-mang (the MAF), which was run by the lien-tsu. But the lien-tsu was dominated and controlled by the PSG, and both these groups met every ten days. In addition, the Wang-mang MAT member would frequently have to deal with or perhaps even serve on a variety of other organizations, such as a newspaper-reading group, study groups, after-work classes, by-production teams, the militia, and a supply and marketing co-op, to which he would go to buy his daily needs and
to sell his produce.

One striking characteristic of organization in Wang-mang is the sheer volume of new kinds of associations which sprang up so quickly in a village which had probably known little or no formal organization for centuries. Pluralist political theorists have given considerable emphasis to the importance of a vigorous associational life.

Voluntary associations have figured in many theoretical speculations about the social bases of democracy and, in particular, about some special features of American democracy. A rich associational life has been considered the hallmark of American democracy. Such associations provide an intermediary level of organization between the individual and the government. And this, it is claimed (sometimes supported by data, sometimes not) ...mediates conflict, and increases citizen efficacy, participation, and influence.

Surely the mass organizations which popped up in Wang-mang on the heels of liberation were intended to and could not but have increased citizen participation in local political life; whether they in fact increased the peasants' political influence and efficacy is a difficult question which lies at the heart of my research, and shall be touched on later. Nevertheless, it is extremely important to note here that the proliferation of organizations in Wang-mang did, probably for the first time in history, transform Wang-mang into a political as well as a geographic, social, and economic unit.

A second feature of post-liberation organization in Wang-mang is that economic management was handled at a sub-village level, while political activities were organized at the village level. The daily operation of the MATs was left to the individual teams and agreements among the team chiefs, who also met every ten days. Standards for crediting labor points and for payment to owners of draft animals were set by the MAT itself, as was the amount of remuneration per work point. Within the teams, the team chief was in charge of allocating both animal and human labor and tools. The accountant would keep track of work points earned by each member and his animals. Ten work points made a labor
day: two for morning and four each for the forenoon and afternoon. During especially busy periods, there was some co-operation among the teams as well as within them. The procedures for this type of operation were either worked out in ad hoc arrangements among the team heads or by the lien-tsu.\textsuperscript{43}

But, as we have seen, political functions, specifically education, propaganda, participation in national political movements, public security organization, and of course decisions about village organization and policy, were carried out by village-level organizations such as the lien-tsu, the PSG, the militia, the monthly MAF meeting, and the after-work school.

Why were economic functions aggregated at the sub-village (MAT) level but political functions at the village level? Two plausible and compatible explanations come to mind. First, the party did not have sufficient resources to penetrate every MAT: there were 25 MATs and only nine Party members. Second, the PSG was moving in the direction of centralization of production and economic organization at the village level. In the MAT period, it was trying to lay the political foundation for these later developments in an historical period in which villagers would not yet accept broader levels of collective organization. Strengthening of it as a political (and social) unit would have strengthened it as an economic organization, and the Party, by organizing political work at the village level, was presumably planning for future developments. It had to settle for sub-village-level economic organization in the short run, but that was no reason to institutionalize this transitional phase through political organization, at the same low level.

The development of a mutual aid movement in Wang-mang had several advantages. With all the sub-committee organization around functional problems such as technical research, water conservation, and various kinds of by-production, it became possible to undertake projects of a size hitherto prohibited by the small scale of private economic organization. For example, the water conservation small group organized the cleaning out of ten irrigation ditches, and planned and coordinated the construction of ten new ditches and seven new wells. This sort of aid accrued to individuals as well as the village as

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a whole. The Ch'ao family's dam, which had not been repaired for 21 years, was almost completely rebuilt.\textsuperscript{44} New production techniques were also propagated more easily. Because of the efforts of the technical-research group and the lien-tsu, peasant resistance to dense rice-planting was overcome, and output increased 33% as seedlings were now planted only 8" apart instead of the traditional 1'2" apart. Overall production increased by 474 catties in 1951, an increase of 63.9% over 1950.\textsuperscript{45}

But the Wang-mang mutual aid movement was also criticized by our source on a number of counts. First, labor productivity and activism were still regarded as sub-standard. It was suggested that the labor-day system was responsible for this. "No matter if you're strong or weak, or your skills high or low, as long as you work all day you get ten points."\textsuperscript{46} This was criticized as "egalitarianism," and the suggestion was made that the village adopt the policy of "pay according to work."\textsuperscript{47}

Another problem, which conflicted slightly with the first but was linked to it, was sex discrimination. Women were receiving only half as many labor points as men, even under the "labor day" system. When the women took their complaint to the monthly MAF meeting (the locus of peasant political participation in this period), their wages were raised to 60% of those of men. (According to my informants, women's wages in production teams today range from 75% to 95% of men's wages.) But this system still stifled the labor activism of women, some of whom were, according to the report, better workers than men. The principle of "equal pay for equal work among men and women" was stressed. But sex discrimination took another, more directly political form. The women's MATs were organized after the men's, and then merged with them. Consequently, there were no women MAT chiefs, and only one woman vice-chief. It was suggested that after the formation of women's MATs and their affiliation with the men's MATs, that new elections for MAT chief be held.\textsuperscript{48}

A third criticism was that there was too little collective property. It was recommended that more tools should be purchased by the MATs. This would both increase skill levels and thereby productivity and also heighten the amount of socialist organization in the village.\textsuperscript{49}
A fourth problem was the bifurcation between agricultural and by-production. By-production was, according to the report, viewed by most peasants as a form of charity work or busy-work befitting only the poorest peasants and those least capable of farm work. The revenues of by-production were returned to those who had engaged in it, and so the by-production which the Party was trying to foster was turning into just another form of capitalist enterprise. The article urged that the revenues of by-production ought to be treated as property of the collective and thus as an embryonic form of socialism. It is clear that what the author had in mind was an attempt to create a firmer material base for the collective economy of Wang-mang. Hua's proposal stands in marked contrast to the system of by-production delineated in the 1962 "60 Articles" on commune organization, still in effect today, which stipulate that household by-production is "a necessary supplement to the socialist economy" and that communes should not establish new business enterprises (ch'i-yeh) and should close down existing enterprises which hamper agricultural production and are not "welcomed by the masses."50

Apparently, the enormous amount of organization in Wang-mang struck Hua too. He criticized the fact that there were too many meetings in Wang-mang, noting that they were held every night and often lasted until midnight if preparation for them had been inadequate. He felt that this practice did not permit villagers to get enough sleep, and so urged their curtailment. He made such practical suggestions as the use of mealtime and rest for meetings, calling only important meetings, and preparing better for those that were called.51

Lastly, he felt that Wang-mang villagers did not eat enough vegetables, and criticized them for not making use of spare plots of land and spare labor power of women and children to grow vegetables. In contrast to his suggestions about by-production, this vegetable production was to be undertaken by individual families privately for their own consumption. Those who could not produce vegetables were urged to buy more. Obviously, the goal was not to heighten socialism, but rather to "increase the peasants' health, reduce illness, and better undertake agricultural production."52

The cause of all these problems was seen as political
and ideological. First, "the village cadres and MAT backbone elements (ku-kan fen-tzu) still have more or less conservative thought." Secondly, leadership from the county, ward, and township levels was insufficient. The article implied that P'u and Yi, the two leaders of the Wang-mang mutual aid movement, were aware of this lack of higher-level leadership, and that it was they who would have liked to see more of it. This view of the roots of Wang-mang's problems accorded with the essentially political nature of the problems themselves: egalitarianism, sex discrimination, improper use of by-production, and too many meetings. Even the vegetable problem was not really economic: there were no economic barriers to production of more vegetables, just barriers of "conservative" thought. Economically, Wang-mang had done well. Output was increasing. The work now before it was of a more political nature. New and more socialist forms of production needed to be built. This brings us to the attempt to link the model Wang-mang mutual aid movement to other villages through a "mutual aid net" (hu-chu-wang).

THE WANG-MANG MUTUAL AID NET

The Wang-mang MAT movement reached full development in 1951, and apparently continued to operate and grow through 1952. Sometime during the winter of 1952-3, an agricultural producers' co-operative (nung-yeh sheng-ch'an ho-tso-she, hereafter APC) was set up in Wang-mang, led by and named after P'u Chung-chih. There is little information on this remarkable development, which might lead us to suspect that it had some early problems. It probably involved some pooling of land and/or draft animals. We can infer that it incorporated about three of four MATs, since it included fourteen families. The lack of more information on this presumably progressive development coupled with the fact that the APC became a center of mutual aid networks suggest that the P'u APC was little more than a glorified and enlarged MAT.

In February, 1953, at the county agricultural planning meeting, the county Party secretary Li Ts'ao proposed "the method of uniting the points with the whole" (tien-mien chie-ho). The county committee determined that a mutual aid net (MAN) would be established, with P'u Chung-chih APC as its center. Furthermore, it
appointed a member of the Tu-ch'u ward Party committee's organization committee, Ts'ao Ching-chien, as the secretary of the eighth township, and charged him with the responsibilities of "on the one hand leading the APC, and on the other hand trying out the MAN." Putting the MAN under the leadership of ward-level cadre Ts'ao and village-level cadre P'u was the county committee's way of trying to solve the difficult problem of combining higher-level co-ordination, direction, and control with the creativity, energy, and knowledge of local conditions that only local leadership can provide.

The MAN was to be a multi-village collectivity for furthering economic and political development. Within the month, considerable preparatory work was done by Ts'ao and others working with him. He enlisted the support of two work team members who had organized MANs elsewhere, and travelled to six surrounding villages. Using the material in the rest of the report, it is possible to identify four of these for sure, because they are mentioned by name in illustrative accounts of the MAN operation (see map #2): Tao-ti-chang, Liu-lin, Liu-li, and Eastern Wang-mang. By scanning the map, we might interpolate that the other two were San-kuan-tang and Hsiu-sai. In travelling to these six surrounding villages, Ts'ao and his work team comrades convened meetings of the village cadres and the main-point MATs (chung-tien-tsu) of each village. It was probably self-evident to Ts'ao which teams these were from consulting with the village leadership (as it would be to anyone who came to Wang-mang and spoke to P'u).

The purpose of these visits was to ascertain the kinds of problems that would be involved in the establishment of a MAN and to begin to propagandize for it. Up to this time, there was a good deal of resentment and "jealousy" of Wang-mang by local villages. But the report states that this early canvass by Ts'ao produced a change of attitude. "At this time, as soon as they heard that a MAN was to be organized, everyone naturally wanted to join with pleasure." Surely more was involved than simple osmosis by word of mouth. Perhaps the appearance of a ward-level cadre appointed by the county committee stirred the local leadership into mobilizing their villagers.

By late March, 1953, just six weeks after the county
planning meeting at which the question was first raised, the MAN got under way. It included only seven MATs in six villages, but later grew to include nineteen MATs in ten villages.\textsuperscript{62} To avoid confusion, it should be kept in mind that the MAN was an organization in which only the mainpoint MATs of each village participated. The MAN, through its main-point teams, "influenced 80-90 temporary and year-round MATs."\textsuperscript{63} The principle of organization of the MAN was "a large net fitting over a small one and a small net connecting with a large net."\textsuperscript{64} This is what was meant by "uniting the points with the whole."\textsuperscript{65}

The main function of the MAN was the spread of successful experiences among the villages of a few townships. (While the MAN may have only covered one township at first, hence the appointment of a township Party branch secretary as chief of the MAN, it later came to include a few townships, but probably never the entire ward, since ultimately only ten villages were involved.) Pursuant to this main function, a major activity of the MAN was research. Between March and December, 1953, nine research projects were undertaken. Their number and topical sequence corresponding to seasonal changes suggest monthly schedule of research projects and meetings. The nine topics researched were: "unifying agricultural and secondary production, types of seedlings intensive cultivation, insect control, summer harvest competition, summing up the summer harvest, summing up the rich production of grain, techniques of MAT leadership, and fall harvest and planting."\textsuperscript{66}

Another important activity of the MAN was the propagation of advanced or successful agricultural techniques. The report goes into detail about movements to adopt "suitable seeding" (ho-shih yang-t'ien), "reasonably intensive planting" (ho-shih mi-chih), co-operative harvesting techniques, and the unification of agricultural and by-production.\textsuperscript{67} Because the basic theme of all these experiences is more or less the same—demonstrating the advantages of a MAN type of organization—we shall summarize only the "biggest instance"\textsuperscript{68} of a successful MAN project, namely a movement for insect control.

In mid-May, the wheat fields were invaded by hsi-chiang insects (literally translated as "juice-absorbing" insects; no standard translation could be found).
According to the report, most of the peasants did not know anything about insect control, and a few could not even recognize the insects! P'u Chung-chih made an insect net and "pulled down a heap of insects in the APC's wheat fields." The MAN then held a "research meeting" (yen-chiu hiu-i), at which P'u demonstrated his technique. The mainpoint team heads and cadres attending the meeting then returned to their villages and demonstrated the new technique "in person" To help those who did not recognize the insects, some cadres put up large pictures of the bugs. "At once every village mobilized an insect control movement, and very quickly basically exterminated the hsi-chiang insects, and the rich harvest...was guaranteed."

The modus operandi of the MAN in bringing about miracles of this sort is clear, both from this example and from a more general discussion in the report:

Each time the MAN researches work, P'u Chung-chih analyzes, researches, and proposes a method according to the situation and problems raised by each team chief and according to the situation of West Wang-mang village. Agreement among everyone is reached, it [the analysis and the method] is carried back to each village by the main-point team head, and the MATs of the village are convened for propagandizing and propagating it.

Before each MAN meeting, Director Ts'ao always goes to each township and has a preliminary informal discussion with the township (Party) branch secretary and Party members, or he convenes the township branch secretaries for discussion...After the MAN research and decision, he again returns to help the township and village cadres and main-point team chiefs in intensive propagandization and propagation. Furthermore, he often gives individual instruction to each village Party member.

The peculiar thing about this report, which appeared in the People's Daily (jen-min jih-pao), is that the MAN is evaluated as less than a complete success. Although the MAN is already operative, experience is not yet satisfactory and the
conscious and frequent guidance of the CCP Ch'ang-an (county) committee is also insufficient. But we should affirm that the trial operation of the MAN was basically successful.\(^74\) In the jargon of this sort of material, "basically successful" means "not quite successful."\(^75\) Yet, the rest of the report is full of nothing but praise and commendation for the entire project. There is none of the detailed criticism of the article on the Wang-mang MAT movement.

One line of explanation can be offered. The MAN never proved to be an important part of the CCP's rural development policy sequence. More often than not, the transition from MAT to APC was made without the formation of the MAN. The MAN was an inter-village organization at a time when collectivization of land and animals within the villages had not even been carried out (except on a very minimal scale, as in the P'u Chung-chih APC). It would seem from this article's queer criticism and from the fact that MATs were never prevalent, that around 1953 the government was ambivalent about extending the mutual aid movement through MANs.

The MAN was built on the main-point MAT in each village, and not the lien-tsu or some other village-level authority. This was contradictory to the coming cooperativization movement in two ways. First, by strengthening the mutual aid system, the MANs were reinforcing a system which was still based on private production.

The last line of this report hints at the problem, suggesting that the Wang-mang MAN "take a step forward to unfold the mutual aid cooperative movement, induce the broad peasantry to take the road of cooperativization, and complete the socialist transformation of agriculture."\(^76\) (my emphasis) It can now be better understood why the central unit of this MAN was an APC, at least in name. To the extent that the MAN strengthened the MAT which, at bottom, was still based on the concept of private production (albeit with mutual aid among peasants), it was hurting the eventual goal of socialist transformation of agriculture.

Second, the MAN was based on a sub-village-level unit of organization, namely the MAT. But the MAT movement had been, and the APC movement would be, based on the
village as the unit of developmental administration. It is reasonable to suggest that further development of MATs would only serve to divide villages at a time when it was more important to unify them in preparation for the coming collectivization. It is likely, then, that this peculiarly unsubstantive criticism of the Wang-mang MAN, and the failure to adopt MANs nationally, had to do with the contradiction between the MAN and the more important APC form of organization, which followed closely on its heels.

THE COOPERATIVIZATION MOVEMENT IN WANG-MANG

The Wang-mang MAN was formed and developed in the spring of 1953, and was still in existence at the time of its review in People's Daily in December of that year. But a report by the Rural Work Department of the Shensi Provincial (Party) Committee dated August, 1955, which begins its account with early 1954, makes no mention of the MAN. Yet, the MAN was formed at the suggestion of that same provincial committee. It is fair to assume, then, that the MAN was dissolved shortly after the People's Daily report.

The APC movement got under way on a village-wide scale in early 1954. It seems to have drawn heavily on the leadership and experience of the "P'u Chung-chih APC, established a year earlier, about which this and earlier reports had said little. In early 1954, the membership of the "P'u APC was expanded from 14 to 55 families, and it was renamed APC number one (probably in order to reduce the distinction between it and the newly formed APCs). Three more APCs were established at the same time in Wang-mang, and named APCs two, three, and four. These four included 135 households, or approximately 80% of the households of the village. In addition, a "joint cooperative" was formed by the four APCs, and named the "July 1 Joint Cooperative" ("Ch'i-i" nung-yeh sheng-ch'an ho-tso lien-she). At this point, however, this lien-she was nothing more than a village-level management committee. 77 "Economically, the APCs remained independent of one another." 78 Why then was this lien-she formed and what did it do?

It seems to have been an extension of the old lien-tsu of mutual aid times. Like that group, a chairman and
vice-chairman were elected from among the membership of the four APCs, and it met every ten days. At these meetings, it "studied and resolved such important questions facing the different APCs as plans for agricultural production and by-production, soil improvement projects, finance and accounting, distribution of wages, summing up production experience, selection of model workers, etc."79 It is clear from this passage that the "July 1" joint co-op was a joint committee of the village Party and non-Party leadership to control and co-ordinate the four APCs. "At the beginning and the end of a growing season, the joint co-op was to convene a general meeting of the members to explain the jobs they were expected to do."80 The continuity between the lien-she and the lien-tsu is remarkable. The control functions were almost identical, and again P'u and Yi were chairman and vice-chairman. Likewise, the lien-she and the PSG were not coterminous.81 Unfortunately, this report does not give us the names of the other members of the lien-she. The aim of the lien-she is explicit: "to pave the way for forming a large APC."82

By the fall of 1955, with the addition of 23 families, membership in the Wang-mang village APCs climbed to 158 families, just nine short of the former total number of families of the village.83 Tools had already been collectivized under the MATs. There was some pooling of animals in the small APCs, which bought them from their owners at market value or the price which their owners had paid for them. But private ownership of some animals continued to exist as well. It is not clear whether this was due to peasant resistance or to APC policy. (In the communes, private ownership and husbandry of small animals—pigs, chickens, ducks, rabbits—was encouraged, but private ownership of draft animals was not permitted.) All the land of the members was collectivized, and shares in the APCs were given as remuneration.84 While the report is not explicit about who decided how to allocate the shares, the nature of the political structure of Wang-mang at the time and the history of the MAT period (and particularly the function of the lien-tsu in that period) suggest that it may well have been the lien-she.

In their actual operation, APCs two, three, and four deferred to the leadership of APC one, the earlier
P'u Chung-chih APC. This is not surprising, since P'u was an experienced village leader of long standing, head of the lien-she, and a member of the PSG as well. The report notes that in order to help the other APCs with the unfamiliar work of planning, "the joint co-op first helped APC one draw up its production plans and set the norm for crediting workpoints of a specified job."\(^8\) Again, this is the same function formerly handled by the lien-tsu during the MAT period. But, to continue: "Through popularization by the joint co-op, the other APCs benefitted from the experience gained by APC one."\(^9\) Clearly, APC one, which probably included the same vanguard group and definitely had the same leadership as the early P'u MAT and the MAN, was still at the forefront of political and economic development policy in Wang-mang.

Although the PSG remains in the background of this report, it is clear that it was very much in control of the lien-she, and through it of the APCs. The joint co-op was formed in order to facilitate the later formation of a single APC in the village. But, from the day the joint co-op was formed, the PSG paid attention to instructing officers and members of the APCs on the importance of working collectively and on the necessity of merger in the future. It was explained that the joint co-op was merely a transitional form, and that sooner or later the several co-ops would be merged into one.\(^\)\(^9\) Here the PSG seems to be bypassing the joint co-op and going directly to the APC leadership and members with directives and instructions about present and future behavior and events. It is not likely that there was much doubt in the village about where real political authority lay in Wang-mang.

The PSG ran into some serious resistance from the masses over the question of exchange of land among the APCs in order to eliminate convoluted boundaries among them and to prepare for their eventual merger. While "every co-op supported this proposal"\(^8\) in principle, the greatest political struggle in Wang-mang took place over its implementation. Yi Chi-hsi,\(^8\)
a Party member and head of APC two, was singled out by the PSG during this struggle and criticized for his "departmentalist thought" (pen-wei ssu-hsiang). He told his APC members that they got the worst of it from the joint co-op in the exchange of land, and this caused a split of some of the members [of APC two] and the leadership of the joint co-op. The PSG tackled this question in good time by calling a meeting of Party members, at which Yi Chi-hsi was criticized and the members were reminded that they must take into account the interests of all concerned on the question of land exchange. Some of the Party members examined their own attitudes on this matter. Yi Chi-hsi made a self-criticism at the meeting.\(^90\)

This struggle was probably even more serious than it appears in the report, since in all likelihood fraternal or collateral ties between PSG head Yi Chi-tung and Yi Chi-hsi were involved. The point is that it was at the stage of land redistribution that the most serious intra-village political struggle broke out. This echoes with Theodore Lowi's hypothesis that issues of redistribution elicit stronger feelings than other kinds of issues.\(^91\)

The formation of the Wang-mang village-wide APC was accomplished in four stages. First, the PSG "decided that the small APCs would be merged after the fall harvest and that members of MATs and peasants still working their own land would be enrolled."\(^92\) This is a change from the mutual aid and early APC days when membership was voluntary. Next, the matter was discussed at a Party branch meeting at the township level. The township Party branch gave its approval. Third, the "July 1" lien-she was convened and the matter discussed. Fourth, a meeting of the members of all the APCs was convened and the matter again discussed.\(^93\)

Despite the language of the report, it should not be inferred that the PSG unilaterally made the decision to merge, and that the last three steps in the process were mere formalities. My interviews in Hong Kong

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suggest a far more complex picture of decision-making processes of this kind. They lead me to hypothesize in this case that the PSG reached a tentative decision to push ahead with the consolidation of the APCs only after trying to anticipate public reaction by consulting with cadres, mass representatives such as leaders of mass organizations or respected old peasants, or with the masses directly through interviews or meetings with them. It is my hypothesis that only after this process would the PSG make its decision and refer it up to the township Party branch for approval. After all, the branch committee would no doubt require some proof that the policy would work before approval would be forthcoming. The meeting with the lien-she would provide another check to make sure that the PSG's reading of public sentiments was correct, and would probably also serve as the best forum for formulating the concrete details of consolidating the APCs. This then would be presented to the masses at a mass meeting, where remaining objections could still be voiced. Hopefully, though, most objections to the decision to go ahead with forming the enlarged APC would have been anticipated and already taken into account, leaving the mass meeting free to debate and decide on the details of implementing the decision. Unfortunately, materials of the kind used in this paper are unable to help confirm, refute, or revise this hypothesis about the local decision-making process. More will be said of the short-comings of this data in the conclusion.

We know little of what the Wang-mang APC was to look like, and nothing of what it actually did look like. Of course, common property of the four small APCs was to be transferred to the new APC. This included tools, land, and animals, the latter to be transferred either from the small APCs or from their owners at the prices originally paid for them. Land was pooled as in the old APCs, with the same number of shares in the new APC as the peasants had received from the small APCs awarded to each. New members were to be given shares in the APC according to the same standards used originally by the small APCs.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

I. Village-level Administration and Radical Change.
Continuities in the Wang-mang materials point up a few simple but very crucial features of the local Chinese political and economic scene. First, in a major departure from administrative practice of the thousands of years of the empire, the village in post-1949 China becomes an important political unit. In traditional China, the imperial government had no official organs below the county level. But in Wang-mang, the major new forms of social, economic, and political organization were formed at the village and, temporarily, the sub-village level; and in fact, later developments show that the village has re-asserted itself as a political unit against attempts, such as the commune, to delegate political functions to higher levels. In the MAT period, the village level lien-tsu shared the responsibility for economic management and planning with the sub-village MAT. Specifically, the lien-tsu handled the allocation of labor and animals to the teams and the formulation of production plans, while the MAT handled the day-to-day allocation and management of work. But, political work was handled almost exclusively at the village level by the lien-tsu and the PSG, specifically: operation of schools, administration of Youth League affairs, organization of newspaper-reading groups (actually conducted at sub-village levels), convening of monthly meetings of all MAT members, at which important political and administrative work was carried out (new members admitted, contributions to the MATs evaluated, labor points standards set, and propaganda campaigns carried out) and the making of key decisions on village organization and administration. We have attributed the demise of the MAN to its emphasis on sub-village-level organs (namely, the key-point MATs) rather than the unit which was to dominate the period of cooperativization to follow: the village. In the APC period, the village-level lien-she performed the crucial functions of allocating resources to the four APCs, preparing village-wide plans, and setting norms for wages, among others. As our case material for Wang-mang runs out, a village-level APC is being organized. Furthermore, during the three stages of development which have been covered here, the organ of ultimate local political authority was always the PSG, also organized at the village level. And from what we know about developments in China generally, we can infer that
the village has remained an important unit of political and economic administration up to and through the commune period.

In all this, the higher-level organs make surprisingly little appearance. The only point at which they get serious attention is in initiating the MAN. Work teams came to Wang-mang only three times (that we know of) between mid-1949 and August, 1955: to organize the first MATs before land reform, to organize MATs after land reform, and to organize the MAN. Two of these three ventures failed. Leadership indigenous to the village is most important throughout. Of course, Wang-mang was constantly bombarded by reports and directives from higher levels via newspapers and other channels. The important PSG, about which we know so little, was probably more subject to higher-level Party direction than the other organs about which we have more information. But the PSG did not make the essential decisions about the daily operation of the MATs or APCs, which leads us to infer that the sorts of direction it received probably had more to do with general directions of policy—when and whether to carry out rent reduction, land reform, mutual aid, and cooperativization—than the actual and important details of how to implement these policies.

In short, we can firmly conclude that the village was the main administrative unit throughout the periods we have studied. This itself is an important departure from administrative practice in traditional China, in which the basic administrative level was far higher. This dramatic lowering of the basic administrative level in less than fifty years is concomitant with the change in the goal orientation of the center from the empire to the People's Republic; and this perspective may help us understand the failure of the KMT as well. Where, as under the empire, the main orientation of the regime is the preservation of the social, economic, and political status quo, comparatively little administration is needed. Studies of local government in traditional China have stressed taxation and peacekeeping functions. But, in post-liberation China, the amount of administration needed to transform the entire, social, economic, and political landscape was and remains enormous. The variety of conditions within a county or even a ward, combined with the sheer volume of work which would aggregate at these levels
render them unsuitable as the main administrative units of local affairs. The CCP recognized that the village simply had to be penetrated and transformed into a political unit if socialist transformation were to be accomplished. This perspective can help us understand the failure of the KMT to carry out a successful revolution in China. Its only serious attempt to penetrate the village level was the pao-chia system, which was patent-ly related to control and not development or change. If the KMT had any revolutionary visions for China's villages, as it claimed to have (e.g., the slogan "land to the tiller"), certainly it could not have hoped to implement them without a broad mobilization of village leadership. This it did not do.

II. The Behind-the-Scenes Role of the Party.

A second general theme in the Wang-mang material, and one which is characteristic of the rest of China as well, is that Party leadership is organized into small, behind-the-scenes groups which exert leadership func-tions through other, more broadly "democratic" or repre-sentative forms of organization, rather than themselves operating directly on other mass units. In Wang-mang, a majority of the members of the lien-tsu (and probably the lien-she as well) were members of the PSG. We have speculated that it controlled the newspaper-reading groups within the MATs with the help of the Communist Youth League. It operated after-work schools and local primary schools, and, through the lien-tsu, it controlled the technical research, water management, and other special-ized groups and teams. We can hypothesize that one reason for the demise of the MAN was that its multi-township structure made for conflicts between basic-level Party groups. This kind of leadership arrangement poses some intriguing questions: Why does the Party prefer to act through "front" organizations? Are these "front" units merely transmission belts downward? If not, then to what extent do they permit upward flow of information which might effect decisions reached by the PSG? What are the consequences of this structural arrangement for leader-mass relations in China?

This arrangement seems to have served the Wang-mang PSG in at least six ways. First, it insulated the Party from public criticism for failures of local policy. For
example, the failure of the original Wang-mang MAT was attributed to imprecise planning and poor management, not to an error by the PSG.\textsuperscript{95} It was the lien-tsu, and not the PSG, which was criticized for holding too many mass meetings in Wang-mang. The deficiencies of the mutual aid movement in Wang-mang were attributed to the "conservative thought" of the "village cadres and backbones," and not to that of the PSG.\textsuperscript{96} Of course, the local Party leadership is often responsible for such failures, if for no other reason than its overlap with the administrative organs which are held responsible. But this "front" system of organization makes it publicly seem less responsible, and so helps preserve it legitimacy.

Second, the "front" style of organization permitted the very important but often highly technical problems of day-to-day management to be handled by organs which had a broader membership, constituency, and range of inputs than the PSG. This made for the possibility of more effective decision-making while still keeping matters under the ultimate authority of the PSG. For example, the lien-she handled problems in hoeing, plowing, and harvesting.\textsuperscript{97} The lien-tsu was to "check on production of the MATs..., help draw up production plans, resolve difficulties, allocate human and animal power and agricultural tools, develop the functions of the MAF,...and set out work regulations."\textsuperscript{98} This covers a wide range of highly detailed, important, and potentially divisive kinds of issues in the village. The successful resolution of these issues required a range of inputs about the spread and intensity of interests and capabilities among the effected parties much wider than those available to the PSG directly. While of course the PSG reserved the right to "check over" the decisions of these groups, it left such actual decisions to more broadly constituted groups which it controlled but into which it had co-opted representatives of other effected and relevant groups of the village.

Co-optation of broader village interests also helped increase the legitimacy of the PSG. It may have helped woo potential village activists\textsuperscript{99} (as well as "activists," i.e., chi-chi fen-tzu) through the Hawthorne participation effect, which predicts higher compliance when those affected feel that they have had a hand in the decision.\textsuperscript{100} And it may have influenced the less politically active
masses by conferring upon the PSG's policies an aura of democracy or broad support among influential non-Party figures in Wang-mang. For example, the *lien-tsu* included a woman and at least three members of the peasants association.

Fourth, this arrangement enabled the Party to handle serious problems decisively without jeopardizing the rest of the village structure. For example, when Yi Chi-hsi was endangering the unification of the four APCs, he was forced by the PSG to make a self-criticism before it. In this way, the problem received a quick solution, decisive and authoritative, and the PSG did not risk a public split.

Fifth, this arrangement provided Wang-mang with flexibility in economic and production administration and continuity in political leadership and authority. When it came time to organize the MATs, MAN, the four APCs, and their subsequent unification, all fundamental transformations of daily life and work in Wang-mang, a reorganization of the PSG was not necessary. So, while every other form of political and economic organization was undergoing radical transformation, the Party was more able to maintain the continuity and (presumably) solidarity necessary for its role as the ultimate authority in the village.

And last, the PSG was able by this arrangement to operate in relative secrecy. This explains why we know so little about it.

While these six points have all offered explanations of why the Party organized itself for leadership the way it did, we still have not addressed the question of the effect of this structure on leader-mass relations. Was this structure of leadership in fact just a tool for co-opting possible opposition and facilitating Party manipulation of indigenous village social, political, and economic forces, or did it permit some effective articulation of interests from the masses to the leadership, i.e., some democratic influence over policy? In connection with a decision to organize an APC during the winter of 1951-52, an investigation was carried out, and the decision to form the APC was deferred indefinitely. This step, which would have meant the end of private ownership of land, would have involved changes far more serious than even the land reform. When a single APC was finally
organized in 1955, the greatest political struggle since 1949 broke out. Did the deferment of the formation of the APC result at least in part from the masses' influence over their leaders? The material suggests that this is at least a plausible hypothesis.

Another incident suggests the same possibility. In mid-1949, a work team came to Wang-mang in order to organize MATs, indicating the interest of higher-level Party authorities in promoting the policy. But peasant resistance was overwhelming, and the local cadres finally had to organize an MAT among themselves alone. This effort also failed. Only after land reform could the MAT movement get underway successfully. Did the Party have to sweeten the pill for the peasants through land reform? Was this an instance of bargaining between the leaders and the masses? Such a possibility cannot be ruled out. But in advancing such hypotheses we run into an inherent limitation of the data, which can only be overcome through interviewing or first-hand research. More discussion of the limitations of this data follows.

III. Wang-mang as a Model.

A third salient characteristic of the Chinese development pattern which was evident in Wang-mang was the use of models in propagating policy. When the Wang-mang peasants first refused to join MATs, the cadres organized one themselves, in order to provide an example. While MATs were being organized in Wang-mang, P'u's own MAT was a model for the others. The MAN was conceived in accordance with the principle of "uniting the points with the whole" and "a large net fitting over a small one and a small net connecting with a large net." It was composed of model MATs, and each member MAT was to publicize its successes to the MAN and to pass on the experiences it gained from the MAN to other MATs in its village, forming in effect another smaller net. During co-operativization, the P'u APC (APC no. one) was a model for the other three. P'u himself is of course a model man; his role is treated separately below.

The use of "models" or exemplary pilot projects in China has been criticized by some Chinese and by outside observers as well in two ways, both of which parallel more general criticisms raised against pilot projects in developmental schemes in other developing countries. First,
it is often argued that models are difficult to adapt to other broad areas of the countryside. Three specific forms of this problem are frequently mentioned. First, it is sometimes argued that model projects are chosen from among areas which are relatively well endowed with natural resources, but the rest of the country is far poorer and so has less productive material—labor, capital, skills, good weather, or otherwise—on which to rely. Second, it is frequently the case that techniques developed in pilot projects cannot be adapted to other areas, because of differences in the natural environment, local habits, availability of labor, skill level of the local peasantry, or animosities among local leaders or peasants. And third, it is often true that different parts of the countryside face widely different kinds of problems, and that the pilot project may therefore be coming up with ways to handle problems which large areas of the country do not experience while not treating problems which are plaguing other parts of the countryside. A second general criticism of pilot projects is that their success is not attributable to excellence in innovation or success in adapting new technology but rather because these models are the object of various kinds of official favoritism, and that they therefore receive inordinately large doses of technological, financial, capital, and human inputs not even remotely available to the rest of the countryside.102

But the Wang-mang case is an example of the Chinese ability to overcome these difficulties. Unlike famous Tachai, Wang-mang was strictly a local model. Throughout China, counties, townships, and later communes, each have their own models which develop projects and techniques that attempt to solve local problems using local resources in the context of the limitations of local conditions. One example from the Wang-mang material is the insect control campaign. My inability to find a translation for the hsi-chiang ("juice-absorbing") insects might suggest that they were a specifically local problem. Furthermore, the solution which the MAN promulgated was the use of an insect-catching net invented locally (by P'u) and made from local materials by the peasants themselves. This campaign, only one among many others in Wang-mang which have not been mentioned specifically here—such as "suitable seeding" (ho-shih yang-t'ien), a method for planting seeds in beds instead of
merely broadcasting them randomly over the field; "reasonably close planting" (ho-li mi-chi); more efficient allocation of labor during the busy summer harvest; the development of by-production; and others—demonstrate the practical superiority, due to easier generalizability, of local over national models. That the "Learn from Tachai" campaign is directed more at ideological-attitudinal and organizational goals than technological or strictly productive-technical ones indicates that Chinese planners are aware of this problem of generalizability and the value of local models therein.

The second general criticism of models—that they are the beneficiaries of undue official preference—is harder to treat from the Wang-mang material. Surely the Tachai case, at least in its early years, demonstrates the opposite: it was the object of official scorn under Liu Shao-ch'i's administration. Wang-mang seems to have received no large doses of capital or financial support. There is no mention of the mysterious appearance of modern machinery or large loans or grants. The improvements which were developed, such as close planting, bed seeding, insect control, reorganization of harvest labor, and the like, all seem to be low-cost improvements consistent with the principle of self-reliance. Of course, this one case gives us no basis for drawing a general conclusion about all local models. And the Wang-mang case is time-bound: even if a county official, for example, wanted to subsidize Wang-mang, there was precious little money and machinery available to do so up to 1954. It may have become easier for officials to unduly enrich local models as the resources with which to enrich them became more plentiful in later years. But if it is true that Wang-mang was not the recipient of special treatment, then the fact that it was receiving so much publicity indicates that development based on self-reliance and not on infusions of wealth from outside was the pattern which official policymakers at higher levels were seeking to promote.


A final characteristic of Wang-mang common to patterns of political development throughout the Chinese countryside is the role of P'u Chung-chih. He is the embodiment of the three other salient characteristics which
we have already discussed. He is a native village resident, and his ascendance corresponds to the importance of the village as a political and economic unit in post-liberation China. While head of the peasants association and head of the lien-tsu, the lien-she, and the chief exemplary MAT of the MAN, he is also a member of the PSG. Consistent, however, with the "behind-the-scenes" nature of Party leadership, P'u is not the head of the PSG, presumably Wang-mang's most authoritative political post. His leadership, then, of the lien-tsu, lien-she, MAN, and his own model MAT and APC, was not seen publicly by the masses as a mere stand-in for (and therefore imposition of) Party control. Third, he is of course a model worker and cadre.

The prevalent use of such model men in China, from Dr. Norman Bethune to the famous Ch'en Yung-kuei of Tachai Brigade to our own P'u Chung-chih, demands some explanations. It may have some roots in the Soviet tradition of Stakhanovite labor heroism. But it is clearly related to Mao's thought as well. Mao's conception of the relationship between consciousness and material conditions is not well understood and is therefore the subject of furious debate: some view him as a voluntarist and idealist visionary, and others as merely a hopeless pragmatist. Whatever the outcome, we are sure that Mao accords great importance to man's creative consciousness. Because of the special responsibilities of leaders, the role of creative thought is a particularly important characteristic for good leadership. In other words, creative consciousness is a necessary condition or changing the world, and changing the world depends on good leadership. Like Ch'en, P'u demonstrates the potentialities of creative leadership par excellence. When there was an insect problem, P'u did not seek the help of experts or advanced technology, nor did he assign the job to others. Rather, he self-reliantly made an insect net himself, demonstrated its value in practice by actually catching insects with it, and then showed others how to make and use such nets. It is important that he did not seek a ready-made solution, such as purchasing exterminating equipment, but rather created his own solution which fit the local conditions and could be made locally and cheaply, and then demonstrated its utility in practice. Local leaders like P'u are important, then,
because they are the embodiment of the important principle of self-reliance and creative revolutionary consciousness and its potential effect in changing local conditions. The thrust of Wang-mang material is that P'u's creative leadership was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the successful transformation of Wang-mang. Its analogue in Mao's relation to the Party and the people, and the Party's relationship to the proletariat in Marx and particularly Lenin, is clear. P'u is a little Mao, and China needs thousands, indeed millions of little Maos if the Chinese revolution is to succeed.\textsuperscript{103}

V. Leader-Mass Relations in Wang-mang.

But the Chinese concept of leadership has been studied quite thoroughly,\textsuperscript{104} and Wang-mang adds little to what we already know. The burden of my research, therefore, is to move beyond leadership studies to the analysis of leader-mass relations in China. In the American literature, leader-mass relations has been conceptualized as an interaction among three levels: leaders, activists (or high political participators), and masses.\textsuperscript{105} Verba and Nie have hypothesized two basic patterns of leader-mass relations. In the participation strategy, the elite interacts with and pays attention to only those sectors of the masses which come forward with their political views, i.e., those who participate in politics. In the polling strategy, the elite responds to what it perceives as the generalized interests of all the masses, regardless of whether these are expressed or not.\textsuperscript{106} Of course, each strategy reflects a different political reality about the masses. I hypothesize that each also has very different and important consequences for policy. Stated very briefly, I hypothesize that the participation strategy results in policy outcomes consistent with the interests of the highest participators. Since participation patterns are stratified socially, with the more advanced strata participating more, the participation strategy tends to perpetuate a certain pattern of social and economic stratification in the society. The polling strategy, on the other hand, tends to distribute public policy benefits across lines of social stratification, thereby tending to diminish them.

We must begin, then, by identifying the leaders,
activists, and masses in Wang-mang. The local leadership can be identified as the PSG, the lien-tsu, and the lien-she (and, in the MAN period, Comrade Ts'ao Ching-chien, secretary of the township committee, who was appointed by the county committee to take charge of the MAN). The activists—citizens of Wang-mang who are not leaders in the strict sense but who participate actively in political affairs—are the team chiefs, the APC chiefs, and the heads of mass organizations, about which we know nothing except that they existed. This group also includes the anonymous spokesmen of opposition to the Party's policies, who no doubt existed and were often effective (e.g., in stalling P'u's early plan for MATs in mid-1949, or in the movement to oppose the redistribution of land informing the Wang-mang APC, led by Yi Chi-hsi). The well publicized "activists" (chi-chi fen-tzu) are but a part of this group. Everyone else can be considered as in the "masses."

In Wang-mang, the initial movement for mutual aid was organized completely by the leadership. In 1949, "P'u and others thought of organizing MATs, and called several meetings."

When the peasants refused to join, the leaders and now some activists—here, "28 village cadres"—organized mutual aid among themselves. When this too failed, land reform was carried out, and "activists" (chi-chi fen-tzu) gushed forth. With the help of a work team and these "activists," fourteen MATs were organized, and only then did the masses join.

This sequence represents an initial failure of the polling strategy, followed by a success for the participation strategy. The initial movement for mutual aid before land reform seems to have relied on a presumption of extant mass support. Such latent support did not exist, and the premature movement failed. Mutual aid teams could finally only be organized with the assistance of activists participants—here, "activists"—who had appeared during land reform and who could take positions of responsibility in the new MATs. If we make the likely assumption that some of these activists became MAT heads, then they would have been in a position to chair team meetings and thereby become intermediaries between the leadership and the masses. The only formal channel for direct leader-mass communication was the monthly MAF meeting (of all MAT members); it was in this forum that women—definitely
members of the "masses"—who were dissatisfied with their work-point allocations brought their complaints directly to the attention of the leadership.

But Wang-mang was a very small place, and informal ties were surely widespread. That we have no data on them is no reason to discount their effect on leader-mass relations. What this exploratory case is telling, in part then, is that future cases must be chosen which give us some better hints about the extent of various kinds of informal vertical and horizontal relationships in the local community before we can draw any conclusions about leader-mass relations and the leader-mass dynamics of public policy. The only thing we can say now is that the leadership's reliance on activists in Wang-mang enabled it to implement policies of social, economic, and political change which it was unable to do by relying on the masses directly. The point is, however, time-bound: the original MAT movement failed because the masses' political consciousness was too low. This was, after all, just after liberation. Has the leadership's need for reliance on local activists and the participation strategy changed since then? Has the polling strategy, through, for example, various mass line tactics, become more efficacious and therefore been used more as a result of significant increases in the political consciousness of the masses? What kinds of changes have taken place in Chinese politics at their most basic level since the early 1950's? What has been the fate of the participation and polling strategies, and what has been their effect on public policy? As stated at the outset, these are uncharted seas in the study of Chinese politics. As far as Wang-mang is concerned, we must remain cautioned by Aristotle's warning not to make any distinctions finer than those to which the material lends itself.108

VI. Chinese Media and the Problem of Local Studies from Afar.

This brings us to the last remaining objective of this paper: an evaluation of the utility of the kind of data used in the preparation of this paper for future research on local politics in China. We have been able to learn a good deal from a very close reading of three relatively short (article-length) official reports on Wang-mang. This material is very useful, for example,
in illustrating the actual form which certain general characteristics of local administration and leadership take, such as the functions of different administrative levels, the role and functions of local Party organization, the usefulness of models, and the ideal form and potential efficacy of local leadership. In addition, it can tell us much about the outlines of the process of structural development in Chinese villages like Wang-mang: what forms of collectivization were pursued in what order, why some forms were dropped in favor of others, and at what stages the greatest problems of gaining popular support and moving forward appeared.

However, it is also clear that this type of material, when used by itself, is of little help in probing below the surface of these processes and structures — in asking questions such as: What are the lines of informal affiliation and conflict in the village, and how do they effect local political processes? To what extent and in what ways does post-liberation political leadership reflect, co-opt, and depart from the pre-liberation constellation of political forces? Just who makes local decisions about what issues? And more important and interesting, who influences them and who does not? How? How is support obtained, and from whom? Who is in opposition to what? How is opposition influence brought to bear? Why is it successful at some times and not others?

These kinds of questions open doors to problems of broader social scientific interest, such as the usefulness of social class categories and class analysis in studying social change, and the problems and possibilities of democratic and non-democratic political processes in communities and countries faced with pressing problems of political and economic development. If these kinds of problems cannot be addressed squarely by analyses of the Chinese case which rely mainly on published materials, must the Chinese case be dropped, even temporarily, from social science research into broader problems of political and economic development?

Not without a fight. China is interesting and valuable in social science research because its approach to the whole range of problems of economic and political development is so unique and, it would appear by most accounts of recent visitors, so successful in many
respects. The Chinese solutions to the problems of development faced by all "less-developed countries" demands thorough and thoughtful analysis. Studies of local politics and economics in China must, therefore, move beyond the limitations of official reports. Specifically, interviews with former residents of China, captured documents, and visitors' and field researchers' reports must be integrated if Chinese society is to be probed beneath its surface.

In revising this paper after completing six months of intensive interviewing in Hong Kong, I frequently noticed that the reports on which it was based took on a new meaning. The actual connotation of certain terms, phrases, and slogans has become clearer after hearing informants use them in different contexts. Hypotheses about gaps in the data can be made more easily and confidently, and this makes the data easier to theorize about as a whole. In addition, interview material can be used systematically as a source of case and even cross-sectional data, and then compared with data based on official reports and reports by visitors and field workers so as to highlight the perceptual, political, and sampling biases of each.

Visitors' and especially field workers' reports, such as the work of Myrdal and Chen, are invaluable in providing still a third perspective on local life in China. Despite their superficiality and selection bias, visitors' reports can often be useful in pointing up the general outlines and problems of development in at least advanced villages; in addition they are often good sources of badly-needed economic data. The field worker is in a far better position. He or she can follow up interesting leads better than the interviewer, who is limited by the knowledge of his informant. He can be more systematic in gathering social and economic data. We are to be encouraged by the fact that recently researchers have been permitted to conduct field work in villages which are not model areas.

Finally, captured documents provide another equally vital perspective: that of cadres reporting to each other, both upward and downward, about progress and problems. Here we learn not only more about what the knottiest problems are but also how different interests
are articulated upward, how negotiations among various levels and bureaucratic sectors are carried out, and how solutions are implemented.\textsuperscript{112}

None of these sources is without its own perceptual, political, and selective biases. But used together, in combination and contrast, the specific form and content of the biases can be best discerned and coped with. In addition, using all these sources is our only assurance of tapping the broadest possible range of economic situations, social practices, and political perspectives and behaviors. That is to say, it is our best hope of making local-level research on China work.

NOTES


As we shall see, P'u more than once showed a tendency to try to establish new forms of organization in Wang-mang before they were established nationally and before Wang-mang was ready for them.

For example, the village headman's fields were spread with manure in half a day, a job which had taken him over a month in the past. We can calculate this to represent approximately a doubling of labor productivity, since 28 men did in half a day what one man took 30 days to do before.

It is not clear whether this indicates that it is the old village leadership or just the position of the village headmanship which is being co-opted. That is, we do not know how long before or after his affiliation with the Party Yi became the village headman. This type of data limitation is discussed more fully in the conclusion.


It is startling that Wang-mang received eighteen copies of daily newspapers, in light of informants' reports from Kwangtung Province, which report that in most cases one copy of Nan-fang jih-pao was received by their production team each day, and that it was
usually not read but rather used for wrapping. Indications are, then, that either Wang-mang had attained a relatively high level of political development, or that the newspapers were a collateral benefit of its being a model.

26. There is an unusual translation problem here, and it may point to an interesting conceptual insight. **Lien** means to connect or unite, and **tsu** means group. The term **lien-tsu** is a novel one in Chinese, hence the translation problem. Looking at the context in which it is used, it seems to have two meanings. On the one hand, it refers to the entire body of people who are organized into MATs— the Mutual Aid Federation as a whole. On the other hand, it is definitely meant to be an abbreviation for the seven-man group which was coordinating the whole mutual aid movement in Wang-mang. This duality of meaning corresponds, for example, to that of the word **hsien** in Ch'ing documents. There, the term could mean the county, the county seat, or, in some contexts, the county magistrate. In both cases, the language assumes an identity between the social or political unit and the leadership of it. If this could be extrapolated to a "Chinese" concept of leadership, in which the leadership is the "essence" of the led and identical to it in some transcendental way, it also fits the Marxist-Leninist notion of the Party as "vanguard" of the proletariat. In any event, for the rest of this paper, "lien-tsu" will be used to refer to the seven-man group, and "mutual aid federation" (MAF) will refer to the village-wide mutual aid movement and everyone involved in mutual aid. But the linguistic and philosophical problem of the identity of the two should be kept in mind, although it cannot be pursued in appropriate detail here.

27. Hua, 460.
28. Hua, 462.
29. Hua, 462.
30. Hua, 462.
31. Hua, 462.
32. Hua, 462.
33. Hua, 462.
34. Hua, 462.
35. It is not clear if this means that every MAT included at least one literate person, or that each time the newspaper-reading group met a literate Party
member, Youth League member, or "activist" visited the MAT. Interviews with former residents of China, which were conducted after the completion of this paper, suggest that the latter is a frequently-used technique.

37. Hua, 463.
38. Hua, 463.
40. Hua, 465.
41. Hua, 466.

43. Hua, 463.
44. Hua, 464.
45. Hua, 463-4.
46. Hua, 466.
47. Hua, 467.
48. Hua, 467.
49. Hua, 467.

51. Hua, 467-8.
52. Hua, 468.
53. Hua, 468.
54. Hua, 468.

56. Chang, 646.
57. Chang, 646.
58. Chang, 646.
59. For some reason, this report focuses on Western Wang-mang, while the other two reports and at least one map consulted (see map #2) do not make any distinction. Perhaps they were regarded as two neighborhoods of a single village. They were only about a li (½ kilometer) apart.

60. Chang, 645, 646.
61. Chang, 646.
62. Chang, 647.
63. Chang, 649.
64. Chang, 649.
65. Chang, 646.
66. Chang, 647.
68. Chang, 648.
70. Chang, 648.
71. Chang, 649.
72. Chang, 649.
73. Chang, 649.
74. Chang, 651.
76. Chang, 651.
77. Here again we encounter the linguistic and philosophical problem discussed above (note 26) of the same term being used for a social unit and for the executive committee leading it. Here, however, the problem is even more perplexing, because the social unit involved --the joint co-op or lien-she-- did not actually exist as a functioning social, political, or economic entity, but merely as an ideal immanent on the then-current situation. That is, it had no existence outside the co-ordinative functions of the executive committee.
79. Kung-tso-pu, 1198.
80. Kung-tso-pu, 1198.
82. Kung-tso-pu, 1197.
83. An earlier report noted that among the sixteen families who failed to join MATs, two were landlords, eight were without a breadwinner, and six were engaged in revolutionary work (i.e., they were cadres serving
outside Wang-mang). It would be interesting to know which of these groups was excluded (or excluded itself) from the APC as well. While we can be fairly sure that the landlords were still excluded or more likely refused to join, we cannot be sure about the other two groups.

84. Kung-tso-pu, 1203.
85. Kung-tso-pu, 1199.
86. Kung-tso-pu, 1199.
89. He was probably a brother of the village and PSC head Yi Chi-tung, since the first two characters of their names are identical and the last characters mean "east" and "west."
94. Protocols can be made available upon special request, c/o the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
95. Hua, 460.
96. According to informants, the term "village cadres" often refers to local cadres who are not Party members. By contrast, the term "cadres" includes Party and non-Party cadres. This interpretation is particularly likely in this case, since "village cadres" are linked with "backbones," who are, according to informants, non-Party, non-cadre people whose help in a particular task is solicited by a cadre. We can infer, then that non-Party people are being singled out for criticism here.
98. Hua, 462.
99. By this term, I mean those with an above average propensity for political participation.


103. On the importance of local leadership, see Millikan and Hapgood, pp. 88-90.


106. Verba and Nie, chapter 15.

107. Hua, 460.


111. For example, see: W.R. Geddes, Peasant Life in Communist China (Ithaca: The Society for Applied Anthropology, 1963).


CHINESE TERMS

The following Chinese terms have been translated here as follows:

hu-chu-tsu 互助组 mutual aid team (MAT)
kung-tso-tsu 工作组 work team
hu-chu-wang 互助网 mutual aid net (MAN)
hu-chu-lien-tsu 互助联组 mutual aid federation (MAF)
lien-tsu 联组 abbreviation for MAF; also,
leadership group of MAF.
nung-yeh sheng-ch'an 荒野生产
ho-tso-she 农业生产 合作社
agricultural producers' cooperative (APC)