From Japan's Modernity
A Reader

Select Papers, Volume No. 11
The Center for East Asian Studies
The University of Chicago
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PREFACE

This Reader takes its inspiration from the dialogue between Maruyama Masao and Katō Shūichi in "Translation and Japan's Modernity" Honyaku to Nihon no kindai, (Iwanami, 1998). It is a conversation that, without any fanfare, reviews the pivotal importance of "translation" for Japan's modernity. The natural, social, and human sciences were to be taught throughout the educational system in "translation" not in their "original". There is not the slightest nod to nativist ideals of linguistic essentialism nor the notion of foreign ideas being sources of cultural contamination. Taking the position that translations are crucial for nourishing critical perspectives on modern changes, they range widely from subjects crossing national and chronological boundaries. We are reminded that in our part of the world too, texts from the pre-modern era — the great texts of the "ancient", "medieval" and biblical traditions — as well as those of modern literatures from other "national" languages, become accessible to us only through translation. All societies, in whatever area of the globe they may be located, partake of this translation culture.

This slim volume, From Japan's Modernity, is an undertaking that is respectful of how knowledge is transferred across temporal and political boundaries through the effort of translation. It is intended to remind those of us who teach the study of civilizations that without "translation" teaching cross-cultural intellectual history would not be possible. Just as, without apology, Maruyama and Katō embraced the importance of translation for modern Japan, we do so in compiling our reader for the teaching of Japan's modernity outside of Japan.

As with its predecessor Readings in Tokugawa Thought (Select Papers vol. 9, 3rd edition, 1998), this Reader is a product of student initiative and interest. The texts chosen for translation do not reflect an overarching thesis or idea but are extensions of individual research. They do not fill 'gaps' in a file of predetermined subjects.

The translations were reviewed in many intense seminars (dokusho kai) that extended over the course of the academic year 2000-01. These sessions brought together graduate students from several disciplines, including history, film studies, art history, and east asian languages and civilizations.

I would like to extend special thanks to Professor J. Victor Koschmann for his translation of Katō Hiroyuki's Jinken shinsetsu, "A Reconsideration of Human Rights". Now a professor of history at Cornell University, Victor Koschmann prepared this translation for use in our courses on modern Japanese history and civilization in the mid-1970s when he was a graduate
student here at the University of Chicago. He reopened his translation at a workshop in the spring of 2001, and kindly agreed to its inclusion in this Reader.

In “A Reconsideration of Human Rights”, Kato Hiroyuki attacks the theory of natural rights, a view he himself previously held, arguing instead that rights are acquired through evolutionary development. Also included are three texts by natural rights proponent Ueki Emori which call upon the people to actively take their “heaven-given right” of liberty and to set limits on the power of the state. In “An Outline of National Morality,” a key text from early 20th century moral discourse in Japan, Inoue Tetsujiro discusses the basic features and importance of the moral sensibility of the Japanese people.

Later texts give a sense of intellectual concern and engagement with “the social problem” (shakai mondai). Tomeoka Kōsuke situates the problem of national decay within the social and advocates a program of juvenile reform based on the concept of kanka, which implied direct transformation through a strict regimen of moral, intellectual, and physical education and indirect transformation through social change and interaction with the natural environment. Futabatei Shime, the nom de plume of Hasegawa Tatsunosuke, discusses the circumstances of his early adult life when he wrote his seminal work, Ukigumo, as well as the moral dilemma, which carried over into his later years surrounding his need to sell his art in order be financially and socially independent of authority. We have also included the famous exchange between two key thinkers in twentieth-century Japanese history on the shakai mondai. In 1926 Watsuji Tetsuro and Kawakami Hajime, then serving as professors at Kyoto Imperial University, engaged in a disputatious exchange regarding the Students Arrest Incident. This incident, otherwise known as the Gakuren Incident, marked the government’s first use of the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, a law enacted in May of that year to curtail the activities of anyone who “formed an association with the objective of altering the national polity (kokutai) or the system of private property.”

The later pieces try to give some hint of the extraordinary depth and breadth of the intellectual production on the relationship of science and culture in Taishō and early Shōwa Japan. The first text by Ōshita Udaru, written before the establishment of the SF genre, tries to make sense of the growing presence of science within literature by identifying two distinct types of scientific novel: the pure scientific novel and the quasi-scientific novel. Hasegawa Nyōzekan’s “Original Art and Reproduced Art” elaborates Hasegawa’s insistence on the importance of relying on one’s own senses, and illuminates how he sought to evaluate the increasingly popular and common experiences of reproduced art in relation to fundamental human senses. In “The Film Era,” Terada Torahiko recollects his childhood experi-
ence of cinema as a scientific yet magical toy, and fantasizes about the birth of a national cinema based on traditional arts. Finally, Tosaka Jun’s “The Principle of Everydayness and Historical Time”, a foundational text of his philosophical materialism, argues for an autonomous history independent of consciousness, religion, and natural science.

Special acknowledgement is due Robert P. Stolz who proposed this reader and who served as the coordinator of the project. We are indebted to him for his dedication and mindfulness to the many turns of this undertaking.

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This Reader is dedicated to the memory of Robert Adams (PhD 1991), who, as a graduate student, was the prime mover in the publication of the collection of essays, Productions of Culture in Japan (Select Papers, vol. 10, 1995). A devoted scholar of twentieth century Japanese thought and philosophy, Robert Adams passed away in the spring of 2001. He was associate professor of philosophy at Sophia University in Tokyo.

Tetsuo Najita

July 2001
Jinken shinsetsu
A Reconsideration of Human Rights (1882)
Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916)

Translated by J. Victor Koschmann

Part I: The Origins of a Chimera: Natural Rights

Chapter One

In Europe, great scholars such as Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton began more than three hundred years ago to study thoroughly the realities of nature. They discovered the principles governing the motion of the earth and other heavenly bodies, finally succeeding in dispelling the grand delusions of the past. In the course of the past hundred years, Lamarck, Goethe, Lyell and Darwin have carried out exhaustive experimentation, resulting in the gradual discovery of the evolutionary principles that order all worldly phenomena. Outmoded fantasies have been exposed, and the disciplines of the physical sciences have been transformed by these discoveries to an extent that to this day excites our boundless admiration.

In disciplines concerned with the mind, and human affairs, such as philosophy, politics and law, however, experimentation is still difficult. Unfortunately, therefore, scholars in those fields generally have continued to wander blindly, unable to cast off the pall of delusion. It is only very recently that a few wise, clear-sighted thinkers have begun to apply themselves to research on the actual principles that govern human affairs, often with the assistance of the physical sciences. The appearance of these scholars heralds not only academic progress but a broad expansion of human well being. Among them are Draper, Buckle, Paine, Lecky, Bagehot, Spencer, Strauss, Büchner, Carneri, Radenhausen, Lilienfeld, Schäffle, and Jhering. All have profited from an intimate knowledge of physical principles; most have learned much from the laws of evolution discovered by Darwin; and they all have made important advances in the realm of the mind and spirit which they have recorded in the following works: (Draper) History of the Conflict between Religion and Science and History of the Intellectual Development of Europe; (Bain) Mental and Moral Science and Mind and Body; (Lecky) History of Rationalism in Europe and History of European Morals; (Bagehot) Physics and Politics; (Spencer) Descriptive Sociology and Data of Ethics; (Strauss) Der alte und neue Glaube; (Büchner) Der Mensch und seine Stellung in der Natur and Kraft und Stoff; (Carneri) Sittlichkeit und
The eminent scholar Haeckel says:

What we know as evolutionism will be the fountainhead for the furtherance of mankind’s great civilization and enlightenment in the future. From the first exposition of this doctrine in recent times, biology (a discipline combing zoology and botany) experienced a sudden transformation, and it goes without saying that the next to be greatly affected is anthropology (the discipline that studies the reasons for mankind’s physical and mental development). Moreover, it should cause philosophy to transcend the fanciful delusions of the past and study the realities of human life, and a great advance also should be expected in social morality.

Draper, an American, says:

Nowadays, in studying the principles of philosophy related to the mind, it is impossible to go beyond vain fantasies unless one begins with the study of physiology (a discipline that studies the reasons for life in the body).

These opinions are both based on firm knowledge. Moreover, according to the great scholar Wallace, an Englishman:

If the institutions and ordinances, and also the education and morality, of the countries that make up our present-day civilization are compared against the progress made in arts and techniques related to the physical sciences, we can only be truly shocked at the parochial baseness of the latter.

No doubt that is largely because the disciplines related to mentality and human affairs such as law and morality, have not yet succeeded in escaping the fanciful doctrines of the past.

Chapter Two
To recapitulate, most scholars in the field of human affairs are still wandering blindly, unable to free themselves of delusory viewpoints. Indeed, the component forces of deception have become increasingly agitated, to the
extent that they interfere with substantive discoveries, and, even more
deploitably, prevent social progress. One of those forces is the doctrine of
natural rights (tenpu jinkenshugi) which I have here undertaken to refute.
According to its purveyors, the doctrine of natural rights holds that each
individual is uniquely endowed at birth with rights to freedom and equali­
ty, and that those rights can neither be violated nor revoked by an outside
force. Such “fundamental rights” are known variously as jura innata or jura
connata in Latin, Droits de l’Homme or Droits humains in French, “rights of
man” in English, Utrecht, Fundamentalrecht, Angeborene Menschenrecht,
or Menschenrecht in German. The idea of natural rights has succeeded in
accumulating sufficient persuasive force to sweep across all of Europe, and
today its impact is being felt with increasing force in the East as well. As far
as I am concerned, there is no evidence for the existence of any such thing as
“natural rights”. I believe the whole idea is merely the product of certain
scholars’ fertile imagination. First, I shall outline the factors behind the orig­
inal conception of such an idea, and why it took on such vehement strength.
Then I will attempt to prove conclusively that “natural rights” do not exist.

Chapter Three

Belief in natural rights as such never occurred in the ancient civilizations
of India, China and Egypt. Nevertheless, in India, the Buddha rejected the
arbitrary powers of the Brahman class, propagating the new doctrine that,
regardless of the degree of status or respect accorded them in this life, all
men are equally able to achieve Buddhahood in the next. Despite its reliance
on belief in another world, perhaps this view has something in common with
a theory of natural rights.

Turning to Europe, while great progress in the realm of legal principle is
apparent in the flowering of ancient Greece, there clearly could be no belief
in natural rights. There is not even any evidence of a sense that the employ­
ment of slaves was unjust. Even the great philosophers, Plato and Aristotle,
ever argued against slavery. Indeed, the slave was a necessary foundation
of the state. In Athens, admired as the summit of Greek civilization, the
republic, supposedly a government of all people, excluded slaves from the
circle of humanity. They were non-people. Even later, with the rise of Rome,
there was still no fully explicated idea of natural rights. But the famous early­
third century AD legal scholar, Lupian, announced the belief that “All men
are endowed at birth with the right to freedom and equality.” Does this not
make Lupian the father of a clear concept of natural rights? And then, in
Christianity, the doctrine emerged that all are equal in the eyes of God
regardless of social status or wealth and perhaps this also may be considered
a form of natural rights theory.
There is in the above, however, still no clearly and systematically elucidated doctrine of natural rights. As we move down to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we come upon a natural-law school, including such scholars as Grotius, Hobbes and Puffendorf. They held that law originates in the nature of man, and that rights are a natural endowment of all. This school of thought gave rise to one individual, at least, whose delusions were unprecedented.

Chapter Four

Who was that individual? None other than the famous Rousseau. Vehement and intense by nature, he happened to be born at the zenith of the French monarchy. He was overwhelmed with indignation at despotic rule, and began to study diligently. As a result, he wandered into delusion, finally penning his famous *Contrat Social* (1762). In that work, he insisted that man is uniquely vested at birth with rights to freedom, independence and equality. Accordingly, he believed that the state originated in a process whereby persons secure in their right to freedom and equality gathered for deliberation and open expression of opinion. Having exchanged views and reached an agreement, they established society and constituted the state. Naturally, therefore, the people remained in full possession of eternal and unlimited rights in perpetuity. Later, however, kings, aristocrats and priests emerged to oppress their “sovereign majesties,” the people, stripping them of liberty and infringing upon their equality. Finally, conditions reached their present state of misery, where Rousseau expounded the belief that their “sovereign majesties,” the people, should spare no effort in ousting evil kings, nobles and priests, establishing a just and lawful republic, and regaining their natural rights. At the time, not only the French, but other people as well, were for the most part chafing under despotic rule, so no doubt Rousseau’s new ideology struck a responsive chord. It got so that faith in *Contrat Social* exceeded devotion to the bible of Jesus. Henceforth, the temper of Europeans and Americans was shaped by that new doctrine, and in the late eighteenth century the principles of natural right, as expounded by Rousseau, were carried out in practice. The Americans turned on Great Britain to achieve their independence, the French overthrew the monarchy to establish a republic.

The Americans, being stable and level-headed like the British, abhor rash and impudent action. From the first, they sought proper means to realize the principle of natural rights through the exercise of moderation; they insured that short-range benefits would not bequeath a legacy of harm. But the French are the opposite. Being volatile by nature, their passion for rights blazed up overnight. Soon those rights were flagrantly abused, and eventu-
ally they spun out of control. The republican government that received majority support at the polls wantonly executed the king and massacred aristocrats and priests, carrying out an unprecedented reign of terror. This all resulted from a theory of natural rights that was carried to extremes.

Chapter Five

Since that time, it is generally recognized that Rousseau’s doctrine of natural rights is bound to lead to inordinately radical results, and most scholars realize that it is counter to reality. The ranks of its advocates have thinned. In contemporary academic circles, the theory has been returned to a more tranquil, innocuous level, and even doctrines holding that all men possess innate, inalienable rights to liberty and equality are no longer so radical as that propounded by Rousseau. Most now agree that individuals have no blanket right to participate in government. Of course they can dispose of their private lives virtually at will, and have the right to be free of arbitrary interference or oppression on the part of the government or other individuals — they have, in short, the right to maintain their integrity as human beings. When it comes to public, national affairs, however, they do not necessarily have an equal right to liberty and equality. It is natural that their rights should vary with the degree to which they carry out their duties to their country. There is a world of difference between this view and the radical doctrines of Rousseau. Nevertheless, I cannot help but feel that, whether radical or benign, natural-rights theory in any form is equally a delusion. Below, I will offer my reason for that view.

Chapter Six

Using an evolutionism typical of the discipline of physical science, I intend to frame a critique of the ideology of natural rights. To use the doctrine of evolutionism for the purpose of attacking natural rights is equivalent to using science to attack delusion. The latter is absolutely no match for the former. To begin with, the doctrine of evolutionism is to be understood as the study of how plants and animals develop through the operation of a struggle for existence and natural selection, and gradually give birth to higher forms of life. This perspective originated in the discoveries of such eminent scientists as Lamarck and Goethe, but through the famous accomplishments of Darwin it has since matured into an invincible doctrine. Therefore, in order to prevent misunderstanding of my argument, I must begin by summarizing the doctrine’s main points.

All plants and animals, compete incessantly to preserve their existence and achieve long life, each endeavoring to pre-empt success for itself. While such competition occurs quite unconsciously, its intensity is really quite star-
ting. Those organisms that win out preserve their existence and enjoy long life, while those that lose eventually die out completely. Such competition is of two types: the first is between plants and animals, and inorganic matter; the second is among plants and animals themselves, of either identical or different species.

Plants and animals must compete against a multitude of inorganic substances and forces such as sunlight, cold and heat, air, seas and land masses, mountains and rivers, soil quality, and a variety of circumstantial phenomena. In other words, they must be capable of bearing the harm and benefit—the sympathies and influences—exercised upon them by inorganic matter. If they withstand them successfully, they will be able to preserve their lives and live long; if they are unsuccessful, they will not. For example, some organisms are injured by dark or light from the sun’s rays, or extremes of temperature in the climate, while some are not; others adapt more or less well to dryness or humidity in the air, or rain, or snow, and therefore may not suffer harm. Those that are injured or damaged prove unable to preserve their existence or even live out their lives. Those that are not injured or damaged live long and flourish. Such is the logic of winning or losing in the struggle of plants and animals against inorganic elements.

**Chapter Seven**

Next is the competition amongst plants and animals of the same or different species. There are also two varieties included in this general type. The first occurs when one species of plant or animal is exploited as food by another. Examples are large birds or animals killing and eating smaller ones; poisonous insects sucking the blood of people or animals; intestinal worms, tapeworms, etc., living inside the bodies of people and animals, receiving nourishment from the host’s secretions; and parasitic trees ingesting fluids from other trees.

The second variety occurs when the same or similar species of plants or animals derive their nourishment (not only food, but everything necessary for existence and long life, including sunlight, air, soil, and so on) from the same area. While competition between plants and animals of completely different substances is very slight, the same or similar plants and animals generally are nourished by the same or similar substances and therefore must compete in seeking to obtain that nourishment. If the numbers of plants and animals born each day is in equilibrium with the quantity of matter (organic or inorganic) that serves as nourishment for those plants and animals, this form of competition does not occur. Nevertheless, the natural economy has never been prone to such an equilibrium, and when the nourishment generated each day is insufficient to handle the daily increment of plant or animal
life, such competition must take place, and it is, in fact, the most intense among the various forms.

Chapter Eight

The logic according to which a struggle for existence emerges in the plant and animal worlds should be well understood from the causes outlined above. Then what is the result of that struggle? It can be summarized in one sentence: the organism that proves superior gains victory, and the inferior is overwhelmed. By the term “superior” is meant, in the case of both plants and animals, the one that is strong and healthy, brimming with vitality; in the case of animals alone, the one that is also mentally and emotionally capable and agile. It includes, in short, those that excel over others. Among the inferiors are those that are constitutionally weak, poor in vitality, mentally timid or foolish, and so on; in short, those that are excelled by others.

If we look into the causes whereby superiors and inferiors become that way, we find that plants and animals receive a varying heritage, constitutionally and mentally (animals alone), from their ancestors and immediate parents, and also vary according to the mutations they experience mentally and constitutionally as a result of the influences and sympathies projected by the multitude of external objects and factors they encounter in the course of their existence. According to Haeckel, an organism’s constitutional and mental heritage results from protoplasm received from the bodies of its parents, and consists in the molecular vitality conveyed by that protoplasm. Mental and physical mutation consists of the modifications induced in the vitality of that protoplasm as a result of the sympathies and influences exerted by the numerous external objects the organism encounters in the course of its life. Those organisms fortunate enough to receive favorable endowments and modifications will become superiors, while those that are not so fortunate will become inferiors. Those that win out in competition will include only those that are superior by the above criteria; those that lose will be limited to the inferiors. Moreover, those that survive will include just the superiors; the inferiors will soon die out completely. Therefore, only the superior organisms are able to raise offspring and have descendants, so all descendants are able to benefit from their superior genetic heritage.

On the other hand, descendants do not receive that inheritance in complete uniformity, and hence from birth there is still variation among them along the lines of superior and inferior. They also receive varying sympathies and influences from the external objects they encounter, causing different modifications to occur, and leading to the emergence from them of superiors and inferiors. For example, among the many specimens of a certain species of tree in a forest, there can be no uniformity in terms of size, height
or number of leaves and branches. The variation results from the peculiar heritage each receives from parent plants, and the different amounts of nourishment they receive in the form of sunlight, water, soil richness, and sympathies from temperature, wind, and rainfall. As for animals, since they have an innate ability to move about and to cerebrate, the influences and sympathies they receive from external objects are the strongest of all, and therefore the changes they experience constitutionally and mentally as a result are also great, leading to broad variation among superiors and inferiors.

Chapter Nine

The logic whereby variations among superiors and inferiors emerge from the twin processes of heredity and mutation is outlined in the preceding paragraphs. But distinctions between superiors and inferiors are not fixed and unchanging. They are modified and interchanged according to further fluctuations in weather, topography, soil conditions, and so on. For example, animals that flourish and multiply in warm areas are naturally superior there, but if they are moved to a colder clime, that would no longer necessarily be the case. Most likely, they would become inferior, and soon die out. The same would occur if cold weather animals were put in a warmer place. Similarly, if a plant that flourishes in an island environment were moved to the mountains, of course it would no longer be superior. Rather, it would rapidly become an inferior, wither, and die out. The same would occur if a mountain plant were transplanted into the islands. Some plants are adaptable to plateaus, but not to mountain valleys; some are adaptable to high land but not to low land; and so on, so that for each of an infinite number of circumstances there are corresponding realignments of superior and inferior. Therefore, it should be evident that differences among animals in terms of superior and inferior are usually dependent upon whether or not the character of a given organism is adaptable or not to the climate, topography, soil conditions, etc., of the area in which it exists. This means that differences between superiors and inferiors are not necessarily fixed and unchanging; they vary and reverse depending upon their circumstances. Therefore, obviously all distinctions between superior and inferior emerge from the interaction of the two factors of heredity and change.

Hence, if we take for example a certain species of animal whose constitution is basically favorably suited, by virtue of heredity, to exist in both warm and cold climates, and which, furthermore, has actually existed in each of those climates, changing in response to the various sympathies and influences common to both settings, it would gain increasingly the constitution suiting it to exist in both climes, and be able to be superior in both. Moreover, if an organism suited by virtue of heredity to life in a warm climate, but
unsuited to a cold climate, were to move in the course of its life to a cold area where it received all the sympathies and influences typical of that environment and as a result become accustomed to it and experience favorable changes in its constitution suiting it to live in that cold climate, it would likely then be equipped to be a superior there as well. However, in the process, it could lose the constitutional heritage that suited it to warmth. An organism which moves from a cold climate to a warm one would react in the same manner. Therefore, differences between superior and inferior are not necessarily fixed. They interchange and reverse in response to changing circumstances, but that process of interchange and reversion itself grows out of the twin factors of heredity and mutation.

Chapter Ten

As differences between superior and inferior in the plant and animal worlds emerge from differential heredity and mutation in their constitution and mentality, descendants in those lines are also endlessly distributed among various levels of superiority and inferiority. If there is no limit to that distribution, then there should be no limit either to the struggle for existence which arises from those differences. The superiors endlessly emerge victorious from the struggle, overwhelming the inferiors, and becoming the sole survivors and progenitors of offspring. This is what is called the natural selection which emerges from a struggle for existence. As this process continues for several, then several hundred, years, the constitution and mentality of superiors at a given time might be completely different from their early ancestors, appearing as a completely new species. This is what is called evolution of plants and animals. Of course, this sort of evolution can be contrived through human intervention as in the breeding of flowers, cattle, and so on. Even in Japan, it is widely known that what are virtually new species can be produced by breeding chrysanthemums, silk worms, fish, and so on. The principle involved is no different from that of natural selection, so Darwin has called it artificial selection.

In sum, differences among superior and inferior emerge in plants and animals as a result of the twin processes of heredity and mutation. In order to preserve their existence and live long, each organism competes against the others. The superior organisms win out by overcoming the inferiors (unconsciously of course). By being the sole survivors, they alone are able to beget progeny. This is an eternal, unchanging, natural system – a great principle of the law of nature. I call it the law of survival of the fittest (yūshō reppai). The universe is a great battleground. All living things struggle incessantly upon it, each in order to preserve its own existence and live longer. Nothing occurs that is inconsistent with the law of survival of the fittest.
Chapter Eleven

In Chapters Six through Ten I have presented a bare outline of the principles of the struggle for existence and natural selection as they operate in the plant and animal kingdoms. In the hope that my readers are now familiar with the gist of that process, I will proceed to my main object, the refutation of natural-rights doctrine. The appearance of variation among superiors and inferiors in terms of physical and mental constitution as a result of heredity and mutation is by no means limited to plants and animals. The same occurs in humans, who are higher than the animal kingdom. That is to say humans, in the same manner as animals, receive a physical and mental endowment from their parents, and are subject to a wide variety of influences and sympathies in their encounter with external objects and circumstances. Their physical and mental makeup is modified in response. Accordingly, it is impossible to prevent the emergence of variation between superior and inferior. People are physically large or small, strong or weak, healthy or unhealthy, intelligent or stupid, keen or dull, honest or dishonest, and the origin of those differences is either in heredity or in the influences and sympathies occasioned by encounters with numberless objects and events in the course of human existence. If the latter are examined more closely, it is clear that modifications in one's own physical and mental makeup appear as a result of the myriad influences of climate, topology, the environmental milieu in which one lives; the customs, doctrinal orientations and politico-religious authority structures that characterize one's society; the education and upbringing one receives; one's friends and companions; and also social status, occupation, wealth, and so on. All these are causes of the differences among superior and inferior. Since a struggle for existence among them is then inevitable according to the law of nature, the superiors are bound to prevail and control the inferiors. In other words, a process of natural selection is unavoidable, resulting in the survival of the fittest. It is amply evident that the survival of the fittest as a fixed law of nature applies not only to plants and animals but to the world of human intercourse as well.

If there is no room for doubt concerning the occurrence among human beings of differences between superior and inferior as regards their physical and mental constitution, resulting in the inevitable operation in human affairs of a law of survival of the fittest, then it is very clear that the theory of natural rights, postulating the unique endowment at birth of all human beings with rights to liberty and equality, is directly counter to reality. What is counter to reality is a delusion. Reality and delusion are mutually incompatible. As explained in the last section, there is a pervasive, unchanging, eternal law of the universe controlling birth and death, rise and fall, assem-
bling and dispersing, appearance and disappearance, and all other phenomena. And even man cannot escape its force.

In their ignorance of that reality, the fantasizers imagine that man's nature sets him completely apart from animals. Not only that, but they delude themselves into thinking that the universe exists solely to serve the purposes of man. They think cows, horses, dogs and sheep, for example, were made by the creator for the nourishment and use of mankind, grains and flowering plants are dedicated to satisfying our hunger and delighting our eyes, and all other things were either directly or indirectly created to increase our happiness. Sometimes they even believe that the beasts which harm man were put there by the creator to punish us for our sins. God's love and mercy are profound, so he has bestowed upon each individual not only a wondrous body and mind, but the precious rights of liberty and equality. That conviction gives rise to the delusion that such rights are the basis for the greatest happiness of mankind. Nevertheless, the doctrine that a creator had from the outset certain objectives and created all things in accord with those objectives is not the result of experimentation. It belongs to a class of doctrine called teleology, and is directly at odds with the doctrine of causality, or experimentalism. The latter holds that results arise from causes, which are themselves causes, resulting in further outcomes, and so on, without any predetermined purpose or end. That being the case, a teleological doctrine could never be espoused by anyone who is cognizant of the empirical laws governing all things in the universe.

Is the increasingly frequent advocacy of natural-rights theory by these fantasizers, then, because they are unaware of the existence of the real laws that have been so clearly shown to govern all things, or is it because they mistakenly believe that such laws do not apply to human beings? Whereas the results of the principle of survival of the fittest are amply evident in traces from the past, as well as the present, and can be proven easily with reference to social reality, there is no way to prove the actual existence of a natural right to freedom or equality. If anyone believes that such a method exists, I hope he will apply that method to the historical evidence and contemporary social realities, and then present his findings. For my part, I shall now use that historical evidence and social reality to prove the operation of a principle of survival of the fittest.

Chapter Twelve

There are in the uncivilized world peoples amongst whom intellectual development is retarded, morality is dormant and laws unknown. They exist in a state not very far removed from animals. Indeed, some seem more primitive than that. Even now there are races in the Americas, Africa and Pacific
islands that cannibalize their enemies, or even people from their own village. There are aborigines in Australia, the Americas, and elsewhere, who not only lack a concept of right and wrong, but in addition to engaging in massacre and pillage, actually reward them with honor and glory. Furthermore, in America there are such customs as abandoning, on the open plain, those who are physically weak and therefore cannot bear hardship, or burning alive as public parasites those among their fathers and mothers who are too old and sick to carry out their jobs. It is not at all unusual, even in this day and age, for primitive peoples to be totally ignorant of ethics and morality, and uncivilized as regards the nature of wrongdoing and criminality.

That being the case, it is unlikely that many of today’s civilized peoples were able in the beginning to avoid such a state of savagery either. It was normal in ancient Europe, America and Africa for subjugated enemies to be enslaved. According to Spencer, that showed progress over a still earlier time when captured enemies were customarily eaten. Only a moment’s reflection should suffice to enable the reader to imagine the nature of the association carried on among such early peoples. The primitive world is without nation or country, division of labor, or philosophy of education, and social organization is extremely simple. Distinctions among high and low, rich and poor, intelligent and stupid, are unpronounced: there is differentiation only among male and female, old and young, physically strong and weak. In other words, the only distinctions made are those evident in a pure state of nature; discriminations that arise only from moral civilization are absent. It goes without saying that a pure, natural form of struggle for existence and natural selection, in other words, a pristine process of survival of the fittest, is endemic in such societies. What that means is that adults naturally dominate and oppress the young, males naturally dominate and control females, and the strong by nature dominate and abuse the weak. According to the manners and customs of primitive society, the immature, the female and the weak are totally unable to avoid the shackles of bondage. According to Lubbock, the belief that the savage tribes of antiquity possessed a full right to freedom is a gross misconception. He says it is apparent that most of them were oppressed by cruel folkways and customs.

Chapter Thirteen

If it is amply clear that today’s primitive societies have a pristine form of survival of the fittest, then there can be little doubt that even today’s civilized peoples in the beginning experienced the same sort of process. Far from being in possession of natural rights, the early primitives were in abject bondage. However, when public morality moves toward enlightenment, an ethical sense finally appears and common folkways and customs move
beyond their former savage state in the direction of civilization, a national structure finally is established, and methods of division of labor progress along with a philosophy of education. When this occurs, domination by the mature, the male and the strong — that is, the pure and pristine form of survival of the fittest — declines and a new form of competition related to an awakened public morality appears. A corollary of that tendency toward enlightenment is the emergence, and increasing importance of gradations of distinctions among people on the basis of the degree of their mental powers rather than on the basis of physical strength alone. Those individuals who display mental superiority — in intelligence, talent, or resourcefulness — attain positions of dominance and inevitably lord it over those who are mentally inferior, possessing the power to manipulate them.

The logic behind that situation has remained unchanged to the present day. By the eventual progress of civilization alone, competition in mental power — that is to say, survival of the fittest in the realm of intelligence and initiative — gradually tends toward justice and fairness. In other words, it tends gradually to promote the interests and well being of society as a whole. It is, of course, true that even today justice and fairness are not always realized in our society. We are often confronted with more evil than is evident in the competition typical of pristine ignorance, and the development of a truly human world is impeded.

Nevertheless, the truly natural form of survival of the fittest characterizing primitive societies hardly differentiated the human from the animal worlds. As human intelligence gradually progressed, however, and survival of the fittest operated increasingly in the realm of mental rather than physical powers, a situation emerged that more closely approximated a genuinely human world (aside from its relative "good" or "evil"). Moreover, in my view, as civilization progresses, there are corresponding decreases in evil forms of survival of the fittest and increases in just forms, contributing, in turn, to even higher levels of civilization. Without the operation of a just form of survival of the fittest, there can be no civilization and enlightenment of public morality; indeed, it is the most indispensable condition.

Chapter Fourteen

According to Schäffle (a German), there are two fundamental causes for the struggle for existence in the human world, in addition to the need for nourishment which man shares with the animal world. The first is the inherent, selfish desire to rise above one's fellows and preempt more than they in the satisfaction of tangible and intangible interests. The second is a public spirit expressed as the desire to expand the happiness and benefits of society at large. In primitive, uncivilized society, as in the animal kingdom, the
only kind of struggle for existence that occurs is centered on the drive for nourishment. As primitives turn in the direction of civilization, however, the other two types of competition can occur and are, in fact, necessary elements in the further development of a civilized and enlightened public morality.

All men like wealth and fame, seek great achievements, love profit, covet power, and in matters of intelligence, talents, the arts, agriculture, commerce, and even all manner of construction and fabrication, seek all they can get and are consumed with the desire to exceed and excel beyond others. This is the struggle for existence that arises out of the selfish desire to surpass others in the preemption of tangible and intangible rewards. The second type is public-spirited competition to promote the interests and happiness of society at large. This type is exemplified in the efforts of Shakyamuni, Jesus, Mohammed, and other founders of religious sects, to propagate their doctrines, repel magic and paganism and bring mankind to salvation; by the Ancient Sages and the Early Kings, or Confucius and Mencius, as they sought to clarify the principles of government, exclude heretical doctrines, and nurture the people; and by great scholars and scientists in their discovery of natural principles, dispelling of illusions and leading of the people into civilization.

It appears to me that the most intense and severe of the above struggles is that purely selfish form of competition which focuses upon political power, and there is no society, small or large, where such a struggle does not occur. I call it the power struggle, that is, survival of the fittest in the realm of politics (a milder appellation would be "rule by the fittest"). A virtually unlimited number of extraneous struggles can serve as the basic elements in a struggle for power. From the largest scale, where the struggle for power is expressed in relations between whole countries, through all levels beneath that—national, racial, tribal, provincial, domainal, municipal, organizational, factional, lineal or familial—such a struggle is inevitable whenever a certain number of people gather in relationships of coexistence.

The classical Romans subjugated and controlled nearly all of Europe; the Christian church, too, captivated the minds of all Europeans; and the medieval German race also developed sufficient power to overcome their fellows. In all such cases, the parties with superior mental powers overcame their inferiors. It is by the same superiority that the Indo-European race, in the other words, the Europeans and Americans, have succeeded in accumulating sufficient strength to manipulate the rest of the world. In worldwide competition for power amongst countries and peoples, then, the superiors win over and dominate the inferiors in an actual process of political survival of the fittest. In ancient India the Brahmans, at the top of the castes structure, held political power and ruled the country; the Ancient Sages and Early
Kings grasped authority to govern the country, preserve peace and nurture the millions; in early Japan and in Europe, as well, a military class and a titled aristocracy controlled the course of history and monopolized power; in recent times in Europe and America, elite commoners have steered the course of their nations and gained power (the large landholders and financiers, the merchants and wealthy farmers, and the scholars and artists/technicians). Despite broad differences in substance, these groups all displayed maximum mental power, enough to exercise actual control in their societies, and their success must be recognized as a case of superiors winning out over inferiors. Any other time, whenever people in a race, a tribe, a province, a district, a town, an organization, a faction, a lineage group or a family, coexist together, a power struggle — that is, the operation of a law of survival of the fittest involving power — will always develop.

**Chapter Fifteen**

Furthermore, there are also superiors and inferiors among superiors themselves, and among the inferiors too, and they too compete according to the law of survival of the fittest. The same occurs among major and minor superiors and major and minor inferiors. In early Japan and Europe, for example, while the military elite and the aristocracy together were the superiors in their own societies and had sufficient power to regulate national affairs, even among them, there were superiors and inferiors. This was true, particularly in the sense that the law of survival of the fittest operated not only in peacetime but in wartime as well, and in wartime it was the military that always determined win or loss. Recently, the elite commoners (jōtō heimin), the middle classes, in Europe and the U.S. are supreme in their societies and therefore have the power to manipulate affairs, but even among them there is variation and therefore struggle leading to survival of the fittest. In England, sides are grouped as Conservatives and Liberals, in the United States they are either Republicans or Democrats. Even among members of these parties there are various differences with respect to superior and inferior: the superiors hold power in the party and take charge of the inferiors. That being the case, it is evident that a political law of survival of the fittest will occur in any human society, large or small. In fact, it may be said that whether or not one of those parties in present-day England or America wins, and thereby gains control of the government, or loses, is determined by the number of its members. Therefore, success or failure depends upon a man-made set of policies and principles, and it must be recognized as a freely-operating form of survival of the fittest.
Chapter Sixteen

Nevertheless, in human societies, large and small, it is by no means certain that superior individuals will occupy the highest positions. And it goes without saying that moral justice alone does not suffice in attaining the highest positions of authority. While England, France, Germany, Russia and the United States now swagger from one side of the globe to the other, overpowering other countries at will, it is certainly morally unjustifiable for any of them to claim the status of world suzerainty. Nor, in terms of moral justice, do they have the right to interfere with, or push around, other countries. There are quite a few other truly independent countries in the world, such as Japan, China, Korea, Turkey and Persia, and morally speaking, they retain the same status as England, France, Germany, Russia and America. Furthermore, even tiny island kingdoms such as Hawaii are legitimately as independent as the great powers.

On the level of single nations, it is clear that the elite commoners who are in possession of sufficient real power to manipulate events in each of their nations are in fact not equal to the nobility or the clergy in status and therefore have no moral claim to a right to govern. Analogous situations exist within small local groups such as races or tribes. Even in a family, the patriarch is not necessarily in actual possession of complete authority. There are times when his wife, children or grandchildren may be most powerful. Supreme power does not always accord with status, nor is it always possessed by those who have the greatest moral authority; it always goes eventually to the one who displays the greatest mental capability and strength.

There are critics of that view who assert that if the European middle classes - those elite commoners who have displayed the greatest mental powers and as a result are in control of supreme power in their respective societies - cause a general upheaval in authority relationships, it would end in the height of disgrace. These critics also believe that eventually there is a danger of those elites going to extremes, insulting the authority of royal governments, and finally planning a general rebellion. I do not agree with their view. In this day and age, when the civilization of Europe is progressing rapidly, not only would things never get that bad, but in fact the grip on social power maintained by the elite commoners is actually in the best interests of their societies. It promotes happiness and stability. If it is obvious that at present no members of this class are seeking to seize power or affront the authority of royal governments, then it is even less likely that they would plan to overthrow those governments. They have obtained great power through social intercourse, and participate in politics to defend against royal tyranny or to protect royal authority (the elite commoners are not the only
ones who have the right to participate in politics, but they have the most power). It should be possible for the royal governments to gain the support and protection of this class and thereby to strengthen the regime. In fact, at present it is largely the power of the elite middle classes that checks the reckless violence of the socialist, communist and nihilist parties. In uncivilized countries, on the other hand, there are no groups who qualify to hold power as a result of social intercourse and coexistence. Hence the regimes of royal governments are isolated with no force to protect them, and soon they are so beset by internal and external difficulties that their survival cannot be guaranteed.

In that sense, it is clear that the great social power achieved by the elite commoners in Europe, and the political authority of royal governments are two entirely different things. Rather than conflicting, they are together capable of enhancing the public welfare and should in no way herald widespread upheaval. Nor should there be any disgrace or affrontery. On the other hand, there are, of course, some of great mental power who oppose laws that allow one individual to monopolize power in society. In the old days the distinguished families, the aristocracy, held actual power in society even when they were not mentally well-endowed, while those below them - the knights and commoners - were dominated, even when they were mentally superior with no way to obtain effective power. At that time it seemed to be a real case of reversal between superior and inferior. When we investigate the matter closely, however, there is nothing strange about it. The nobles are not such by accident. They are the nobility because they are the descendants of mentally superior individuals. If the power of their ancestors has, over a period of several hundred years, been protected and augmented by custom and law, and they preserved it they should themselves in the context of that society be considered superior. According to Schäffle, the longer such a custom lasts, the more power it accumulates. The caste system of India is a case of such a custom being very detrimental. There are other cases as well. Even among the elite commoners of Europe, there are those whose mental capacity is not terribly large, who maintain their elite positions by virtue only of their wealth and therefore their power. One may consider this counter to the logic of survival of the fittest, but it is not. If, indeed, the possession by these inferior individuals of great fortunes is the result of their ancestor's mental superiority, that does not constitute evidence against the law of survival of the fittest.

Chapter Seventeen

Another view is offered in refutation of the one advocated here. That view - not to be believed - holds that in any society the most superior men-
tally will always have power and oppress their inferiors. The leaders of the socialist, communist and nihilist parties that have threatened to vastly increase their power in Europe, for example, were not poorly endowed with scholarship or talent, but their followers were generally benighted and poverty-stricken. The Tenant's Party formed recently in Ireland is also composed of a majority of the people beneath the middle classes. Under present circumstances, there is the possibility that these ignorant masses will gain strength, eventually overwhelming the elite commoners. Would it then be possible to call the ignorant masses superior? It would not. We should not accept the view that the dominant ones in society are always none other than the mentally superior.

My view is that such masses are able to cause trouble and threaten the elites, not because they are mentally superior, but precisely because they are weak. They are easily seduced into temporary insurrection by unscrupulous leaders. They are never able to gain sufficient power to decisively influence events in society for a very long period. In France, since the great revolution in the late eighteenth century, the ignorant masses have gained great strength, rebelled vigorously, and often brought about an anarchic situation. But they have never been able to preserve that state for long. Their impact shows not mental superiority but extreme weakness. And that also applies to today's socialist, communist, nihilist, and tenants' parties. While it is impossible to predict what will happen to their insurrections in the future, as long as the mental superiority of the elites does not decline, I believe we will not be forced to witness their complete overthrow. Today's middle-class elites are, on the whole, the cradle of all intelligence, talent, integrity, morality, culture, wealth and production in agriculture, industry and commerce. The vitality of the state depends upon this group; public opinion and mores flow from them. They have broken down the decentralized, feudal system, limited the arbitrary oppression exercised by the nobility and the clergy, established freedom and autonomy for the people, defended order in the nation, fostered progress, reformed social ethics and morality, promoted scholarship, agriculture, industry and commerce — indeed the present civilization of Europe is in large measure the boon of their talents. Future progress also awaits their efforts.

Chapter Eighteen

In Chapter Nine we saw that differentiations between superior and inferior in the plant and animal worlds are not necessarily fixed. They change in response to varying circumstances. Then, through a couple of examples, we also noted that gradations in human society are not necessarily stationary either. They also vary in accord with varying circumstances, but not, as in
the plant and animal kingdoms, with such factors as climate, environmental
trends and soil quality, etc., but with personal feelings, popular morality,
customs, degree of advancement of civilization, and field of endeavor. In
short, with changes in the trends of the times. Those who adapt successfully
to those trends are the mentally superior, and they eventually gain the reins
of power. Therefore, whether or not they were superior in mental powers in
the first place, if they do not adapt to the times they will not maintain their
power, but be ruled by those who do. There are circumstances to which
priests adjust best, those to which warriors adjust well, and others most
favorable to merchants. An era in which public morality is not yet enlight­
ened and intelligence not yet raised is usually adapted to best by the priest­
hood. Under such circumstances, even though scholars or soldiers, for exam­
ple, may be mentally superior, they will never succeed in gaining power.
They will be ruled as inferiors by the priests. Therefore, all those with even
a modicum of intelligence converge on the priesthood to follow religious
teachings, and as a result, priestly power grows. If, due to a certain chain of
events, a period of warfare would erupt, the military warriors would find
that they are most adaptive. Then, despite the occasionally superior mental
power of priests or tradesmen, they will find themselves cut off from power,
condemned to the status of social inferior and at the mercy of the soldiers.
Soon those with intelligence compete to become soldiers, and join in on mil­
itary expeditions. As a result, the power of the military increases.

Hence, we must realize that, since gradations of relative superiority gen­
erally vary in accord with trends of the time, it is those among the mentally
superior who adapt well to the times that will control the seat of power. At
the same time, such trends are not just produced by nature but can be effec­
tively cultivated and manipulated by human beings. Those who presently
find themselves at the beck and call of another group may develop the
strength to foster a new trend and ultimately ride it to power. Such a thing
cannot be accomplished by one or two individuals, but requires a collective
effort. Recently in Europe, for example, the middle classes which have
destroyed autocratic rule by the military and the aristocracy, and have initi­
ated the present trend, have always been that way, with power struggles
more violent than at other times.

Chapter Nineteen

As pointed out in Chapter Thirteen, when closely inspected, the opera­
tion of the principle of survival of the fittest in the realm of mental attributes
is not always conducive to justice and fairness; indeed, it is often quite evil
and operates detrimentally to the progress of a truly human world.
Moreover, in the last chapter, we saw that differentiations among people in
terms of superior and inferior are not fixed, but vary according to the trends of the time. If the trend has not yet matured, the group that is suited to become superiors cannot be the initiators in promoting social enlightenment. Therefore the principle of the survival of the fittest may not operate to enhance the interests and happiness of society; it may indeed retard it.

Nonetheless, I believe that the law of survival of the fittest is operating in Europe and America today in a beneficial way. Why do I say that? The answer is obvious. As described in Chapter Seventeen, the middle classes, who on the whole should be called the cradle of all intelligence, talent, integrity, morals, culture, wealth, and productive activity in agriculture, industry and commerce, are supreme in the society and function as the initiators of social enlightenment and civilization. In other parts of the world, there has been only despotism with no group worthy of the name free commoner, and no Estate to compare with middle classes. Those who monopolize the status of superior in such countries are not the heralds of social enlightenment, and therefore the rule of survival of the fittest does not operate there with the same beneficial nature as in Europe or the United States. The fact that such countries largely lack a group equivalent to the scholars of Europe and America indicates one immediate cause of their unenlightened state.

When we look at recent circumstances in our own country, where the samurai in particular have generally been the superiors in possession of the power to regulate society, it is evident that the members of that class are losing their power day by day, month by month. From among their ranks, as well as from the common people, there are arising youths with new vigor, and radical elements who are covetous of power. They are stirring up the people in hopes of taking over society. Generally not widely schooled, nor rich, nor well-versed in worldly affairs, nor morally upright, they pretend to great achievement and mislead the people. Nothing but harm will come of it. They are more radical than the commoner elites of Europe and the United States, and are inclined to foment disorder in society. There certainly is no group in Japan to compare to the European and American middle classes. Granted, there are some in the samurai class who are experienced and stable, with very high levels of scholarly attainment, but not very many have adapted well to the trends of the time, even sufficiently to generate a decent living. Similarly, there are some commoners who retain considerable fortunes, earning the labels of rich farmer or wealthy merchant, but very few have talent and intelligence and are conversant with the ways of society. Not only can fellows like these not hope to gain power themselves, but they are liable to be swayed by young zealots or radicals and led into serious error. It is extremely regrettable.
Chapter Twenty

Since Chapter Fourteen, I have endeavored to explain the logic behind the omnipresence of a power struggle, that is to say, the operation of the process of survival of the fittest in relation to political power. I have already pointed out in Chapter Fourteen that the competition, or struggle, that occurs in human society is by no means limited to the realm of power. There are infinite contexts in which struggle is oriented to selfish desire or public mindedness. However, when a struggle breaks out, there is no immediate certainty that the superior contestant will gain victory by overcoming the inferior, and rule over him. In other words, a process of natural selection always follows from the outbreak of struggle. Viewed in this manner, human society is a great battlefield on which competitions and conflicts are interwoven, and on that battlefield those who are superior by virtue of inheritance and mutation, both physically and mentally, are eventually victorious. That they are able to overcome those who are inferior and rule over them makes human society not altogether different from the animal and plant worlds. Both are subject to an eternally unchanging principle of universal law.

The principle of survival of the fittest has remained in operation from man’s unenlightened, savage antiquity even up to his present state of civilized enlightenment, and I believe it will never change as long as man inhabits the globe. Moreover, since in man’s physical and mental makeup, heredity and mutation produce good and evil, superior and inferior, surely distinctions and gradations among men in human society will never cease to emerge. For countless generations man has been born into a world of survival of the fittest and has died in that world as well, never able to escape it for a moment. However, as noted in Chapter Thirteen, when viewed closely in its particular manifestations, this law of survival of the fittest can have both beneficial and detrimental effects. And as outlined in Chapter Nineteen, when the trends of the time have not yet fully progressed, the results of the process of survival of the fittest may be deleterious, injurious to the interests of society, and it has always been that way. But, conversely, without the operation of survival of the fittest we should be unable to hope for any progress in civilization or promotion of enlightenment.

In Schöpfungsgeschichte, Haeckel says, “Struggle between superior and inferior [survival of the fittest] is, throughout the universe and for human society as well, a ceaseless process that in fact eventually fosters the interests and happiness of mankind.” Also, in Physics and Politics, Bagehot says that the great prevalence of war in the ancient world served as an essential element in the achievement of human progress. Similarly, Schäffle explains
why the world is a fabric of countless struggles in the following terms:

Struggle between superiors and inferiors, and the resulting victory of one and loss of the other, are essential to progress in civilization. Indeed, Jesus, and all those who may be called wise men, of necessity followed the way of struggle. The fact that from the beginning they advocated belief in the way of true principle, repelling all heresies and magical arts, is evidence of none other than a win-or-lose struggle between superior and inferior. If this did not occur in the world of man, human society would be already dead, without progressing a single step. If it is clear that differences among people according to heredity and mutation will never for eternity disappear, then that guarantees that the win-or-lose struggle that emerges from those differences will, fortunately, never cease.

It should be clear by now that there are various differences between human beings in terms of superior and inferior, leading to innumerable instances of the operation of the law of survival of the fittest. If we agree that this principle of universal material law will remain unchanged to eternity, then it must be obvious that human beings do not as individuals possess anything like a right to equality and self-determination. But the deluded ones are still ignorant of this incontestable reality. They repeatedly advocate an ideology of natural rights, insisting that individuals are uniquely endowed by heaven with the rights of equality and self-determination and that those rights may not be revoked or impaired in any manner by an external authority. This is truly laughable in its naive stupidity. For people in this day and age, when the realities of the survival of the fittest have been demonstrated beyond any doubt, to be unaware of that and continue to propound belief in natural rights reminds us of the priests and others who still advocated a Ptolemaic theory of the universe after Galileo and Newton had already discovered that the earth revolves around the sun. As for me, I believe that the theory of natural rights is a mirage. It has beguiled people for a while but the time has come for it to evaporate. There is no longer any way to maintain it.

Chapter Twenty-one
I think that the preceding chapters have witnessed the sharp sword of evolutionism deal a death-blow to the delusion of natural rights. In this day and age, those scholars who have thrown off all illusory doctrines - particularly those engaged in empirical research, and those who are aware of the realities of evolution and seek to apply it in their research and writing on
philosophy, politics and law – must be especially perplexed to find that some individuals are still mired in the delusion of natural rights theory.

Some natural-rights supporters such as, Frantz (a German), are very different from the usual run of deluded souls. By looking at the realities of the nation-state and seeking to unearth its true nature, he has infused his work with many unprecedented insights. Nevertheless, he has not yet realized the fanciful nature of natural rights. So concerning the nature of the state, he says:

> Discovery of natural rights must be credited to the liberals, but such rights are merely private, with no relationship to society or affairs of state. It is a great mistake for them to indiscriminately advocate such rights, using them to justify universal suffrage.

While this is an eminently moderate view, insofar as he believes in natural rights, there is no difference between himself and the radicals.

Froebel (a German) also believes in evolutionism. He has been enlightened to the necessity that even politics be studied in relation to the doctrines of evolutionism, and makes frequent use of evolutionist analysis in his book, _Theorie der Politik_. But he has not yet become aware of the moot nature of natural rights theory, and often refers to such rights. Even when the overall thrust of J. S. Mill’s work, _On Liberty_ (1873) is considered it is obvious that he does not reject natural rights. When we look at Spencer’s _Social Statics_, too, we find that his belief in the existence of natural rights admits of no uncertainty. Reichenbach, also, believes in evolutionism and in the course of the past thirteen years of accumulated research has made many empirical discoveries which he has included in a single volume. But it is still very curious that throughout that volume he continues to advocate, and in fact place great stress on, natural rights (he calls them fundamental rights). One has to consider it remarkable that these accomplished scholars have yet to divest themselves of such illusions.

**Chapter Twenty-two**

I myself am a former champion of natural rights, having widely pronounced that ideology in my essays, _Shinsei taii_ and _Kokutai shinron_. Since I came to believe in evolutionism, however, I soon began to doubt the existence of natural rights. I began to search the publications of scholars for signs of a critique or refutation of natural rights doctrine, but found none. Nevertheless, having confidence in the logic of my convictions, I spoke for the first time on the topic of “Refutation of Natural Rights Theory” in November of 1879 (I have forgotten the date), and then again on 7 March
1880.

In May and June of the same year, I received and read a work by Carmeri (Austrian) on the relationship between morality and evolutionism. He says:

With the development of Darwin’s evolutionism, it is clear for the first time why previous theories having to do with mentality and human affairs have been spurious; it has shown that so-called natural rights do not exist, and has made it clear that whatever rights man has are acquired from external sources.²

Also, “Thanks to evolutionism, it is now clear what kind of being man is, making it beyond doubt that natural rights do not exist.” And, “We are unaware of anything called natural rights, knowing only of acquired rights. Moreover, these acquired rights exist or do not exist only in relation to the state, and cannot exist for a moment apart from it.”

When I read this, learning that my beliefs coincided with those of a great scholar and that my hypothesis had not been mistaken, I nearly wept with joy. After that, I found Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte by Henne Am Rhyn, which says, “What are called natural rights are the height of misconception. The unchanging law of nature is for the strong to rule the weak and the superior to rule the inferior.” I also read a book describing the view of rights put forward by Jhering (German). In the context of a discussion of the relationship between rights and power, it says that only power originates in heaven while, rights are born from that power. The gist is as follows:

What are called rights are born only when the ruler, in seeking to advance his own interests, freely decides to limit his power and be fair and impartial. Therefore, rights flow from power. Those mediocre scholars who see power and rights as mutually opposed, and believe that rights are good things endowed at creation, while power is a bad thing produced in the mundane world, are fundamentally mistaken.

I do not entirely agree with this view, but insofar as it denies natural rights, it is extremely prescient. Jhering often makes use of the doctrine of evolution, and has discovered the logic of the view that rights evolved out of a process of competition and natural selection, as covered in Der Kampf um das Recht. His discussion is more in accord with reality than any other.

Hellwald (German) also argues on the basis of evolutionism in his Kulturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung, spelling out the reasons for denying natural rights and on that basis refuting the delusions of the
French radicals. Schäffle’s Bau und Leben des Sozialen Körpers is also based on the doctrine of evolution: “Rights to free independence and equality certainly do not originate in heaven. They emerge gradually in the course of public enlightenment and progress.” There may be other scholars who refute natural rights on the basis of evolutionism, but I have not yet succeeded in finding their works.

**Part II: The Origins and Progress of Rights**

**Chapter Twenty-three**

I am convinced that once the reader has thoroughly digested the thrust of the foregoing, which seeks to refute the existence of natural rights, he will largely accept it. In this Part, then, I will address the problems of where our rights do in fact originate and for what reasons they finally develop. In the previous chapter I quoted Carmeri to the effect that, “We are unaware of anything called natural rights, knowing only of acquired rights. Moreover, these received rights exist or do not exist only in relation to the state, and cannot exist a moment apart from it.” This seems to suggest that rights emerge only at such a time as people have formed a stable society, in other words, when their nation-state has to a large extent taken shape. I think this is a sound theory.

A tendency for kindred things to flock together and form a community is not peculiar to human beings. It is the same with animals. Radenhausen (German) says, “It would appear that to gather together in a community is a universal law of nature. What few beings do not act in such a way are in opposition to that law.” In the animal world, however, communal behavior is generally sporadic, tending toward fluctuation between solidarity and separation rather than permanence. Moreover, in view of the fact that there are no rulers and ruled among them and no division of labor, and considering that they have no stable society, of course they cannot be said to have established a form of nation-state. Among human beings, as well, even today it cannot be said that communal solidarity is totally different from animal society; in many places, what could be called a state has yet to emerge. Some groups have no chief. Others select a chief only in wartime. Elsewhere even when a chief is in position perpetually, he in fact has no power. Often social solidarity is extremely weak, with individuals milling in and out like a herd of wild boar. In other groups solidarity prevails during ordinary times but collapses upon receipt of an enemy attack. Such circumstances in savage society are recounted in Peschel, Völkerkunde; Lubbock, Origin of Civilization; Taylor, Primitive Culture and Kosmos (1880, 1881).

What is very mysterious, however, is that ants and bees, even though
they are members of the animal kingdom, have formed a stable basis for communal solidarity and not only have differentiation between rulers and the ruled, but even have an established system of division of labor. While only insects, they actually may be said to have established a form of state and are therefore far superior to many primitive, uncivilized humans. According to Caspari (German), there are two types of collective solidarity among animals, “herd” and “state”. When the same form of life gathers together in one place, but without the intention of mutual protection, it is a herd. In this case, the basis of solidarity is very unstable and even if a chief exists, his authority is weak. He is unable to exercise control, and the herd sometimes disperses in an instant. In the case of a “state”, on the other hand, the whole reason for forming a collective solidarity is mutual protection and therefore its basis is firm. When a chief exists, he is able to provide actual unity, form a system of division of labor, and provide for mutual nurturance and support. Hence, this form of collective solidarity is usually permanent. It is the latter type that characterizes ants and bees.

While doubtless primitives in earliest times gathered in a strongly cohesive form of “state” to protect against wild animals and other threats, even today among the aborigines of Australia and America, there are some who gather only temporarily in “herds” like animals.

Chapter Twenty-four

As discussed above, there are human societies that have not yet formed a nation-state, and it goes without saying that, for the people of this type of society, rights have not yet come into existence. On the other hand, in any society which has established the basic framework of a state, the people always have a certain modicum of rights. Certainly the framework of a state does not take shape overnight, but gradually emerges over a period of time. It is the same with rights. Therefore, it must be concluded that in a society in which the framework of a state has yet to be erected there can only be the seeds of rights, not rights themselves. On the origins of the state, however, there is as yet no agreement among scholars.

While the works of Bagehot, Maine, Spencer, Post, etc., take various viewpoints, there can be no doubt that, first, a plurality of individuals gather to form a village, and then various villages gather to form a state. Froebel and others have noted that the state emerges because of the variation among people in terms of wise and stupid, strong and weak, respected and disdained, poor and wealthy, so on, and distinctions among races and ethnic groups; in other words, differences between superior and inferior. On the occasion of a war, or other unavoidable exigency requiring the cooperation and unanimity of the people, a person from among the related individuals or villages
who is superior in mental ability, that is, intelligence, talent and resourcefulness, or who is from a prestigious family, or wealthy, and therefore popular and respected — all of which adds up to superiority — takes power and unifies the villages or group, establishes a strongly cohesive society, and finally erects the framework of a state.

Of course, there is no reason to doubt that the people have a certain degree of solidarity even before the state structure emerges, and that in that solidarity there are the seeds of rights. In the ancient family, for example, when siblings got into a dispute over an accusation of some sort, the patriarch used his authority to judge the merits of the case. He issued scoldings if the accusation were wrong, and warnings if it were correct. By stopping the dispute he protected the other family members. Therefore, to some extent they began to possess rights. Caspari remarks that, “Rights begin to grow in the communal existence of the family.”

In addition, even in the “herd” type of collectivity formed by savage peoples, as noted in the previous section, the chief’s power may be weak but when he is able to limit or prevent small squabbles the village has begun to receive his protection. Each villager begins to have a right to life, or to property, and so on. Soon he is able to avoid insults or interference from others. But to the extent that the basis of their cooperative solidarity is unstable, rights will not be stable or firm either, and are therefore actually unworthy of being called rights.

Chapter Twenty-five

As explained above, when several related individuals, or several villages, need cooperative unanimity, a superior one from among them unifies the people or the groups into a stable society and for the first time erects the framework of a state. If the people do not already have the type of friendship characteristic of kinship groups, however, and if their customs and folkways are somewhat different, a strong and stable form of collective solidarity can be forged only through the initial application of a despotic and arbitrary form of rule by the superiors. As long as the people continue to practice only survival of the fittest, the superior individual will oppress inferiors, superior kinship groups or villages will behave arbitrarily with inferior ones, and the results will be harmful. When survival of the fittest is all inclusive, the interests of the superiors are completely at variance with those of the inferiors and no firm solidarity can ever arise.

In what manner, then, is the greatest superior to employ autocratic power in order to apply techniques of preventing arbitrariness on the part of the other superiors, and what techniques can he use? There is only one way. He must prevent arbitrary treatment by granting certain rights and obligations
to all the people. Of course, he does not issue an order to that effect, nor does he pass a law. When there are those in the community who commit bloodshed, robbery, affrontery, etc., the superior man who is the dictator executes, banishes, or punishes in some other manner, the criminal, thereby also warning the others and preventing future disputes. As a result, the people acquire the duty not to inflict damage on others or to interfere with them, and the right not to have damage done to, or interference with, themselves. That is how rights originate. They depend completely upon the protection of the most superior man, that is, the ruler with his dictatorial powers. Schäffle elaborates upon this point. Spencer discusses the reasons why in primitive, uncivilized human societies the chief is very weak and cannot control the people, but this fact may rather offer evidence that, conversely, when the chief’s power is weak, it is impossible to forge strong collective solidarity.

Chapter Twenty-six

In Chapter Twenty-two, I quoted Carneri’s statement that, “We are unaware of anything called natural rights, knowing only of acquired rights. Moreover, these received rights exist or do not exist only in relation to the state, and cannot exist for a moment apart from it.” In Chapter Twenty-four, we noted that, according to Froebel and others, the state emerges because of variations among people in terms of wise and stupid, strong and weak, respected and disdained, poor and wealthy, etc., and distinctions among races and ethnic groups. Since I believe these views to be the most sound on the subject, I have based my remarks in the preceding chapter completely on them. If we are so fortunate that this research is without error, then we must admit that human rights depend upon the protection of the ruler in possession of dictatorial power, that is, the most superior individual, and come into existence for the first time only upon the establishment of the state. As long as a superior individual who can grasp such power fails to appear, human rights can never be born. The state cannot be formed apart from rights, and rights cannot be formed apart from the state. According to this view, the state and human rights are established by a dictator in order to secure the safety of the whole group, and of each individual, in a time of unavoidable crisis. Naturally, before the autocrat is able to grasp sufficient power to unify the people, and thereby establish rights and duties, there are bound to be numerous difficulties. It is not an easy thing to do.

Nevertheless, as long as a strong, stable society has yet to be formed, even superior individuals who cannot insure their own safety are well-advised to follow completely the commands of the most superior who is the autocrat. The logic of this is revealed in the obedience of the French to the autocratic rule of Napoleon I after repeated rebellions. However, in such a case the peo-
people who gather together in solidarity do not necessarily all achieve equal rights because of differences among large and small, powerful and weak, different ethnic groups, families and villages. The higher ethnic groups receive powerful, extraordinary rights and use them to oppress lower groups; lower groups receive lesser rights and find it difficult to avoid pressure from the ruler or higher-ups. The Indian and Egyptian caste systems are the most extreme form of this.

Moreover, when enemies are subjugated, their people become slaves rather than members of the society. Some customs allow them to be denied any rights at all, and to be employed arbitrarily. For such reasons, while rights emerge for the first time at the nascent stage of the state, all people do not naturally and necessarily receive rights in equal degree. Within the same stratum of people or the same ethnic group, however, rights are generally uniform. For even people of the same group or stratum to gain equal rights certainly sets that situation apart from one in which the state has not yet been set up and there is no ruler. At least in the former case the lives and property of people are generally safe.

Chapter Twenty-seven

In view of the above, it is clear that rights are born when a state of unbridled survival of the fittest is regulated by a dictatorial ruler, who then establishes rights in the course of seeking safety and stability for each individual, and society as a whole. And, as a matter of fact, the means of eliminating the harms and ills of the process of survival of the fittest is none other than the further operation of survival of the fittest itself. For the most superior individual, who is the autocratic ruler, to exercise his power to unify the people, establish rights in the process, and thereby prevent insults and mutual interference among the people, is actually to use a major operation of survival of the fittest to control a minor operation of that same principle. This is true not only at the stage when rights come into existence, but even in today's civilized world. To take supreme power in the state in order to protect the rights of the people and prevent them from affronting and interfering with each other is also none other than the employment of a major operation of survival of the fittest to control another, more minor one. It takes one process of survival of the fittest to control another! I have come to believe that, as noted above, the survival of the fittest is an absolute and eternally unchanging principle of natural law, and it is impossible for us to escape it for a moment.

In Chapter Twenty-two we included Jhering's statement on the relationship between rights and power: "What are called rights are born only when the ruler, in seeking to advance his own interests, freely decides to limit his own power and be fair and impartial." Jhering uses as an example the aboli-
tion of slavery and the conferral of rights upon the former slaves. I think that freeing slaves is a most appropriate example, but whenever a group that is very weak in solidarity is to be given strong collective cohesion for the first time, the strong man must not just limit his own power, but also expand it or he will never reach his objective.

Chapter Twenty-eight

Having dealt with the origin of rights in a manner that is hopefully well understood, next I shall turn to the actual reasons behind their gradual development. Here, too, of course, we find survival of the fittest. Jhering has included in his major work an excellent discussion indicating that rights develop out of competition. While the people receive rights through their dependence upon the ruler's protection, they themselves must preserve those rights and defend them against damage or interference from others. But without the desire to augment rights if they are insufficient, and the intelligence necessary to preserve or obtain them, they will inevitably become shells, empty of the content of true rights. The fact that Europeans and Americans gradually succeeded in stabilizing their rights, and even expanding them, is the result completely of that sort of spirit and intelligence. Conversely, the reason the people of other countries have not succeeded in obtaining far-reaching rights, but remain slaves of the government and nobility, resides only in that mental weakness. When viewed in this manner, it is obvious that survival of the fittest is again at work.

Both the continuing lust for power of the government and the nobility, expressed in continued pressure on the rights of the people, and the resistance against that pressure in seeking continuing progress in developing their rights, take place in the context of survival of the fittest. The former, however, brings misfortune and disadvantage to society and therefore is evil, while the latter brings happiness and benefit to society and is therefore good. If, however, the people commit outrage against the rights and power of the nobility with no hint of regret, and pay heed only to the expansion of their rights, the result will be a process of survival of the fittest that is injurious to society. Violent rebellion is not a good way to achieve progress in genuine rights, and whatever results it may produce cannot be retained for long.

Chapter Twenty-nine

Radzenhausen believes that rights progress through four stages: 1) the rights of the people in animal-like society, 2) rights possessed in a society of collective solidarity, 3) rights possessed in international society, and 4) rights possessed in a society of all peoples of the world. From the beginning to the present day, rights have gradually made progress in the framework of these
In the beginning, when man had not yet transcended the bounds of primitive savagery, and human interaction was mingled in with that of animals, human cultures and morals were also indistinguishable on the whole from those of the animal world. Men brutalized and plundered at will, with “rights” only to pursue selfish satisfaction. It was a stage of struggle, devil take the hindmost, with nothing that could correctly be called rights. This was the first stage of the “rights” of people in animal-like society.

Next, people’s intelligence gradually expands, and they finally gather collectively in villages, progressing from there to the formation of a state. Now, violence and pillage are prohibited within the boundaries of the new solidarity, and gradually human rights are firmed up. People now do not dare infringe on the rights of others. In this second stage of rights in collective solidarity, the rights already possessed gradually expand and develop.

Next, human collectivities in a number of separate areas — in this case the European countries — come to associate in peace, and each country recognizes the rights of both other countries and the people of those countries. It is now just as if man has become one people, and a law to govern relations amongst his societies, international law, comes into existence. Man now for the first time has rights on the international plane, and they gradually expand and develop. At this third stage, people have transcended the variations among states and respect each other’s rights as equal human beings, but the boundaries of this community do not extend beyond Europe and America. That is, Europeans are an identical race, with identical doctrines and identical customs, but they have not yet progressed to the point of being one people across the world. In recent times, however they have begun to expand the boundaries of their community, eventually to include all the peoples of the world.

Eventually, Japan, China, Turkey, Persia, and other countries that are racially different from Europe and America, and have different doctrines and customs, will also interact on an equal basis through international law and possess equal rights and duties. Soon there will be a tendency for the savage people of Africa and Australia, and the peoples of India, and so on, to become members of the group of nations including England and France, and for the people of those areas to gain rights and duties equal to the home countries. Similarly, in America, the black people will be given their citizenship with rights equal to those of whites, and gradually a world community of peoples with equal rights will emerge. When that happens, we will have begun to advance to the fourth stage of rights in a world society of all peoples.
Chapter Thirty

In my own view, progression to that fourth stage should be considered the entry of all into the framework of survival of the fittest. But some would criticize my conclusions by saying that, if we assume that the second stage comes into existence when an autocratic ruler uses his supreme power to unify the people so that human rights gradually solidify, and that it may therefore (as outlined from Chapter Twenty-five onward) be characterized as the use of a major process of survival of the fittest to inhibit a minor one, then it is far-fetched to call progression to the third and fourth stages equally a process of survival of the fittest unless a superior individual with supreme power actually takes over either the European countries as a whole or, in the fourth stage, all the countries of the world, thereby constituting rights for members on that level. Rather, they say, the progression to each of these stages was in fact the result of the belief of all Europeans in the Christian gospel, their observance of the ethics of justice and humanity, and, as these trends became more powerful, their actual practice of the true principles of universal human brotherhood.

But this criticism does not yet hit the mark. The reason the Europeans have escaped parochial differences and finally succeeded in viewing the people of the world as one is that out of their highly-developed intelligence they have rejected the small, short-range self-interests that are immediately before them in favor of pursuit of eternal, inclusive self-interest. It is just as explained in Chapter Twenty-two by Jhering: “What are called rights are born only when the ruler, in seeking to advance his own interests, freely decides to limit his own power and be fair and impartial.” True self-interest is eternal and inclusive. Since long range self-interests are difficult to achieve without first benefiting others, the superior Europeans — or a superior individual from among the Europeans — realized that the custom of oppressing inferiors in the countries of Europe, or inferior races in other lands, was not at all in the long-range interest of the superiors, so they gradually limited their own power and granted some power to those who had theretofore been oppressed. So, in the final analysis, what flows from the pursuit of the great goal of inclusive, long-range self-interest — that is, true self-interest — is really not the operation of survival of the fittest in the narrow sense at all.

Whereas my critics cite Christianity as the centrally effective element in the progress of rights, it was not that at all. It merely functioned in a variety of supplementary ways. But even if we were to concede to our critics here, granting for the time being that their point regarding Christianity were completely correct, it would still not endanger our argument regarding the operation of a law of survival of the fittest. What actually happened, as the Europeans worshiped the gospel of Christ, hewed to a path of morality, and
then actually behaved in accord with the true principle of world brotherhood, was that the superior Europeans, or a superior individual among them, took the initiative in establishing the foundation for respect for rights, possessed by people as brothers, all over the world. In other words, in conformance with Christian morality, they actually made progress toward the third and fourth stages outlined above. What is that, if not a typical process of survival of the fittest? We must realize that progress in rights can all be explained as the result of survival of the fittest.

Chapter Thirty-one

Surely there can be no doubt that rights have progressed in the framework of the above four stages as a result of a pervasive process of survival of the fittest. On the other hand, even today, the European countries have not yet actually achieved unification. They do not yet adhere to the same institutional framework or obey the same laws, so if a dispute should break out between two countries there still would be no means of recourse to a court or other institution to pass judgment on the merits of the case. As a result, it would be likely to end in war. Should a war break out, the country that lost would find its rights impaired. And it is important to realize that, rather than having its effect on the government alone, that impairment would constitute a burden imposed on each and every citizen. In effect, the question of whether or not the people shall have rights is determined by whether they win or lose, and to that extent their situation is little different from the brutish life of the first stage. For civilized people in this day and age still to be immersed in the world of brutes is extremely regrettable. But man can only be free of brutishness when future generations establish a great, universal community where all the countries of the world abide by a central institutional framework and uniform laws. In other words, we must wait for the ultimate occurrence of a process of survival of the fittest.

Chapter Thirty-two

On the necessity of some day establishing a great, universal community, see the works of Bluntschli and Kolb. The most thorough treatment is by the former. The gist of his argument is as follows:

Intercourse among the states of Europe has become much more frequent in recent years. Moreover, there are Europeans all over the globe. Few places have escaped the presence of Europeans as they carry on trade and spread the gospel. Learning and the arts are now common properties of the peoples of the globe, and because of the spread of shipping, train lines, telegraph, and postal
services, contact amongst people everywhere has burgeoned remarkably. As a result, the international law used in Europe will spread, eventually including independent nations on other continents as well. There are even plans afoot to modify that law for the better. It appears, then, that the peoples of the world finally are beginning to have common interests, and common conceptions of what is at odds with those interests. When discord breaks out in relations between states, there have already been several instances in which disinterested, third nations have offered judgments thereby permitting the situation to be settled short of war. It must be recognized that these cases anticipate of a day when the people of the world will form a great universal community with a central institutional structure, uniform and equal laws, and equal protection for all.

I generally find these views convincing, and do believe that someday there will be established a universal community. But for that to occur would necessitate the fourth stage offered by Radenhausen, that in which rights which the individual should possess in a universal society of intercourse among the peoples of the world are guaranteed for the first time.

As already concluded in Chapter Fourteen, power struggles occur among all peoples of the world. Should the force behind the oppression and manipulation presently exercised by the Indo-European peoples, that is, the Europeans and Americans, against all the peoples of the world, increase, it would culminate in survival of the fittest. Moreover, recent evidence clearly indicates that interaction between civilized and uncivilized peoples results not only in a power struggle but in a struggle for existence which duplicates that in the animal and plant worlds. In the interaction between Europeans and the savage peoples of Australia, Africa and America, the death rate of the savages always increases and their birth rate suddenly declines, resulting in depopulation or, in some cases, the complete extermination of the race. It is said that the King of Hawaii regrets the precipitous decreases of his nation’s population, and is agonizing over a policy to remedy the situation.

No doubt there are various reasons for these decreases, or disappearances, of population, but according to Darwin and others, when savage peoples associate with civilized Europeans a number of radical changes take place. The results are, first, what is probably the factor most responsible for population attrition, the variety of new diseases contracted by the natives. They also use strong drink, and there are inevitably other changes in customs beginning with clothing, food and living styles. These factors are injurious to the health of the people and invite dissipation. The women have less...
strength for childbirth, and by virtue of having inherited weakness from their fathers and mothers, even those babies that happen to be conceived are often stillborn. As a result, the population is decimated. As Darwin concludes, "It is inevitable that sooner or later the superior races will win out completely, and the inferior ones lose, to the extent of being completely wiped out." He refers to competition not unlike that in the plant and animal kingdoms, centering on physical adaptability. This is also a struggle for existence in the mental realm, resulting, as noted previously, in a struggle for power.

The spiritual and mental capabilities of uncivilized peoples are even farther removed from those of civilized people than are their physical qualities. Some are less well endowed mentally than animals. As noted in Chapter Twelve above, some people in Africa, Australia and America are morally and ethically uncivilized. Some eat the flesh of their village mates. Some cannot count above, "One, two, three, four." Others have not the intelligence to realize how things should be classified, having no idea that cows, horses, dogs and sheep are all animals, or that pine, oak, peach and plum are all trees. They go naked, dwell in bamboo huts, live amongst dogs, eat insects, snakes and roots, and have no desires or hopes beyond food and sex. In extreme cases, they know nothing even of building huts, and live like long-armed monkeys in the tree-tops. Some know nothing of marriage, others of cooking food. Some have no language, but borrow words from neighboring villages. Some are difficult to distinguish from apes. One Australian missionary sought to educate some savages in Africa, but when he found that their mental capacity was even below that of animals, and that they had absolutely no desire to learn, he gave up and went home.

Chapter Thirty-three

When such low forms of human life are compared to the civilized peoples of Europe and the United States, they hardly fit into the same category as human beings. As discussed above, these savage peoples will probably be completely defeated in the physically-oriented struggles for existence, and sooner or later disappear from the globe completely. Even if they are fortunate enough to escape complete extinction, there can be no doubt that they will fall totally under European and American domination in the power struggle that emerges from mental and spiritual competition. Even should civilized people take delight in granting equal rights to uncivilized people, such savages have no way, in fact, to preserve those rights and therefore the results will not be favorable.

In his Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte, Klemm (German) divides the peoples of the globe into two broad categories: the first, those who possess the
strength to make progress, includes the Europeans and Americans; the second, those who have no such strength, includes all other peoples. This view is not entirely without plausibility. Viewed from such an angle, even if we get to the point of establishing a great universal community and legally make all men equal, in fact those peoples in world society who would become the superiors would be limited to the Europeans and Americans plus, in Asia, probably only the Chinese, Japanese, and a few other civilized peoples. Even if the rest are fortunate enough to escape obliteration, they would survive as inferiors, with no choice but to submit to vigorous rule by their betters. Establishing the equality of all people through the framework of universal community would amount to a way by which a major process of survival of the fittest could be substituted for a variety of minor ones. This would indeed be a step in the direction of civilization and enlightenment. However, those who seek to completely suppress the operation of the principle of survival of the fittest among the people of the world, who are as different from one another as night from day, should not be allowed to attain this objective.

Part III: Caveats Concerning the Quest for Progress in Human Rights

Chapter Thirty-four

In the preceding chapters I have sought to outline the sources from which rights originate and the reasons behind their development. Rights are born and advance when people, as they become mentally enlightened, limit the operation of pure survival of the fittest in order to adapt that process to the general achievement of human happiness and safety. What limits survival of the fittest is also, by the same token, more of the same, with a difference merely in scale. Hence, man is born, and dies, in a world of survival of the fittest and cannot for a moment escape its reach. In planning for progress in rights, then, there are some caveats which must be observed, a certain logic that cannot be treated carelessly. It goes without saying that progress in rights should be equal to the task of advancing the happiness and security of all of mankind. Any means of securing such progress that is not strictly supportive of such objectives will only succeed in retarding them.

Naturally, means and techniques must vary depending upon whether a country is civilized or not, and what are the peculiarities of its customs and way of life. For example, the fact that England has not yet put into operation in colonies such as India and Australia, laws equivalent to those enforced in the homeland, and has not bestowed on the aborigines of those countries rights that are equal to those enjoyed by British subjects, should not necessarily be construed as evidence of oppression. The British homeland has a
long history of civilization, while in the colonies that tradition is as yet only shallowly rooted. There are differences in custom, in religious doctrine, and so on. The precipitous introduction of the laws and rights of the motherland would not only fail to advance the security and happiness of the people in those areas, but would actually impede them. The countries of Europe are different from those of Asia in their degree of enlightenment and civilization, in their mode of life and customs, and so on. Therefore, laws and rights which advance the security and happiness of the countries of Europe will not necessarily be conducive to the same results in Asia. Those in authority, and scholars and commentators as well, should never overlook that fact.

Nevertheless, the deluded ones who believe in natural rights are mistakenly convinced that the immediate extension of human rights is dictated by a natural principle. In total ignorance of the differences among nations in the realm of civilization and enlightenment, way of life, and customs, they indiscriminately advocate a sudden expansion of rights. What their argument amounts to is that those rights which European people have gradually secured over the eons should be, overnight, transplanted into Asia. But human beings, as with plants and animals, progress only gradually and in stages. This is a principle of the universal law of nature. No matter how one may try to achieve progress through the use of human intelligence, the process can be hastened only slightly. The natural-rights theorists’ desire to achieve all this in a thrice betrays their ignorance of natural principles.

Chapter Thirty-five

When seeking to apply human abilities to the advancement of rights we must be ever mindful of natural processes, being careful to avoid rash and precipitous action. Whereas it is probably true that private rights — those which concern only personal affairs — can be expanded, sometimes even fairly rapidly, without doing any major harm, when it comes to the right to participate in political affairs, extreme care must be exercised since that is a matter that deeply affects the prosperity or decline of the society. If such rights are granted precipitously extreme harm could result. Since the advent of natural rights theory, an ideology of open elections has flourished while limitations on suffrage rights are increasingly considered counter to natural principles. The first to actually practice such an ideology was France in 1793, when all adults were given suffrage rights. But to the present day, only France, Switzerland, the German Empire and the United States have instituted this sort of universal suffrage.

Participation in government requires great ability, and it is absolutely necessary that men of intelligence and substance be chosen as representatives. Naturally, in order to elect talented representatives, the electors them-
selves must be capable men of good judgment. If this is not the case, the entire country will suffer. Well, it is self-evident that the establishment of universal suffrage laws, designed to secure immediately, equality and impartiality in public affairs by allowing all the people to elect their own representatives, is directly at odds with the principle of allowing capable people to elect capable representatives. This is ample reason to exercise caution with regard to general suffrage and to insist on a restricted electorate for most purposes.

Naturally the specifics of limited suffrage laws vary from country to country, but the most usual practice is to draw the line at a certain level of tax payment. We can probably assume that ability is related to wealth, and since those today who are fully absorbed in making a living generally have no education, we can assume that they are low also in ability. Therefore, in general, the poor may be said to have little ability. This logic also implies that those with a certain amount of property and education have some ability. Moreover, the will of those who have some property is stable rather than rash and fickle like the proletariat. They have regard for themselves, and also for their country. Therefore, making electors out of those who have a certain amount of property will generally insure that capable representatives are chosen. On the other hand, acting contrary to that practice, by giving the vote to all adults, will insure that those without ability will comprise a majority. In that case, they will be swayed by dissemblers and follow the crowd, unable to elect suitable representatives. We must conclude that it is a mistake to bestow suffrage upon the poor.

England is the motherland of representative, constitutional government, and of all countries has the maximum amount of liberty, but it always had a restricted electorate. Restrictions, however, have been gradually relaxed over the years. According to the great scholar Strauss (German):

Rather than focussing on reality, the French and Germans have a weakness for theory. Only the English esteem a realistic approach, abjuring all fascination with empty doctrine. This attitude is evident in electoral laws as well, where the English have gradually relaxed restrictions with no desire to abolish them altogether.

Jeremy Bentham held that England’s restricted suffrage law was injurious to his first principle, the greatest happiness for the greatest number. He therefore advocated its abolition in favor of universal suffrage. In fact, however, it is precisely the restricted system that brings greatest happiness to the greatest number, and to attempt to secure that principle through universal suffrage would be imprudent and foolish. If is now fifty years since Bentham
passed away, and England does not yet have a universal system of suffrage. Furthermore, no one with intelligence contests that preference.

Chapter Thirty-six

The eagerness of natural-rights supporters to achieve instantaneous progress is not limited to the matter of electoral laws. Anything that involves expansion of the liberty of the people is fair game. The reasoning behind their ignorance of natural principles and tendency to rush blindly into fallacious doctrines seems to be the supposition that man, through his own power, can at once, without delay, accomplish what is necessary to insure his happiness and security. But when they act, things never turn out that way. They take vain speculation for natural principle, and assume that humans are capable of accomplishing what is actually out of their hands, confined to the realm of natural law. Their major premises are mistaken, so it is no wonder that their results are. They fail to realize that, for the most part, human society operates according to principles that apply as well to the plant and animal worlds. If, indeed, there is nothing exempt from the laws of nature, it follows that principles of human progress and social development must also be expounded in relation to natural principles as they operate in the plant and animal worlds.

As explained above, the physical and mental characteristics of animals develop through heredity and change, and variation among them as a result of heredity and modification occurs as a uniform principle of natural law. In fortunate cases, heredity and modification work together beneficially to produce superior results: when a specimen is unfortunate, the result is inferiority. When modifications are precipitous, however, those individuals with good heredity almost completely disappear. How much more so for those without favorable heredity. Water is necessary as nourishment for plants. But if a large volume of water is provided to plants that up to that point have not had much water, a drastic change ensues and the plant inevitably dies. Learning, by the same token, is necessary for the mental nourishment of human beings. But if a student who heretofore has not been made to study is suddenly forced to study excessively, drastic change results and the student will soon collapse. It is not that the stimulation of change per se is damaging, but that its methods are excessively rapid. It is the same in all walks of life. It has always been necessary to reform the customs and folkways, the institutions and laws, of human society in order to expand human interests and happiness. To carry out such reforms according to methods that are too rapid, however, is damaging to such ends.

From this perspective, in the present-day world of social policy the ideologies of conservatism and gradualism are not inconsistent with heredity
and modification, and to achieve social change based on these ideologies is the same in principle as nurturing plants and animals through heredity and modification. If they are carried to extremes, the result will be either radicalism or reactionism. Conservatism and gradualism are the only ways to raise up our society and the state. Radicalism and reactionism are the ways to destroy it. Extreme care is essential. In his *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, Bluntschli discourses in detail on the various political parties and their records, clarifying the contrast between the beneficial accomplishments of the conservatives and gradualists, and the harm caused by radicals and reactionaries. If we look closely at the theories and explanations offered by various present-day natural rights advocates, it is clear that they generally fall in the category of radical: rapid movement toward universal suffrage, a unicameral legislature, party cabinets, popular election of prefectural (fuken) officials, disallowance of government review of prefectural assembly decisions, and so on. These are radical programs, out forward without adequate reflection or deliberation, and intended to bring about in Japan a theory-based society to an extent unknown even in present-day Europe and the United States. We must expose these charlatans who are oblivious to the realities of social genetics and change. Among the radical natural-rights advocates are those who extol republican government, and exalt the ideologies of the socialist or communist parties. Their activities must be recognized as despicable.

In an attack on the rebels in France, Polk says, “A nation is not just the society as it exists in the present. It was bequeathed by that society’s forefathers and must be passed down to its progeny. It is unforgivable, therefore, for contemporary members of that society to disrupt it.” Also, Strausz praises the people of England for their habits of simple stability, their supreme patriotism, and their avoidance of rashness and radicalism. He says,

Even in England, there have been some thoughtless individuals in recent times who have extolled republicanism. But a year ago, when the prince was ill and appeared to be in dangerous circumstances, even though the people often do not approve of his personal comportment, they sent condolences to the palace, and showed their desire that he should recover at the earliest date. Even the republican parties found it impossible to stand by, and finally joined in, sending a message as well. This is evidence that the English are deeply patriotic and not only are unmoved by radicalism, but have the strength to control it.
The radical natural-rights supporters in Japan should reflect deeply on the English example.

Chapter Thirty-seven

There is one more matter which, in conclusion, I should like to address. In this essay I have discussed, in terms of the great principle of survival of the fittest, the sources of illusion concerning natural rights, and the origins and progress of real rights. Indeed, the term "survival of the fittest" is the very heart of my effort, and I have heard that because I have hammered that term home with such insistence, it has been mistakenly interpreted as a deleterious process according to which the role of duty in relationships of sovereignty and throughout the hierarchical order, will be destroyed, bringing a situation in which nobles will be guilty of lese majeste, the people will despise their king, and so on. Some apparently feel, therefore, that what I have presented above is an evil essay which will lead people into unrighteousness and injustice. This misunderstanding can only be the result of careless reading, if not purposeful misconstruction, of my argument.

The term "survival of the fittest" means, as always, simply that the superior individuals win, while the inferiors lose. In other words, it means that those who deserve to win do, and vice versa. It does not mean rebellion or lawlessness. It is true that those who should win, that is, the superiors, include ruthless as well as virtuous individuals, as do the inferiors. When the virtuous superior wins, defeating the ruthless inferior, the process may be called beneficial survival of the fittest; when a ruthless superior is victorious, overwhelming a virtuous inferior, the result may be called damaging survival of the fittest. The distinction between superior and inferior has to do with physical and mental strength, while those between right and wrong, good and evil, have to do with mental powers and morality, respectively. Therefore, they are fundamentally different. Rectitude does not necessarily add up to superiority, and superiority is not necessarily just or correct; sometimes rectitude is inferior, while wrong is superior.

Therefore, it is irresponsible for my critics to take a concept of survival of the fittest that is based only on power and make of it a pejorative term, construing this essay as an attempt to seduce the people into injustice and unrighteousness. Would such a critic, upon seeing the harm done to human beings by fire and water, ignore the great benefits those elements bring and call them injurious? Natural law does not exist for the purpose of benefiting mankind, and therefore the forces of fire and water, which are part of that natural law will sometimes harm mankind. The law of survival of the fittest as well, which also has its origins in natural law, occasionally is harmful. It is inevitable that all things should have harmful as well as beneficial aspects.
Hence intelligent beings should not just see the harm, while ignoring the benefits. The smart way to proceed is to avoid the harm originating in natural law while exploiting the good. According to Tylor (English):

Primitive peoples knew the least about the principles of the law of nature. Hence, their ability to adapt nature to the interests and convenience of mankind was least developed. Peoples what were merely uncivilized knew a certain amount about the principles of natural law, and therefore they had considerable ability to adjust it to man's interest and convenience. Civilized peoples know the most about the principles of the law of nature, and therefore they are best able to adjust it to the needs of man.

Bücher, too, says:

Man is part of nature, and therefore cannot completely escape the force of natural law. As his intelligence advances, however, he investigates the principles of nature and gradually gains the ability to regulate it. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that man today is progressing to the status of God.

To my way of thinking, the lifelong effort of the ancient sages was to avoid the harm to man done by the operation of survival of the fittest and to promote the good. In other words, to bring about the favorable operation of survival of the fittest. That meant honoring the gentlemen, but despising the lout; employing the wise man while avoiding the rascal; rewarding the honest and chastising the unjust; making ethics clear and punishing rebels and traitors; expounding the Way and expelling heresies. The Sages did not confuse rectitude with error, or indiscriminately lump gentlemen with common men, thereby stopping the beneficial operation of survival of the fittest.

Chapter Thirty-eight
As explained above, it is incorrect to use "survival of the fittest" as a pejorative term, and treat this book as an evil tract designed to lure the people away from justice and righteousness. It goes without saying that evil, the destructive operation of survival of the fittest, was most prevalent during the era when man's intelligence had not advanced and his morality was unawakened. Today, while it cannot be said that such evil has thoroughly dissipated, no one will dispute that it has lessened since antiquity. In the advanced civilizations of Europe and the United States, particularly, the national-level process of survival of the fittest in each country is moving
decisively in a beneficial direction; rebellion and criminality are nearly stamped out. In early times, the kings and nobility, along with the clergy, monopolized supreme power in society and held the people in shackles. In order to escape those shackles and seek individual happiness, it was necessary to defy the rulers at the risk of one's life. The extreme form of such action was, of course, armed rebellion. In recent civilization, however, the nobility and the clergy have largely lost their power, and the sovereigns do not dare exercise unlimited power for oppression. The people will finally obtain their rights, and full participation in government. Even today, the elite commoners who are in control of social power, and even the lower classes, have in large measure already received their full complement of rights. That this has not been achieved by the villainous nihilists and their ilk causes them no end of pain, so they tend all the more toward the vilification of royalty and demands for seizure of power.

In Japan as well, the power of the sovereign is no longer absolutist in reality. A representative system should be substantially achieved in no more than several years, as a group equivalent to the European and American middle classes gradually emerges to become the superiors, takes supreme power in society, and uses that power to participate in government. Such a process would surely usher in a beneficial process of survival of the fittest. In conclusion, I urge natural-rights enthusiasts to avoid radicalism; it is my hope that they will nurture a stable, sincere spirit, become superior individuals in their society, and eternally serve the throne.
Yo ni yoki seifu naru mono naki no setsu
There is No Good Government Anywhere in the World
(A Speech Delivered in 1878)¹
Ueki Emori (1857-92)

Translated by Katsuya Hirano

The people have a way to make a government into a good government, but a government cannot make itself into a good one. Since ancient times, people have always hoped to have a good government. There was not a moment in history when people were not concerned with questions of which government is good and which is bad, what a good government should be and do, what kind of person is desirable as the leader of a country, which leaders are despotic, and so on. But the reality is that even when the people had good and desirable leaders, they did not know how to make these leaders conduct affairs of state in a respectable and desirable manner. We can hardly say that this is a situation with which wise people would be satisfied.

A government does not make itself into a good government. Only the people can make a government a good one. Having said this, if we claim that there is no good government anywhere in the world, people may wonder if this is a reasonable and legitimate claim. Of course, it is perfectly understandable for them to doubt this claim, but there is a logical ground for making it.

To begin with, we must talk about the way in which a society is constituted. Some people consider the constitution of society to be equivalent to that of the family, and thereby explain the relationship between government and people in light of that between parent and child. But this is an utterly mistaken view. The relationship between government and people is solely based on contract, never on natural bond. There is natural affection between parent and child. Between government and people, however, there are conflicts of interests. Government seeks its own benefits, uses its power to oppress whenever it possesses such power, and takes advantage of every opportunity to do so. Thus people must be very attentive to what their government does.

Think about this. We can never take it for granted that from ancient times to the present the government has progressed, and law has become fairer to such an extent that the government is willing to grant us popular rights and liberty. When we do, we immediately bring calamities and harm upon ourselves. Let me take a recent example from our country to illustrate this. There
is a rumor that our government will reduce a land tax by five percent this spring, and will allow payment of taxes either in rice or in money. The government would not have considered making this change which will benefit the farmers if a number of farmers had not protested last year in various parts of Japan. Even though they were just farmers' protests, it was this act of resistance that brought about such a positive result.

In olden days, even in European countries such as Greece, Rome and England, people did not enjoy liberty, and instead they were constantly oppressed and exploited by their rulers. Then, they stood up, seeking to realize their own liberty and peace. To use a metaphor to describe their struggle for liberty and peace, the people were like a flock of birds, whereas the rulers were like eagles. The flock of birds had long suffered the eagles’ attacks. And then, from among these vicious eagles, a group of heroic eagles emerged. They sought to restrain the vicious eagles and to help the weaker birds, to liberate them from their suffering. Nevertheless, despite their initial intentions, those heroes became rulers even more despotic and abusive than their predecessors. Those weak birds spent their days and nights defending themselves against the poisonous beaks and talons of their new rulers. Witnessing this situation, those who loved their country and felt sympathy for these people thought that the unceasing despotism was due to the lack of a way for the people to set limits on the power of their rulers. From that point forward, they thought, they would limit the rulers’ rights to govern the people. They called this idea, according to which the rulers have limited powers and rights, the principle of liberty.

Look, for example, at the case of the United States. Their independence was never favored by England. Or think about the people of England. It was not King John’s own will to sign the famous Magna Carta. And what about other countries? Was there ever any government that was willing to create a republican form of politics? Did any government ever take the initiative to establish a parliamentary system? No. None of them! Therefore, although democratic politics did not dramatically develop except in a few countries, the very logic that no government was willing to allow such a development to take place is the same everywhere. The difference is just a matter of degree.

In looking into our own history, we tend to think that there were occasionally truly benevolent and compassionate rulers. But, on closer examination, true benevolence and compassion never existed. Rulers such as Emperor Jintoku were no different from thieves.

It is difficult to know whether or not a government is good or bad at the time of its founding, for we can know this only when we look back and evaluate what a government has achieved or failed to achieve. This is why we
can speak of Yao, Shun, Hsia, King Shang, King Wu and so on in high esteem. We can never clearly know if we have a good or bad government until we observe it long enough. This is why it is of vital importance to establish the constitution so as to guarantee liberty. But even this is not good enough. We must make sure to preserve and keep the constitution effective after establishing it.

Humans are always motivated by some kind of personal interests and ambitions. As in the metaphor of the birds and the eagles, if the people have absolute faith in their government, the government will take advantage of their faith. The more the people believe in their government, the more the government will abuse that belief. If we do not maintain our skepticism towards and watch over the government, we permit the government to do anything it desires, and we never know what the government will do to us. This is why I say, “there is no good government anywhere in the world.” Accordingly, the people should supervise and monitor the government’s actions, and resist it whenever resistance is necessary. If once we discontinue such efforts, we will never realize good and just politics. Needless to say, such effort is all the more necessary when a government reveals its despotic nature from the outset.

There is a saying: learning is like pushing a cart slowly up a slope. Our situation, that is, the way we popular rights activists confront and struggle against our oppressive and exploitative government, is well represented by this saying.

Of course, there are some differences between an oppressive and vicious government and a relatively respectable government. And naturally the ways in which people confront and deal with these two kinds of governments differ as well. But there is no government that can be regarded as good from its inception. This is why we must always be ready to watch, supervise and resist any government.

As vast as the world is, there must be good and bad governments. Yet, in general, we have to say that most governments are harmful because there are so many examples attesting to this point of view. People must struggle to make bad governments into good ones, instead of blindly believing in the goodness of their governments. In general, such blind faith allows bad governments to turn into really vicious ones. This resembles a situation in which, when you lend your money to someone with caution, the return will be ensured; but without any caution, you will be thrown into a miserable situation. The Japanese people must remember this and struggle hard towards realizing a good government. This is how we can make our government a good government.
If you think that my statements are too radical to be accepted, please think at least in the following way: remain cautious about our government. Though you may not wish to openly confront and resist our government, never put your entire trust in it.

Notes
Chapter Two: People Must Acquire Their Right of Liberty

There was a person named Jean-Jacques Rousseau. According to him, human beings are born free. We can thus say that human beings are creatures of freedom. Even though law helps guarantee and actualize people’s liberty, liberty is a gift from heaven and is something that every one of us is innately given. When people are deprived of their liberty, it is a serious crime committed against heaven. And it is also shameful for one not to claim one’s own liberty. This shamefulness refers not only to claiming what one should not claim, it also refers to not claiming something one should. That is to say, not only is stealing shameful, not only is lying or having an affair shameful, but also not to claim the right of liberty endowed by heaven to us is equally shameful. Moreover, when heaven creates each individual, it bestows upon each talent and potential. Human beings can live and work fully as human beings with such talent and potential. But despite the importance of these heavenly endowed gifts, if we do not possess freedom, our gifts of talent and potential are simply wasted. Think about a bird kept in a cage. Any bird possesses feathers and wings, but when it is trapped in a cage, its feathers and wings have no use. Even though human beings are given precious talent and potential, they are like birds trapped in a cage without their freedom. Not even one tenth of their talent and potential can be used. To be bridled and confined is the worst thing of all. Therefore, there is nothing in the world more precious than liberty, and without it life and talent are totally wasted. And can we really say that there is happiness and peace without liberty? There is a huge difference between life with and life without liberty in realizing happiness and peace. Liberty is something everyone must have.

As a way to fully preserve and defend the right of liberty, people built nations, established governments and laws, and employed civil servants. These institutional arrangements are all meant to help protect people’s right to liberty: if there is injustice and unfairness among the people, these arrangements are meant to rectify the problems and realize equity among the people; they are also meant to punish those who commit evil deeds, and to rescue and bring happiness and peace to those who are victimized by
these evil deeds.

Furthermore, in human affairs, there is nothing unrelated to the matter of liberty. As I have just said, establishing government and law, and employing civil servants are all for the sake of ensuring the right of liberty. Even waging war or engaging in disputes is also often related to the matter of liberty. For example, the United States revolted against and declared its independence from English rule because the people in the United States could no longer endure England’s tyrannical politics which oppressed the people’s right to be free. The people in the thirteen colonies got together with a common purpose in mind and waged war against England for seven years. They finally won the war and liberated themselves from English rule. This was a war for liberty.

Similarly, the people of England, pained and enraged by King John’s tyrannical politics which not only deprived the people of their right to be free but also brought great calamities to their lives, forced King John to sign the Magna Carta. Thus, they demanded new laws: “The King must neither harm the people nor damage their possessions without reasonable cause;” “In interrogating a criminal, the government must employ someone who has the same status as the criminal;” “A new tax policy must not be implemented without the parliament’s authorization.” People assembled to force King John to concede the enactment of these laws. This was a dispute necessary for realizing liberty. Caesar in Rome, Louis the Sixteenth in France, and Charles the First in England were either beheaded by their countrymen or their governments were subverted. This was the penalty they deserved to pay for taking away the right of liberty from the people. In our country too, imperial loyalist samurai revolted against and overturned the Tokugawa regime a little more than a decade ago. They renewed the imperial household and built the Meiji government. All these changes took place because the Tokugawa shogunate had been so arrogant as to mistreat the royal family and obstruct the people’s heaven-endowed right of liberty. The people became enraged by the shogunate’s politics and eventually overthrew the government. This is also an example that needs to be understood in relation to liberty.

Thus far I have talked about how precious liberty is, and how broadly it is related to our human affairs. I have also stressed how important it is for the people to acquire their right to be free and thereafter not to renounce or lose it. But, sadly enough, since the olden days, people such as those of Tang have been imbued with the custom which I call servility. They are easily persuaded to accept and do whatever is demanded of them, being so subservient to the authorities that they are incapable of being independent. When ordered to do something by the government, they worship and obey
that order without asking why they must do it. These people act like horses or cattle whose duty is to be used by their masters. They are in no way different from monkeys in a monkey show, being manipulated by their masters. Always saying “yes” to their masters, they try to carry out their duties with subservience. By doing so, they show no will and spirit of their own, and thus simply accept things as they are. That is how these people lose sight of the real meaning of social contract: not only do they forget that they choose and employ civil servants to fully realize their liberty, but also they allow these officials to steal their rights and allow tyranny to prevail. Moreover, in realizing what they have lost, they desperately seek to regain some kind of equilibrium between themselves and the officials by paying to each of these officials a salary equivalent to the combined incomes of hundreds of ordinary people. While farmers labor hard in the fields under the blazing sun of summer, these officials feed on taxes paid out by the farmers, rowing a boat in a cool river with courtesans and dancers. These are truly the conditions of a world-turned-up-side-down. And even though this is apparently as mistaken as putting a shoe on one’s head or wearing a hat on one’s foot, these people neither say a thing nor protest at all. This is utter nonsense! Or if nonsense is not an appropriate word, this is nothing but a state of absolute servility! Can we call those who act this way human beings?

Long ago, there was a king in Rome called Caligula. Watching a shepherd raising sheep, he remarked that the relationship between the king and the people was just like that between shepherd and sheep. He thought that, to the same extent that a shepherd is nobler than his sheep, and the sheep are lowlier than the shepherd, so is the king nobler than the people and the people are lowlier than the king. By reasoning in this way, he eventually declared that kings are gods and that the people are beasts, and thereby began to act as the shepherd of the people.

In China too, it is thought that governing the country means pasturing the people. The ruler is referred to as a shepherd (boku jin) whereas the people are as pastured people (boku min) or the herd. Do you really agree with King Caligula’s idea that the ruler is a god and the people are beasts? Why should we be so servile? All human beings, rulers as well as common people, are created by heaven and are equal to one another. Why should there be any difference between the two like that between shepherd and sheep? Have the courage, the fortitude to go to the grave of that haughty King Caligula, to dig up his bones, and to break them to pieces! Born as human beings, our lives are empty without liberty. Please never submit yourself to servility. Heaven gave us liberty. Insist on the popular rights of the people and talk about liberty. And if we are unable to acquire our liberty, we should
rather die. Without liberty, life is meaningless and empty.

Notes


2 Ueki takes this analogy directly from the Japanese translation of Book 1, Chapter 2 of Rousseaus's Social Contract. By the time Ueki was writing this essay, Social Contract had already been translated into Japanese by an eminent social critic and an ardent supporter of the popular rights movement, Nakae Chōmin.
Chapter One: General Remarks

There are people in the world who hold up a sign saying, “I am a proponent of popular rights,” and proclaim that they are one who advocates liberty. Yet they are in fact those same fellows who have one leg in the shit-bucket of despotism and are unable to escape the stench of oppression. To grasp in general terms what these fellows are now discussing, some say, “Politics is something that concerns matters of life and death for the state. Unless you are one who possesses the merits of rich experience and a wealth of political thought, even though you may be of the upper class, you mustn’t be too quick to discuss politics. Therefore, when we allow members of lower-class society, who don’t even know what liberty and popular rights are, to participate in politics, we endanger the welfare of the state and slow the progress of civilization.” Others say, “Once these ignorant folks of the lower classes expand their influence over the political world, the level of thought—even of those with broad ability who embrace lofty thought—will decline to a certain extent, inevitably approaching the level of thought of lower-class people. How can we claim that this is the path to attain the welfare of the state?” Still others say, “People of the lower class have no education and no intelligence. They have no spare time to properly study political matters, and no energy to spare. To teach them of political matters without adequate preparation would certainly cause great harm.”

When others raise the flag of despotism from the outset before making this kind of argument, there are no particular doubts as to why they say what they do. But it is indeed surprising that these fellows, even as they pose as advocates of popular rights and liberty, can be so profuse in their disrespect toward lower-class society. They prattle on endlessly about “upper-class society” and “lower-class society.” But in regard to state politics, those who pay taxes and abide by national law are all one and the same people. Therefore, the language that speaks of “upper-class society” and “lower-class society” is certainly not one for advancing one’s views concerning national politics.

Now, even if we try to make a distinction between upper and lower-class
society, we cannot necessarily say that the wealthy belong to upper-class society and the poor belong to the lower class. In ancient times, there was a saying by a person named Zi Si. He said, "That which cannot be taken from one is called wealth, that which cannot bring disgrace upon one is called nobility. What cannot be taken, what cannot bring disgrace, is this not what we call wealth and nobility?" Even if one is poor in a material sense, if he has that which cannot be taken away and cannot bring disgrace, then he must be considered part of upper-class society. Even if one is wealthy in a material sense, if he has that which can be taken away and can bring disgrace, then he belongs to lower-class society. It is extremely unjust to abandon those who are uneducated and poor to a realm outside of political rights. Also, if we look merely at the words "intelligent person" and "stupid person," the opposition between the two appears to be correct. But all human beings possess intelligence to a certain degree. To call one person stupid and another intelligent is nothing more than to indicate differing degrees of intelligence. For example, let's say that when we measure the intelligence of an intelligent person, it is one foot in length. A stupid person measures seven inches. There is a difference in length between seven inches and one foot, but the important thing is that both equally have length.

If we follow those who argue that people of the lower classes with little intelligence should not participate in politics, how can we distinguish the intelligent person who should participate in politics from the stupid person who should not? Compared to a person with an intelligence of seven inches, a person with one foot of intelligence is indeed intelligent, but compared to someone with one and a half feet of intelligence, they must be considered stupid. The person with one and a half feet of intelligence, compared to a person with one foot of intelligence, is intelligent. But matched against a person with two feet of intelligence, they are immediately demoted to the status of a stupid person. If we follow those who argue that if you are not intelligent you should not participate in politics, it follows that in the end the one person with the highest intelligence must govern the nation alone while all others remain apart from politics.

Now, we cannot measure the intelligence of a person as though weighing stones and earth. And we cannot measure intelligence like the length of a piece of cloth. We cannot make distinctions of the sort that say this person has this much intelligence and that person has that much intelligence. Even if we assume that we can do this, we must realize that one's intelligence will grow in accordance with the things that one experiences. Even a person with an intelligence only eight inches in length who has not experienced certain things may advance to one foot, or even to one and a half feet, when they experience something new. Viewed from this perspective, we must conclude
that excluding lower-class society from politics is a great disadvantage for society. Furthermore, the state is something that creates and promotes equal happiness for all of the people; it is not something that is built for one or two people alone or for one portion of society or for one clan. Even though we can hypothetically distinguish between members of upper-class and lower-class society, from a political point of view, they are equally one people on one and the same level. How can we endow members of upper-class society with political rights while excluding members of lower-class society? This being the case, by condemning members of lower-class society for being uneducated and illiterate, and thereby relegating them to the status of political society's stepchild, we will truly allow members of that group called “upper-class society” to monopolize the power of the state. In other words, this amounts to despotism at the hands of the few. What kind of popular rights theory is this?! These fellows can only be called advocates of despotism posing as defenders of popular rights.

Notes
2 Zi Si (Tzu Ssu), thought to have been the grandson of Confucius.
Ueki Emori
Kokumin dōtoku gairon
An Outline of National Morality1, excerpt, (1912)
Inoue Tetsujirō (1856-1944)

Translated by Richard Reitan

Preface
The East Asia Society that I established met at the Tokyo Foreign Language School to hold a class from the second of July until the fifteenth of the same month in the forty-third year of Meiji [1910]. There, I delivered a talk entitled Kokumin dōtoku no kenkyū (Research on National Morality), lecturing for two weeks on all types of subjects concerning national morality. At the time, we had a stenographer in attendance, and although we had a record made of every lecture, in the end, I had no opportunity to make this available to the public. In December of the forty-third year of Meiji, however, the then Minister of Education Komatsubara Eitarō appointed me to give a lecture outlining national morality specifically for the instructors in charge of the departments of moral training at the Teachers' Colleges.² Accordingly, I presented a lecture entitled Kokumin dōtoku no taii (An Outline of National Morality) from the fifth to the thirteenth of December at the Ministry of Education’s Center for the Study of Arts and Sciences. Although a record was made of that lecture’s main points, this too has not yet been printed. In July of the following year, the Minister of Education again instructed me to lecture on national morality as part of a training course for middle school teachers. Accordingly, from the twenty-sixth to the thirtieth of July, I gave a lecture entitled Kokumin dōtoku gairon (An Outline of National Morality) in the lecture hall of Tokyo Imperial University...

Introduction
I will now begin my lecture outlining national morality. First of all, as an introduction, I would like to outline the reasons for now lecturing on national morality. What makes research on national morality particularly necessary today is, first of all, the relationship between national morality and national education. This relationship is hardly something new, but the sense of this relationship has not always been clear. And so, in regard to this matter, it is easy to go astray. Therefore, it is first necessary to clarify the relationship between national morality and national education.
National morality occupies an important position in national education. This is because national education is essentially something conducted with the aim of educating the people as a people (kokumin o kokumin toshite). In particular, this refers collectively to education on the level of primary to middle school. It is insufficient, however, merely to educate each individual simply as an individual. I say that this is insufficient because the goals of education will not be attained in this manner. In addition to educating individuals as individuals, there is a need for education that takes account of the group called the people. That is, we must provide education that will ensure the self-preservation of the people. If we do not provide education that furnishes a capacity to ensure our continued existence and development as a people, the objectives of education will not be attained. Joining together the education of the individual and the education of the group, that is, of the people, we will be able to attain the true objectives of education for the first time. And yet, within national education, national morality occupies the most important position. I say this because the issue of national morality is inseparably connected to the matter of educating the people as a people. In educating the people as a people, we will not attain our objectives unless we teach the people about their national morality as it has historically developed and in this way create the capacity for the self-preservation of the people. Although national education includes a variety of assigned subjects of study, some are without a direct relationship to this objective. Students must certainly pursue their studies as a people, but there are many universal fields of study that do not have any particular relationship to the self-preservation of the people. For example, math, zoology and botany, physics and chemistry—these kinds of things are universal fields of study, and while they are essential to each individual’s education, they have no particular relationship to the self-preservation of the people. But national morality is something with a particular relationship to the people of each nation. Because of this, from the standpoint of national education, it is clear that national morality must occupy a considerably important position.

Second, national morality is an expression of the people’s spirit (minzoku teki seishin). The people’s spirit is something that gradually develops historically and comes to be expressed in a given society. For this reason, research on national morality has come to be absolutely necessary for educators. But from the standpoint of education, simply conducting a broad investigation of morality is still insufficient. Research on the people’s spirit, which has gradually developed in accordance with the record of that people’s history, is needed as well.

Third, national morality has been overlooked by the general discipline of ethics. Within the general field of ethics, research on national morality is sim-
ply not being conducted. It is not that such research is somehow inappropriate, but such are the present conditions nonetheless. One of the reasons for this is that ethics today follows in the tracks of the research of Western moral philosophers. Because scholars in Japan conduct research that is modeled after Western research, there are indications that research on Japan’s national morality has not really been carried out. It need hardly be said that Japan’s ancient sages devoted a great deal of attention to the matter of national morality. But ethics today is the construction of Western moral philosophers, and because we continue to proceed in accordance with the research methods of this field of study as practiced in the West, we have inadvertently become trapped in this model. As a result, scholars of ethics in Japan naturally avoid and neglect research on national morality. Viewed in terms of education, this is an extreme defect. Beyond establishing the discipline of ethics, we simply must bring together the views of Western scholars of ethics and the customary views about morality in the Orient. But so far, this has not been adequately carried out. At any rate, because we have merely been pursuing the model of these Western scholars, the circumstances are such that we have taken no account of national morality.

Theories of ethics in Japan really do appear to be borrowed views, and there are more than a few areas where they may not be operating with a sufficiently vital spirit. There are indeed views that have been borrowed and are not sufficiently our own. Although one cannot say this is true in all cases, still in some respects, this unpleasant situation continues. Given this situation, it is necessary to carry out research on national morality so as to greatly offset the defects of ethics. But this is not simply a matter of offsetting the defects of ethics. From the standpoint of national education, there is no doubt that this research will at once be reflected in national education and greatly revive the vital spirit of national education’s content. In light of these points, research on national morality is essential.

It is possible to divide the customary elements of national morality into the following types. By “customary,” I mean, well, mainly the period prior to the importation of Western civilization, prior to the Meiji Ishin—perhaps safe to put it this way. Until this time, there were three elements of national morality. First was Japan’s inherent spirit, that is, the spirit of the people of Japan. This is national morality’s true essence. This is the most important element. Although this spirit of the people is considerably powerful as well as practical, its content was gradually borrowed from outside. That is, Confucianism and Buddhism were gradually subsumed within the spirit of the people of Japan, and the customary national morality of Japan came into existence. This being the case, in addition to this inherent spirit of Japan, the two elements of Confucianism and Buddhism slowly entered into
Japan. As a result, there have been three elements of national morality until the time of the Ishin.

Although Confucianism has represented the civilization of China and Buddhism that of India, they were imported into Japan, and assimilated into the national character (kokuminsei) of Japan. They became elements of Japanese civilization and were adopted as the content of national morality. But even national morality is something that gradually changes and develops. With the entry of Confucianism and Buddhism, national morality showed signs of much development. Such were the circumstances, and from the time of the Meiji Ishin, Japan imported Western civilization, leading to the further development of national morality.

Here, however, we must call attention to a certain point. When Confucianism was first imported, no violent change of any sort arose in Japanese society. The introduction of Confucianism to Japan was extremely peaceful. Gradually, Confucianism was assimilated as a part of Japan’s national character, and formed part of the content of Japan’s national morality. The reasons for this are various and deep. There is an essential quality in Confucianism that made it easy to assimilate into the national character of Japan. I will have occasion to discuss the reasons for this at a later time. Buddhism, however, which was imported next, was certainly not imported peacefully. With the introduction of Buddhism, a considerable degree of conflict emerged, resulting, in the end, in bloodshed. A quarrel developed between those in favor of, and those opposed to bringing Buddhism into Japan. As a result, Japan became a country at war, leaving an unhappy history. This was because Buddhism, unlike Confucianism, has aspects that do not conform to Japan’s age-old customs. To mention one, Confucianism is a teaching of virtue that simultaneously emerged with the family system. In addition, the teaching of ancestor worship is included within Confucianism. Such features are not a part of Buddhism. Buddhism is not a religion that recognizes the family system. Moreover, ancestor worship essentially does not exist in Buddhism. A great deal of trouble arose because Buddhism is inconsistent with the national character of Japan. Nevertheless, in no time, Buddhism blended into the national customs of Japan. Its distinctiveness of that time gradually came to be forgotten and it was by and large assimilated as the religion of Japan.

Third, the importation of Western civilization brought great change to Japanese society. Yet, compared to the importation of Confucianism and Buddhism, that is, the introduction of Chinese and Indian civilization, this was change on a far greater scale. And Western civilization is certainly not a simple thing like Confucianism and Buddhism. Of course, even Confucianism and Buddhism cannot be called simple, but they are simple in
a comparative sense. Within Western civilization, by comparison, are elements that are far more complicated. Religion, science, philosophy, literature—all manner of things entered Japan as a part of Western civilization. This brought to Japanese society great change of a kind previously unknown. It brought about new trends in every aspect of Japanese society. Not surprisingly, such great change had an impact on national morality. Just as Confucianism and Buddhism contributed to the development of Japan's national morality, Western civilization has come to further aid the development of Japan's national morality. In addition, current trends seem to urge this development forward more and more.

In short, the influence of Western civilization has continued from the time of the Ishin, forging an altogether permanent relationship with Japanese society. As a result, it exerts an extraordinary influence on national morality. During the forty-four years since the Ishin, national morality has gradually developed, but it is also steadily being affected by Western civilization. This being the case, what is the appropriate position to take on the matter of national morality? I believe that the determination of educators to address this question is a serious matter.

Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, because Western civilization includes extremely complex elements, it is clear that it is certainly not a simple thing. Within Western civilization there are certainly features that have greatly contributed to the development of Japan's national morality. Yet, there are also unhealthy forms of thought of the sort that destroys national morality. Behind Western civilization lies very harmful thought. There is even a great poison. These poisonous elements, not surprisingly, were also imported into Japan along with beneficial elements. As a result, there are those, like the treasonous group that was punished this year, who embrace dangerous thought. And there are certainly some among a portion of society who embrace unhealthy thought, even though they go unpunished. It cannot be denied that there are those who embrace the kind of unhealthy thought that opposes or destroys national morality. But, national morality is the manifestation of the people's spirit and is therefore quite influential. As long as we use national morality to regulate Japanese society, the continued existence of the Japanese people is assured. When the spirit of the people is the driving force in the management of society and the state, the healthy existence of the Japanese people becomes evident. At a time when the people of Japan are clearly undergoing healthy development as one people, the health of our national morality must be maintained, and national education must be managed by relying upon the strength of national morality.

But, as I said just now, as a result of the importation of Western civilization, unhealthy thought, dangerous thought, poisonous thought was import-
Inoue Tetsujirō

ed as well. This too is something against which we must be always on our guard. Consequently, at this point, we must proceed by studying national morality, by clarifying the standpoint of national education, and by having no misgivings whatsoever in regard to the course of national education. These are issues that must be investigated thoroughly with the firm determination of today’s educators.

There is another issue I would like to discuss. The Imperial Rescript on Education, granted to the people of Japan in the twenty-third year of Meiji [1890], can be thought of as the essence of national morality in our country. Within it are listed all of those things considered to be the important points of national morality. We all know how praiseworthy the Imperial Rescript is, but allow me to express how I truly feel. There are more than a few successive imperial edicts. And there are many imperial edicts that are highly praiseworthy. But as the Imperial Rescript on Education in particular holds forth the essence of national morality, among rescripts both ancient and current, there is certainly nothing that can compare with it. There are more than a few edicts that concern various political, military, economic, and diplomatic matters of importance. But as for edicts issued that concern national morality in particular, it appears we can find no edict whatsoever that is concerned with national morality to the same extent as the Rescript on Education, not only during the Meiji years, but from the beginnings of Japanese history.

And yet, one text that must be compared to the Rescript on Education is Shōtoku Taishi’s Seventeen-Article Constitution. Although it is called a constitution, viewed from today’s perspective, it is a form of instruction like the Rescript on Education. However, the Seventeen-Article Constitution was not enacted on behalf of education in particular, rather, its concerns were many. The Rescript on Education also concerns the whole of the nation, but I believe that, as the main policy granted to us for national education, it is the essence of national morality. In other words, the Imperial Rescript on Education is the sacred text of Meiji.

The power to actually put into effect the true spirit of the Rescript on Education lies in the work of educators. If educators take to heart the true spirit of the Rescript on Education and make every effort to actualize this spirit, a splendid outcome will certainly arise. Now even in regard to the Rescript on Education, there are those who speak of various shortcomings. These are mostly religionists. But educators have quite a firm belief in the Rescript on Education. So, as long as they have the preparedness sufficient to clarify their own standpoint in regard to various criticisms, nothing will go awry. But if they lack firm self-confidence, I fear that various critiques will cause the standpoint of educators to waiver. Actually, I believe that the
matters listed in the Rescript on Education are the essence of national morality. Even my lecture on the outline of national morality lies behind the Rescript on Education. That is, I feel as though the significance of my lecture is as background to the Rescript. Perhaps there will be no objection if I choose to see it this way. I therefore decided to state this in the introduction.

Notes
1 Inoue Tetsujirō. Kokumin dōtoku gairon. (Tokyo: Sanshōdō Shoten, 1912). Note: the wording of the preface and the introduction is slightly altered in the revised and expanded version of this text (Shinshū Kokumin dōtoku gairon, 1928).
2 The Shihan Gakkō or Teachers’ Colleges were part of Japan’s educational system from 1872 until 1945 when they were replaced by the departments of education within universities. They were established to train teachers for positions in primary and secondary schools.
3 In his Tetsugaku jii (A Dictionary of Philosophy), published in the same year as his Outline of National Morality, Inoue translated the English word “nation,” as well as the German terms “Volk” (which carries the sense both of “people” and of “nation”) and “Staatsbürger” (“citizen”) as “kokumin.” Except for its adjectival form (here translated as “national,” e.g. “national morality”), I have translated the term “kokumin” as “the people.”
4 The 1868 revolution in which the bakufu government was overthrown.
5 Inoue is here referring to the High Treason Incident (taigyaku jiken), in which twenty-six socialists were charged with plotting to assassinate the emperor. Of these twenty-six, twelve, including Kōtoku Shūsui, were executed. The trial for this case was held between December 1910 and January 1911.
6 A seventh century politico-moral document.
Inoue Tetsujirō
I have long felt that the area of prison reform must not be neglected. For several years I worked closely with convicts in the capacity of prison chaplain, and in regard to practice and theory, I have studied significantly in our country and abroad regarding the causes of crime, its cure, and its prevention. I should say that the fact that gentlemen in both public and private affairs have come to feel that prison reform must not be disregarded is truly a good sign for the nation. However, what is not yet widely perceived is the practical problem of how we are to pursue prison reform. Debaters say that the following issues are the most urgent: prison fees and payments from the national treasury; education; partitioning of prison cells; the revision of prison regulations; probation; etc., etc. However, while admittedly all of these reforms are important and no single measure on its own is sufficient, my own perspective differs slightly. If we truly desire a reduction in crime then the reforms advocated by several people enumerated above are certainly necessary. However, if we desire the reduction of crime and to maintain a healthy nation, then these are still not enough. Rather, we must go to the source, that which causes criminals to emerge, and remedy it.

First of all, what is this original cause? It is delinquent children. There are many persons in almost all the countries of Europe who are working to implement various improvements and putting their efforts into reform (kanka) works in order to reduce the number of criminals. In countries such as ours, the prison problem is something that public-spirited men have come to direct their attention toward. Yet, it is a major failing that we have not promoted a suitable method of reform works in order to protect and educate criminal children and delinquent children. I must also mention that the fact that there are no books about reform works is deplorable. I presume, then, by myself to write this small work for the development of reform works and to state the important relationship these works have to our nation, and I wish to appeal to the esteemed officials of public charity to consider this. It is not my intention that this work be considered an essential material for sociological research.
New Year's Day, Meiji 30 [1897], Written in my humble home in the village of Shibuya.

**General Remarks: The Spirit and Method of Reform Works**

The source of the difference between human beings and lower order animals can be found in the fact that human beings have a sense of universal love and compassionate righteousness (hakuaijingi) and they can fight against selfishness and selfish desires by practicing the mission that is bestowed upon them by heaven and the way of their humanity. Universal love and compassionate righteousness are materialized in various works of charity such as seen in the empathy expressed to inmates through Howard's prison reforms; the American civil war which removed the yoke of suffering from the slaves; the medical care of Nightingale who consoled the soldiers; and the direct petitioning of Sakura Sōgorō who took great pity on the poor. There is no end to the examples I could name throughout history; however, to put it simply, this spirit serves the purpose of holding back cruelty and brutality in order to rescue the poor who have no haven of their own. Foreigners call this "humanity"\(^3\), and Confucius called it "benevolence" (jin). We, the Japanese, call it "the spirit of Yamato" (yamato damashii) or "the spirit of righteous aide" (gikyōshin). However, no matter how this is termed it is the same throughout the world. Even though there are differences between the East and West in regard to religion and custom, there is only one spirit that assists the weak against the strong. This is the spirit of universal love and compassionate righteousness and it is found in all humanity. This no one can deny.

The site where this humanity\(^4\) is revealed is in charity works for the lowest strata of society (kasō shakai). This humanity is also concealed as an inner virtue (intoku) in each individual. However, what I want to discuss here are child-saving works as the most important endeavor among the many charity works. What are child-saving works? Just as is indicated by the written characters, they are child-saving and protection enterprises for the benefit of infants just taken from the wombs of their mothers to those of 17 or 18 years of age, or what we must surely call the "young foliage" of humanity. Kindergartens and elementary schools provide a pure and simple education for children who come from good families and who are pure and without sin, while the significance of child-saving work is that it targets poor children who are in a position of need. Accordingly, there can be no debating that these are very different. If this is the case, then at what level is assistance and protection necessary?
First and foremost, it is for those children who have lost their parents; second, child drifters who have parents but whose parent’s selfish behavior prevents them from having a home; third, children who reject or refuse their parent’s attempts to provide them with a proper education, for example, those who have come up against public law because they have not received proper education from their parents or those who have not yet become criminals but could commit dangerous acts in the future. Fourth, children who are abnormal in mind or who are imbeciles. Fifth, illegitimate children who cannot receive public education openly and are abandoned, or the extremely poor who are abandoned because their parents cannot afford to raise them. In short, all children who fall under these categories may receive the benefits of child-saving work. According to the spirit of humanity we must construct measures to save and protect children such as these by all means necessary.

At this time, there are two driving forces that stand out in child-saving work: the energy that comes from religion and the energy that is provided by the illumination of academics. If the humanity that is concealed in the depths of the human spirit is to be expressed and if we hope to make these works into a great movement then we must look to the fervent power of religion. However, religion is not just something to encourage and cheer public-minded men who save and protect self-pitying, non-communicative children. Rather, it also has the immense power to cure, utterly remold, and cultivate the characters of children who are at the level of requiring saving and protection. Is it not then the academic methods that will lead religion to fulfill this mission? Undoubtedly, when bringing about a movement by borrowing upon the power of religion alone, charity works intended to save people may have the opposite effect.

There have often been poor results in regard to those who receive assistance and protection or for charity works that have failed to rely on academic methods. This is a historical fact. In order to realize a charity work in no way should we then disdain academic methods. It is because of such methods that recently there have come to be orphanages for orphans, sanitariums for imbeciles, and reform institutions for delinquent children. However, even though academic methods have this great power, they are after all nothing other than method.

If we compare this to something material, religion acts similar to a great force like steam, and academics acts as the engine. For example, even if the engine is well-equipped and made ready, if the power of religion is not the motivating force then we cannot hope for the perfection of this [child-saving] work. Or, even if there is religion, if there is no academic method, then the religion that is intended for the benefit of all can have the opposite effect of
becoming harmful. In short, only after these two elements have begun working together will there be remarkable success in charity works. Won't philanthropic work such as this bode astounding progress in these modern times?!

At this time our country has made progress in all things, and likewise for the prison problem, which up until recently has not received so much as a glance, has now come to be addressed by all. In order to perfectly accomplish prison reforms, first of all, we must from the onset conduct child-saving works as a method of prevention, and in particular guide delinquent children toward goodness and honesty. I won't be able to restrain myself from dancing with joy [lit. flutter about like a sparrow] if and when this view comes to be strongly advocated within public opinion.

Thus, I will now summarize the history of the reform institution system as it has come be developed in Europe and America, and discuss the reason for the necessity of establishing reform institutions in our country. However, even if my determination is very strong, my views may be too confined, or I may be lacking in talent, and my experience may be limited. Hence, this article may be too narrow in its breadth and some information may be lacking in accuracy. In short, it is not my intention to discuss all these items in full, setting this aside for the future. For now I want to restrict myself to discussing only the outline of this problem, and for this I ask the reader's patience.

Chapter 7 The Relationship between Reform Institutions and Prisons

At this time charity works display a force like that of the burning sun rising high up to the heavens, and if there are persons whose natures are not cruel and brutal nor animal-like, then it is because they have come to know the benevolence of universal love. Even though presently almost all people hope these works will flourish, if we go back a hundred or so years ago in the past no one was engaged in prison and reform works. In particular, criminal laws were undeveloped and in opposition to humanity. For example, in Britain, a child could be punished with death for stealing a few pence. The chaotic state of the British criminal law was still mired in a stage of barbarism. These horrible conditions are almost inexpressible in words. It is only at the beginning of this century that such [reform] works began to develop, bringing the light of dawn to illuminate the heavens, and finally attracting the attention of society. It is in the past forty years that progress has truly been forged, as I have already relayed in previous chapters.

Many people must wonder why reform works followed behind prison works and attracted the sympathy and attention of society later than prison works. This is because society at that time, in its ignorance, could not recog-
The place where child-saving institutions has seen the most success is in England. In 1877, Britain amended its prison regulations, thereby reducing its prisons from 120 to 60, while at the same time the number of criminals dropped rapidly. Although prison reformers attributed this success to the organization of the prison system, in reality the power of reform works was immense. Moreover, recent publications in the prison field are not satisfied merely with arguing over theory and practical utility, but rather they have come to demand the urgent necessity of preventive reformatory works. As Sergi De Yarov of Russia states, "The main progress of humanity will only be seen when prisons are largely changed to reform institutions" and as Victor Hugo says, "The droves of drifters that run rampant throughout the world are those who originally failed to receive an education as children." H.H. Heart, who is a child-saver in Minnesota in America, declared from his seat at the American Prison Convention in St. Paul in 1894, "If we want to reform criminals, we must plan a generation ahead. This is the most essential element necessary for reform works in Minnesota." Even though we may truly want to create a path toward making good those who have already become criminals, we are already implicated in its failure. That is to say, if we want to eradicate crime, we must nip it in the bud. This should be our principle in reform works. If we look at the statistics we can see that the effectiveness of the reform of children in reform institutions is much greater than that of convicts in prisons.

The 80% rate of success in reform at the Elmira Reformatory Prison in New York is the best record of reform. This number is actually quite exceptional even in the US and Europe. Even though this rate of 80% is almost unheard of in the prison world, if we consider it in terms of reform institutions works, it is not that surprising. In Europe and America, among reform institutions of good standing, the rate is 80% for outgoing occupants.
record of 85% is a typical figure. In other words, this figure of 80% is not all that rare. On the other hand, if we consider reform institutions in our own country, why are they apparently so weak and underdeveloped?

In this country the average number of delinquent children is approximately 30,000, and in Tokyo alone there is at least another 2,000. Now, if we give the number of reform institutions for assisting these, there is one. In the case of the Ichigaya Prison which contains many minors, children are placed in the same cells as hardened criminals. No one debates that fact that juvenile correctional institutions and prisons differ in legal terms; however, if we think about this in broader terms, attempts to transform these delinquent children from bad to good by shackling them within these fearful prisons has no benefit, and causes only harm. Moreover, it would be to me, unbearable if the general public opinion fails to progress in regard to this problem. In Japan 70% of all prisoners are repeat offenders. Compared to the record of reform of Elmira, the difference is that of heaven and earth! Moreover, although the number of recidivists in our country in comparison to that of other countries cannot be attributed to a single cause, we must acknowledge that it is because reformatory works have not yet flourished. In short, we must come to see preventive reformatory works, prisons, and prison improvement as if they are wheels of the same cart. If we place the prison reform of the world upon our lips and focus our attention on this single point, the rewards will be limitless.

Chapter 8: A Bill Related to the Construction of Reform Institutions

In the previous chapter by illuminating the criminal theory of other countries, I debated whether delinquent children should receive the same punishment as adult criminals. Further inquiry into this problem is still needed. Therefore, I would like to investigate as to under what type of system and in what type of facility delinquent children should be held.

Because our criminal legal system and prison regulations from the very start were modeled and adapted from the civilized countries there are some differences, but this of course does not mean that our prison laws are inferior. However, in the case of the actual application of these laws, we are one step behind the civilized countries. Is not the fact that we place the criminal youth and children sent to these correctional institutions together with mature adults the most glaring example of our inferior misapplication?

According to the explanations of prison scholars, the germination of crime to some extent begins with imitation and becomes a trend. In other words, placing delinquent children in the same environment with adult criminals is the same as placing patients of an epidemic in the same room for prevention. Just as a patient with an infectious disease is isolated in a sanitarium...
If we seek to reform delinquent children then we must start by curing them outside the prison. Still more, even if the law dictates that the punishment area and prison are two entirely different entities, it would be a fundamental mistake to locate the punishment area within the prison. In this case, then, the problem develops as to where we should place it and how should we deal with it. Mencius said that to transform one’s spirit or one’s circumstances is not simply a matter of education. This is a problematic aspect for delinquent reform and is also linked to the basis of the cause of crime. To make straight and narrow delinquent children and child criminals who are raised within the evil circumstances of society by chaining them to prisons with their countless infectious germs is like being forced to choose whether to straighten the corner or kill the cow.

As the criminologist, Okada Chōtarō, of our country states in his discussion:

There is a logic which dictates that housing children of correctional institutions in a separate environment from convicts and providing encouragement through prison chaplains and protection would be sufficient to fulfill the purpose [of reform]; however, it is to this very logic that we must direct our closest attention. In other words, when we observe the actual conditions of such correctional institutions, this is not the case. If we would add a provision to the 79th and 80th prison regulations that judges can directly request that delinquent children be placed under proper educational institutions such as reformatories, how much greater the effect would be than placing them in the correctional institutions where they are constantly exposed to other villainous, gangster youths.

Furthermore, as it is stated in Article 6 of the British Reformatory Regulation: “Reformatories and child-saving associations which collect and supervise delinquent children should be constructed in the remotest sites possible. Likewise, if such remote areas already contain prisons and poorhouses they should also be avoided as they will have a negative influence upon reform.” If reformatories even in the same proximity of prisons negatively influence reform, how then can we place our children directly within the prison?

When I traveled to North America, the reformatories in which I witnessed reform taking place were all completely separated from the prison and were located in splendid, beautiful areas in mountains, along quiet and solitary lake shores, or at seashores pounding with waves. Surely there is no holding back the immense reformative power of nature such as this!

If we consider this situation in comparison with our own country the dif-
ference is like night and day; therefore, let us consider the statistics of those who are in the penal institutions of Japan between Meiji 15 [1882] and Meiji 26 [1893].

**Population of Inmates in National Correction Institutions**

Looking at these figures, in Meiji 15 [1882] there were approximately 273 inmates and in Meiji 26 [1893] this drastically increased to 909. The number of entering inmates has been on a constant rise. Moreover, if we look at comparative statistics regarding consecutive years of crime for minors over the course of thirteen years, from Meiji 15 [1882] (the year preceding the enactment of the Criminal Law Criminal Procedure Law) to Meiji 27 [1894], there were 226,158 persons incarcerated for misdemeanors, or roughly 17,511 persons per year on average. Of those, 196,304 were male inmates, with the number of female inmates totaling 25,354. In short, for every one hundred criminals there were 88.6 males and 11.4 females. The statistics below show classification by sex according to year.

This table shows that over the course of eight years, despite slight varia-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 15 (1882)</td>
<td>8,216</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>9,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 16 (1883)</td>
<td>11,212</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>12,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 17 (1884)</td>
<td>10,614</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>12,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 18 (1885)</td>
<td>12,678</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>14,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 19 (1886)</td>
<td>12,332</td>
<td>1,687</td>
<td>14,019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meiji 20 (1887)</td>
<td>11,391</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>12,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 21 (1888)</td>
<td>10,045</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>11,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 22 (1889)</td>
<td>11,470</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>12,901</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meiji 23 (1890)</td>
<td>17,742</td>
<td>2,221</td>
<td>19,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 24 (1891)</td>
<td>20,446</td>
<td>2,486</td>
<td>22,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 25 (1892)</td>
<td>22,309</td>
<td>2,937</td>
<td>25,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 26 (1893)</td>
<td>23,407</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>26,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 27 (1894)</td>
<td>24,442</td>
<td>3,228</td>
<td>27,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>196,204</td>
<td>25,354</td>
<td><strong>222,658</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Per 100</strong></td>
<td>88.56</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...there were roughly 9000 to 14,000 or 15,000 inmates; however, in Meiji 23 [1890], there was a drastic increase to nearly 20,000 inmates, and from that year on for each consecutive year the numbers showed a constant increase. By Meiji 27 [1894] there were a total of 27,607 persons. If we compare this to the figure of 9,016 in Meiji 15 [1882], then it is almost a three-fold increase.

Where on earth can we locate the cause of the force that drives this relentless increase? Although, this cannot be attributed simply to a single cause, it is unquestionable that correctional institutions must not be placed within the prison. If, we classify the number of crimes from the previous table committed by minors according to age and type of crime (felony or misdemeanor), then:

Such being the case, in Meiji 15 [1882] there were 9,016 minors under the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fel 12 yrs.</th>
<th>Mis 12 yrs.</th>
<th>Fel 12-16 yrs.</th>
<th>Mis 12-16 yrs.</th>
<th>Fel 16-20 yrs.</th>
<th>Mis 16-20 yrs.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 15 (1882)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>6,522</td>
<td>9,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 16 (1883)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2,688</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>9,152</td>
<td>12,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 17 (1884)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2,614</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>8,725</td>
<td>12,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 18 (1885)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3,499</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>10,119</td>
<td>14,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 19 (1886)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3,688</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>9,409</td>
<td>14,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 20 (1887)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>3,609</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>12,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 21 (1888)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>7,526</td>
<td>11,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 22 (1889)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3,661</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>8,477</td>
<td>12,901</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meiji 23 (1890)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>6,044</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>12,803</td>
<td>19,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 24 (1891)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>6,890</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>14,833</td>
<td>22,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 25 (1892)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>7,183</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>16,738</td>
<td>25,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 26 (1893)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>7,223</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>17,885</td>
<td>26,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji 27 (1894)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>7,563</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>18,730</td>
<td>27,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>220</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,086</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,060</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,949</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,985</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,358</strong></td>
<td><strong>222,658</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age of 20 but in Meiji 27 [1894] this rose dramatically to 27,670, an increase of 8,660 persons. If we learn from the countries of Europe and establish correctional institutions and reformatories for the placement of criminal and delinquent children, there is no doubt that we could prevent most of these crimes. In this sense, in terms of the road to child reform, we cannot possibly achieve this goal if we do not construct special correctional institutions as penal institutions separate from the prison. However, upon which method should we rely for achieving their goodness? Needless to say, there are countless "isms" and measures in regard to the treatment of convicts; however, the nineteenth century has shown us that physical punishment-oriented theories are ineffective in achieving the purposes of punishment: hence, the dungeon has been transformed to a prison, and the prison revolutionized to the reformatory.6

In the most progressive prisons, the force of punishment is less important than influencing criminals toward reform through educational elements. Isn't this an occasion for celebration and rejoicing? However, the fact that we see conservative and progressive factions engaging in disputes over differences regarding methods and principles is typical. It is something that occurs in all countries and in all times. Likewise, [in Japan] these two factions are divided over the issue of prison improvement, each perceiving progress in terms of their own "ism." On the one hand, the progressive faction, the Eiseiha, sees the ultimate goals of punishment being realized through the educational reform of criminals, while on the other hand, the conservative faction refutes the views of the progressive faction with overly sophisticated
language; thus if someone says inmates should be treated with human compassion, the conservative faction replies that this is not the way they should be dealt with. In terms of prison improvement, each refutes the other, but in terms of reform institutions both sides are completely silent, precisely because they could not agree more.

Private citizens reduce reform works to the sphere of religion, ethics, and problems of charity as if there is absolutely no relation to economic concerns. Why can’t they realize that charity problems which at first glance seem to have no causal relationship to economic issues are of immediate concern? Furthermore, when we prevent delinquent children from committing crimes, the effort and financial resources required as opposed to saving and protecting after the fact are vastly different. However, it seems as if these explanations fall on deaf ears and are simply a waste of time. Now, below I will propose a few measures in regard to a new direction for bettering delinquent children.

1. Because delinquent children cannot receive a proper education in the home or in school, those newly entering [reform] institutions should receive roughly the equivalent of a primary school education.

2. As the illustrious scholar Spencer states in *The Philosophy of Politics and Law*, “Just as civilized life cannot be established without relying upon tireless, unwavering, industrious labor, neither can the gathering of human beings that becomes the foundation of civilization originate without such industry. For such unceasing labor, the physical energy of the human body is required. In other words, the works of society can only be achieved through strong and healthy bodies.”

Herein lies the excellence of industry. To neglect industry is to take lightly the value of human life. Furthermore, industry as the foundation of health, and the source of morality (*jinrin*) is the special right and duty of humankind. For if you do not work hard, you will never have a true healthy morality, nor will you attain happiness in your life. In other words, in the broad sense, hard work is an educational problem. This is why Mr. Demetz reasons that the earth is improved by man, and man by the earth. At the very least, reform institutions must be organized because hard work is necessary, and the essential work is that of agriculture. Thus, to adopt an excellent education that will ensure the reform of children there is nothing easier. That is, we must teach [these children] about the
greater problems of life by utilizing the products of nature. However, it is not good to rely solely upon work. Education and industrious labor should be balanced evenly, and both must be taken in due moderation.

3. A healthy body indicates a healthy intellect. Just as physical education is necessary in primary schools, it is also vital for the youth of reform institutions. There are two methods of physical education: the first is normal gymnastics, and the second is military physical training. Because both of these teach obedience, discipline and order, quickness, and self-restraint, they serve as correctives to the abnormal development of the brain and nerves, which are special conditions found in all delinquent children, while at the same time they strengthen the voices of institutionalized children for the love of reading. Therefore, such training is especially important in the case of reform institutions.

4. Along with physical education the proper cultivation of spirituality must not be neglected.

Religion is part of human nature. In short, it is because it creates a feeling of reverence in the human spirit that we cannot disregard issues of religion that are related to spiritual education in order to succeed in reform works. In other words, we must teach living religion to delinquent youth. In order to accomplish this neatness and order must be maintained in reform institutions, and if we want to ensure that their hearts are filled with moral fire, then we should utilize the family system as the primary measure in place of an institutional system.

If there are 300 children that are to be institutionalized, they should be separated into ten families of 30 members each with a congenial family head, a family matron, an assistant matron, and instructors, with each family leading an independent life. In regard to the institutionalized children, the focus should be on the practice of morality, and moreover, to the extent possible, they should be educated in the harmonious and lively environment of the family. This ought to be strived for without expecting success through a model based upon the actions of the instructors. Accordingly, should the establishment of reform institutions be a work of the government or should it be a private work? Certainly there are compelling reasons for establishing it either as a government or private work, so one cannot easily decide based upon one perspective alone.
There are various ways of categorizing British reform institutions; however, if we break these down into two main categories, the first is officially sanctioned reform institutions or industrial institutions, and the second is private reform institutions. The former is maintained by a certain amount of protection from the government and voluntary contributions solicited from private institutions. The latter is an entirely private institution with no protection. In the countries of Germany, France, and America, the government regulates reform institutions strictly as governmental works, while private, voluntary activists create institutions that have absolutely no connections with the government. Therefore, from the start in those countries there is a clear line of demarcation between government and private institutions. In cases where the mother and father are unable to educate their sons and daughters properly, because of their poverty, ignorance, or immorality, it is certainly the government's duty to gather up these youth and give them the proper protection. In addition, the necessity of private institutions is recognized in regard to the responsibility of fellow countrymen to sympathize with the poor environment and miserable plight of these parents and children and to save them. This being the case, it would be equally erroneous if there were a tendency to simply depend upon government institutions and disregard private ones, or have private institutions but not see a need for government institutions.

From the onset for any type of work there are necessarily three main conditions which must be adhered to: 1) The spirit as the foundation of the work; 2) Money that can be unrestrictedly utilized for the work; 3) A means to fully realize the previous two conditions, in other words, the academic method. With regard to reform works as well, the necessity of the above conditions must be acknowledged, without question. The point at which governmental institutions surpass private institutions is in the perfection of the organization, but the great expanse of passion which overflows from the public is the reason that private organizations are much superior. Government works have both the power of money and organization; however, its failure to succeed results from a lack of passion which should be made into the very basis of its works.

It is not without significance that Spencer says, "Government is always behind and dim-witted, with unnecessarily high expenditures, and with no ability to adapt to the circumstances. It is easily corrupted and becomes caught up in many obstacles." Government officials in government works do not have a burning passion, and if they take action it is only for the sake of official goals. For example, when there are no oversights in financial accounts, the official has no motivation to complete his goals by working above and beyond his official duties by sacrificing his own time. It is difficult
to expect him to work with a heroic dedication for further progress. On the other hand, even if this kind of pent up energy appears externally in private works, there can be no expansion no matter how one wills it with only limited funds. Considering this, presently, when private works gain sufficient capital, and when government works come to employ those with passion and academic training, it is probably at this point that we will observe remarkable changes in this movement. This reasoning should not escape reform works. If the government takes into account the present situation, then they should separate correctional institutions from prisons, and if they create reform institutions located in nature, in the mountains and along land with verdant hills and flowing rivers, then it would not be difficult to prevent countless crimes. According to the investigation carried about by the former Head Justice, Miyoshi Taizō, a very perceptive man who has already endeavored to gain an overview of the general situation, the number of delinquent children amounts to more than 25,000. Such a great number of delinquents, scattered about the country, is having a considerable influence upon the nation.

Alas, how can we possibly save and protect these children when we still have not put in place government reform institutions? At this time, the emblem of our country soars above us beyond the clouds with our cultural products and legal systems constituting the brilliant crown of the East. In spite of this, we have given up our morality and obligations, sullied, to the world, we rely on the trifling and the frivolous, we follow after greed, religion permeates the earth but its light still does not illuminate the world, religionists remain unenlightened, lying in their comfortable chairs, dreaming of paradise, intellectuals manipulate with their clever ways, and scholars sell their principles and become slaves to this earthly life. This is the way in which the entire society is degenerating into a mindless den of the notorious, the power hungry, and the hypocrites. It is not without reason that a certain scholar of America looked upon the Japan of today and slandered its civilization as nothing other than superficial.

There is nothing wrong in desiring a material civilization, along with the brilliance of electric lights and the convenience of public transportation; however, if we have lost our way, unable to perceive nothing more than this, surely there must be someone who has courage, who bites their tongue in anger and spits this boiling blood to the shining stars! Ah! A material civilization is not the way to sustain the eternal permanence of the nation. The post-war Japan, a victorious nation, should stop here, take warning and display the flag of morality and righteousness to the heavens.

Miasma is a poison that constantly drifts upward toward the sky, and if this invades the body it will formant into a horrifying disease. Have the
roughly 30,000 delinquents that drift throughout the nation now become this miasma? Ah! Petty squirming, wriggling scholars, go away. Petty religionists closed up in your solitary rooms, go away. Petty schemers showing off your superficial knowledge and intellect, go away. Instead, bring forth the compassionate charity workers. Bring forth the hot-blooded religionists with their many tears. There is no food to eat, no safe haven for the body, nothing to clothe with. We must do something for these unfortunate children. If you do not go out and administer that which is provided to you by heaven, what will become of this nation, Japan, that they influence?

Before I put aside my pen, I must appeal to you, the authorities, in a still more emphatic way to save and protect these delinquent children in compliance with the grand design of the nation as well as for the sake of our national essence. If the government will decide here to establish model reform institutions, then public-minded men within the private sphere will rush to follow this example, and we would be able to see a proliferation of private reform institutions everywhere beyond our expectations. To bring about reform institutions, regardless of whether it is through the government or based upon an actual private demand is clearly at present a matter of great urgency. My own personal hopes as well as those of many others are directed solely upon this single point day and night.

Notes

2 Tomeoka was inspired in part to engage in prison reform by the work and writings of John Howard, which he came across while he was a student at Doshisha University in Kyoto. In 1773 and 1774 Howard traveled 3000 miles visiting 70 prisons documenting the horrific conditions of disease, starvation, death, overcrowding, and exploitation. These inspections become the basis for his work, The State of Prisons in England and Wales with Preliminary Observations and an Account of Some Foreign Prisons published in 1777.
3 Humanity is typeset in English in the original text to the right of the Japanese characters for jindo.
4 “Humanity” is written in katakana in the original text alongside jindo.
5 Preventative work is glossed in katakana in the original text next to kanka jigyō.
6 Rogoku is glossed as dungeon, kangoku is glossed as prison, and kankain is glossed as reformatory in the original text.
7 Georges Demetz served as the director for the Mettray reform institution in France, which was well known in the US for its reform based upon agricultural work. Tomeoka became familiar with Demetz’s work when he stayed in the US from 1894-6.
8 Referring to the victory of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894.
I could give this piece a name like “My Career in Literature,” but since I’ve produced no real gems, I would rather settle for “changes in my ideas of long ago.” In other words, this is a midlife confession...and above all this’ll provide me with some restitution for my sins, so the title will serve just fine.

Getting down to business, then, about why I first came to be a lover of Russian literature; for that I must explain why I studied Russian. The reason is this: I’m not sure, but you know, we were involved in an incident with Russia; what might be called the Sakhalin Exchange Incident, or something to that effect, had taken place. And after a great uproar was raised in society, the journal, Domestic-Foreign Relations, incited further hostility against Russia. Thus, it was an era when public opinion was at a boiling point. So the ideological tendencies I had held since childhood — what should be called the persona of one true to the purpose of ishin — was just beginning to sprout. In short, the public opinion of righteous indignation and patriotism, and my own views were fused together. As a result there was little doubt in my mind that Russia would become Japan’s greatest enemy. I thought, this rascal’s got to be stifled while we’ve still got the chance... And to do that the Russian language would be a primary necessity. So, as you can see, it was from such thoughts that I came to enroll in the Russian department of the Tokyo Foreign Language School.

And so, the way to look at literary materials was due to my entering into the Tokyo Foreign Language School; the necessity to do so developed of its own accord as I was swept away by the particular kind of imperialism mentioned above and in studying the language. That is to say, the courses at the language school at the time used the same lessons as those taught in Russian middle schools; they taught such basic subjects as physics, chemistry, and mathematics in Russian, on the one hand, and taught rhetorical studies and Russian literary history on the other. So the structure was such that the instructor of Russian literary history had to read the representative works of the greatest Russian novelists aloud to us.

Through this I unwittingly came under the influence of literature. Of course, there was undeniably an underlying affinity so to speak that I had had since childhood toward this particular genre of art. This was now rekin-
dled through Russian literature and began to develop on its own. Yet, there was also the passion of righteous indignation brought about by my patriotic persona. At the outset I did not lean toward either of the two views and their development in me was almost entirely equal. But eventually, the passion of imperialism subsided and the passion of literature alone burned within me. However, this turn of events warrants an explanation.

My appreciation of literature was not that of your average scholar. Rather, what amused me was to observe, study, and anticipate through literature the issues dealt with by Russian scholars, in other words, social phenomena — and what, by the way, had not yet even been considered by our Eastern gōketsu-types. So, what I found interesting might have ended merely as a discussion of amusement, but when that amusement became an idea, it became socialism.

I may have interacted with literature and gotten quite close to it, but in actuality, instead of entering into literature, I first entered into socialism. In other words, I was spurred into socialism by my interest in literature. By socialism, I mean philosophical interests such as one’s attitude toward life or human destiny, or something to that effect, was beginning to appear. In the beginning, however, my socialism was not purely philosophical...rather, on the one hand, there was something like a general theory of civilization; on the other there was socialism, a critique of the structures and systems of that time. And well, their origin as literature was the same but my responses to it digressed in this manner. Numerous Russian novelists were instrumental in instilling socialism in me; the personality of the man called Bazarov, from Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons, is even now seared into my mind. Apart from that work, I often read from the works of Chernyshevsky, Herzen, and though not a Russian thinker, Lasalle.

Above all, at the time, having called it socialism I was deadly serious, but now that I think of it, I was exceedingly naive. For example, I would be annoyed with the government administration, or would find my parents’ interference to be bothersome. I would indiscriminately yell “Freedom! Freedom!” and because my general attitude was, well, for the most part in this vein, it’s no surprise that I was displeased with the government-run academy. By the way, the Tokyo Foreign Language School was closed and transformed into a language department at the Tokyo School of Commerce. Then in a short matter of time, that department was also dissolved and those students were completely absorbed by the School of Commerce. So, I got out of there right away. At the time, my parents earnestly pleaded with me to attend the university, but for the same reason that I couldn’t stay at the government-run School of Commerce, I didn’t want to enter a university run by the government. I decided to cut myself off from that alternative by striking
out on my own, since in the end, to be dependent on one's parents restricts one's freedom.

In order to do this, I would have to work and earn a salary. That was when I wrote that work, *Ukigumo* (Floating Clouds). But there were translations that preceded it. I once translated the opening of Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*, which I mentioned above. I just had Mr. Tsubouchi look at it but nothing came of it. So you ask, did *Ukigumo* have a model? There's no doubt about that but the models were only examples, and I did not copy from them directly. Obviously, I did not find a model and immediately say, now this is interesting. It wasn't that, but instead I had a vague abstraction about the tendencies of young men and women of Japan at that time inside my head. I thought, what kind of form could this abstraction take? For example, let's say I was trying out various ideas and I would meet someone somewhere, or I would be acquainted with someone who could breathe life into the abstract ideas. I would first make that person into a base to build him into a type. Of course, that person would have his own unique qualities but these would be discarded. Then, I would accomplish my first objective by refining that person and making him into a type, because a type is not a notion but something concrete. In terms of this definition, *Ukigumo* has a model, but this and what society considers it to be, or its meaning are different.

In any event, I cannot argue with the fact that the ideas in *Ukigumo* were influenced by Russian literature. Since it was an era in which I read such critics as Belinsky with pleasure, I was eager to expose the underbelly of Japanese civilization. So the fact that argument is at the core of that novel is for that reason. The narrative of the first section is a combination of Samba, Sanjin, and Mr. Aeba. The middle section departs from Japanese influences and takes from Western literature. In other words, this arose from my desire to import Western literature to Japan. First, I studied the likes of Dostoyevsky and Goncharov; I leaned for the most part on Dostoyevsky's writing style. In the final section, there's no doubt that other influences existed but I imitated Goncharov's style the most.

So, regarding *Ukigumo*, I had said before that I wrote it in order to make money. When I say that, it seems quite simple. But actually, this caused me great agony of which no one knows.

At the time, adhering literally to the word "honesty," I held to the notion that I wanted to lead a life irreproachable in heaven or on earth. This ideal of "honesty" was gleaned from Russian literature, but the influence of Confucianism was greater. This story goes back in time a little, but at the same time that imperialism influenced me, I was also heavily influenced by Confucianism. So on the one hand Confucius' self-sufficiency is deeply
lodged in my head... In short, my ideal was nothing more than a superficial illusion. In any case, it was superficial and I was in earnest. If I were to give an example of this: when I would listen to a lecture, I could not listen without placing both of my hands onto the floor. This gesture was less a response to the teacher's character but was a sign of respect for "the Way" itself. I had such religious and philosophical inclinations from an early age. My central confucianistic ideals, and henceforth my irreproachable "honesty" was formed when the Eastern, Confucian influences joined with the influences of Russian literature and Western philosophy, and was topped off by the influence of socialism.

This is just on a conceptual level, however. It is another thing to relate this to literary labor. First, I will start with Ukigumo; whether or not it was in fair assessment of that work that it received some popularity, I, myself was terribly ashamed of it. I have no confidence now, and at the time, I had nothing even remotely close to it. Nevertheless, I had this ideal called "honesty." I also had a reverence for art. Well, what came about when these elements of self-deprecation, honesty, and artistic reverence were merged was something like this: with no certainty of the future, I thought, at the time, that it would be a show of utmost arrogance and a slight against art for me to take part in the literary world. I thought, I have not realized the ideal of honesty...nevertheless in practicing "honesty" I must not cling onto my parents; I must practice self-reliance, not relying on anyone's kindness. Then, I began to desire power and money. If I wanted money, I would have to write a novel, and that would be an insult to art. Ironically, I could not even publish it in my own name, so I borrowed Mr. Tsubouchi's name and was finally able to convince a book dealer to publish it without correcting the name. I used Mr. Tsubouchi, making him take part in a dishonest act, not of his own making, but for my own profit. Thus it was the same as my exploiting him. Besides this, there was also the matter of what this would do to the readers. I was truly remorseful. It was an act comparable to displaying a lamb's head to sell dog's meat; to put it severely, it was a scam.

This was a terrible dilemma: it was the clashing of the practical and the ideal. Thus, I could not resolve this dilemma in my mind. But in the meantime, the necessities of daily life were increasingly gaining up on me. So out of necessity, I had to produce Ukigumo and take money for it. From the standpoint of my ideals, I was thoroughly conscious of myself as an insolent being. I took the money, but for myself I was ashamed; I was also made aware of my own worthlessness and wretchedness. And then at the height of my agony, the words that issued forth from me were: Die, you scoundrel! (kutabatte shimae!?).

There are various conjectures circulating concerning my pen name, but
Yo ga hansei no zange

Actuality it is as I’ve told it just now. Alas, when I said, “Die!” I thought that when I did in fact die, a proper resolution could be reached. At least regarding that matter, life would be settled. So, if I take it to heart, “kutabatte shi-mae” still resonates with meaning. Regarding what these feelings mean for the work, it was as though they were truly etched into my bones, cutting through my flesh. It was an intense suffering ending almost entirely in sweat and tears. But such laboring comes from my belief that I might at least atone for my sins; so if I sell dog meat by displaying a lamb’s head, then, well, I should at least make it pork, and prepare something worthy to be eaten by humans. So it was from this most timid “honesty” that I began to work very hard. In terms of translation, you could double that hardship by another factor. At the time, I had great respect for Turgenev, and I did not want to take the sweat and tears of a master writer and ravage it utterly with my own hands. It would be too much of a shame. Therefore, because a faithful rendering of the work’s spirit would be impossible, I thought, at the very least, to import the original form, as it is, to Japan for people who could not read Russian. I thought, mightn’t a person be able to imagine something of the original work’s inexpressible beauty? I took great pains to keep to the original with commas, periods, and even word count. Now that I think of it, it was pretty idiotic. But as I speak of these things, it would seem that I was wholeheartedly faithful to honesty, but then there was great contradiction. In a nutshell, I had a desire for fame.

There was also a time when I gradually fell into great agony over problems of life. This came about because the aforementioned honesty was gradually crumbling; first, by writing novels I was destroying honesty, and in addition to that there were other reasons for its being destroyed. You could say that daily life was destroying it. Consequently, because I engaged in literary production in this state of mind, I became increasingly unproductive. With the money that I made from the manuscripts, I could hardly support even myself. Needless to say, my standard of living declined and I fell into a lonely state. My old folks never had a moment of relief. On top of that they had various other hardships. By hardships I mean, precisely, that they didn’t have any money. It may seem redundant — you may be sick of hearing it — but I wanted money. However, if I was to have money, I would have to perform the aforementioned transgression. And once I’d done so, whatever I got was bound to be inadequate!

Oh Dilemma! Dilemma! Who can know how tormented I was? This was the great cause that dredged forth my anguish in my approach to life. Therefore, living in such agony, I naturally ran from my ideas toward such questions as, what would happen to my life, and what was my life purpose? Accordingly, I had no leisure as such to afford careful consideration of these
questions, but could only be torn with grief. This agony would not feed me, but was simply a study of life's struggles because I could not free myself from suffering. It was not a leisurely study of life to pass the time, but I was agonizing through it. It was at this time that I enthusiastically pored over philosophic works. It was also around this time that I looked into Christianity, studied Buddhist scriptures, and even tried my hand at Shinto studies. Had it simply been pessimism, everything would have been quite easy, but at the time, I struggled because there were contradictions. The world no longer seemed appealing. But pronouncing it so didn't mean that I could just throw it out. There was still something familiar about it. Even in a logical argument, I am not sure whether or not there was worth in mundane living. From an emotional level, I do not even know... In any event, it is a fact that because I had such half-baked emotions, I remained in a painful position. But, I do not think that this should be called "pessimism."

Let me describe one small aspect of my suffering at that time. — In those days, there was one Christian publication that was the most widely read. This publication would state everything in a Christian manner, for example, that God made this world, or something or other, and state it without reservation. That attitude got on my nerves...how could they utter such impertinence without thinking? With an empty self, and an empty, limited head, how could they proudly make such claims? I would think in this way, but neither saying that they were vulgar nor that they were shameful. I was simply annoyed.

And so, one day I decided to take a walk in Ogawamachi. Then something caught my eye at the storefront of an art shop. It was a flyer for the aforementioned publication. Well now, I just glanced at that thing hanging there and it made my chest choke up in anger and this isn't just an analogy but I actually almost threw up. I quickly turned my face away and rushed by, just getting past the storefront of the specialty store. My nerves were all worked up into a frenzy. At the same time that my thoughts were going haywire, my nerves were dysfunctional as well and it was...utter foolishness!

So you see, what I did was very violent. In this state, all a person is is his animal appetite: he eats, he drinks, even fools around with women. There's not much more for him to do. — Though I had been unable to handle even a drop, I began drinking, and steeped myself in the Edo manner that I had despised as a child. I chased after the women in the neighborhood. Having already reached middle age and turned serious, I again sought the company of women, falling completely into an animal existence. In the end, I even thought that I would not mind stealing. Yes, this is all quite true.

But I could not even go that far. Even while I felt life to be utter nonsense,
that everything I did was a lie, I also felt that there might come a time when the light would shine. So in other words, this was utter stupidity. That is why when we do bad things, we suffer...having done what I had done, I was still hesitating to go the extreme.

So one day, as I was carrying on like this, I met a real lower-class woman. She was my exact opposite and an incredibly cheerful old girl. She was a woman who sailed through life humming. Of course, she was a bit shallow, but there was something lively about her. She wasn’t dead like me. And the way that woman laughed with her mouth wide open, that attitude produced a truly mysterious kind of attraction. But, that’s not to say that I fell in love with her. But, somehow I felt that the spring of life lacking in my life was bubbling up in her. And so, well, it was perhaps only natural for me — a person, about to be captured by the cold of the shade or death — to seek out the sunny warmth of a vivacious, lively, sunlit place, and in anguish because I could not grasp it. It was, shall I say, the motivation for me to turn around.

And so, thanks to this archetype before my eyes, I could see that reactions to suffering or to joy varied considerably from person to person. For example, something that causes me great pain would not necessarily affect her. So, it’s because she’s so shallow that she’s not affected, but there are those who are not shallow and still are not affected. If you were to ask me who that might be, I’d say that would probably be Confucius. To be able to calmly enjoy one’s destiny is truly noble. For instance, the problem of death is as of yet utterly irresolvable through theory. But even were a resolution to be reached, death would still be unpleasant. Only, once a resolution is reached, it would make it easier for one to begin coming to terms with it. But it isn’t as though the reason for “death” being unpleasant has existed from of old — it just is unpleasant — and even if the reason is known, it is forever unpleasant. Thus, it isn’t possible to escape through knowledge the fear of death. The fear, or the lack thereof, of death is without reason. In other words, it exists in that person’s “mental tone.” That is to say, it belongs to the “temperament” of a saint like Confucius. If one had the temperament of one of these holy types, then it’s unlikely that one would get upset over the fear of death. This is also true for life’s travails, and though saints have travails, they still have the virtue of composure so they do not fall apart. The calm and imperturbable temperament is, in short, perfect virtue. That is why, though I don’t know whether or not the human problem can be resolved theoretically, I thought that on the one hand, if a person is trained in the temperament of perfect virtue then he could transcend life, just as if he were moving up a level, and be impervious to pain and so I thought I might try becoming like the Buddhist’s Ishvara.

That is when I began my studies in psychology. Ancient people were
trained mentally in perfect virtue, but I thought, perhaps the people of a new era could be trained in it physically.

In addition to psychology and medicine, I began to study physiological psychology. I collected a considerable number of sources in English on these subjects for almost a decade into my thirties. It was also at this time that I exchanged communications with Professor Kure Shuzo, and taught myself German out of a desire to read through the original sources. However, as a result, I realized that I couldn’t do this by myself. I began to see that without the laboratories of Wilhelm Wundt, or William James, true research would be forever out of my grasp. Then, I would have to use inexpensive experimental procedures. But in order to do this, there was no other way but to sacrifice myself and place my body on the dissecting table to further the study of anatomy. At the time, the story of a person who had swallowed poison to further a great medical discovery was still fresh in my mind, causing me to harbor self-sacrificial notions. That is to say, I would place my own “mind stuff” under various circumstances to be tackled and tortured by them, and then provide the world a wretched experiment. Then, even if I did not understand the principles that would scientifically cultivate one’s “mental tone,” I might obtain the art.

And so, in first choosing a field, I decided that business would be ideal. I was impatient to become a businessman. But I could not enter the business world without my Russian. So I eased in through a Russian trading company. Having stuck my head into international relations, my patriotic persona and the persona of a businessman intermingled with a little Confucianism, and I began to find the likes of Cecil Rhodes interesting. It wasn’t merely out of envy for the rich. Though different in form, I thought I’d like to try my hand at that type of business and began moving in that direction. So if I track the genealogy of my employment it would be something like this: translator at a government-run paper; language instructor at the Military Academy; editorial clerk at the Naval Ministry; and a Russian instructor at the Tokyo Foreign Language School, in that order. Since I had been interested in that aforementioned international incident, I traveled to Vladivostok through Manchuria, and even tried to enter into Mongolia, and ended up serving for some time at a police academy in Peking.

However, these are the factual circumstances that appear on the surface. But if I describe my mental state, I was trying to see the amount of training it might take to make my delinquent mind stuff into something worthwhile, while not being overwhelmed by life. Naturally, by taking part in numerous actions I would not need to worry about such things as human problems. And with the activity in this line of work, I would fit perfectly into life, and though pain would still be pain, it wouldn’t be anything I could not tolerate.
Given that I would be able to struggle all the more, I had a feeling that if I struggled I would find in it some purpose for living.

In July of 1904, I returned to Japan because the Russo-Japanese War was about to break, and began working at my present job at the Asahi paper. And though as a service to the public I wrote Sono omokage [An Adopted Husband], and Heibon [Mediocrity], and have drawn closer to the literary world, I still do not feel as though I can pose as a man of letters. And you know, I still have that ambition for great action and great struggle — even now.

Notes
2 Sakhalin Incident refers to the exchange between Russian and Japan in 1875, when Russia acquired all Sakhalin in exchange for the Kurils.
3 Meiji ishin, is translated as the Meiji Restoration, Meiji Renovation, or Meiji Revolution, and refers to the rapid modernization and Westernization of Japan, which came as direct imperial rule was reinstated with the end of the 250-year reign of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868.
4 Gōketsu-types refer to authors who created the heroes (gōketsu) of the popular fiction of that time.
5 Tsubouchi Shōyō (1859-1935), Futabatei’s mentor, influential critic, playwright, novelist, translator, and author of “The Essence of the Novel” to which this essay is a response.
6 Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinsky (1811-1848), Russian literary critic, “father” of Russian radical intellectuals, his theory of literature in the service of society greatly influenced Russian Socialist Realism.
7 Futabatei translates “kutabatte shimae” phonetically into the characters “futabatei shimei”.
8 The reading in katakana is “mental tone”; the translation for the reading of the kanji would be “one’s feelings.”
9 “Jizaiten,” is the term used here to refer to Ishvara, considered the highest deity and creator of the cosmos in some forms of Hinduism, and who is often identified with Shiva.
In 1926 Watsuji Tetsuro and Kawakami Hajime, two prominent thinkers then serving as professors at Kyoto Imperial University, engaged in the following disputatious exchange regarding the Students Arrest Incident. This incident, otherwise known as the Gakuren Incident, consisted of a series of arrests in December 1925 and January through April 1926 of university students associated with the Marxist Leninist group Gakuren (Gakusei Shakai Kagaku Rengōkai, or Student Social Science Federation). These arrests marked the government's first use of the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, a law enacted in May of that year to curtail the activities of anyone who "formed an association with the objective of altering the national polity (kokutai) or the system of private property."

I heard this once while attending a literary gathering of the late Yasunari Sadao's, that around that time among the Socialists certain members were reading books on Russian riot tactics and considering strategies for instigating riots in Tokyo. I don't remember all of the particulars now, but I seem to remember it being a strategy quite well thought out in detail. Later, during the Great Earthquake, rumors spread from who knows where that the consequent great fires were the work of Socialists and Koreans. Those rumors were so convincing that for a brief moment I was made to wonder if perhaps those strategies hadn't been more than mere castles in the air after all. The masses believed so, capitalists believed so, and scholars believed so. Those who didn't believe so were limited to a relatively small group of people with exceptionally good judgment. But in the end people, the quicker ones after a day had passed, the slower after half a year or even a year, finally realized that it was all a lie. All that fuss about riot strategies had just been empty fancy to release pent-up anger, and there had been no concrete, organized plan whatsoever.

I can't judge for myself whether this recently disclosed incident stems from nothing more than youthful fancy or is the initiation of concrete action. Most likely it's some combination of the two, I would think. On this matter I
feel that social scientific "research" must absolutely be distinguished from such things as empty fancy to release pent-up anger. Does not the advancement of class-consciousness call forth unreflective sympathy for destructive means? Even the law itself, since it has been created by the opposing class, is not to be acknowledged—such an attitude is clearly violent. If this sort of idea were made the basis of our actions, then the laws created by the proletariat class would likewise be applicable only to that class alone. A distinction must be drawn between the fact that the present law is flawed, or that the law's enforcement is flawed, and the authority of the law itself. We all consider sublime the attitude of Socrates, who calmly accepted an unjust punishment out of respect for the law of the land. That Marx took a stance in favor of violent revolution is itself a highly debatable issue, and there is no basis whatsoever for the affirmation of violence. We empathize from the bottom of our heart with the ideal of defying the rule of law and founding the rule of virtue, but to implement the rule of violence in order to establish this rule of virtue is clearly self-contradictory.

"Research" into Marxism and Leninism is certainly a necessity. However, can the attempt to faithfully imitate the example of Russia's violent revolution ever truly be free research? That the Russian revolution could not help but retrogress to such a degree that even the landowners were recognized, however much this may be explained away as using retreat as a means, is clearly the penalty for the use of destructive means at the beginning. While a revolution that dramatic could not have been achieved without destructive means, by the same token it is due to those destructive means themselves that the revolution retrogresses. Socialists would carelessly remark, "just tear it all down, things can only get better," but from a humanitarian perspective what evidence is there that Russia today from the time of the revolution onwards is any better off than Russia before the revolution? Were all the enormous sacrifices for the sake of the revolution, all that large-scale human massacre, truly in the end a worthy price to pay for giving birth to the Russia of the present? Why is hoping to reform society to the same degree as present-day Russia but by legal means, without perpetrating all of that misery and tragedy, being too half-hearted? Russia's revolutionaries excuse themselves that what unavoidably forced them to resort to terrorism was the presence of capitalist countries surrounding them. But can anyone honestly say that foreign intervention does not stalk any revolution? To think, unable to see these circumstances clearly, that the Russian revolution would immediately erupt into world revolution—isn't this the same mistake as that of the Kaiser, who thought he could advance into Paris in one or two months? Rather than all of this, the Russian revolution is instead a massive demonstration of just how prone to error human beings are. Likewise it is
nothing else but an illustration of the mutual contradictions contained within destructive means themselves.

No one doubts the fact that present-day society requires reform. Universal manhood suffrage is also a means of reform. However, the problem resides in whether we should proceed gradually by such means as these, or must rely on violent revolution. Now we have found out that even relying on violent revolution we cannot attain the goal quickly, that even as things retrogress and get off track we will be forced to entrust the realization of our goals to the next generation. We have found out that the proletariat class, their livelihood precarious, will not through extreme means all at once gain a guaranteed livelihood, but even as they are threatened all the more by starvation and their livelihood is even more intensely menaced, they will be forced to labor away to guarantee the next generation’s livelihood. The reliable way that builds an economically just society through gradual means of reform, just as the old proverb\(^2\) has it, in no way whatsoever slows us down in reaching our destination.

Socialism has meaning only as a means, nothing more. The more passionate one is towards the goal of actualizing a society where economic justice is practiced, the more one must carefully select one’s means in light of that goal. Towards such a careful selection of means, “research” into Russia offers the very best data. However, this research should be thoroughly critical, should be carried out in order to discover the truest, wisest means; it must not be an analysis of means already settled upon. To research only in order to faithfully imitate the violent revolutionary means used in Russia is not worthy of the name “research.” Neither can being unable to critically examine that invaluable experiment as “one already carried out” and thus attempting oneself to repeat the same old experiment all over again be called “the scientific attitude.”

If one claims to be carrying out “research” into “social science” while actually devising strategy for class warfare with religious faith in Leninism, then it is a misuse of the words “science” and “research.”

October, 1926, Kyoto Imperial University Newspaper

Notes
\(^2\) Watsuji is here perhaps referring to the proverb isogaba maware, which roughly translates as “haste makes waste.”
Concerning the Students Arrest Incident—To Mr. Watsuji Tetsuro

Kawakami Hajime (1879-1946)

Regarding “Some Opinions on the Students Arrest Incident” which you published the other day in the Kyoto Imperial University Newspaper (September 21, 1926), I would like briefly to express some opinions of my own. There are a variety of reasons for which it came to pass that I here take up this issue. First and foremost is that your opinions have made a certain powerful impression upon a great number of people. This I have been able to find out through conversations personally. A great number of people have brought this up with me as a topic of conversation. Naturally their attitudes have been of two diametrically opposed types. One takes your view to be a most reasonable one. Those people who fall under this classification either feel that you said exactly what they had wished to say themselves, or otherwise feel that through what you said their own thoughts were given a firm footing, and as far as I am aware this group by far makes up the majority. The other takes your view to be utterly unreasonable; I of course am of this party, and we may also find a representative of this group in Kobayashi Terutsugi and his piece “The Class Nature of Philosophers” which appeared recently in the same university newspaper. In either case, that one essay of yours has made a certain powerful impression on people. This of course is on account of the thoughts expressed therein as well, but in addition to that it rather seems as if its prose technique—its manner of expression—played quite a large part in the essay’s impact. Second of all, your opinions were printed in a university newspaper. Impressions and critical evaluations regarding the recent student incident have been published in a variety of newspapers and magazines, and I would imagine that among them there have been any number with which from our standpoint we must contend. However, even though the censorship ban on articles has been relaxed, I have not had the luxury of reflecting upon worldly matters due to the death of my beloved child, and so have not taken a look at each of them in detail, even less have I been of a mind to grapple with them one by one. However, as your opinions were published in a university newspaper, I, as one with an outlook opposed to yours and as a member of the same university, felt as if I had a duty to publicly make a statement criticizing your opinions. As I see it, within your discourse is included a reproachful criticism of our scholarship. Speaking frankly, upon our scholarship you have showered down your commonsensical, unreflective criticisms. Answering such criticisms as these coming from a philosopher, one who would usually be expected to take the most critically reflective stance, is perforce our scholarly duty. That being the
case, I wished in fact to print this, my essay, in the same university newspaper, but, as I wished to use up space at will, I decided instead to utilize this journal under my own editorship. Many people there are in society who hold the same views as yours, so I hope you will not mind if we move this issue out into the arena of public debate. The other day when we met I gave you notice that I would at some point express my opinions opposed to yours. Now I have fulfilled those words in this form. From this point onwards I will speak without restraint, and will perhaps dispense with courtesy as a matter of course, but it is my hope that you will not take me to task for this, but that my readers will see this as a sign of my sincerity.

I will first of all reprint your article here in its entirety:
[Here Watsuji Tetsurō’s “Some Opinions on the Students Arrest Incident” is given in full.]

And now please allow me to analyze your writing a bit.

At the outset of your piece you first say the following: “among the Socialists certain members were reading books on Russian riot tactics and considering strategies for instigating riots in Tokyo.” A claim of this magnitude you introduce at the very beginning as “something you heard from the late Yasunari Sadao.”

Next, at the time of the Great Earthquake “rumors spread […] that the consequent great fires were the work of Socialists and Koreans,” and so, well, you wondered for a moment whether those riot strategies and so on and so forth that you heard about from Yasunari Sadao “hadn’t been more than mere castles in the air after all,” but of course it wasn’t so, which fact you state, and you conclude “all that fuss about riot strategies had just been empty fancy to release pent-up anger, and there had been no concrete, organized plan whatsoever.”

Within a piece altogether covering five columns of newspaper print, the above occupies only a column or so, but all of this about Russian riot tactics, the great fires attending the Great Earthquake of Tokyo—for that makes up the content of your piece’s introduction—from the very start causes the reader to prejudge the events of the recent student incident as somehow being extremely disorderly, something along the same lines as a riot or a great fire; indeed on this point your writing displays more than enough literary finesse.

However, that you mentioned the above two facts is not due merely to literary technique. That this is so can be readily understood from the fact that you say in the sentence immediately following: “I can’t judge for myself whether this recently disclosed incident stems from nothing more than youthful fancy or is the initiation of concrete action. Most likely it’s some combination of the two, I would think.” Your linking of phrases is, as I see it,
crafted with extreme subtlety here. I say this because you seem to conclude with "I can't judge for myself," but then right away continue with "most likely it's some combination of the two, I would think," reversing your former statement with a smooth ambiguity; from that point onwards it is quite as if you take the statement "some combination of the two" as the presupposition of the rest of the piece in its entirety without openly declaring so. The measured wording of this part, made to appear connected and yet disconnected, continuous and yet discontinuous, therewith stamping a certain convincing impression on the reader's mind—intentionally or not—seems to me to possess a most unusual subtlety.

What you are saying is that "the recently disclosed incident" "is some combination of the two." To what does "some combination of the two" here refer? First, it refers to the idea that "among the Socialists certain members were reading books on Russian riot tactics and considering strategies for instigating riots in Tokyo" and so on and so forth. That would be your so-called "youthful fancy." Therefore this, if translated in terms of the recent incident, becomes: "Among the members of the Association for Social Scientific Research certain people were reading books on Russian riot tactics and considering strategies for instigating riots in Kyoto." Second, it refers to the idea that Socialists took advantage of the Great Earthquake of Tokyo and started the great fires. In Tokyo's case this was merely a rumor. To quote your own words, the "riot strategies" that the Socialists in Tokyo had been considering "had just been empty fancy to release pent-up anger, and there had been no concrete, organized plan whatsoever," but then you say that "this recently disclosed incident" is "some combination" of "nothing more than youthful fancy" and "the initiation of concrete action," and so, in the final analysis, you are conjecturing that the recently arrested students were not only researching riot tactics but also actually carrying out "the initiation of concrete action" to riot. Of course, as I said before, a vague uneasiness remains that to piece together your arguments so snugly somehow forces upon them an unreasonable interpretation; this is due, as it were, to the delicacy of your writing, I feel, but in any case there is no doubt that you take this conjecture as your presupposition in expressing your opinions, and thus I must first of all set about investigating this presupposed conjecture.

First of all, as for these books on Russian riot tactics, who wrote them, what are their titles? You write that you "heard about them from the late Yasunari Sadao at a certain literary gathering." Mr. Yasunari has already passed away, to say nothing of the fact that this was chitchat during a literary gathering, so at this late date it wouldn't do to press him on the matter. However, as you cite this matter anew and make it the starting point of your criticism, to you, sir, as well falls the responsibility to provide a concrete
answer to this question of mine, the question being again: just who wrote these books on Russian riot tactics, and what were their titles? While awaiting further instruction from you on this topic, at this moment for the time being I must say that I was not aware, my knowledge being limited as it is, that the study of riot tactics had been established as a subject of scholarly enquiry in Russia, or indeed anywhere in the world for that matter. Or perhaps you are referring to the works of Lenin and other such people, but, if so, how is it that you take these works and all at once summarily make them out to be riot tactic books? Unless I am mistaken, within the term “books on riot tactics” is included the connotations of something violent, something disorderly, something without valid purpose, something which should not be read, something to be detested and rejected, but to apply from the start such a designation to the many works relating to Leninism without giving a reason is something that the many people who recognize in Leninism great scholarly worth would most likely find rather difficult to accept.

The books that were confiscated on the occasion of my house being searched this year (1926) on January 15 were one by one listed in the September 21 issue of the university newspaper, and among them was a German translation of Lenin’s work *Imperialism*. This work by Lenin was published openly even in Czarist Russia, was translated in Japan by Aono Suekichi in 1924, and to this day is being published openly here. I am at a loss as to why that German translation was worthy of confiscation, but I suppose perhaps that the police authorities just guessed that since it’s a work by Lenin it might well be dangerous. I don’t complain. It is forgivable that someone not engaged in scholarly research within a specialized field make an error in judgment, and perhaps it’s only natural. However, if it is you who make this out to be a book on riot tactics then I cannot but offer my objections to such a characterization.

Moreover, among my translations there is Deborin’s *Lenin’s Dialectics*, the first volume in the *Library of Marxism* series under my editorship, and within that work is included a fragment on the subject of dialectics written by Lenin himself. It is an extremely short piece, and yet even you couldn’t disagree that it is an extremely powerful written source on dialectics. I believe that it is no overstatement when Deborin says at the beginning of his Introduction, “Seeing only the claw, we know the lion; if one reads attentively and carefully this following fragment by Lenin on the subject of dialectics, he will find more than enough to make him conscious of the fact that the international proletariat lost one of their greatest thinkers with Lenin’s death.” Furthermore, within the near future a translation of *Dialectics in Kant* by none other than Deborin again (Miyakawa Minoru, translator) will be published as volume six of the same *Library of Marxism* series. Now as
Kant is one of the principle icons in your own scholarly field, I should perhaps leave any evaluation of the work’s contents up to you, but it goes without saying that this is no book on riot tactics.

Incidentally, those students now with an interest in social science hold that the soul of their scholarly field is in fact none other than dialectics, dialectical materialism that is. Dialectics is of course characterized as follows, according to Marx: “Within an affirmative understanding of present circumstances is simultaneously included its negation, an understanding of necessary downfall, that attempts to grasp all arisen circumstances within the flow of movement in terms of the passage of time; unstoppable, it is in its essence critical and revolutionary,” and thus it is without doubt “the distress and the dread of the bourgeoisie and their scholarly advocates.” Furthermore, in that “Lenin’s works in their entirety are saturated with dialectics, and with him as with Marx, dialectics fuses with the concrete contents of the phenomena to be analyzed” it is in this way too unmistakably “the distress and the dread of the bourgeoisie and their scholarly advocates.” However, to thus label these works “riot tactic books” is a characterization with which those being criticized could hardly agree. Even in our country six volumes of Lenin’s collected works have already been made available to the public. If these were all riot tactic books then there’s absolutely no way they could have been successively published so openly in our country with its strict censorship. The “violence” implied in “riot tactics” already dogmatically includes within itself an uncritical evaluation. As a vocabulary term bandied about at a literary gathering it is utterly out of place, and as a designation applied by a (by rights critically-thinking) professor in a philosophy department to the scholarship of another in a public organ it is far too dogmatic.

Further on moreover you say, “Socialists would carelessly remark, ‘just tear it all down, things can only get better,’” but this can only be your own careless remark. Socialist writings in every country of the world today probably now number in the tens of thousands, and even works concerned exclusively with Marxism alone, if we look at the Marx and Engels Archive, number more than 800 for works published after the Great World War alone (excluding Russia). Granted I have not of course looked at each and every one of these works, and it’s no exaggeration to say that the works we have looked at amount to no more than a drop in the ocean, but we have yet to come across a Socialist who carelessly remarked, “just tear it all down, things can only get better.” Still, is this how Socialists appear in your eyes? If so, it cannot be helped that books on Marxism and Leninism appear to you as riot tactic books, but isn’t Socialism viewed in a somewhat better light even by the “prejudice of so-called public opinion”? Marx once said in the prologue to his work Capital: “All the judgments of scientific criticism we welcome,
but regarding the Vorurtei of so-called public opinion, to which we have never made concessions, we as ever apply to ourselves the maxim of that great man of Florence, Dante: ‘Go your own way, let others say what they will!’ However much you may criticize them, Marxists will continue along their way, no doubt, but to accuse them of carelessly remarking “just tear it all down, things can only get better” is prejudice above and beyond “the prejudice of so-called public opinion.” Kobayashi Terutsugi’s criticism of this is no overstatement, that large as Japan is, no one thinks that that’s all there is to Socialism except for this one professor.

In sum, to think that the students at issue recently were “considering riot strategies” under the principle of “just tear it all down, things can only get better” is factually in error.

Your second conjecture is that these students were carrying out the “initiation of concrete action” to riot. This is an important conjecture, so there is a need to clarify the facts to the greatest degree possible. As I pointed out before, at the very beginning of your opinion piece you first of all recollect the Great Earthquake of Tokyo and its great fires, but, as I see it, to associate the event in question here with such disorderly incidents is groundless. That is because, as far as the newspapers have reported, there is no factual basis to suggest that the students in question carried out any initiation of concrete action towards any type of riot whatsoever. We as yet do not have the liberty of scrutinizing the facts to a sufficient degree and so cannot pronounce the final verdict concerning these matters, but at the very least it can be said that a looming question mark has been added to your presupposed conjecture.

It may well be perhaps that your speaking of the initiation of concrete action and so on and so forth is some special form of argumentation giving priority to one’s motives from an ethical standpoint. That is to say, perhaps you take the diffusion of ideas expressed in what you call riot tactic books to indicate in and of itself the eventual result, the concrete act of rioting. But if that is so then I cannot but protest such a manner of expression. For example, it must be recognized that the diffusion and propagation of a theory that the only way to fundamentally cure a certain illness is to perform a surgical operation and the actual placing of a patient on the operating table and wielding the surgical knife to carry out that surgical operation are two utterly different matters. Now you spend the majority of your opinion piece in criticizing violent revolution and censuring the Russian Revolution. If the students in question had actually drawn up some concrete plan to enact violent revolution or had in fact behaved in ways resembling the Russian Revolution, then naturally your criticisms would have managed to serve as criticisms of these students’ actions, but to the degree that the students did no such thing, your statements are nothing more than mere comments on
Marxism, Leninism, and the Russian Revolution—the validity of those comments being a separate issue still. I suspect you may have confused two different issues here.

In the above I have expressed my misgivings that the conjectures which form the presupposition of your opinions may well be mistaken; if they are in the final analysis mistaken, then, as I said just before, your comments truly fail to address the recent student incident and end up only as mere comments on Marxism and Leninism expressed on the occasion of the recent incident. If that is the case, why don’t we then take a look at your statements in terms of being criticisms of Marxism and Leninism? I will next of all express my views on that point.

You continually criticize violence, but essentially this word “violence” is a word already loaded with an evaluation, and to say that violence is wrong is much the same as to say that a villain is evil. At that rate it comes to having the conclusion you intend to prove included within the premise from the very start. Thus for our word choice we should replace “violence” with “Gewalt.” Now as for Gewalt, our nation today was established through the very thing, and the resulting national rulership—class rulership—has been taken as perfectly natural by one and all, at least until class conflict began to bubble up in a menacing form upon society’s surface. Looked at in this way, it is not that the exercise of force is inappropriate as a rule, but rather its relative appropriateness is to be decided according to each situation’s conditions and aims. That is, for us the problem is determining the right or wrong of the exercise of a certain amount of force for certain specific aims under certain specific conditions. In this situation what is of paramount importance is clarifying the concrete conditions of the case. For example, whether injuring a person so that blood flows is good or bad is not an issue generally and in the abstract. In most cases it is obviously bad, and so common sense has generalized this principle so that it is easy to judge that injuring people indiscriminately is not good, but just as no generalized house exists independently of individual, really existing houses, so there is no such thing as just “injuring people” in the abstract. Such an act is carried out definitely under specific, concrete conditions, and it is due to those conditions that the appropriateness of such measures is first determined. In all actuality a surgeon cuts a person so that blood flows, and to the degree that he does so causes the ill person intense pain. To outer appearances it is such a horribly cruel scene that no untrained layperson can bear to watch. But you wouldn’t criticize that and call it an act of violence. Of course even in the case of surgeons cutting people, if it is simply for the purpose of earning the surgery fee and is performed on someone who doesn’t actually need surgery (in today’s cap-
italistic society such a thing happens not infrequently, I hear), then that, we
may say, is not proper. For these sorts of reasons we cannot set about indis­
criminately deciding whether cutting people is good or bad. The executioner,
an official of the national government, does often kill his fellow country­
men, and in war a soldier kills an enormous number of fellow human beings.
When the issue of social reform is seen in this light, if there is a theory which
holds that for the sake of the realization of social reform there are cases in
which no alternative exists but to reluctantly use Gewalt as a necessary evil
under certain conditions, then to immediately exchange the word “violence”
for “Gewalt” in spite of this theory and attack it saying that we must
absolutely reject the use of violence can by no means be thought of as a crit­
cical, scientific judgment, even if such a move is welcomed by general com­
mon sense.

The early Socialist Robert Owen held that societal reform would be
brought about “not by force, but by reason”; the reform of society, according
to his words, must be realized “through general consensus, gradually and
moderately,” “so that no group, nor individual, whatsoever, shall be harmed
by the necessarily occurring changes.” You allege that “Socialists would
carelessly remark, ‘just tear it all down, things can only get better,’” yet this
early Socialist was as “moderate” and “moral” as this. If Socialism were such
as this, then you too would most likely not criticize it so indiscriminately, I
would think, yet this in fact is the fanciful image of Socialism which first
occurs to the common mind, and accordingly the average layperson imag­
ines Socialism to be primarily something along these lines even today. But
the problem is, is such a thing in reality possible or not? I’ll get to the point
here: in the act of treating a certain illness, to achieve the cure without harm­
ing a single cell in any one part of the patient’s body or setting off some sort
of adverse reaction is utterly impossible. For example, in taking medicine, if
it is bitter then the taste buds will resist taking it in. At the very least it is
often the case too that medicine makes one sick to one’s stomach or gives one
a headache. How much more is this the case with major surgery, which to
perform without harming a single cell or a single organ whatsoever is obvi­
ously out of the question. The only way to get around this fact is to give faith
healing a try, but with that the curing of the illness ends up an empty fanta­
sy, and if perchance the illness is a serious one then after a while the patient
himself ends up dying.

Why is it that this form of Socialism advocated by Owen, acceptable to
anyone, relying not on force but on reason, has been superseded by
Marxism, referred to as Scientific Socialism? Seen from the point of view of
some people, this definitely marks Socialism’s degeneration, but why did
this “degeneration”—development, that is—take place? I don’t now intend
to discuss the matter in great detail here, but that there is some sort of inevitable reason for this shift has perhaps been anticipated by a number of people. I feel that this resembles the advancement of surgical science. Surgery, as I mentioned before, is a task involving the act of cutting a living human being with a scalpel and thus making him or her bleed, which as a matter of course causes the ill person extreme pain and injury. In fact, we are aware of a number of cases in which surgery actually hastened the patient’s death. But despite this, modern science instructs us that as a necessary evil surgery is an unavoidable means for the fundamental treatment of certain illnesses. To cut a living human being and spill blood is in and of itself clearly to harm that person, and to take a patient suffering exceptional pain from an illness and inflict even more pain on that person artificially would appear from the point of view of common sense to be the very means not to cure an illness, but there are in fact cases when that alone is the single only effective means. In such cases surgery takes a phenomenological appearance contrary to its essential nature. In its essential nature it is an act of kindness to cure an illness, but in its phenomenological appearance it takes the outer aspect of an act of cruelty cutting people and making them bleed. It is here then, it seems, that common sense and science cannot help but collide. I am quite uninformed about the history of modern medical science, but I would imagine that the first person to advocate surgery most likely came up against no small amount of suspicion and anxiety, criticism and attack from general common sense.

Science always collides with common sense. Why? If common sense unerringly grasped the true nature of things, then there would be no need for scientific research or the like, but as mere common sense almost always inverts the true nature of things, science emerges with the aim of correcting the errors of common sense. Accordingly, it is ever the fate of science to collide head-on with common sense. (Scientific knowledge becomes common sense as it is propagated, but in becoming common sense it sublates itself. A new scientific discovery always opposes itself to common sense at first, and within the long-term process of its struggle with common sense it reaches the point of sublating itself for the first time within the fusion of science and common sense. Those theories which set out from the very start only to endorse common sense are the yes-men of the status quo. Unable to contribute anything to the development of human knowledge and even scheming the perpetuity of erroneous common sense in its flattery of the same, such common-assumptionology is not science, it goes without saying.) That is why I dare not fail to protest when the average person’s commonsensical ideas are uncritically ushered into the world of scholarly enquiry as is. Science should not be critiqued by common sense, common sense should be
critiqued by science. To allow the average layperson to impose regulations on social scientific research is to put the cart before the horse. Allow me to cite a few examples from the realm of the natural sciences. The Earth, for instance, revolves around the sun while rotating. However, to the eye of the average layperson it appears as if the sun is revolving around the Earth. So it seems to common sense; in that it is the responsibility of science to correct such commonsensical errors, the first proponents of the Copernican theory suffered cruel persecution at the hand of this same common sense. But within the struggle with that persecution, today the Copernican theory has in the end transformed itself into what is now considered common sense. I have heard from a certain doctor recently that when drinking alcoholic beverages, our body temperature actually decreases. This can be understood by checking with a thermometer, and can also be clearly proved by the results of an experiment wherein three rabbits are the experimental subjects: one is fully injected with alcohol, one is injected with half of that amount, and the third is not injected with alcohol at all; when these rabbits are placed within boxes and with some mechanism or other the temperature within the boxes is lowered, rabbit number one is the first to freeze, rabbit number two is the next to freeze, and rabbit number three holds on until the very end. And yet, there is no one who thinks that his body temperature drops when he drinks liquor. The drinker himself—as a result of the alcohol numbing the nerves that sense coldness—feels that he has become warmer since he started drinking, and so takes off his coat in the cold and whatnot so that even to bystanders he appears to be warm. In this case too the true nature of things takes on the opposite phenomenal form. And so if we were to advise someone who is drunk, "your body temperature is dropping more and more, so don't take off your coat," depending on the circumstances we may well get our lights punched out.

I have strayed from the subject a little, but let me once again return to the topic of surgical operations. As I have already mentioned over and over again, to perform a surgical operation is to cut a person. If you were to take an uncivilized man utterly unfamiliar with modern medical science and abruptly lead him into the operating room of a large hospital and show him the many patients moaning in pain with their chests or abdomens cut open, he would most likely be rather startled; in precisely the same way, if you take a man uncultivated scientifically and show him social scientific research, which attempts to dissect present-day society in its actual living form, or reveal to him the policy measures based upon the results of that research, then he too will find much to be startled by, I would think. However, no surgical doctor is there who would carelessly remark, "just cut the patient up, the illness can only get better." Likewise, Socialists do not
simply remark carelessly, “just tear it all down, things can only get better” as you allege. I am no expert in medical science, but I imagine to myself that surgical science has progressed to the degree it has today because there were cases in which taking medicine, applying ointment, and means of that sort were utterly incapable of completely curing certain types of illness, and when the illness went uncured the patient weakened day by day and finally ended up inevitably dying. I would hold that the case is similar for societal illnesses.

You point out that many people's lives were sacrificed in the Russian Revolution. I am not convinced that so many were, but let us say for the sake of argument that you are right. On the other hand then we cannot ignore the fact that actually far more people's lives were also sacrificed in the recent World War. Well then, why did such a war as this occur? It goes without saying that Marxists find its fundamental cause in capitalist social structure—an interpretation you would of course disagree with, I presume—but in any case, that a truly enormous number of human lives must be sacrificed as well in order to maintain the present social structure is a readily apparent fact that even you must acknowledge. The ravages of the Great World War seem to be the glory of God in your eyes, while the sacrifices of the Russian Revolution appear in your eyes to be cruel brutality. This cannot possibly be so. But let us leave aside the issue of war for the moment. Let us simply take a close look at the ordinary conditions of the society in which we are living. Thereupon we cannot but recognize that each and every day under today's economic structure countless people die without fulfilling their natural span of life because of the restrictions of that structure. However much modern medical science has progressed, the cases in which its blessings reach down to the overwhelming majority of the nation, the proletariat, are extremely few; we needn't rely on Tolstoy's supplications to know that this is so, for it is a fact that we can see with our own eyes and hear with our own ears, and I would imagine that even medical scientists and doctors would none of them deny it, and so even on this point alone we see that today's society is maintained upon the sacrifice of people's lives, lives that could have been saved by human power—above all else the lives of the massive number of children born into the proletariat class. You may perhaps claim that this is not how society is maintained, but that is one necessary aspect of the monopolization practiced by the bourgeoisie class, and this monopolization first comes to be maintained by the sacrifice of the many. And so we see that under the present day economic structure appearing ever so tranquil (that is its phenomenal form) the countless corpses of infants and children and the ashes of those worn out with labor are in fact piled up higher and higher each and every day (this is the true nature of the situation). If you will allow
me to borrow your wording, therein "enormous sacrifices" are constantly expended, and "large scale human massacre" is by degrees relentlessly practiced by the pressures of the economic structure. And so in this case too the true nature of things conceals itself with the opposite phenomenal form. For this reason social science, as a true science, must wield a keen scalpel to actual living society, peel off the many layers of the outer skin (phenomenal form) obscuring the true nature of things, and expose the root of the illness concealing itself within society's inner workings. Therein lies the mission of pathology, and based on the fundamental theories of that pathology a certain clinical science is therewith born.

At the same time that you criticize violence, moreover, you preach that the authority of the law must be respected and that social reform must be carried out by legal means. This is identical to the principle aims of the newly established political party announced recently by Abe Isou, Yoshino Sakuzō, and Horie Kiichi in their role as midwives in the birth of a new proletarian political party outside of the Japan Labor-Farmer Party. Now it goes without saying that such requirements were sufficient to earn the consent of many people. However, we must investigate to some extent the actual content underneath the superficial appearance of these requirements.

At issue is reform of the social structure. Looking to history for examples, at issue are such acts as, say, overthrowing the Tokugawa military government and transforming Japan from a feudal society into a capitalistic one; in short, that revolution called the Meiji Restoration. You would hold that it is desirable for such a revolution to be carried out through legal means. However, could the Tokugawa military government's overthrow have actually been realized according to the very laws it itself had established? Or, in any case, was it overthrown in such a way? Even if desirable, is it really possible that the military government itself would have established a law providing for its own overthrow? Needless to say, such a thing is impossible, and for that very reason my old hometown predecessor Yoshida Shōin broke the national legal prohibitions of the time for the sake of the revolution's concrete initiation of action, and so was punished with execution. He most definitely did not acknowledge the authority of the law in place at that time; far from it, he was nothing less than a dangerous character aiming to overturn those then in authority. If you had been born in the last decades of the military government you would have criticized him, of this I am sure. Therefore I find it somewhat odd that you don't seem to mind at all that this agitator of the social order is today worshipped as a deity. Located in Hagi city, Yamaguchi prefecture is Shōin Shrine, and I seem to remember that there is another shrine dedicated to him in Setagaya, Tokyo. And that is not all. On
the very campus of this university where we work as professors is Sonjō Hall, at which place the soul of Yoshida Shōin is worshipped. A religious festival in his honor is held every year on the 27th of October, the anniversary of his death, and at that shrine are collected "posthumous handwritten manuscripts by those benevolent men with a sense of patriotic mission who, overcome by opposition, martyred themselves at the time of the Restoration," which manuscripts "serve in the capacity of instilling high morale in young men and inspiring in them martial valor." (according to The History of Sonjō Hall). I cannot help but feel that all of this is somewhat enigmatic in today’s world, where it is taken for granted that agitating the legal order is the greatest crime known to man, but in the end it only goes to show that a revolution in the economic structure is accompanied by a revolution in moral conceptions and that in a time of social transformation value judgments are flipped with the revolution’s accomplishment. If they win they're loyal troops, if they lose they’re bandit rabble. On the night before the revolution they are criminals on whom the nation inflicts capital punishment, but once the revolution is accomplished they are granted official titles and worshipped as deities. Well then, what guarantee is there that the same thing can’t happen again in the future? In basing itself upon a class system the present economic structure is the same in essence as feudal society, and so it is by no means unnatural if the thought occurs to one that a new society will someday be born from the womb of this one in much the same manner. As this society is a class society, and as true legislative power is gripped by the ruling class, a ruling class that to the very end endeavors to maintain the fundamental principles of the social structure in their presently existing form, it is easy to see how legal means of reforming the social structure will one after the other be changed into illegal ones. The chances are high that if one of the few remaining legal means has a chance of actually working, then through the enactment of a new law it will right away be made illegal. And yet if even then you still insist that the reform of society must be carried out only by legal means from beginning to end, then in the final analysis you are doing nothing else than requiring that the present situation be maintained eternally; even if on the surface it takes the phenomenal form of a demand for societal reform, in its essential nature it is nothing but a rejection of societal reform. It is not that I am opposed to your argument for respecting the law, I only wish to clarify its implications.

Regarding respect for the law, there is a point to which I would like to direct your attention. Namely, that when the police arrested students from Kyoto Imperial University at the end of last year, the measures they adopted were against the law. Such has already been explained in great detail in
the declaration announced collectively by the professors in the law department at Kyoto University, so there is no need here for me to go over all of that again now. Only, what I take issue with is how you, who encourage respect for the law, seem to turn a blind eye towards illegal actions actually being perpetrated right before our very eyes. As even you would most likely agree, the recent flurry of student arrests is clearly an instance of the illegal utilization of Gewalt. If we are calling the illegal utilization of force “use of violence,” then rather than something to fear as a potential occurrence in the future it is instead a fact actually happening right here before our very eyes at this very instant. The recent student incident does not mark the first time such illegal arrests have been made, for they are pretty much a year-round fact of life for the proletarian class. Not long ago in fact I heard the following from someone actually connected with the police: “At the end of last year students from Kyoto University were illegally arrested, so university professors made a big hubbub about it, even publishing that declaration, but all of that was just empty theory from the ivory tower out of contact with reality. If the police really adhered to that stuff, they couldn’t get anything done. If all criminal investigations were carried out as regulated by law, according to a bunch of procedures, then more than half the criminals locked up today would still be at large. So no matter what the law’s regulations may be, in principle society’s needs transcend the law, so anyway if the police spot some suspicious looking fellow they just drag him off.” And so on and so forth. Since I am not an expert on such matters, I cannot of course speak with any authority, but to the limited extent of my knowledge this does somehow seem to be the way things are. Well then, what does this mean? It means nothing less than that, for the sake of what are called criminal investigations, illegal Gewalt is in all actuality being constantly utilized on a daily basis under the presently existing order. If we are to call force illegally utilized “violence,” then we cannot even begin to imagine how much of a nuisance this violence really is for the proletarian class. Why is it that this fact is approved of and tacitly consented to as if it were all perfectly natural by those who say they disapprove of violence or argue for respecting the law? In the case at hand, at least, why is it that this fact is not an issue for you? The mere possibility that Socialists might someday perhaps use violence is already a source of worry for you, and yet violence actually happening now is not even an issue as far as you are concerned. Why? Why do you, who admonish these students against violence, ignore the violence they themselves are subjected to? Mr. Kobayashi criticizes you, saying that you are terribly apprehensive about the proletariat’s resistance but “display no anxiety or misgivings whatsoever concerning the bourgeoisie’s atrocities,” and, identifying this as “the idea that oppression by the bourgeoisie’s thugs, the
police, is legitimate, but resistance on the part of the proletariat is illegitimate," attacks "the class nature of philosophers." As his comrade in being familiar with the actual circumstances of the social movement, I must say I find his criticism quite credible.

Moreover, in your essay is the following passage: "a distinction must be drawn between the fact that the present law is flawed, or that the law's enforcement is flawed, and the authority of the law itself. We all consider sublime the attitude of Socrates, who calmly accepted an unjust punishment out of respect for the law of the land." This is to use Socrates as an example to reprimand the students, but as for that, what is it that Socrates in fact did? For the moment let us look at what professor Sakaguchi writes on this topic in his _A General Survey of World Historical Currents_, wherein he says the following: "Athens had suffered a number of frequent political shifts, was beleaguered by postwar difficulties, and in the end reverted to a degraded form of democratic government. The tragic protagonist of most unsurpassable renown who came to be sacrificed by this government was none other than the greatest thinker of that time, Socrates. Let us look at the charges levied against him as recounted then in the citizens' court of law: namely, that he was opposed to democratic government, due to his outspokenly criticizing the present situation in which the vulgar masses were erupting in rampage; namely, that he had slandered the nation's religion, due to his freely questioning the superstitions of the day; namely, that he had led young men astray, due to his critiquing the errors of the scholastic methods practiced by people in society, advocating a new education and sharing this with listeners who came to visit him at his household." (Page 34). For this he was then condemned to death, drank poison, and died. Those are the facts. And then these facts are made use of by you in order to preach that even if a law is bad, since it is the law we must obey it, but in this case it would seem that the example you have chosen is not very apt. How much difference is there really between Socrates, of whom you would make an exemplar, and these students at issue recently? What did Socrates do? First of all, he opposed democratic government and outspokenly criticized its true state, and were not the students at issue too attempting to oppose capitalistic government and outspokenly criticize its true state? Socrates second of all freely questioned the superstitions of his day, but in the society of commodity production in which we are actually living a great variety of superstitions exist regarding social relations. Marx has called this the commodity world's fetish character, and in all truth were not these students too attempting to do away with such superstitions? Third, Socrates critiqued the errors of the scholastic methodology practiced by people in society and advocated a new education, and were not these members of the Association for Social Scientific Research in
fact taking dialectical materialism as their scholastic methodology and, believing this to be true science, advocating a new education? I am completely uninformed concerning the concrete facts of each and every thing that they did, but I feel rather certain that I have now roughly expressed the standpoint of their thinking, at least. Seen in this light, the minimum we can say is that they did not act in a manner directly contrary to Socrates. Furthermore, they were charged with breaking the Peace Preservation Law. 

Not long ago I was informed by one of our colleagues who specializes in jurisprudence that, as he explained, it is very doubtful whether their behavior really infringes upon this law. I have more than enough confidence in his views on jurisprudence. But let us continue assuming that the actual verdict given by the court of law will be “Guilty.” If so, then what? A great many people assert that the Peace Preservation Law is a bad law. But as it is the law, no matter how bad a law it may be, those students, condemned as guilty according to that law, will in all likelihood calmly accept punishment. In fact, if they don’t escape to Siberia or China they have no choice but to accept punishment. And so you, you who say, “We all consider sublime the attitude of Socrates, who calmly accepted an unjust punishment out of respect for the law of the land,” even if you do not consider the attitude of these students sublime, have no basis on which to criticize them so. Socrates was in his time an agitator of the legal order as well, and for that reason was sentenced to death by the court of law of that time. Therefore I find it inexplicable that it is his attitude of all people’s that you “consider sublime.” If the explanation for this mystery lies merely in the temporal distance of a few thousand years, then this only serves to prove that you are entirely a vassal to the present age and are in close collusion with the interests of the present age’s ruling class. If we were to transpose you back thousands of years ago in the past, would you not join with the “ignorant mobs of Athens” and censure Socrates yourself?


Notes

2 “Prejudice.” (German)
3 “Drastic measures; force.” (German)
4 Printed in English in the original.
5 Sonnō Jōi. The name of this hall is derived from the slogan of those carrying out the Meiji Restoration, to “revere the emperor and expel the (Western) barbarian” (“Sonnō Jōi”).
Kawakami hakase ni kotau
In Reply to Professor Kawakami
Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960)

Professor Kawakami, to have received from you such an intricate, not to mention severe, refutation of the little opinion piece I published in the Kyoto Imperial University newspaper was for me an extremely awkward matter. By no means could such an off the cuff opinion piece stand up to the professor’s rigorous analysis and critique. However, that you took this opinion piece to be showering down upon your scholarship my commonsensical, unreflective criticisms struck me as a particularly serious criticism difficult for me to accept. Even if rigorous thinking reveals my opinion piece to be full of holes, I think that there may be quite a few points upon which your criticism of my humble work misses the mark.

1. You see a close connection between the very first sentence of my opinion piece and the beginning of the paragraph about the Students Arrest Incident and interpret my words to mean, “Among the members of the Association for Social Scientific Research certain people were reading books on Russian riot tactics and considering strategies for instigating riots in Kyoto.” I was truly surprised by this interpretation. If that simple opinion piece could be interpreted in such a way, far from displaying “more than enough literary finesse,” it would cause me to doubt whether my own words said what I thought they did. At the beginning of the piece I was simply giving one example, gained through hearsay, of “empty fancy to release pent-up anger.” However, I never even dreamed that any of the readers of the university newspaper now or ever would think that the Students Arrest Incident was an incident involving the consideration of “strategies for instigating riots in Kyoto.” I was speaking with the intention of addressing people who already have a general knowledge of the student incident. I began the paragraph by writing that I did not know whether this incident, a matter of common knowledge, was nothing more than “youthful fancy” or the initiation of concrete action. If it was nothing more than fancy, then here too we have one more example of empty fancy to release pent-up anger. Without determining whether it was in fact empty fancy or the initiation of action, I simply expressed the opinion that social scientific “research” must distance itself from this sort of empty fancy altogether. However much I reread my words now, on this point I am at pains to see what could give rise to an interpretation such as yours. You say that “in the final analysis, you are conjecturing that the recently arrested students were not only researching riot tactics but also actually carrying out ‘the initiation of concrete action’ to riot,” to which I assert that I have absolutely not made any such conjecture whatso-
ever, nor is such a conjecture in any way, shape, or form expressed in my writing.

2. You grilled me as to who wrote the book on Russian riot tactics and what its title would be. I can’t give you an answer. I also do not have any information as to whether the study of riot tactics has been established as an academic discipline. However, when I heard the name of this book, I envisaged it to be a book researching methods of perpetrating riots. At that time Mr. Yasunari was so kind as to explain to me the strategic significance of Sukiya Bridge, of Kanda Bridge, and of the city water system’s reservoirs. At the time of the earthquake the Metropolitan Police Office was the very first thing to burn down, and this among other things matched up with the riot strategy as explained by Mr. Yasunari. I don’t recall each and every little detail, but I do remember that when I heard all of this I realized that with that strategy a few hundred people or so could indeed very well plunge Tokyo into utter chaos and, timid as I am, I was quite taken aback. I said “books on riot tactics” without really thinking about it, but I remember that, even looking at the title alone, anyone would take it to be a book researching the kinds of things just described. And so here too I was taken by surprise and accused of “perhaps [...] referring to the works of Lenin and other such people.” According to Mr. Kobayashi Terutsugi, “As far as social science is concerned, Assistant Professor Watsuji is an utter dumbass,” and since you approve of Mr. Kobayashi’s views, you may very well have made such a conjecture as it would be an idea quite appropriate to a “dumbass,” but on my part I am totally “struck dumb” and don’t know what to say. You say, “within the term “books on riot tactics” is included the connotations of something violent, something disorderly, something without valid purpose, something which should not be read, something to be detested and rejected, but to apply from the start such a designation to the many works relating to Leninism without giving a reason is something that the many people who recognize in Leninism great scholarly worth would most likely find rather difficult to accept.” If constrained to imagine the term “riot tactic book” to be such as you do, I can only say I agree with you. I have read S.I. Gussew’s *A Study of Civil Wars*, and I certainly didn’t think while reading it, “Aha! Riot tactics!” Thus it is beyond my comprehension why we must imagine as you the term “books on riot tactics” to be such. That you spend four whole pages on such a self-evident matter is to me rather unwonted. You say, “As a vocabulary term bandied about at a literary gathering it is utterly out of place, and as a designation applied by a (by rights critically-thinking) professor in a philosophy department to the scholarship of another in a public organ it is far too dogmatic,” but I merely brought up the conversation at that meeting and simply mentioned a book studying the perpetration of
riots; however much I reread this part I still feel that I am undeserving of such unjust accusations. Rather, to use your wording, I feel I must object to your “dogmatic” reading.

3. The single phrase “Socialists would carelessly remark, ‘just tear it all down, things can only get better’” was also severely attacked by you. You say, “We have yet to come across a Socialist who carelessly remarked, ‘just tear it all down, things can only get better.’” However, I have personally seen careless remarks along these lines in an article by Mr. Sakai Kosen. It is extremely unfortunate that I cannot now give you the exact name and date of the magazine here, but if my memory is not mistaken it was one or two years after Lenin’s revolution. I have heard that when Bertrand Russell visited this country Kosen, attending a reception in his honor, declared, “We approve of the Russian Revolution,” but since I vaguely recall remembering his before mentioned remarks when I heard he did this, I surely must have read them some time before Russell’s visit. At that time the Russian Revolution was an object of intense interest for me, so things I read then have stuck in my mind with relative tenacity, and thus the phrase “Just tear it all down, things can only get better” unconsciously came forth. But personal observations aside, can you positively assert that among the words of Liebknecht, Spargo, and Lenin statements to that effect are totally absent? Now I am not such a “dumbass” as to think that “that’s all there is to Socialism,” nor did I make “Socialism” out to be such anywhere whatsoever in my opinion piece, yet when those who call for a Socialist revolution are refuted on the grounds of all the sacrifices that would be incurred during the revolution or the chaos that would occur afterwards, for them to answer something like, “Whatever sacrifices we may suffer will be as nothing compared to the ills now accumulating on a daily basis in today’s capitalist society” is pretty much the standard comeback, is it not? That’s what it says in The ABC’s of Communism, and you yourself have stated much the same thing repeatedly, haven’t you? I would think that taking the argument—that we must at any rate overthrow the capitalist social system without worrying too much about the temporary chaos that may ensue afterwards since even if things fall into some disorder the situation will still be more favorable than at present—and rephrasing this argument as “just tear it all down, things can only get better” is not entirely out of bounds, what do you think?

4. As I already said in article one above, I cannot accept your contention that I have conjectured that the arrested students were initiating the concrete act of “rioting.” What the students did constituted an incident centering upon their lessons in theory and practice and has nothing to do with “rioting.” I wrote my opinion piece taking that to be common knowledge. Moreover, I only touched directly upon the students’ actions in a couple of
statements, and then discussed my own opinions in association with them. For this to be interpreted as a criticism of the students’ actions is for me most annoying. Such a "criticism" could not be carried out without touching upon the contents of their lessons in theory and practice. Accordingly, my opinion piece consists as you say of my comments on Leninism and the Russian Revolution and that alone, or rather I should say comments on those who blindly idolize Leninism and the Russian Revolution. I was of the impression that this is obvious at a glance. And so then the confusion of two different issues you mention was produced by your own reading into this passage a criticism of the students’ actions unintended by me.

Up until this point I have only voiced objections to areas with tenuous relations to the main theme of my opinion piece or to what are simply your misunderstandings of my writing, but when we come to your criticisms of the main theme of the piece not only can I not agree with them, I find them rather troubling. As I said before, I made the main theme of my opinion piece the opinion that “acting out of blind idolization of Leninism” should not be called “research.” So it really puts me out to have you see it as a “critique of Marxism and Leninism.” Such a large-scale critique could hardly be accomplished in so short an opinion piece, now could it? I was aware from the very beginning that even just using the words “blind idolization” would bring on your objections. To those who think that “Since Marx’s theories are correct, they are indeed omnipotent. They encompass all without omission and grant to humankind a single, unified worldview that opposes all superstitions, all that is reactionary, and all justifications for subordination to the bourgeoisie” (Lenin’s words) and believe that this Marxist worldview “grants a true, scientific solution to all the problems of research methodology,” telling them to consider this “true research methodology”—dialectical materialism—itself from an even more critical standpoint must sound to them rather as if you are telling them to replace a true research methodology with a mistaken one. And yet why is it that dialectical materialism itself cannot be made an object of critical inquiry? According to Deborin, whom you have translated yourself, “Dialectical idealism, once it came to a point at which it would contradict its own foundation, transformed into its opposite, dialectical materialism.” If so, what are we to make of a dialectic that itself evolves dialectically? Even though the dialectic in essence requires concreteness, idealism is abstract, and so requiring advancement towards actuality it evolved into materialism—a dialectical development of this description is indeed nothing other than the development of the Idea. I do have some qualms about oversimplifying Hegel’s “Concept” and “Idea” as abstract, even if it is permissible, I suppose, to do so since they are lacking in irrational factors. Indeed,
that which is irrational is matter, and matter does undergo dialectical development. Even so, the development whereby dialectical materialism, which recognizes this dialectical development of matter, is dialectically produced from dialectical idealism—in other words, the progression in thought from Hegel’s philosophy to Marx’s dialectical materialism—is really nothing but the progression of the Idea, isn’t it? If not, if this progression in thought is a reflection of matter’s own dialectical development, then matter develops in exactly the same manner as Hegel’s Idea, and is not matter as the natural sciences conceive of it. The only thing that has been done is that Idea has been subtracted from Hegel’s dialectic, leaving nothing besides matter, matter reconceived in a very different sense from matter as originally described in materialism. What basis is there for claiming that matter such as this is the foundation of things? We can understand this as the hybrid of a materialistic epistemology and an idealistic dialectic. In other words, all we have here is matter being conceived of from a materialistic standpoint and interpreted as developing dialectically, then posited as the basis of consciousness also conceived of materialistically. However, I cannot help suspecting somehow that in this case two standpoints that should be kept strictly distinct have been uncritically combined.

Moreover, if this “matter” is held to be a directly experienced fact, then we must inquire as to just what this sort of experience is. What is it to experience “matter that evolves dialectically”? Within such an experience there is already included much theoretical content, don’t you think? With these points in mind, is it really a mistake here to see a need to consider the issue more radically? We credit Hegel with having best grasped the theoretical essence of the dialectic. Deborin was right on the mark when he said, “the forms internal to actuality shape the research methodology.” But from this standpoint, if we are to transcend Hegel and “advance towards actuality” further, we cannot get away with merely recognizing actuality’s materialistic qualities. We must grasp the forms internal to actuality more directly, more concretely. Perhaps you will dismiss all of this that I’ve said as just bourgeois ideology, but I for my part believe that we must examine more closely the basis of the view, likewise an ideology, that “matter determines human consciousness.” Without starting off from the idea that the brain produces thought, we must, I believe, try to go still deeper epistemologically to the very root of the matter. The task of evolving Hegel’s dialectic into dialectical materialism and applying it to social science so as to explain human consciousness in terms of the contradictions of material life and the struggles inherent in the social forces of production is essentially a theoretical task. Doesn’t holding the idea that this theoretical task itself comes forth from the contradictions of material life amount to taking that which you intend to
prove theoretically and making it the theoretical premise of your argument? If dialectical materialism, as a theoretical dialectic, is determined by a practical dialectic, i.e. the actual practice of class struggle in real society, what is it that makes us aware of this relationship of determining—determined, if not conversely theoretical dialectical materialism itself? To use dialectical materialism as a weapon in the class struggle or in that sense to claim that dialectical materialism is the class scholarship of the proletariat is one thing and to say that the existence of the proletariat necessarily gives rise to dialectical materialism quite another. If not then we can't explain how a person living a bourgeois life and educated as a bourgeois could come to uphold dialectical materialism at all. Therefore, if dialectical materialism as a theory can become part of the consciousness of a person who before didn’t question the state of social existence, we must utterly rethink the significance of existence when we say that theory is regulated by existence, mustn’t we? Certainly theory is determined by existence, but the manner in which it is determined cannot be explained away by the simplistic idea that thought is a product of the brain; rather, the explanation can only be found in the fact that within existence itself Logos is immanent. With this point in mind, I believe that the dialectical evolution of dialectical idealism into dialectical materialism will as a matter of course sublate itself and evolve towards their synthesis.

One could go on forever listing off these kinds of unsophisticated nit-pickings, but there are, I would say, others besides myself who are unable to believe in the “omnipotence” of Marxist theories. It is only to be expected that those who from such a skeptical standpoint problematize the truthfulness of dialectical materialism face those who profess that dialectical materialism is the one and only true research method and tell them this kind of profession of faith is not worth the name of “free research.” Any direct rebuttal of my opinion piece must first and foremost concentrate upon clarifying the truthfulness of dialectical materialism. Say what you will simply professing a belief in dialectical materialism and my doubts will only remain as doubts to the very end.

Even if for the sake of argument we allow that the profession of faith in dialectical materialism is not blind idolization, problems still remain. Again, I made the main theme of my opinion piece the argument that holding up Russia’s violent revolution as a model cannot be considered free social scientific research. According to Deborin’s Lenin’s Dialectics, Lenin too made a distinction between theoretical dialectics and practical dialectics. Lenin’s studies in imperialism were social scientific research in the sense that he analyzed actual society using dialectical materialism as a method, but the Russian Revolution itself, occurring under Lenin’s leadership, exemplified
practical dialectics, the actual practice of class struggle, and cannot be said to be scientific research. Now the task of analyzing Japan’s actual society using dialectical materialism following Lenin’s example is indeed one form of scientific research, no matter what doubts there may be about that method. However, can we give the name “scientific research” to the act of actually practicing here in Japan violent class warfare under Lenin’s leadership just as in Russia, to serving as a soldier in the warfare of the classes? Is making dialectical materialism one’s research method the same thing as actually taking dialectical development into one’s own hands? How can my stating that the actual practice of class struggle cannot be said to be research amount to showering down unreflective criticisms upon your scholarship?

I have now dealt with the major issues, but regretfully you also took issue with me over the more peripheral niceties of word choice. I am unable to readily accept many of these points as well, and so I will reply to them next in itemized form.

6.2 First of all there is the issue of the word “violence.” Trotsky in his *Terrorism and Communism* emphasizes that what will eradicate the existence of the bourgeoisie is Gewalt and not universal manhood suffrage or “a majority in Parliament,” that the real class struggle is a life or death battle of strength, that victory can only be had by wielding the gory weapon of Gewaltta, paying the price of blood, and killing, that the dictatorship of the proletariat will be established only through terrorism, whereas prohibiting illegal action, avoiding open warfare, and placing one’s hope in democracy as a way of peaceful reform is empty-headed. Again in his *The ABC’s of Communism* it is put forth that “Marx advocated civil war/Bürgerkrieg, the war in which the proletariat takes up arms against the bourgeoisie,” that “it is impossible to reason with the bourgeoisie. The only way is to take up rifle and cannon and overcome them in civil war.” Labeling this an advocacy of violent revolution does not constitute inappropriate wording as far as I can see. You explain that through this same Gewalt the nation was founded, and using the example of clinical surgery maintain that for the sake of social reform the use of Gewalt is the only option. When you think about it, the only thing this can mean is class struggle intensifying into a civil war revolting against the bourgeoisie’s national authority. I on the contrary place my hopes in the way of social reform through legal means, without relying on illegal acts. Here I advocate not a dialectic proceeding naturally and necessarily as in Marx but a dialectic of the will, preferring a legal way led on by hopeful idealism. Even if the present law or its implementation does nothing but demonstrate the Gewalt of the bourgeoisie, the law itself must not be Gewalt. I am to understand that advocating democracy rather than civil war and reason rather than violence already reveals me to be a henchman of the
bourgeoisie, but the case is still open as to which is better suited to achieving the aim of an "economically just society," violence or reason. Russia's revolutionaries, in the position of having already effected a violent revolution, were pressed with the need of justifying their own actions, and with faith that "through the Russian Revolution the age of civil war has begun," saw in the workers' strikes taking place in other countries a type of civil war as well. And yet in our case a violent, destructive revolution has yet to take place. However much workers have gone on strikes, they still have not gotten around to using destructive means. Thus we are in a position to study Russia's invaluable experience with a cool head and based upon this historic event consider for ourselves whether legal means are the most appropriate for reaching our ultimate objective. If, as Russia's revolutionaries claim, the Russian revolution constitutes actual evidence of Marxist theories in action, then based on this actual evidence it is all the more possible to examine the truthfulness of those theories. This and this alone can truly be said to be free research.

7. Next of all you quote Robert Owen's motto, "not by force, but by reason," and say, "If Socialism were such as this, then you too would most likely not criticize it so indiscriminately." Indeed you are quite right. Far from indiscriminately criticizing it, I could not but step forth and voice my full agreement. Call me a petit bourgeois if you will, I just cannot see the movement to create an economically just society proceeding without hopeful idealism. This was true even in Lenin's work. In an article at the beginning of The International Communist, number 12, Maksim Gorky states, "I still think today what I have thought for two years, that as far as Lenin was concerned Russia was nothing more than a test case for the world, for the universe." and continues, "The ultimate purpose of Lenin's whole life was the happiness of all humankind, and without a doubt he foresaw several centuries into the future the final objective of the great process which he initiated with all of his will in a stoic, manly way. He was an idealist, if one takes this word to signify one who concentrates all of his natural forces upon one single ideal (the ideal of human happiness)." I was introduced to these words over four years ago in an issue of the journal Thought, and I still agree with them.

You stress that this "moral" socialism "is the fanciful image of Socialism which first occurs to the common mind, [...which] form of Socialism [...] has been superseded by Marxism, referred to as Scientific Socialism." But should we reject as "fanciful" the tendency shown by England's Labor Party, as reported recently, to resurrect Owen's ideas and emphasize not class struggle but love for humanity? I cannot believe that the tendency for people to turn back to morality due to the "test case" Lenin gave us is nothing more
than compromise or retrogression, as those of the left wing are wont to shout. Using the example of clinical surgery you argue the impossibility of reforming society “not by force, but by reason” and assert the need for surgery which spills blood, but, as in the case of England’s general strike, hasn’t the labor movement here, failing for the moment because it used no weapons and spilled no blood, through that very failure secured their victory in the long run? “In England the revolution will occur late. However, in that country the proletariat, after gaining victory, will organize a new economy much more quickly. [...] Even though late, it will be a much more progressive revolution than Russia’s.” So Nikolai Bukharin prophesied in 1919. However, could it be that this progressive revolution has already occurred without spilling any blood at all as the Labor Party has even made up the Cabinet a couple of times? The leadership of England’s Labor Party, such as Arthur Henderson, James Henry Thomas, and John Robert Clynes—but with the exception of those forthright Menshevik James Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden—refer to themselves as guides for those who labor, though Harry Quelch would inform us that they are in fact the betrayers of the laboring class, their Judas (in The International Communist, number 16). To top it all off, under these men’s guidance a quite powerful labor organization has gone a full seven years, still going strong today, without so much as making the slightest move to spill a drop of blood. Now for a long time now I have been no ardent admirer of contemporary Anglo-Saxon culture, but I must admire this ethnicity’s sharp instincts when it comes to what is practical. When the opportunity is ripe the prick of a needle will let the pus out, and the healing will then be a lot swifter than ripping open a large wound with bungled incisions.

8. It seems that your use of the clinical surgery example is, as a medical doctor I know informs me, not quite appropriate. Medical science is based upon experiment. In clinical medicine the most important determining factor is the medical examination. Social science on the contrary takes historical fact as its subject matter, which precludes experimentation and repeated practice. Applying dialectical materialism so as to analyze actual living society is, if translated in medical terms, like giving a try at diagnosing a real, living and breathing patient’s illness with only a theoretical grasp of physiology. Pathology is a field of scholarly enquiry built upon the experience of having taken many ill people as subject matter, often treating them as mere flesh, especially in the case of the dissection of cadavers. Clinical medicine likewise has been built up by basing itself on the findings of pathology and trudging along the path of trial and error while relying on concrete experience. Aren’t you blinding yourself to the differences in methodology between natural science and social science when you compare the two in this way? My diagno-
sis finds the source of your blindness to be an unreflective combination of materialistic epistemology and dialectics. Even if you let me get by with that figure of speech, professor, just what did you intend to liken social science to: pathology, clinical medicine, or surgery? And it goes without saying that the actual performance of surgery and surgical science are two distinct things. Even if the study of surgical science implies the idea of practicing for actual surgical operations, that practice is done under the supervision of an experienced doctor. Such a doctor performs a surgical operation guided by accurate judgments of concrete conditions and with well-practiced skill. Through following his example the novice ripens his own skills to the point that he can perform a surgery himself. If someone tried to actually perform surgery without having practiced at diagnosing or operating but having only read a book on pathology, I don’t think any of us could help being a bit anxious about undergoing surgery at his hand. Now in America if you have a stomachache they immediately say it’s appendicitis and start operating on you, so a law has been made in certain states to the effect that if upon performing the abdominal operation they find out it’s not appendicitis after all then the patient is absolved of paying all fees. In this case at least there’s some compensation in not having to pay the fees, but if the patient actually dies from undergoing such an operation at the hand of someone unpracticed in surgery, then the fundamental objective, curing illness, has been altogether violated. If we think in terms of this metaphor, then with the cure of actual living society it is necessary to exercise all the more caution. Here the subject of research in pathology is simultaneously the one and only patient whom we are trying to cure. Knowing only this patient’s medical record, we dare not experiment or practice on her, much less may we perform a diagnosis by wielding a keen scalpel and exposing the root of the illness, as you put it. To do that is just like performing a laparotomy just to diagnose whether a stomachache is appendicitis or not. Instead of that, we must carefully “research” the matter by examining the patient’s past medical record and minutely investigating her present symptoms. Accordingly, the fact that we can study the truthfulness of Marxist pathology through the irreplaceable data of Russia’s social ills and its experiencing a major operation is an indispensably important matter. However, to take Russia as a model and immediately try to perform the very same surgery here in Japan cannot really be said to be research. Perhaps to the degree that one has faith in Marxist pathology one thinks we must start operating right away, but this still doesn’t make it research in pathology. This is the distinction I discussed in my opinion piece. I said, if you will, that initiating the actual practice of surgery is not the same thing as researching pathology. I don’t think your example of clinical surgery has refuted me in the least.
9. You say that the present social structure produced the ravages of the Great World War and that a great many lives are sacrificed in order to maintain the present economic structure. I certainly agree. There's not a single word denying that this is so in my opinion piece. Rather, I assumed that an acknowledgement of these facts is contemporary common knowledge and that my readers all understood it to be so without my emphasizing it for them yet again. However, just as you guessed, I disagree with the dogma that the "fundamental cause" of these ravages and sacrifices lies in the social structure. The social structure may well be a cause, but behind this structure lies an even more fundamental cause. That cause is the mass of contradictions inherent within human nature itself. This fundamental cause appears in the form of the social structure among other things. However, by simply changing the structure we will by no means uproot the fundamental cause of these awful ravages and sacrifices. The Russian Revolution proves that more than anything. Naturally I am not opposed to improving the structure. I just think it is a misdiagnosis to start operating without delay with the faith that merely improving the economic structure will get rid of the fundamental cause of society's ills.

10. I also received your harsh reprisal for believing we should respect the authority of the law. You say that hoping to carry out societal reform by legal means is in essence nothing but a rejection of societal reform. This must seem obvious to a Marxist, who thinks that it is just an empty dream to believe that the Labor Party will ever come to hold a majority in the Diet and be able to revise the legal system. All the same, I don't believe that the essence of the law is Gewalt. The rule of law began as a replacement for the rule of force by using reason to transform force. If the present law is in fact nothing but the bourgeoisie's violence, then it is merely violence and not law at all. From the Marxist standpoint there is no such thing as law, there is only the opposition of force against force, with one side merely occupying the position of rulership. But if that were so then illegally arresting the students would just be the natural thing for the ruling force to do, and there would be no basis upon which to criticize them. When Professor Sasaki denounced the illegal measures taken by the authorities, he did so from the standpoint of respect for the law's authority. (In my short opinion piece I did not touch upon this issue since the theme was simply "free research," but I have been in full agreement with what Professor Sasaki says from the time of the law department's first declaration. I neither approve of nor give my tacit consent to illegal arrests. But to take that opinion piece with a stated theme and rake it over the coals for not criticizing the violence of the bourgeoisie is to confuse issues, is it not?) As long as one recognizes the authority of the law one should reject illegal acts whether by the police or by the proletariat. But I don't see how
you can advocate using illegal acts in your own struggles on the one hand while denouncing the other side’s illegal acts on the other. If the law is nothing and the contest of force against force is the true nature of things, we can only see it as perfectly natural if the ruling class pulls aside people who call for illegal resistance to the ruling class and slaughters them, i.e. if the ruling class makes use of terrorist tactics. I cannot approve of such terrorism. Thus I believe the illegal arrests of the students should be decried, and if you, professor, were set to be beheaded like Yoshida Shōin for expressing the “idea” that revolution through illegal means is the only way, I could only stand up and do what little I could to fight for freedom of thought. However, from your own standpoint can you object in theory if the ruling class sees your expressing this “idea” as revolt and punishes you accordingly? Mustn’t you rather acknowledge this punishment as the obvious measure for today’s ruling class to take towards someone they see as poisoning the minds of the youth? That accords more closely with your theory that all is the contest of force against force, does it not? You uphold the motto, “If they win they’re loyal troops, if they lose they’re bandit rabble.” Perhaps on the morning after victory a Kawakami Shrine will be built just like Shōin Shrine, but even so if the government troops, in the position of victors now, were to cut you down as bandit rabble, wouldn’t this just substantiate the point of your motto? Fortunately the present-day police do not adopt means that patently illegal. Accordingly you are under the protection of the current law. I am most glad that the authority of the law is acknowledged at least to that degree. In the time of the Restoration anyone who expressed ideas calling for illegal restructuring as blatantly as you do would have been cut down on the spot. Or else visited by an assassin later. At that time people really did rely on force of arms to contend with each other. Now, though, such resistance is protected under the law as a legal means. You argue that legal means of social restructuring would one after the other be changed to illegal ones, but on this point at least what were once illegal means have been changed to legal ones, haven’t they? The gradual recognition of the right of collective bargaining demonstrates the same tendency, don’t you think? Even if the current economic structure is in essence the same as feudal society, at the time that Japan’s feudal social structure was toppled the oppressed classes were unable to participate in legislation in any way whatsoever. Now the oppressed classes can take part in legislation. Whatever obstacles there may be, the fact remains that the legalization of restructuring means for the benefit of this class can be accomplished. Doesn’t your standpoint, which ignores this difference and instantly upholds direct action typical of the Restoration’s time even while your very expression of such ideas is protected under the law, contain not a few contradictions? To approve of terrorism
on the part of the proletariat is to approve of the same on the part of the bourgeoisie. I find it a most mysterious phenomenon your feeling that Professor Sasaki’s upholding the authority of the law defends those who advocate Bürgerkrieg, civil war.

You even took me to task for calling on the example of Socrates, but I would imagine that anyone who has read Plato’s dialogue Crito probably found your argument a bit absurd. When speaking of Socrates’ “respect for the law of the land,” at the very least one must have Crito in mind. In that dialogue it is argued by Socrates that even if the actual law is employed as the manifestation of unjust force, one must not on that account refuse to acknowledge the law of the land, that injustice is inflicted by human beings so one must not on that account use violence against the laws themselves. In my opinion piece I referred to Socrates’ thoughts on this matter in connection with my own rejection of violence and advocacy of the law’s authority as the law. These were not words directly related to the student incident. It was truly beyond my wildest expectations that these words would bring on a rebuke that the arrested students were just like Socrates or that Socrates disturbed the legal order of his time.

As I have made clear in this response, I absolutely cannot accept your refutation of my opinion piece. You may say that is because I am in close collusion with the interests of the present age’s ruling class, but as I indicated before it’s exactly that kind of class-centered outlook that’s the source of such suspicions.

December, 1926 (Taishō Year 15).

Notes
2 Here Watsuji jumps from 4 to 6, an inconsistency appearing in the original text.
3 “Violence.” (German).
4 Watsuji mistakenly has “Tom Quelch” in the original.
5 Printed in English in the original.
I. Classifications

When one uses scientific phenomena as the primary material or subject matter of literature, regardless of how that material is treated, roughly two forms of scientific novel can be obtained. If we were to name them, the first would be:

- the pure scientific novel, and the second would be
- the impure scientific novel (or the quasi-scientific novel)

These would be the two types (Among the publications that go by the name of scientific novel, one does occasionally find works that are particularly wont to use novelistic techniques in order to facilitate the reader's understanding of various scientific problems. However, this is a means to promulgate scientific knowledge and it would be quite difficult to call these novels. If we regarded them as novels, there could hardly be anything drier or duller than this, so they have naturally been left out of this category.)

II. The Pure Scientific Novel

What is it that we call the pure scientific novel? From beginning to end, it is science through and through; in other words, it is the result of creating a novel solely based on an interest in scientific phenomena. When encountering such a novel, readers must not, as with other novels, try to discover within it a portrayal of real life. Nor should they expect to be told love stories. Were such things to appear, they would merely be a free gift, a garnish on a sashimi plate. All that exists is science and science alone. It is nothing more than the literary observation and the literary depiction of science.

So then, given the pure scientific novel in this sense of the term, how can readers be interested in such a thing? This is a question that would probably spring to anyone's mind. There are even critics who question the raison d'être of a literature that doesn't reflect life. Yet one of the important characteristics of the pure scientific novel is that it always brims with the most delightful fantasies.

Such is the case that we could, in a sense, call them fairy tales for adults. The conditions of the real world that always encompass our lives give us both strong stimulation and stress. We sometimes feel the desire to break
away from such oppressive conditions and cast ourselves adrift on the seas of unbridled imagination. At such times, how great would be the solace that pure scientific novels could bring?

Although works that deserve to be called pure scientific novels unfortunately do not exist within Japanese literature, one does occasionally see translations or adaptations from foreign literature. Among these, works such as H. G. Wells’ *Fushigi na hatsumei* [The Amazing Invention], in its Japanese translation,2 can be considered the most representative examples:

Gibberne the scientist invents a certain amazing chemical. Named accelerator, it allows any human being who ingests it to do everything at hundreds or even several thousand times the speed of a normal person. Therefore, when the user looks at an object falling from the sky, for example, the quickness of the eye far exceeds the speed of the falling object, so that, in comparison, it can only be seen as immobile. A speeding bicycle only looks like a statue and even a bee flittering down in loop-de-loops only seems to be moving at a snail’s pace. A moment’s smile between lovers looks like an everlasting expression of joy. At the same time, powers of hearing increase in speed so that the performance of a musical ensemble only sounds like the toll of a great clock winding down to a stop. The mouth of a beautiful woman in a coquettish smile becomes so ugly that it looks just like the snarl of a wolf continually baring its teeth. However, during these strange experiences between the cracks of time, the experimenters notice that their clothes begin to catch on fire. They have been walking at such speeds that the friction of the air has generated heat.

As we can learn from this simple outline, the pure scientific novel is not the slightest bit concerned with expressing the loves and desires of life. It does nothing more than ironically sketch life’s various aspects as seen through the strange prism of science.

Even for Wells, who wrote many other excellent scientific novels, this is probably his most outstanding work. One could rightly say that its interest is born from the truly incredible concept of a new chemical, the accelerator, which propels human functions to thousands of times normal speed. Although it goes without saying that this reveals the presence of Wells’ singularly sharp powers of observation, it would also be quite impossible to write such a work without an imagination. Thus, the pure scientific novel’s greatest attraction lies in the uniqueness and interest of the fantasy related therein.
While it would be hard to call Stevenson’s famous work *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* a pure scientific novel, anyone would probably agree that the story’s interest is based on imagining a drug that clearly separates a human being’s good and evil sides. One could speak similarly about the story that uses absolute black and absolute transparency. To follow the plot, on the one hand, nobody can see absolute black since it absorbs all light, and on the other hand, since absolute transparency allows all light to pass through, nobody can see it either. So then, this is the tale of two scientists who have independently invented the corresponding chemicals and respectively change their bodies to absolute black and absolute transparency in order to kill each other. Stories such as these are truly excellent ideas as scientific novels. In the present age, when everything is coming to a standstill, to entertain such dreams is already an enjoyable relief in itself.

And yet, although that may be because pure scientific novels are as fantastical as this, does it then merely suffice for them to always be the most fantastical stories? One more thing now remains before us to consider: While the pure scientific novel, on the one hand, is based on the likes of the aforementioned imaginative fantasies, on the other hand, its depictions must be strictly consistent with scientific reality. Once we have seized the nucleus of imagination, there can be neither contradiction nor inconsistency in order for it to bud, grow and flourish. As a novel, the plot developments must be corroborated by the highest possible degree of scientific correctness. The moment readers discover a contradiction or an inconsistency, the fantasy that at first sparked their interest will probably be despised as utterly foolish babble and they will be discouraged from continuing to read any further. Although Wells’ previously mentioned accelerator is very unrealistic at the outset, there isn’t a particle of scientific error in the events that are experienced once the accelerator is used. Then there are works about Mars, for example – which were once written in many formats – most of them dealing with Martians invading the Earth, humans setting off on an expedition to Mars or works of that type. Within them, the theoretical reasoning of numerous scientists was always described in a profoundly interesting way. While traveling to and from Mars was, in itself, a fantasy with hardly any basis in reality, there was much to convince us in the observations about the Martians. Whether it be the extreme rarity of the Martian air accounting for Martians’ particularly large lungs, the weak pull of the Martian gravity accounting for the way they walk like birds, softly floating along, or the fact that rockets are used in the vehicle that travels to Mars, it is precisely because the explanations of this sort have something in common with real theory that these novels become interesting.
The skillful fusion of theory and imagination – that is the pure scientific novel’s lifeblood. Without that fusion, nobody will express any interest in the pure scientific novel.

Looking back at the pure scientific novel that has this particular format, what position has it occupied in the history of Japanese literature? We could only call it a very unfortunate one indeed. Although the varieties of magazines published monthly in Japan today are truly numerous, how many original works that call themselves scientific novels can be found within these magazines? From a historical viewpoint, we might as well say that the scientific novel has no history. In Japan, up to this point, the magazine Kagaku gahō [Scientific Pictorial] probably has invested the most energy into the development of the pure scientific novel. However, even in this magazine, the number of pure scientific novels that are published as original works is practically negligible. Most of the works published are adaptations, if they are not translations. Nevertheless, the magazine’s editorial department did once solicit scientific novels with a literature prize and produced a scant three very short stories for publication in the magazine.

When it comes to why the pure scientific novel is in such an unfortunate position within literature – and the same could probably be said overseas – it seems that we can find three causes.

Namely, first of all, as previously mentioned, the pure scientific novel must be a skillful fusion of the most delightfully outrageous fantasy and rigid scientific theory. Yet what a difficult task this is. It is this difficulty that hinders the novel’s development in the first place. Second, those who pursue a career in general literature have a poor knowledge of science. Therefore, they are practically unable to incorporate any scientific material within their works, or else, if they do go through the trouble, they are unable to make any use of it whatsoever. Third, Japanese journalism has heretofore tried to capture the largest possible number of readers. As a result, it has remained almost completely unreceptive to works such as pure scientific novels that tend to be difficult for the general public to understand.

As science advances and develops, people’s scientific knowledge deepens day by day. In the near future, this fact will necessarily expand the purview of the pure scientific novel well beyond what it is today. Looking at it from another aspect, the number of readers who want more scientific material to be incorporated into normal types of novels – even if it is not as much as with pure scientific novels – is already increasing dramatically of late. Both journalism and authors cannot but pay attention to this trend. The quasi-scientific novel that will be introduced next is something that was born in response to this demand. The quasi-scientific novel is a work that uses as
much scientific material as possible, yet cannot fully become a pure scientific novel and remains under the name of another novelistic genre.

We could give the mystery/horror novel as a prime example of this. Second would be the detective novel. Then, there is also the adventure novel. Within works in these categories, one can find a considerably large number — not all of them, of course — that deserve to be called quasi-scientific novels.

III. The Quasi-Scientific Novel

Why do those works that should be called quasi-scientific novels appear so frequently within the likes of mystery/horror novels, detective novels and adventure novels? The reason for it is quite simple.

Namely, these types of novels, compared to other kinds such as the psychological novel, the romance novel and the general domestic novel, for example, have a quality that makes it very easy for them to incorporate scientific material. Moreover, that is because, in quite a number of cases, incorporating scientific material makes it possible to heighten the readers' interests.

Mystery/horror novels, as the name indicates, are stories centered on bizarre events and occurrences. However, it is getting to the point where people today no longer feel very stimulated by bizarreness of a merely supernatural nature and are no longer frightened even of ghosts. Instead of ghosts, strange and unusual scientific phenomena are more to the liking of people today. As a result, these types of novels often take strange phenomena or fantasies of a scientific nature as the essence of their stories. Thanks to the detective novel’s characteristic of explaining in the clearest possible manner the cause and effect of the incident described within the work, the way in which it puts a story together is already based on the scientific method. When it comes to choosing an incident to address, following Arthur Conan Doyle’s great detective Sherlock Holmes, who would exclaim: “Detective work is strictly a science,” material is often taken from the most scientific incidents. In reality, crime and detective skills are becoming increasingly scientific. Therefore, among those incidents that were made into novels, one finds a considerable number of scientific descriptions. The adventure novel is extremely similar to the mystery/horror novel or the detective novel in both form and in content. In the same way as the latter two, it takes a resemblance to the quasi-scientific novel.

Here, we must note that the expectations of these quasi-scientific novels are completely at odds with those of pure scientific novels when it comes to the effect of the scientific materials exploited within their pages. For the pure scientific novel, its interest in scientific phenomena is the central interest of the entire work. This is by no means the case for the quasi-scientific novel.
The scientific phenomena of central interest for the former are for the latter a free gift or a garnish on a sashimi plate. At the same time, what were free gifts or garnishes now increasingly occupy a central position within these novels’ interests.

This also explains the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the quasi-scientific novel remains, in name (and in nature), affiliated with other types of novels. Therefore, mystery/horror novels, detective novels and adventure novels are not necessarily required to be quasi-scientific novels. By the same token, we are not entitled to comment on a work’s value just because it has few scientific descriptions. Mystery/horror novels, detective novels and adventure novels all have an excellent raison d’être removed from science.

Both pure and quasi-scientific novels are thus essentially different in the way they treat scientific material. Well then, can we not identify any differences at all within the incorporated materials themselves?

Generally speaking, it would be fair to say that there are differences. While mystery/horror novels, just like pure scientific novels, do occasionally take imaginary scientific phenomena as their subject matter, they never come anywhere near pure scientific novels in the outrageousness of their imagination. That is because they need to provide some sense of truthfulness to the bizarre phenomena being described, as well as to the bizarreness of the work as a whole. As another reason, when there is a lack of reality, readers end up sneering down the bizarre elements presented to them as absurd and incoherent delirious utterances. In order to invite readers into the anticipated sense of bizarreness, the fantasy must at the very least inspire enough confidence for one to believe it could possibly occur in reality. As a result, this drastically hampers the freedom these works may take in the flights of their imagination and it finally becomes difficult for them to reach the realm of the pure scientific novel.

However, the novel for which the incorporated scientific materials must contain the strongest element of truth is probably the detective novel.

In the detective novel, it is practically forbidden to bring in phenomena or matter that cannot exist. This is particularly true with the so-called detective novel whose plots consist of a certain crime and then a detective who proceeds to investigate it in detail. For example, while there is a detective novel that employs the concept of a water-filled flask illuminated by sunlight functioning as a magnifying lens whose focal point accidentally heats the cartridge case of a pistol that happens to be lying about, thereby firing a bullet which ends up killing someone, the story begins with the presumption that it is a murder. As the investigation gradually progresses, it finally comes to light that it is neither murder nor suicide, but that instead, for the aforementioned reason, the pistol had accidentally fired a bullet. Were this final
deduction to be something unrealistic in nature, then the novel would become utterly worthless.

However, as restricted as its flights of fantasy may be, is it not at least marginally easier for the quasi-scientific novel to produce such fantasies, when compared to the pure scientific novel? This reality can be clearly recognized through the fact that hardly any writers of pure scientific novels in Japan have yet been discovered, whereas a considerably large number of works have been published under the name of the quasi-scientific novel.

Beginning with the late Kozakai Fuboku, detective novelists such as Edogawa Rampo, Kōga Saburō, Ōshita Udaru, and especially Un’no Jūza have, to some extent or another, published works that deserve to be called quasi-scientific novels and have taken scientific subjects for their material. Even Naoki Sanjūgo has two or three works that have been published as scientific novels. Furthermore, writers such as Masaki Fujokyū and Inagaki Taruho may hold the most promise for the future as authors of pure scientific novels.

Contemporary journalism welcomes the quasi-scientific novel.

However, when indeed will be the day that the pure scientific novel is also welcomed in the same manner by the general public?

Notes
2 The original English title is "The New Accelerator," first published in the Strand Magazine (December 1901).
As a child, I was sometimes invited by my relatives to banquets, making day trips to their house thirteen or fourteen miles east of Kochi castle town. Among the various arts performed by guests to add fun to the party, most interesting to us children was a certain carpenter's specialty, the dance of shadows. It was simply a dance on the surface of the shoji screen, performed by the shadows of the elastic puppets made of a few chopsticks and hand towels, each of them having a sake cup on the head as a hat. At the time, festivities in the countryside were modestly illuminated by old-fashioned chandeliers with large candles. As the flickering of the candlelight provided every shadow with a living pulse, the grotesque dance of those shadow puppets, enmeshed in the heightened illusory atmosphere, seduced our infantile fantasy into a mysterious world.

Although I have not yet seen a live performance of the Javanese shadow puppets, I imagine that they must share something with the country carpenter's primitive shadow puppet show. The dance of shadows seems not to be an end itself, but to serve as a guide into the world of illusion hinted at by it.

At any rate, if the contemporary motion picture is "the prose or prose poetry of shadows," could this kind of shadow puppet performance not be thought of as "the haiku of shadows"?

It must have been when I was in primary school that a magic lantern was shown for the first time in a theater in Kochi. It was such a large leap from the shadow puppets show made of chopsticks and hand towels, that even though those who had just seen the show told me about it, I could not believe the existence of the shadow play that projected pictures with color, until I actually saw it with my own eyes. This first viewing made an intense impression on me. A junior high school teacher with a high-pitched voice explained a sequence of pictures depicting the eventful and adventurous life of a black slave boy born along the White Nile. Some years later, during the Sino-Japanese War, we went to "magic lantern shows" often held in theaters. Even some ordinary lithographs portraying the heroic death of the young officers from Kochi prefecture were enough to stimulate and excite our naive junior high school minds. The mourning song for those heroes sung by the
girls school choir made our young minds even more sentimental. For one thing, the darkness of the theater was effective. Also the same effect should be taken into consideration in the case of the motion picture.

It was clearly the result of those stimuli that my long deceased nephew Ryo "invented" a hand-made, primitive magic lantern. The "machine" was quite rudimentary. The screen was a sheet of paper, cut into a 3.6 inch x 4.8 inch diagonal, held in place by two nails sticking out of a book case. You would simply fix a glass plate on the back of the screen. The plate, on which figures were painted in black, red, and green ink, was of almost the same size as the screen, and behind it only a kerosene lamp was set up. Nevertheless, it was quite a big job to cover the space surrounding the screen with cloth wrappings or cardboard so that the offstage could be separated from the audience. There was an audience of four or five people, including Ryo's brothers and me. Ryo's labor must have been enormous not only because he was at once projectionist, explainer, and filmmaker, but also because he had only a couple of slides with which to create a sense of movement. Later, I asked my father to have a carpenter make a sturdy wooden box with grooves on the front side where I could slide a larger glass plate in and out, keeping ten or twenty slides in reserve, and started to gather boys in our neighborhood. Aside from the slide show, we asked a doctor we knew well to prepare as entertainment a pseudo chemical trick that transformed different kinds of transparent liquid into red or yellow by mixing them. That part was all right, but now I find it very bizarre that we sang something that went by the name of an English song my older sister learned at Sakurai School around 1878. I remember the sound of the words, but still to this day I have no idea what those words meant. Just the thought of it makes me break out in a cold sweat. Anyhow, it may be of little significance from the perspective of local cultural history that such a Westernized play was practiced among rural children in Tosa [Kōchi] at the turn of the century. Moreover, that kind of event might have influenced my life much more than I realized.

After that I purchased a magnifying lens at a toy shop, and tried to make a real magic lantern, but failed. In retrospect, it seems to me natural that I could not produce a clear image. I did not even have knowledge of introductory optics, I was using a lens of terrible quality, and most importantly, I put the original picture too close to the lens that had a short focal length. It is, however, certain that this failed attempt stimulated my desire for scientific knowledge. Shutting up the windows in the attic of our storehouse in midday, in the summer heat of a southern climate, drenched in sweat, my face close to a kerosene lamp, I took pains to make the vague images larger and clearer. Those feelings are fresh in my memory as if they happened just
yesterday. I can still remember the hazy image of a crude painting of a bird in blue and red ink; the bird was flying upside down.

I think it was in 1891. My father brought back a real magic lantern and a few dozen slides as souvenirs from an exhibition in Tokyo, and thus my long-term wish was finally fulfilled. Strangely enough, however, my memory of having my wish fulfilled is less vivid than my memory of the intense ecstasy induced by that failed attempt.

At the time, most of the slides, which often had a frame made of paulownia, displayed tinted photographs of famous places in Tokyo or the Three Most Beautiful Sights of Japan, or scenes from history or well-known stories. Aside from them, there was the kind of pictures in which a clown doll danced, and it should be called a precursor of the motion picture. The doll only monotonously repeated simple gestures such as opening and closing its eyes and sticking its tongue in and out. There were also slides in which floral figures in five beautiful colors were transformed by rotating them. The sense of marvel those childlike things gave us was much stronger than that which radio or the talkie gives children today. Compared to one, ten is ten times larger, but it is only one tenth, compared to a hundred. Children today seem to have become numb to new marvels.

It was some time in the Meiji thirties, around the turn of the century, that I saw a motion picture for the first time. I was home on summer vacation, and it was shown in a shabby shack covered with straw mats in the recreational area by the Kagami river banks. It was after a rain shower, and the corners of the shack were damp with water from the river. The film, about a chase of a duck-thief, was silly, but this was the kind of experience that "you cannot believe until you see it. Once you see it, you will be first amazed and soon get used to it." Anyway, it seems that I was not as surprised as when I first saw the magic lantern.

During my stay in Europe between Meiji 41 and 43 (1909-11), like everyone else, I often saw motion pictures. At the time, in Berlin they called motion pictures "kintop." There were a number of movie theaters, but they were tiny and only had small seating capacities. I could not find anything like today's Hogaku Za or Musashino Kan there. Movie-going was the most convenient means to distract one from the loneliness of nights in strange towns, when traveling from place to place. In a theater near the train station in Brussels, I almost fainted from a seizure while watching a film about a surgical operation, in which the physician cut off at the socket, an arm swelled up to the size of elephant's foot.

Since my return to Japan, I had seen a sword fight film only once in Asakusa. There I heard the so-called "lecturer" (katsuben) for the first time
and was so shocked and irritated that I completely severed my ties with motion pictures for a while. To this day the *raison d’être* of *katsuben* is still not clear to me.

While I forgot about their existence, motion pictures, without caring about my existence, easily conquered all Japan. When my son entered junior high school, as his parent, I was called to the school. Looking at the scribbles on the desks in the classroom assigned to us as a waiting room, I found badly drawn standing figures of Western women, and carved names such as Lillian Gish or Mary Pickford surrounding them. They reminded me of my mischievous junior high school days, and at the same time made me feel how out of date I had become.

The same faces as the ones which household goods shops and candy shops put at their storefronts to attract customers frequently appeared in advertisements in newspapers and commercial flyers. I was told that they were the so-called “stars” of motion pictures. The faces of the actors dressed and painted as heroes from the end of the Tokugawa period, which seemed to me more grotesque and gruesome than any barbarian’s face, are especially popular with common people. Their pictures in the storefronts always menaced, oppressed, and glared at me.

Only recently motion pictures, with which I had been out of touch for so long, again started being projected onto my daily life from time to time. I went to see *Wings* out of scholarly interest, having been told that it included the scenes where airplanes dropped bombs, and anti-aircraft balloons fell in flames. Then, I saw *Chang* in order to view a huge herd of elephants, and *Samba* for the great landscapes and wildlife of Africa. Soon I was going to talkies to keep up with the times. Before long, I became a novice fan.

Most interesting to me are the documentaries. Artificial things are somehow unsatisfactory and unmistakably shallow. In this sense newsreels are most interesting to me. For example, people like MacDonald or Hoover appear and make a brief greeting. It seems to me that these short scenes make us understand why, and how they are either the prime minister of the British Labor Party cabinet, or the president of the United States of America. By scanning important and unimportant events in the world in a moment, we can feel the world condensed into a surprisingly narrow space. At the same time we almost hear the rapid footsteps of the march of human culture.

In nature films, such as *Samba*, some trivial matters of which the filmmakers were never conscious tend to have a greater appeal for us. For example, lions, giraffes, or zebras are, of course, interesting in themselves. However, it is their relationship with their environment that often offers unexpected knowledge and evokes curiosity. The combination of a lion and the field of grass blown by the wind is one example. Only the parched grass
waving in the wind reveals an actual, living lion in Africa right before our eyes. A zebra’s strange way of walking is in itself interesting, but only the unusual shrubs in the background reveal this animal’s whole life. A crocodile, suddenly startled, dives into a river, adding a whiff of flesh to the pebbly riverbank and grass in which it had previously hid itself. Otherwise we could be satisfied simply by going to a zoo. We therefore want films to show the background and the environment more fully, but, regrettably enough, ordinary films curtail them. Thus the extraordinary experience is schematized.

The same thing can be said about Hoover’s speech. It would be more suitable if an American president were shown on a stage surrounded by a crowd of men and women, young and old, than just his talking head. Hoover as reflected on the expressions and postures of the unwitting American citizens around him speaks more about his personality than he himself does. Therefore it will be more effective to direct the camera half towards Hoover and half towards his audience.

In terms of this sense of actuality, most narrative films are extremely vapid. It seems to be their official principle not to film anything unrelated to the plot. This might be natural in view of the nature of narrative. But as long as drama on stage and that on screen are not necessarily identical, in order to activate a potential specific to film it would be better to make the most use of, and incorporate, the chance plots of nature for their inevitable impact.

The famous Berlin: Symphony of a Great City makes quite good use of nature in the above sense of the word. Sheets of newspaper carried by the wind on the asphalt of the city at dawn, and ripples on the clouded water of the Spree exemplify this. This natural scenery and other things contain something that human words cannot fully explain, and that only film can express. Another example: in Ginreis, which must have originally focused on documentary effects, languid drops of icicles under the eaves speak of eternal sadness, snow melting in a pan expresses the enigma of destiny, and the shadow of an airplane cast on a glacier sublimates the height of the mountains. I wonder, however, if the films whose goal is not the mimesis of reality could incorporate natural materials even more freely. This must have unlimited possibilities. I saw a film, whose title I do not recall, where a fight to the death between a poisonous snake and a mongoose is inserted between scenes set in the Orient. I did not find this very effective. Nonetheless, to create an effect by inserting a brief scene of natural drama between those of human drama is a practice that should be carried out more freely.

We can look to haiku and linked poetry for some indication of this. In the transition between scenes in linked poetry where nature and human affairs
become entangled with each other, a certain powerful dynamics underlying those scenes can be sensed. For example, let us look at a volume of *The Monkey’s Straw Raincoat*:

*Even the kite’s feathers*
*have been tidied by the passing shower*
*of early winter rain*
*His trousers have been wetted*
*in crossing streams*
*and he sees the bamboo bow*
*set to frighten badgers off*

Having started with the above scene, it continues:

*His neglect was heartless*
*but he went again to visit her*
*through the mock-orange hedge*
*now is the time of lovers’ parting*
*and she helps him put on his sword*
*Left all restless with her comb she worried her hair*
*messing its lines*
*summoning determination*
*to hazard his life in battle*

Then comes Kyorai’s masterpiece:

*In the chill blue sky*
*the yet remaining moon dissolves*
*in the light of dawn*

For some reason or other, this always reminds me of the passage on the way to the gallows in Dostoyevsky’s *The Idiot*. The tempo of the transition between these scenes moves up and down freely, and is breathtakingly fast. If someone could make a film that faithfully represents this volume, *Berlin: Symphony of a Great City* would sound like nothing more than baby talk.

There might be, however, a good many viewers who cannot be satisfied without a coherent story. Then we could create something like “*haitaishi* [poetry that uses the haiku form]” tried by Natsume Soseki and Takahama Kyoshi.

In fact, the story is not at all important in film. What people see is in effect not the story but the scene, or rather the timing of the transition from one
scene to another. Most viewers, unaware of this, believe themselves to be following the boring development of the story. This might be why the absurdity of American comedy is popular with the masses. This may also be the reason film adaptations of famous novels and plays tend to fail contrary to expectations.

Linked poetry does not have a coherent story that can be expressed in ordinary terms, but it is musically coherent, its thirty-six verses constituting an integrated movement. I wish someone were able to create a film that, like linked poetry, is coherent in this sense.

Such juxtapositions of scenes as those in the Paramount News are sometimes unwittingly able to create effects similar to linked poetry. A recent issue of Asahi gurafu included pages juxtaposing sketches of the city. It is possible to create “linked poetry” by deft juxtaposition.

Although a number of films have incorporated the kinetic beauty of the machine, artifice always rings hollow and is uninteresting. For example, the machines in Metropolis are naive, dull, and more unpleasant than absurd. To the contrary, films that show real machines in ordinary factories have a profound attraction different from when we see machines in real life. Even an ordinary machine takes on an entirely different life when properly filmed, and content we have missed in real life, comes into view.

It is no more the goal of film than it is of painting to show real things as they are. The genuine merit of film resides in revealing what we could not discover through looking at real things. For example, how could we enjoy the wind-blown grass if we ourselves were in an actual lion hunting scene? Would there be room to feel pity for the lion being killed? Could we distance ourselves to the extent that we could entertain such doubts as, “Do human beings have any right to slaughter these free inhabitants of the plains?”

It is, to my mind, also foolish to attempt to add awkward natural colors to film. Accordingly, it seems that those talkies which are nothing but copies of theater are condemned to fail. Needless to say, the goal of sound cinema as an autonomous art should not be to copy what already exists, but to create what does not exist in reality. In this sense, animated sound cartoons, occasionally shown as a minor part of the program, are certainly an art. It creates a new world, however lowbrow it is. To the contrary, to copy Mrs. Tamaki’s solo is simply a very unpleasant disclosure of reality.

Just as painting progressed from realism to impressionism, from impressionism to expressionism, and from secessionism to constructivism, it is possible that film could take a similar course. Then the inherent essence of film that finally survives might resemble the primitive shadow play I saw as a child in the countryside.

In a vaudeville theater somewhere in Europe, I saw a certain Italian do a
shadow play using only his fingers. The mechanism was simple: he crossed his hands above his head, and a light from a small hole projected their shadows onto the screen. Yet, it was a divine skill. Two small monkeys on the screen, face to face, picking off each other’s fleas or having a fight looked entirely real, but in reality, they were mere shadows of his two hands without any special gimmicks. Another program projected a slapstick comedy solely by means of a few humble props and a backdrop. When the drunken husband came home late at night and knocked on the door, his wife, Xanthippe, threw a strange liquid on him from the balcony. In the end they scuffled with each other. I came across the same attraction by chance when I went to the US. It was quite impressive that one could make a living from such a special skill in various parts of the world. Those who enjoy this sort of entertainment are not only impressed by the extraordinary skill, but also intoxicated by the particular charm of shadow play.

Despite the span of several centuries between primitive shadow plays and contemporary sound cinema, the latter could learn much from the former.

The sound that cinema will come to incorporate does not have further potential if it is solely used for dialogues in order to convey the plot. Its possibility in the remote future must lie more in something like the “shadows of sound.”

One film I saw recently included a romantic scene set on an American river ship in which a group of Negroes, lying atop of one another in the hold like pigs, melancholically sang a sad song of the downtrodden. It made me feel as if I were watching the entire history of black slavery in America.

A camel is lying in the desert, and one can hear the noise of an approaching airplane. Then the surprised camel stands up with a loud bleat. This is enough to unfold the hot desert before our eyes, activating fiction’s lie. In a hotel room people are talking, and then we hear an Arab chanting a prayer for Allah. This transfers an ordinary room to a corner of the town of Teheran. Only sound can achieve this kind of effect. A private detective comes over to talk to the “potential villain,” and hears a native girl singing a lullaby in the next room. The interest of the film lies in the detective’s attention to the lullaby. Although one could list countless examples of this kind, I find it unsatisfactory that, generally speaking, stereotypes such as the sound of automobiles and gunfire tend to dominate. It seems to me that films have not made use of other interesting things. I encourage them to experiment with making a talkie film without any automobiles, guns, or jazz.

Actually, there are many examples in which haiku uses “shadows of the voice” in a very adroit manner. Take “The distant report of gun / Sounds cloudy: The Month of u (April)” as an example. This is subtly different from
the gunfire in American talkies. Another example is “Just as the village comes into view a horn blows to tell of noontime.” This suggests something different from a jazz trumpet. “At the tub of ashes dripping sounds yield to stillness as crickets chirp” provides good idyllic detail, and “The strolling peddler loudly calls his wares in shortened names as he passes by,” provides a comical moment. I recommend the scriptwriters for talkies, at least in this country, study Bashō and Buson.

How will film techniques progress in the future? Is three-dimensional cinema next? It might be possible to actually make a three-dimensional image without relying on the stereoscopic effect. Yet, it is questionable whether three-dimensional cinema could make a great contribution. Rather, I think the progress of cinema resides in the direction of purifying monotone and two-dimensional sound cinema. In order to achieve this, cinema should change into something like symphony or a linked poetry of shadows and voices by eliminating impurities, that is, the reproduction of theatrical performance.

When I was talking about this, someone informed me that films of the school called “avant-garde” were more or less moving in this direction. Unfortunately, I have not yet had a chance to see them.

After writing the previous portion of this essay, I saw an educational film produced by UFA which showed ocean plankton. In observing them through a microscope, we become aware of the relative scale of the microscope before us and the prepared specimen under its lens. However, magnified on screen, they look like monsters. Each part of their transparent bodies displays complex and subtle movements. We, as ignorant human beings, do not understand what these movements signify or what their purpose may be. Because of our ignorance, we feel fear and awe when watching them. An impoverished human science cannot but observe them, dumbfounded. This is nothing other than mystery. Comparing these actual monsters to, say, the Martian imagined by Wells, the narrow and poor range of human imagination becomes painfully clear.

Immediately after this screening, I went to take a look at Suronin Chuya [Chuya the Masterless Samurai]. It was nothing but a disorganized procession of dolls carved by a hand knife and stuck together with paste. It seemed as if I was looking at a piece of glass after watching a diamond. Yet, the audience enthusiastically applauded. I left the theater in the middle of the show, and found the notice, “Sold out,” at the entrance. The same thing happened with Tojin Okichi [Okichi the Foreigner’s Mistress].

The first point I notice when watching these Japanese films is that they adhere too closely to theatrical conventions. In other words, in broad daylight they bring to a natural setting an acting style that could achieve har-
mony only before the footlights of a stage made of cypress against a painted backdrop. Their acting, therefore, looks crazy to the eyes of a novice fan like me. It is impossible to imagine them as our grandparents or great-grandparents with a Japanese hairstyle. The second point is the clumsy use of the crowd. The composition is monotonous and empty because the arrangement of the characters in the crowd lacks a sense of perspective and density. For example, the great courtroom scene looks like a display in a vegetable store. Generally speaking, foreign films are careful in regard to this point. The third point is that Japanese films tend to photograph fast movements at a close distance, ignoring the limitations naturally imposed on speed by the number of the frames per second. These fast movements, not only make the viewer dizzy, but leave a hollow impression and an unpleasant sensation. They should film fast movements at an appropriate distance taking into consideration the limitations of speed in film. In this regard, too, Japanese filmmakers should look at foreign films for reference. The fourth point is that the sets in Japanese films are often so crowded as to dilute and muddy the impression it gives the viewer. The scene of the slum in Suronin Chuya is an example of this. The elements of the sets compete with and cancel each other out, thereby failing to create a coherent atmosphere. In this regard, too, those in charge of directing the film can learn much from haiku. In addition, it is problematic when people, supposedly in the Tokugawa period, stride along a modern highway designed by the prefectural civil engineer, or when a duel with real swords takes place in front of a fence tiled with zinc or plastic plates; but I guess this can’t be helped.

Compared to period films, Japanese films dealing with contemporary subjects have some advantages. They are likely to avoid the first point, i.e., unnaturalness, more easily and can eliminate problems regarding the fourth point, i.e., sets. Therefore, I tend to find their failure less unpleasant than the swordfight films. Nevertheless, for my taste, their acting looks too contrived. The actors too often unnaturally ape Westerners. Have they not considered deepening the sense of reality by showing the ordinary facial expressions of ordinary Japanese? Is it not possible to show the many different types of human beings we interact with in our everyday life? Screenplays today take for granted the so-called “natural character” of the star, and rely on mannerisms. Consequently, even though this may please star worshipers, it does not produce diversity. This might be a universal tendency, and not limited to Japanese cinema. If this is the case, then my discontent is directed toward this general tendency. The mission of cinema should be something more than the construction of a cathedral for the mass worship of stars.

American films of the absurd and musical comedies seem at first meaningless and uninteresting, but are in one sense very advanced. If art is not a
representation of what exists but of what one wishes to exist, as a certain critic puts it, such films are the highest art of the Yankees. Watching those films is a stand in for the viewer’s own singing and dancing, indulging in a quick romantic fling, or randomly firing a gun. Prohibited from drinking alcohol freely, they project themselves into those films, and thereby intoxicate themselves with the glasses of liquor on the screen. In these respects, these films fall into the same category of art as jazz music. Jazz is not for objective appreciation, but is an activity just like frenzied dancing. To prove this, you only have to see the waiter in bell-bottom trousers walking on the street. He starts dancing like some cheap automaton whenever he hears a jazz record playing in a store. Therefore, jazz should be the highest art in the same sense that the barbarians’ dance of war appeals to the barbarians. Likewise, the spectacular action of swordfight films in our country must be applauded by the masses. Most Japanese would find Araki Mataemon’s fight against more than thirty enemies irresistible. The so-called proletarian arts might aim at something similar to this.

Ultimately, the fact that jazz music and films of the absurd are popular in the US is just another sign that philosophy, science, and art in their traditional sense no longer flourish in that country. That is why the philosophy of gold, the science of steel and concrete, and the art of skyscraper crimes develop there.

On the other hand, the reason why philosophy and science in their traditional sense developed in Germany is probably because Germans are “dull,” slow to the point, and do not assume “everything is gonna’ be all right.” Because of this, German cinema is trying to place the art and the philosophy prior to 1930 on screen.

The French are an intelligent race. The country that bore Matisse and Debussy will give rise to something fresh in cinema. I have not yet seen this thing called avant-garde, but regardless, it is probably right to have high expectations for the future of French cinema.

There were some remarkably intelligent, and original geniuses among our forebears, at least in the realm of art: Korin, Utamaro, Sharaku, or Bashō, Saikaku, Buson. What if we were to summon them from their graves to the present of the Showa era and have them work on the writing and directing for silent films and sound films? They would completely digest the American and German styles and then create anew a pure, national cinema. Korin and Bashō would take charge of making art films for the elite, Utamaro and Saikaku, eroticism for the masses, and Sharaku and Kyoden, social satire. It would be exquisite if we could make Hiroshige direct the “New Hundred Views of Tokyo” or the “New Sumida River Railroad Bridge” and it would be exciting for Hokusai to depict the “New Japan Alps
Landscape" or a pageant of contemporary mores. Then these new Japanese films would be exported to the West, as the woodblock prints were. It is rather pleasant to entertain a dream like this even when one is not so very patriotic.

As I was indulging in a flight of fancy, enumerating the old Japanese painters, I came across Toba Sojo. I smiled to myself, imagining a scene where the priest Kakuyu, in his garb with the sleeves rolled up, is a film director shooting his masterpiece, an animal comedy, all with a megaphone in his hand. Then, recalling the images of his famous hand-scroll kept in Kozan Temple, I happened to think of the theme of "the hand-scroll and the era of moving pictures."

The initial idée of the hand-scroll may have been imported, but it is quite a splendid one. In a sense, it can be regarded as a precursor of the motion picture. It seems that both share the idea that we can control the passage of time by projecting time, the fourth dimension, onto a one-dimensional space, instead of cutting the actual three-dimensional space down to a two-dimensional plane. Although in terms of machine technology from the perspective of art criticism, motion pictures unquestionably take the lead over hand-scrolls; it might be difficult to decide which is superior. In the hand-scroll, the transition from one scene to another corresponds to the "fantasy" produced in the beholder's brain. The clouds, waves, landscape, flowers and birds drawn on the scroll become the backdrop, montage, or atmosphere, thus engendering a foreshadowing of the coming scene. Then, finally the next scene appears and "coincides" with the continuum in his/her brain. Hence the scene provides the film in the beholder's brain with a strong accent, and gives stimuli and guidance to its subsequent development. One might say that this is an amazing art. At any rate, it poses a question. I think that the pursuit of this question will certainly result in a number of suggestions extremely important for filmmakers.

Wells wrote a novel called The Time Machine. The story goes that this elaborate machine enables us to travel either to the past or the future as we please. In my mind, the hand-scroll and its offspring, the motion picture, are a sort of "time machine," in that they can control the passage of time at will by playing it in order, reversing it, slowing it down, or speeding it up. Yet, motion pictures that depend on a material mechanism can reveal neither the future of the actual material world, nor a past not fixed in film. It is, however, interesting that the past and the future in the world of the psyche freely unfold on the surface of various hand-scrolls. I have not yet seen the film "One Hundred Billion Years of the Universe," but whether successful or not, the producer's intention must have been the "time machine."

Another question is how can we preserve contemporary films for the dis-
tant future? The preservation of sound has already been carried out by means of metal master discs of phonograph records. Since films cannot survive for a long time as they are, we must transfer them into plates made solely of inorganic matter that will never deteriorate and preserve them in proper places. For example, I wonder if there is any way to print the silver reduced on the surface of the fused silica film directly onto silica. At any rate, if we could preserve films by some means, it would be interesting, funny, terrifying, sad, promising, and helpless, for our offspring, many centuries later, to view the procession of our ghosts.

It is time for me to take my scissors to this disorganized collection of ramblings.

Notes
1 First published in Shiso (September 1930), and reprinted in Terada Torahiko zenshu v. 8 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), p. 113-134.
2 The magic lantern is an optical device that was first made in seventeenth century Europe, and it quickly spread to other parts of the world. It projects images painted on a glass slide onto a white screen in a darkened room, using the light of a candle or oil lamp focused by a lens.
3 Hogaku Za and Musashino Kan were large, high-class movie theaters, specializing in foreign films.
4 The original specifies its printing method as “anime ban,” a process that transfers the negative print of the photograph taken through a glass plate with fine cross strips carved on its surface onto a sensitized copper plate, and develops it, using acid.
7 The Monkey’s Straw Raincoat.
8 UFA is the German film studio partly funded by the government.
9 Directed by Mizoguchi Kenji, released in July 1930.
10 Toba Sojo’s formal name. He is said to be the author of Choju giga, the handscrolls anthropomorphizing animals in a comic/satiric manner made in the late twelfth century.
As machines continue to develop, performance art becomes widely available in reproduced form as opposed to original through the means of phonograph, cinema, radio, television and so forth. I would like to think about the characteristic differences existing between this mechanically reproduced art and unmediated original art.

Art materializes through its expressive form. This form consists of two types: one that must logically be immediate and the other that must logically be indirect. Music, theater and dance belong to the former, as do plastic arts. Such art forms as novels naturally belong to the latter because of the mediation of writing. What I mean by original art is the manner in which we enjoy the immediate form of expression as it is. Reproduced art is that which we enjoy indirectly by changing the manner of appreciating art that naturally should retain its direct form of expression. These include such things as performed music that has been recorded on records, performances of theater and dance made into talkie films, and architectural structures portrayed in photographic prints.

Many people are terribly disinterested in this transformation, and some of them even consider original and reproduced art to be one and the same. However, theater and talkies, for example, are already two different expressive forms. That is to say, the fact that these are two different art forms has been widely discussed among specialists, and indeed, their differing perspectives have been sharply distinguished. The problem emerging from these discussions is a possible loss of raison d'être as reproduced art spreads among the masses and original art becomes the raw material for reproduced art.

Today, as far as the talkie is concerned, all sorts of original art forms are already being used as one type of raw material. The talkie is not a mere copy of original art as it is. Rather, the talkie operates with completely different artistic concerns than those of original art. The capacity of the mechanical device known as the talkie inherently possesses a unique form of expression that uses original art as its material. Therefore, the talkie in itself is a unique
form of art, and to the extent that it becomes independent of original art, it has the potential to attain a higher artistic capacity and value.

In this way, the mechanical device known as the talkie acts like a dictatorial tyrant against original art. Even nature, its form, color, sound, and movements, can be remade freely by the talkie, and original art cannot escape a similar treatment. As the technique of the talkie advances and the talkie continues to mechanically reproduce the specific materials of original art and nature, it processes such materials with complete control as if they themselves were the conceptual products of the talkie producers. The way in which the talkie remakes its subject is unlike the way in which music remakes all phenomena into notes. This is because the talkie, as a mechanical device, has a far more sophisticated capacity to copy the subject. Therefore, as long as its mechanical nature is not wasted, and as long as the device functions, the talkie remakes the original according to its own artistic concerns. In the talkie, the camera remakes nature in the same way that melodrama² remakes nature to be fantasy-like. Needless to say, because the talkie relies on its mechanical nature, it cannot in any way separate itself from objective actuality, unlike the case of melodrama. The more its mechanical nature develops, however, the more the talkie is capable of performing a fantastical reproduction of the material subject matter, similar to what happens in melodrama. In addition, through its mechanical nature, the talkie can actualize what cannot be actualized in melodramatic fantasy. It hardly needs to be said that the talkie also has the ability to bring about such a metamorphosis in original art.

To put this in extreme terms, the talkie can take a solo performance by an average vocalist as material and control and adjust its notes freely to produce any grotesque and random vocal sequence. (It may be possible in the future, when the device improves, to take any haphazard solo vocal sequence and remake it into standard singing). In even more general terms, natural sounds and human voices are never reproduced as they are in talkies, but are heavily manipulated and organized into sounds according to specific artistic concerns. Needless to say, forms and movements are similarly transformed in talkies.

In the talkie, original art is turned into material that does not have its own position. In general, reproduced art shares this quality. In records and radio, in varying degrees, the expression becomes different from that of the original art form.

Here, as I said in the beginning, the following problem can arise: as reproduced art becomes more prevalent, original art comes to serve merely as its basic material and this leads to the loss of its raison d’être.
As far as this problem is concerned, one might say it would depend on how mechanical devices develop. In other words, if a machine develops to the utmost perfection and original art is thus perfectly reproduced, (the same in all aspects, including its shape, form, and sound) original art will lose its raison d'etre and we will be able to enjoy completely reproduced art just like original art. In this view, if the situation arises where the color [of the reproduced] is completely identical to that of the original, the shapes are three-dimensional, and the sound is technically the same quality, then there is no need to come into contact with the original art work.

However, such a suggestion, first of all, mis-recognizes the intrinsic quality of original art. Secondly, it unavoidably leads to the mistake of closing one's eyes to the social nature of human beings.

While there is no room here to explain the intrinsic quality of original art in general terms, if I limit myself to the above-mentioned problem, the life of original art is its sense of the uniqueness of time and its unmediated directness. What I mean here by the 'uniqueness of time' is the fact that it can never be identically repeated despite those who claim that just like "history," original art will be repeated. This is the impossibility of mechanical repetition. Secondly, 'unmediated directness' means that the most basic quality of art relies on the sense that interacts with the original object itself. What I mean by sensual interaction with the actual thing is the naturally developed capacity of human sensory organs to distinguish between the human body, voice and motions, on the one hand, and their imitation on the other. We can imagine this difference if we think about seeing an actual human body and then seeing a wax or lacquer figure that shares a close resemblance to it in color and shape. The accuracy of this ability to distinguish is superior to that of mechanical means, and this is solely due to the development of the human sensory organs. Experts can distinguish at a glance between a building made of skillfully crafted imitation marble and a building made with genuine marble. This is because sensory organs, which have for many years examined genuine marble, intuitively detect a subtly different sensation when looking at imitation marble.

Original art is art that gives a genuine sensation in this way. That is why those who cannot receive this genuine sensation from original art are incompetent in appreciating art. Achieving this competency may seem just as difficult as distinguishing the authenticity of marble. On the contrary, in the case of art, because this genuine feeling is intuitively felt through a general experience common to all humans, this is something a layperson is more apt
to achieve as opposed to distinguishing the authenticity of a particular material.

That is to say, the immediate sensation produced by original art is generally based upon the normal physicality of human beings themselves. This can be felt by anyone, just as when an ordinary person distinguishes between the body of a living woman and its imitation through an instinctive sensory function. Even an amateur who does not have an ear for music can surely feel the force that appeals to instinctive human senses. The characteristic of original art is to give this living physical sense without mediation. However much machines develop, and even when reproduced art replaces original art as such, we should still be able to differentiate between the sensation produced by a machine and the sensation produced by a living human being. Likewise, no imitation can give the sensation that the body of a living woman can give.

In truth, one could say that art’s underlying purpose is to enable a supreme form of such human action. To put this in different terms, original art is precisely that which best responds unconditionally to human artistic demands. Mediated by text, novels and other works of fiction depend on an extremely incomplete medium. Herein lies the reason why literature, relying on text as a form of expression, cannot give satisfaction to the majority of the people. In the present as well as in the past, literature has only become a strong force appealing to the masses when it has taken the form of oral narration or theater. This is why the film adaptations of novels have a much stronger appeal for the masses than the original novel. Even as reproduced art, films are much closer to original art insofar as they are accompanied by forms and sound.

[3]

While art should aspire to create an original experience for enabling a supreme form of human interaction as the ideal form, original art is singular in temporality. Theatrical and musical performances cease to exit after one performance; the same performance can never be replicated. In both music and theater, it has come to be accepted as the norm that the same person repeats the same performance within a given period of time, since the size of the audience has increased. This norm unavoidably creates a slight ‘unnaturalness’ that is in opposition to a primary characteristic of original art, namely, its temporal singularity. Even in a rather formalistic art form like dance, as long as the performance did not require an agreement between the art form and its emotional content, conscientious dancers would not be capable of multiple performances, one after the other. This, in the end, lapses into mechanical repetition, and thus cannot be motivated by conscious reasoning.
In theater, the same act is repeated day after day. This practice must have become mechanical repetition through the languor of performers themselves at first. As in the phase, 'to become habit,' in order to avoid making performance habitual like China's crying man, who can shed tears on demand, actors must have learned to perform so as not to make their performance a mechanical repetition of the senses day after day. There is an anecdote from the West about an actor's apprentice who, on the last day of a program lasting many days, made a mistake in his deathbed performance. His master scolded him saying: "You have repeated this a dozen times, yet you still made a mistake. You idiot!" To this, the apprentice replied: "After I had to feel like dying day after day, at the end I was no longer able to feel like dying." In this case, the words of the apprentice have more human honesty. His masters, through practice, were able to attain a performance technique that made the unnatural appear natural.

When original art is repeated, it always becomes something different depending on the mood of the performer, and the degree of his/her physical fitness. When the same musician plays the same score of a musical piece, [the performance] can never be the same identical mechanical repetition because of the environment in which the performance takes place and the subjective opinion of the performer. For this reason, from the audience's point of view, the experience of going to a live concert again and again to see the same musician playing the same piece, on the one hand, and the experience of repeatedly listening to the same record of a live concert, on the other hand, will never be the same. It is natural that repeated playing of a record causes a psychological effect, resulting from the mechanical repetition of the exact same stimuli. As long as there is no significant time lapse, the listener will probably feel a marked difference in this psychological effect between the first listening and the second.

That is to say, on the receiving side, since reproduced art is that which can be felt holistically, the repetition merely serves the function of triggering memories. Original art, on the contrary, does not repeat in the strict sense of the word. Artists would not conscientiously give a performance that could succumb to mechanical repetition, in the manner of records. Artists invariably perform new art depending on their mood at that time. Herein lies the reason we must always receive art that is fundamentally original, in its 'original form.'

While talkie films can provide an illusion that is closest to the original, there is no doubt that anyone who can imagine the difference between seeing a lover in person and in film can reflect on the difference between this illusion and the original. The magic of the talkie camera is that it contains the
power to provide more of an appearance of illusion; but it does not have the power to give the same sensation that the actual person can give. In fact, once the same film circulates among the general public, it cannot avoid the fate of being put into storage without ever seeing sunlight again. This is an enormous difference from the fact that original art can repeatedly give varying sensations to the same audience. If the best talkie film is ultimately a mere mechanical repetition, this means that its sensations can be felt in their entirety in just one screening. Repetitive viewing may diminish the freshness of these sensations, and lead to the destruction of the artistic sensation of a first viewing.

Although radio is a form of reproduced art, it shares a characteristic with original art through its temporal singularity. Since it utilizes mechanical sound, a voice from a radio lacks the fundamental feeling an original voice has as it appeals to our intuition. For this reason, radio cannot give us the direct unmediated feeling that original art can. Therefore, the artistic form of radio should develop in a form that is different from original art, and it should be studied as a unique form of expression, like the talkie. By the same token, the use of the microphone in music, (which should be original art) becomes problematic. The microphone adds to the voice by transforming it into machine-sound, and thus the most fundamental nature of original art is lost. Especially nowadays, when microphones are used under conditions where electric voltage is continuously fluctuating, electricity takes control of the performer’s voice. Indeed, the absurdness of such a situation is apparent. If the voice can be controlled elsewhere, as in the case of radio, the performing vocalist will turn into a robot working for the microphone tuner and become the same thing as actors of talkie films. Of course, a performer’s voice in a theater cannot avoid sounding different when it reaches the audience, due to the acoustics of the architecture (see Prof. Taguchi’s research in Riken). We can only wait for architecture to develop so that acoustics do not interfere with the sound of the original voice. For reasons such as these, we cannot conclude that original art and reproduced art are ultimately the same thing. When the original sound is lost as a result of echoing, it is not enough to merely say that original art was lost due to a poor environment. Original art must be appreciated in its unaltered state. There is a gallery called the Hoistberling in the St. Paul Cathedral in London. Located in a hallway inside a dome, it is built so that when one person whispers quietly on one end, people on the other hear a ghost-like voice. Of course, this gives a strange feeling that is nothing like the original sound of whispering. Vocal performance which is original art can no longer be called original art when the voice is
transformed by the architecture in such a manner. The reproduced sound we hear is far worse than sound manipulated through a microphone. Vocalists should try to provide as much original sound as possible to large audiences and avoid giving mechanically manipulated performances. To achieve this, they should follow the example of Demosthenes and practice in order to develop a strong forceful voice that can, in its original state, appeal to a large audience. If it would detract from certain musical works to perform with such a loud voice, this should result in a conscientious decision not to play such works for large audiences.

Next, there is another important point concerning the raison d'etre of original art, namely, the social nature of human beings is the reason why people demand original art and are unsatisfied with reproduced art.

Strictly speaking, this is an extremely complicated problem. However, in simple terms, artistic demand begins and ends with searching for the original form. That is to say, while original art is the most primitive and incipient form of art, it is also the most developed and advanced form. As far as the means of human interaction are concerned, there is interaction through texts and interaction through pictorial and photographic means, but society itself can never be built merely through such indirect means. Without an interaction with original forms, human society cannot be established, and the social nature of human beings will not be satisfied. This is the same as a romance that cannot be satisfied through letters and photographs alone. Even in assemblies such as academic conferences where events can be dispensed with through the mere exchange of texts, an annual assembly is planned and each member demands interaction with the original scholar. It is a matter of course that general social relations, based on senses and emotions, cannot be formed without actual contact between human beings.

In this way, original art is a human method that brings senses and emotions into contact with the original material in the most sophisticated and serious manner. It is a method that does not isolate primitive contact between bodies and give shape to the best human interaction. Much of so-called high-class art has as a norm the disengagement from such fundamental senses. However, original art, regardless of how expensive it becomes, or how its expressive form becomes formulaic, will not destroy this natural sensation. It is precisely the expressive form that is fundamentally artistic.

Thus, if we hypothesized that original art would lose its most powerful method of contact through the development of the record, the talkie, television and so forth (even though this could never happen), then human beings' understanding of each other's senses and emotions would become extreme-
ly superficial and formulaic. We would not be able to “see its form to know it is god,” as the phrase goes, and the human bond would then become extremely superficial. It is not necessary to imagine such things by hypothesizing the impossible. However, because the keenness of human senses regarding sounds, forms, and movements have regressed enormously due to the development of tools from many thousands of years ago, particularly compared to that of the animals’ intuitive senses, the regression of unmediated senses among human beings may be all the more unavoidable.

Notes
1 Published August 1, 1935 in Bungei.
2 “Melodrama" is glossed as melodrama in the original Japanese text.
3 “Imitation" is glossed as imitation in the original Japanese text.
4 “Robot” is glossed as robot in the original Japanese text.
I think it is necessary to draw the readers' attention to the principle that may be fairly called everydayness. It is a principle that governs an extremely wide field, however, it is not the principle people currently speak of in everyday usage. I now want to problematize this principle.

The problem is connected to the general — and to that extent abstract — structure of history. It is a problem that pertains to the principle of history. If we say things like, the principle of history, or the general structure of history, we find that the problem returns to a theory of time — historical time. So what is the nature of historical time? In answering this question the existence and character of the principle of everydayness will come into relief.

So — not confining ourselves to history — if we attempt to represent time clearly (evidently), we can only more conscientiously re-represent a representation of time. This means that the representation of time can only be represented temporally. Because of this, the representation of time returns to the temporal representation of things. But this then makes time first and foremost a problem of consciousness. We then have the fact that time seems to belong to consciousness and that it is first uncovered in consciousness.

But if we end up thinking like this, things like historical time become mere appurtenances of the time of consciousness — let's tentatively call it phenomenological time. If this is true, history, its own principle and the general structure of that principle — that is historical time — must be borrowed from the phenomenon of consciousness, from a phenomenon outside history. The principle of history becomes something not of history itself. Historical principle becomes nothing more than the application of some ahistorical something or other. Historical time disappears; it becomes nothing other than ahistorical time. Thus our problem — historical time — is conveniently erased.

By just looking at this it is already clear that for our problem to become a problem at all, and for it to have a resolution, time cannot be thought of as first and foremost belonging to consciousness. This means the problem of historical time can in no way be a subject of phenomenology.
It is usually said that the natural sciences have made time quantifiable. Whether or not this is true, we must be careful of this explanation. If making something measurable means only making it quantifiable or spatializing it, there is no problem. But in most cases, while science is making time divisible within a general representation of time, are not people in the habit of thinking about this uncritically? Inserting a division, that is, making time measurable, seems to mean quantification and spatialization. But it is the parsing itself, exactly the opposite of what most people think, that makes time possible.

Now, if we try to imagine a "pure" time that does not have, that cannot have, any parsing, this is a "pure" duration. Why? Because if the continuity were to slacken even a little bit it would become impure, it is then that a gap may be made in it and it may be thought that this is where a rupture may infiltrate. Such a perfect time, a ceaseless flow is probably the stream of consciousness. But first, does consciousness, in the general meaning of the word, in fact flow? I do not want to say that consciousness stops, clearly it is fine to say that consciousness progresses, but is that a flow? If the continuity of consciousness — and this means the flow — is like a series of real numbers in mathematics then we cannot even problematize the qualitative difference between two points of this flow. There is no space between the numbers. It cannot even become a problem. So, in order to problematize this issue, consciousness does not flow continuously but, as it were, moves only in quantum leaps — which is to say it does not flow. So, I want to declare, time in the consciousness, phenomenological time, and what is thought of as pure duration, even these, if undivided, are not really time.

But though saying this, if there are people who cannot accept that time must be parsed, most likely those people are thinking of temporality [toki] rather than time [jikan]. Actually, the phenomenological time of the consciousness and the relation between the conscious and the unconscious is always dealt with by the category of temporality. But if treated in this way, time — as parsed temporality — has already become not time, and importantly, temporality maintains a solid relationship with the representation of eternity. Eternal things are the exact opposite of temporal things. At the same time temporality is the shadow of eternity (Plato, Plotinus, St. Augustine). The way of thinking that treats time as temporality, ignoring its divisions, originates in thinking that historical time is firstly an example of phenomenological time. This is none other than the device we called the purification of time. But time, in order to be time, absolutely must be parsed. In Aristotle for example, it is parsed by means of the breaths in physical exertion (in broken movements and at different junctures; it is necessary to rest at each breath). In other words, by means of the pauses in motion, because
divisions enter into the temporality of the whole activity, time becomes defined by the number of separate motions. In this limited sense, by inserting divisions, we may talk of making time measurable and quantifiable.

Yet in the natural sciences, the method of inserting divisions itself, as such, is so thoroughly accomplished that people have rather made the divisions independent; the division replaces time itself. Time is defined by its divisions (hours and time frames). But exaggerating the division in this way (in the method of division) means the natural sciences have made time completely homogenous. That is to say, that though it is true the natural phenomenon of the earth’s rotation is taken as a standard of measurement, the unit of division easily may be placed anywhere in time. Oddly, the notion that inserting any division in any place is acceptable — this is homogeneity — also means that, regarding temporal units, it is equally fine to insert or not to insert a division. If this is done, this time, this division, has no essence. Thus the result of exaggerating the division is that divisions of time in the natural sciences transform into the opposite of divisions of time. In other words, divisions become superficial and arbitrary, they have no relationship to the content of time. This is part and parcel of the measurement and spatialization of time.\footnote{In the natural sciences the concept of non-spatializable — irreversible — which is to say pure time is entropy. Yet even an increase in entropy has no division other than energy quanta.}

Such being the case, if we exaggerate the removal of the principle of divisibility from the concept of time, time becomes temporality and temporality is made eternal, as with the phenomenological concept of time suggested in expressions like “time stops”, or “the eternal now”. On the other hand if we isolate and exaggerate the principle of divisibility, time is spatialized and is no longer time (as in the natural sciences). In the end, these two concepts of time are nothing more than caricatures of two kinds of time that come from overexaggerating partial aspects.

Both of these concepts mean the complete rejection of historical time. The reason is that within these concepts it is thought that time, as a rule, cannot be first and foremost historical time. In reality, making time into temporality is the same as making history eternal; it is making history circular. And here history becomes eternal recurrence (see Nietzsche). Thus history is already something other than history; it becomes some sort of a cosmology. It is said that Dante’s cosmography is an expression of the Christian philosophy of history. If we consider these kinds of things, natural scientific time completely parallels those eternal cycles which use heavenly bodies as a standard. Just like the arrival of the spring equinox, Christ too must surely
have a second coming. Something people must recognize is that thinking of
time as temporality and spatializing time are part of the same tendency. The
mythologizing of time and its vulgarization both have the same result. In just
what way is it an identical effect? It is in the neglect of historical time, in the
forgetting of the proper parsing of time — though just what this is we have
yet to see.

Historical time is the fundamental concept of temporal things. And within
that — without overemphasizing or understating it — is the division. But
what is a division of historical time?

It is period (Zeit). A time frame with its divisions and endpoints added
according to historical compartmentalizations (epoche) means a period. But
this period is not the period of the natural sciences (rather it is closer to the
grammatical meaning). If we ask why, it is because this parsed time — his-
torical time — comes from the contents of that time itself, already this is dif-
f erent from the arbitrary and external way of the natural sciences
(see above).

Historical time is divided into periods according to its own contents. Contents are probably endlessly diverse; they culminate not in form but in content. At the same time, when these contents are viewed as belonging to some kind of modality, what is important is the concept of character. After all, this is because character is the category that grasps content with respect to content and not form. In historical time, the unity of various characteristics made into a modality is differentiated and parsed into periods possessing various characters. Character differs from individuality or individual (in-dividuum, a-tom), something which cannot be further divided (clearly already an indivisible thing). In fact, quite the contrary, character is the standard for division. (A principle which divides without this kind of determinate standard based in content — meaning one which divides formally — is the principle of individuation). Periods have various characters. Furthermore various characters give us periods. So the duration (quantity) of a period changes depending on the nature (quality) of the character, not the reverse. For this reason it is the opposite of periodicity in the natural sciences. This difference originates solely in the fact that historical periods come from their own historical contents — and the means to grasp the contents is the category of character.

Character can also be seen as the extremely elastic, robust atom of history. An even better example may be a monad which, with its windows open and freely breathing in the air, expands and contracts. It may be thought that in this way history is heterogeneous and in this limited sense history is continuous. This is most likely what it means to say history is par-
ticular. History is that which is drawn out by the shape of historical time and by the existence of these characters in history. That is, it precisely belongs to one kind of quantity — the division. But this is both a qualitative thing and a measurable quantity. It is not the period of the natural sciences.

We said character is the concept and means to grasp the content of history. But this means is not something anyone can just think up or create; it is produced by history itself. Character is like the fruit which when ripe, on its own drops from the tree of history. When it does fall, people must catch it without fail. It is best to say that people only discover certain characters within history. But it must also be said that in what manner people faithfully receive this fruit depends on the character of the people themselves. The question of how their character is connected to history's — the period's — character is determined by this character which has emerged. The problem then returns to the question of their historical sense.

But their character is not the character of their isolated selves alone; it is only determined in correlation with the general character of their contemporaries. The general character of their contemporaries, by the way, is merely one part of a pair of things, which also includes the character of the period itself. Presently this is the relation between the character of the period and the character of the people themselves who discover that character.

But this alone is not yet a true explanation of character. Just what causes it to fall from the tree (note: in historical time the word cause is entirely adequate)?

In reality, what is it that attaches a character to a period? It is politics. (A thing like cultural history [bunkashi] which does not periodize by means of politics cannot even be considered one piece of a total history). But in the last instance (in order for a total recognition of existence itself) where does the modality of politics originate? It is in the material relations and forces of production. Because of this, in the final instance, the various characters in history begin with and originate in the material relations and forces of production resulting in a determinate modality. This is the genealogy of character in history. By means of these sorts of characteristics a character is attached to a period.

So if we return to the correlation between the character of a historical period and the character of the people who receive it, we must incorporate the very powerful concept of class as a mediation between contemporaries — that is society — and the individual. This is because if we take the material relations and forces of production as the origin, in a specific way — meaning oppositionally — it inevitably results in questions of class. In receiving the fruit, the basket of class is essential.
In this sense history is about character. Historical time (this historical principle is made manifest by becoming a period) and character are of equal value. Historical time, period and character all interrelate in this way.

Historical time comes from the series of individual kinds of various periods. The various periods all have their own unities, unitary measures, and totalities; we may say each period is, as it were, organic (this is not to say that society is organic, but that the period and character of society are organic). The single, organic quality of the period, it occupies a certain, particular position, corresponds to the origin of the series of periods that is historical time itself. Through the process of constructing its own modality (Formbildung), the period itself alters that modality (Formwesche). This means that even as a certain form of life exists, it is approaching death and that in death the seed of a new form of life is rejuvenated. Because of this, the series of periods in historical time can be especially dialectical. — A period then, is none other than the dialectical development of various stages of historical time.

This does not mean that the period is the foundation from which the historical series is constructed. Quite the contrary, it is first defined by means of the totality of the compartmentalizations of historical time. Stages are attached to particular periods by means of their relationship to the totality of historical time. Because it depends on into just what kind of totality the period is placed, even though the method of attaching stages may differ this is not so strange. Against the whole of historical time, the period is given a configured orientation. This is because in a certain sense, the period freely expands and contracts. It goes without saying that this gestalt quality expresses the equal value of both historical time and character. Fundamentally, the character itself, is the principle of configuring the dominant and subsidiary characters in relation to each other.

In the manner of natural scientific time, for example the phenomenon of the earth’s rotation becoming a standard, because it is given as fixed by the totality of the earth’s rotation, in determining the particular period [shuki] there is, as it were, no gap between the totality and the particular. Actually, this use of the word period means the piece cut out from the whole and, at the same time, also means the totality of the standard. So there is absolutely no room for our gestalt quality to slip in. Both periods fall on the same plane. In this sense, period is two-dimensional. Historical period however — that is one where there is a configured, gestalt quality — in a different meaning of the term, may be said to be three-dimensional. Fundamentally, the concept of character is what prevents the three-dimensional contents from being
flattened into a two-dimensional plane. The equal value of both historical time and character is here again made clear.

Despite all that has been said to this point, the most important feature of historical time remains to be expressed.

Indeed, the motivation for historical time becoming a human problem is clearly justified: there is no escaping the fact that people live [seikatsu suru] within historical time. It is the time of our lives, we must now remind ourselves of this fact.

Obviously we all live in the present; so in what position in our historical time do we place the present?

Certain people expand the present all the way to eternity in phrases like "the present in the past" or "the present in the future" or "the present in the present". In other words, the present equals a generalized past, present and future, which in turn equals a generalized time, which equals temporality and from there eternity. And thus "the eternal now". Then there are others who think of the present as a point in geometry, as something which has no length. The instant that the present is thought of, it is already the past, and so on. But both of these extremes merely express the same mistaken conception of the present. The reason is that neither conceive of the present as a period into which a division has infiltrated. Eclectic explanations perhaps consider the present as not having a point but a "fringe" or else in terms of differential calculus. It goes without saying that all eclectic explanations are in the same situation as the previous two extremes. In both differential calculus and the "fringe" view, it seems that there is temporal parsing but really there is none. This kind of present is not a historical period.

I want to caution that all these conceptions of the present come from the phenomenological concept of time. Our consciousness may indeed live in the phenomenological concept of time, but it is equally obvious that our bodies cannot.

The place where we actually go about our lives is a present [genzai] which exists in historical time, a present that is part of a certain period, indeed the present period [gendai]. To say that we live in the present period of course does not teach us anything especially new. What I wish to say is merely this: this present period is a particular period brought into relief through the parsing of historical time. That is to say, the present period has a limited duration (neither infinitely short nor long), but this duration is not like that of ordinary numbers, it is a unique, particular period influenced by the character of historical time which acts like a dependent variable.

Why is it a unique, particular period? It is because here is the accent of the
totality of historical time. It is because here is the core, the focal point of the character of historical time. It is because the three-dimensional nature of historical time is concentrated here.

Now the reader will surely notice that with all of the various regularities of historical time, here, for the first time, emerges the crystallized core. Historical actions, and narratives even, must take the present period as the point of origin; it seems necessary to state this anew.

The important thing is that this present period is freely expandable and contractable within the bounds of necessity. Depending on the situation, the present period may be reduced to "today" or to "now". Nevertheless, this "now" has the same quality — the same presentness [genzaisei], the same reality [genjitsusei] of the present historical period. At the level of principle, this means the principle of the present period is the principle of today. This is the principle of today — the principle of the quotidian.

In this way, historical time comes to be governed by the "principle of everydayness". In the principle of the day to day — the principle of the quotidian — in the constant repetition of the same act though it is a different day, in the common activity of drinking tea, in the absolute inevitability of the principle of everyday life — in these things dwells the crystallized core of historical time, here lies the secret of history. The concept of character which we said has equal value with historical time in reality appears as the principle of everydayness.

We said the present is governed by necessity and reducible to "today"; but what sort of necessity governs it? It is governed by the necessity of the life of practice. Most likely for postulated individuals, people impossibly rich in leisure time [seikatsusha], for them, there are probably many presents and present periods as well. This is because, for them, the present, one in which the concept of today is necessary, really never impinges on their lives. If today is bad, tomorrow or the day after will be better. Opposed to this, in a broad and practical sense, for the "worker" [rodōsha], the work absolutely must be done today. And so, for them, the present is brooded over and becomes the concept of today. — With history thus confined to the level of practice, the present draws nearer until it is "today". And thus the principle of today, the principle of everydayness, uniformly governs historical time. Precisely this is the spirit of history.

The principle of everydayness is the principle of presentness, it is the principle of reality, the principle of factual truthfulness [jijitsusei]. Accordingly, it is the principle of practice [jissen]. To sum up, the principle of everydayness is the principle of reality and factual truth, in other words, it is not the principle of possibility; this we must not forget.*
It is usually thought that talk of principles comes under the aegis of possibility. It is therefore imagined that the principle of possibility is all there is. But if done in this way, history becomes something without any principle at all. Is it not true that there are many occasions when people think of history irrationally?

I will explain the contents of this principle a bit more. The reader will no doubt permit me to relate a story about myself. If I have no work to do, I cannot find any legitimate, ethical justifications to worry over my limited lifetime, which is confined by this famous idea of death. This is truly a luxurious reward. But if I do have work to be done, because time in limited, I can no longer waste even a single day. The reason is, if my life is without end, I can always safely put off my work from one day to the next. I will always have a chance to recover lost time. Without the risk of wasting time, I may calmly spend my days sleeping and relaxing. But because someday death will indeed come, my work must be completed within a definite time period. This final death is even the ultimate reason for the existence of a deadline for this manuscript. Perhaps even more than writing this manuscript, under the same circumstances, my reading some book has value for me. But if I were to put off reading the book until tomorrow, it seems likely that the contents of the book will not have changed much in that time. Opposed to this, there is danger in putting off to tomorrow the writing of this manuscript because tomorrow a friend will most likely call on me. So, no matter what I write, I must finish this manuscript today. — Under today’s circumstances, the previous valuation of the two jobs collapses. The sense of vision that comes from the presentness of today, from the character of the now, constructs an independent priority of values. So, I cannot be allowed to measure the value system embedded in the reality of today with the categories of tomorrow. In accord with my limited lifetime, it is absolutely unavoidable that today’s work be tended to today and tomorrow’s tomorrow. Speaking from the standpoint of planning a work, the present of today imparts this kind of law of perspective to the construction and organization of what to do before and what to do after. — Now, this principle of the quotidian is the principle of everydayness. (Of course, if left uncorrected this is an insufficient model of the relationship between my individual self and society, or as a member of a class, or again, a single day of today and a single day in world history).

Historical time is governed by the principle of everydayness. Furthermore, the exchanging of today for tomorrow, or yesterday for today cannot be allowed. This is because doing so confuses the actual with the possible and this ignores the principle of factual reality.
In the end I will show the real world applications of this principle. But here I will confine myself to problems of logic.

A characteristic of what is called formal logic is that it mediates between things which fall on two identical planes. Things that move and act within these planes are fundamentally contradictory. For example, on one plane, “A” is α and, at the same time, is not something else like β. However, on the other plane, “A” could very well be β (but on this plane then it is already not α). And so, in the — vertical — relationship between these two planes, the law of contradiction is not played out. In the first section, the object “A” is α, but if “A” has a concrete diversity, in the second section it is of course not α (it is β, or something else for example). “A”, rather than displaying its contradictory nature, displays its materiality. Because of this, this so-called formal logic is merely a kind of three-dimensional logic of different planes. It goes without saying that this just illustrated three-dimensional logic is none other than dialectical logic, but what does this three-dimensionality mean?

If we deal with objects practically, the development of successive regularities, are, one after the other, revealed to us. This seems to be a succession for our own convenience but in reality it is a matter of principle, part of the peculiar character of objects themselves. Accordingly it corresponds to the successive development of the various regularities seen when matter is in motion — meaning historically. Because of this, the gap between the previous first and second sections — its three-dimensionality — must be said to correspond to an object’s historical changes. Logic is three-dimensional because it corresponds to historical time.

Now, for things that are especially historical, in other words, for historical, social things, in order to deal with these things practically, logic must be completely unified with this just illustrated historical time (not just simply correspond to it). In other words, logic must be governed by the principle of everydayness. And so, temporal perspective — the distinction between earlier and later, foreground and background — this kind of law of perspective, means the difference between the values stemming from logic. In the end, aligning the reality given by the present with the possibility of the future (ideality, imagination, anticipation, fear, anxiety, and so on) — in a non-everyday, formalistic manner — is necessarily a fiction which renders any of our actions impossible. People call this fiction a utopia. For this reason, in order for this utopia to be shown to be such, the principle of everydayness that governs logic should be made clear. But, in fact, today, this utopia
almost completely dominates the philosophies of Idealism. The real world applications of the principle of everydayness are not exhausted by the above example. Indeed, it is a fundamental principle of every historical and social object. This is because it goes without saying that historical time and the equally important “character” are together the principle of everydayness.

If I may be permitted a rather bold comparison, does not the principle of everydayness occupy a place in the historical imagination just as Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle do in physics? People could very well discover a number of similarities between the nature of these principles. If, in the end, this principle proves the validity of the doctrine of historical materialism and the equally important dictates of logic, the comparison may no longer seem so unjust.

Notes
2 Regularities here means fundamental things which act upon an object and help determine it. Space and time are the most basic of these. See Plato’s Timaeus.
3 Tosaka uses the German words Konfigural, Konfigurien, and Konfiguralität written in the Latin alphabet throughout this paragraph. These come from gestalt psychology and he uses them to say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Appendix
Biographical Notes

Kato Hiroyuki (1836-1916) studied military science with Sakuma Shozan and lectured at the Bakufu’s Institute for Western Learning in the final years of the Tokugawa period. In the 1870s, Kato defended the theory of natural rights, but reversed this position by the early 1880s. From this time, his political and ethical views were guided by materialism, evolutionism and egoism. Also deeply committed to education, Kato served as the president of Tokyo University from 1881 to 1893.

Ueki Emori (1857-1892) played a key role in formulating the theoretical underpinnings of the popular rights movement of the 1870s and 1880s. In 1873, Ueki left his home domain of Tosa (present day Kochi prefecture) for Tokyo, where he soon became active in various organizations committed to popular rights and representative government. Ueki was elected to the Diet in 1890. Though born into the samurai class, Ueki remained highly critical of class distinctions and their attendant political inequalities. Drawing on French political philosophy and conceptions from Japan’s past concerning risk-taking action for the higher good, Ueki argued that all people are endowed with the natural rights of life and liberty, and called upon the disenfranchised to actively take back their rights from those who would withhold them. Despite suppressive legislation designed to crush the popular rights movement, Ueki and other popular rights advocates provided a legacy for social protest movements in 20th century Japan.

Inoue Tetsujiro (1856-1944) graduated from Tokyo University in 1880. From 1884-1890, Inoue studied philosophy in Heidelberg and Leipzig. Upon his return to Japan, he became professor of philosophy at Tokyo University where he remained until his resignation in 1923. Inoue was a central figure in late 19th and early 20th century moral discourse in Japan. His 1891 commentary on the Imperial Rescript on Education became part of the curriculum for moral education throughout the country. Inoue’s collections of and commentaries on Japanese Confucian moral texts served as an authoritative inventory of Japan’s past moral thought from which to construct a morality of the kokumin (people/nation).
Biographical Notes

**Tomeoka Kōsuke** (1864-1934) converted to Christianity in 1882 in Okayama prefecture where he was born and devoted the remainder of his life to social reform. In the history of *Katei gakkō* (Family School) he writes that upon his conversion at the age of seventeen he became convinced that "The poor must be cared for; destitute and wayward children must have homes provided; fallen women must be saved; prisons must be reformed; and the laboring classes befriended." In 1888 Tomeoka graduated from Dōshisha University and became active in missionary work. In 1891 he spent four years as chaplain of Sorachishōji prison in Hokkaido under Hara Taneaki, a key figure in Meiji prison reform. There, based on thousands of interviews of prisoners Tomeoka concluded that improper development during childhood resulted in criminal activity. From 1894-1896 he toured prisons and reform institutions in the United States, including the Concord Reformatory in Massachusetts and the Elmira Reformatory Prison in New York.

Upon returning from the US he became a chaplain at the Sugamo Prison outside of Tokyo and in 1899 he opened the first *Katei gakkō* intended for the reform of delinquent children. The goals of the school were to teach strict discipline, industry, and to provide a model for future care of the family. Such juvenile reform institutions later came to be included under the term *kanka kyōiku*. From 1905-1923 he served as an advisor to the Ministry of Education influencing prison and delinquent reform and lecturing extensively at the Home Ministry’s police and prison school. In 1913, Tomeoka returned to Hokkaido where he established the agricultural Family School and attempted to put his vision of social reform, in which delinquent youth would be transformed by acting upon the products of nature, into practice.

**Futabatei Shimei** (1867-1909) is the pen name for Hasegawa Tatsunosuke, best known for his novel, *Ukigumo* [Floating Clouds], which was serialized in two publications from 1887-1889. *Ukigumo* is considered to be one of the first novels of modern realism in the Japanese language, with its literary techniques inspired by Russian literature and a language that introduced accessible prose by borrowing from the vernacular, an effort associated with the *genbunitchi* (literally the union of the spoken and written language) movement. The article by Futabatei included in this volume was published in the journal, *Bunshō sekai*, a year before Futabatei’s death on May 10, 1909, which occurred while he was en route from Russia to Japan.
Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) was a philosopher and cultural historian known especially for developing a system of ethics which emphasizes the interdependence of human beings, as well as for theorizing on the influence of geographic locale and climate on human culture and for “rediscovering” the 13th century founder of the Sōtō school of Zen, Dōgen. Born near present-day Himeji City in Hyōgo Prefecture, Watsuji graduated from the Philosophy Department of Tokyo University in 1912 and soon after published pioneering studies of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in 1913 and 1915, respectively. Throughout his life he wrote prolifically on a wide range of subjects. He served as professor of philosophy at Kyoto University from 1925 until 1934, and at Tokyo University from 1934 until 1949.

Kawakami Hajime (1879-1946) was an economist and social critic who played a key role in introducing Marxism into Japan. Born in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, he graduated from the Law Department of Tokyo University in 1902 and soon after initiated important studies of socialism in 1905. He served as professor of economics at Kyoto University from 1908 until 1928, during which time he began his groundbreaking studies of Marxism in 1919. In 1932 he joined the Communist Party with the commitment to put his ideals into action. In 1933 he was arrested for being a member of this party and imprisoned the next year, but was released in 1937 upon his agreement to refrain from political activity.

Oshita Udaru (1896-1966) was a laboratory researcher by training who turned to writing detective fiction with a scientific flair. Known for works that focus on how the criminal mind emerges from within social structures, Oshita is also recognized as one of the pioneers of Japanese science fiction.

Hasegawa Nyōzekan (1875-1969) was a prolific journalist and a critic, whose career extends over sixty years, covering the Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa eras. His critical writings examined the rapid process of modernization, deeply engaging with a variety of changes brought out through this process in contemporary Japanese society and state. Hasegawa’s attempt to create a forum for social and political criticism became the journal Warera [We] in 1930. His commitment to democratic society led him to write Nihon fashizumu hihan [Critique of Japanese Fascism] in 1932 which was subsequently banned.

Terada Torahiko (1878-1935) was a physicist and professor at Tokyo Imperial University. He was also a haiku poet, and published a number of essays on literature, the arts, and the relationship between everyday life and the natural sciences.
Tosaka Jun (1900-45) began his career at the First Higher School in Tokyo, majoring in the philosophy of science. In 1926, he moved to Kyoto Imperial University and studied under Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime in the philosophy department. He never accepted the metaphysics of his teachers, believing that they underwrote the chauvinistic, nationalist histories of the Japanese right. He broke with the Kyoto School of Philosophy and co-founded the Materialism Research Group (Yuibusturon kenkyūkai) in 1932. "The Principle of Everydayness and Historical Time" (1934) and "A Theory of Space" (1931) form the basis of his philosophical materialism from which he launched a scathing attack on nationalist thought in The Japanese Ideology (1936). Arrested several times in the 1930s and 1940s, Tosaka died in prison on August 9, 1945.